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A(a)-1

NO HARM IN TRYING

Earl Koester finished ninth grade; Mildred Koester graduated from high
schooL Mildred died in 1988 and left almost all of her estate to Earl. Earl
died in 1996 with an estate between $1,000,000 and $1,200,000. The estate
argued that the decedents could have used two exemptions and avoided
estate tax but "their lack of advanced education left them unaware of the
intricacies" of the estate tax, and thus the estate tax deprives the less welleducated of equal protection. Unfortunately, the Koester's had hired a
lawyer to do their planning! The estate lost in the Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit. Estate of Earl C. Koester, T.e. Memo 2002-82; 56 Fed. Appx. 392
(unpublished).

2002 - 2003 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS

A.

INCOME TAX MATTERS
1.

Final Regulations under Section 645. T.D. 9032 (December 23, 2002) sets forth final regulations

on treating revocable trusts as part of an estate for income tax purposes. The executor of an estate and the trustee of
a qualified revocable trust (QRT) may elect under section 645 to treat the trust as part of the estate during the election
period.
Issues arose under the proposed regulations as to what trusts are QRTs. The fmal regulations defme the tenn:
A qualified revocable trust (QRT) is any trust (or portion thereof) that on the date
of death of the decedent was treated as owned by the decedent under section 676
by reason of a power held by the decedent (detennined without regard to section
672(e». A trust that was treated as owned by the decedent under section 676 by
reason of a power that was exercisable by the decedent only with the approval or
consent of a nonadverse party or with the approval or consent of the decedent's
spouse is a QRT. A trust that was treated as owned by the decedent under section
676 solely by reason ofa power held by a nonadverse party or by reason ofa power
held by the decedent's spouse is not a QRT.
The Comments and Explanation discuss the reasons for the second and third sentences ofthe definition above:
Some commentators suggested that, ifthe decedent's power to revoke the trust was
exercisable only with the approval or consent of a nonadverse party, the trust
should qualify as a QRT. Many persons use revocable trusts as property
management tools and, to protect the grantor from improvident decisions or undue
influence, their trust agreements may provide that any revocation ofthe trust by the
grantor will be effective only if consented to by a nonadverse party. The
commentators noted that the prohibition described in the legislative history
addresses trusts in which only a nonadverse party has a power to revoke.
In response to these comments, the final regulations provide that a trust that was
treated as owned by the decedent under section 676 by reason of a power that was
exercisable by the decedent with the consent or approval of a nonadverse party is
a QRT. The final regulations also clarify that while a trust, in which the power to
revoke is held only by the decedenfs spouse and not by the decedent, is not a QRT,
a trust, in which the power to revoke is exercisable by the decedent with the
approval or consent of the decedent's spouse, is a QRT.
Clarification has also been requested regarding whether a trust qualifies as a QRT
if the grantor's power to revoke the trust lapses prior to the grantor's death as a
result ofthe grantor's incapacity. Some trust documents for revocable trusts provide
that the trustee is to disregard the instructions of the grantor to revoke the trust if
the grantor is incapacitated. The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that, if
an agent or legal representative of the grantor can revoke the trust under state law
during the grantor's incapacity, the trust will qualify as a QRT, even if the grantor
is incapacitated on the date of the grantor's death.
Foreign trusts may also make the election, which is a change from the proposed regulation. The Comments and
Explanation discuss the reasons for the change:
The proposed regulations also provide that a QRT must be a domestic trust under
section 770 I(a)(30)(E) and that a section 645 election for a QRT must result in a
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domestic estate under section 770 I(a)(30)(D). Several commentators suggested that
the section 645 election should also be available in situations in which either the
QRT or the related estate, or both, are foreign. According to the commentators,
u.s. citizens living abroad frequently use revocable trusts to avoid jurisdictional
disputes concerning the decedent's assets, as well as the cumbersome probate and
forced heirship rules ofseveral foreign countries. Many ofthe trusts will be foreign
trusts upon the grantorts death and, if a section 645 election is permitted to be
made, will become part of a foreign estate. The commentators questioned the
authority for the domestic restriction provided in the proposed regulations given
that the statute and the legislative history do not explicitly limit the applicability of
a section 645 election to domestic trusts and domestic estates. Upon consideration
of these comments, the requirements that a QRT be a domestic trust and that the
election result in a domestic estate are removed from the final regulations. The IRS
and the Treasury Department note, however, that a trust for which a section 645
election is made is treated as an estate for purposes of Subtitle A of the Code, but
not for purposes of Subtitle F. Accordingly, infonnation reporting under section
6048 will continue to apply with respect to a foreign trust even though a section
645 election has been made to allow the foreign trust to be taxed as part ofan estate
for purposes of Subtitle A of the Code.
The election is made differently depending on whether or not there is an "executor" of the estate. The term
"executor" is defined:
An executor is an executor, personal representative, or administrator that has
obtained letters of appointment to administer the decedent's estate through formal
or informal appointment procedures. * * * If more that one jurisdiction has
appointed an executor, the executor appointed in the domiciliary or primary
proceeding is the executor of the related estate for purposes of this paragraph
(b)(4).
The Comments and Explanation note that:
The definition ofexecutor used in these final regulations, however, is not identical
to the defmition of an executor under section 2203 of the Code: under these final
regulations, a person who has actual or constructive possession of property of the
decedent is not an executor unless that person is also appointed, or qualified as an
executor, administrator, or personal representative of the decedent's estate.
The regulations set forth the following procedure for making the election if there is an executor:
Filing the election if there is an executor -- (i) Time and manner for filing the
election. If there is an executor of the related estate, the trustees of each QRT
joining in the election and the executor ofthe related estate make an election under
section 645 and this section to treat each QRT joining in the election as part of the
related estate for purposes of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code by filing a
form provided by the IRS for making the election (election fonn) properly
completed and signed under penalties ofperjury, or in any other manner prescribed
after December 24,2002 by fonns provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
or by other published guidance for making the election. For the election to be valid,
the election fonn must be filed not later than the time prescribed under section
6072 for filing the Fonn 1041 for the first taxable year of the related estate
(regardless ofwhether there is sufficient income to require the filing ofthat return).
If an extension is granted for the filing of the Fonn 1041 for the first taxable year
of the related estate, the election form will be timely filed if it is filed by the time
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prescribed for filing the Form 1041 including the extension granted with respect
to the Form 1041.
Conditions to election. In addition to providing the information required by the
election form, as a condition to a valid section 645 election, the trustee of each
QRT joining in the election and the executor of the related estate agree, by signing
the election fonn under penalties of perjury, that:
With respect to a trustee -The trustee agrees to the election;
The trustee is responsible for timely providing the executor of the related estate
with all the trust information necessary to pennit the executor to file a complete.,
accurate, and timely Form 1041 for the combined electing trust(s) and related estate
for each taxable year during the election period;
The trustee of each QRT joining the election and the executor of the related estate
have agreed to allocate the tax burden of the combined electing trust(s) and related
estate for each taxable year during the election period in a manner that reasonably
reflects the tax obligations of each electing trust and the related estate; and
The trustee is responsible for insuring that the electing trust's share of the tax
obligations ofthe combined electing trust(s) and related estate is timely paid to the
Secretary.
With respect to the executor -The executor agrees to the election;
The executor is responsible for filing a complete, accurate, and timely Form 1041
for the combined electing trust(s) and related estate for each taxab Ie year during the
election period;
The executor and the trustee of each QRT joining in the election have agreed to
allocate the tax burden ofthe combined electing trust(s) and related estate for each
taxable year during the election period in a manner that reasonably reflects the tax
obligations of each electing trust and the related estate;
The executor is responsible for insuring that the related estate's share of the tax
obligations ofthe combined electing trust(s) and related estate is timely paid to the
Secretary.
Note that the filing time limit is tied to the date of Form 1041 for the estate would be required if the Form 1041
were required. Also note that the trustee and executor must have "agreed" to allocate income taxes in a manner that
reasonably reflects the respective tax obligations.
If there is no executor, the trustee makes the election alone:
Filing the election if there is no executor -- (i) Time and manner for filing the
election. [fthere is no executor for a related estate, an election to treat one or more
QRTs of the decedent as one estate for purposes of subtitle A of the Internal
Revenue Code is made by the trustees ofeach QRTjoining in the election, by filing
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a properly completed election form, or in any other manner prescribed after
December 24,2002 by forms provided by the IRS~ or by other published guidance
for making the election. For the election to be valid, the election fonn must be filed
not later than the time prescribed under section 6072 for filing the Form 1041 for
the first taxable year of the trust, taking into account the trustee's election to treat
the trust as an estate under section 645 (regardless of whether there is sufficient
income to require the filing of that return). If an extension is granted for the filing
of the Fonn 1041 for the first taxable year of the electing trust, the election form
will be timely filed if it is filed by the time prescribed for filing the Form 1041
including the extension granted with respect to the filing of the Fonn 1041.
Conditions to election. In addition to providing the infonnation required by the
election fonn~ as a condition to a valid section 645 election, the trustee of each
QRT joining in the election agrees, by signing the election fonn under penalties of
perjul)'~ thatThe trustee agrees to the election;
If there is more than one QRT joining in the election, the trustees of each QRT
joining in the election have appointed one trustee to be responsible for filing the
Fonn 1041 for the combined electing trusts for each taxable year during the
election period (filing trustee) and the filing trustee has agreed to accept that
responsibility;
If there is more than one QR T~ the trustees of each QRT joining in the election
have agreed to allocate the tax liability of the combined electing trusts for each
taxable year during the election period in a manner that reasonably reflects the tax
obligations of each electing trust;
The trustee agrees to:
Timely file a Form 1041 for the electing trust(s) for each taxable year during the
election period; or
If there is more than one QRT and the trustee is not the filing trustee, timely
provide the filing trustee with all of the electing trust's information necessary to
permit the filing trustee to file a complete, accurate, and timely Form 1041 for the
combined electing trusts for each taxable year during the election period;
Insure that the electing trust's share of the tax burden is timely paid to the
Secretary;
There is no executor and, to the knowledge and belief of the trustee, one will not
be appointed; and
If an executor is appointed after the filing of the election form and the executor
agrees to the section 645 election, the trustee will complete and file a revised
election fonn with the executor.
If there are multiple QRTs, the election may be made for some or all. If there is no executor, the various
trustees must appoint a trustee to file the Forms 1041.
The effect of the election is as follows:
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If there is an executor, the electing trust is treated, during the election period, as
part of the related estate for all purposes of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue
Code. Thus, for example, the electing trust is treated as part ofthe related estate for
purposes of the set-aside deduction under section 642(c)(2), the subchapter S
shareholder requirements of section 1361 (b)( I), and the special offset for rental
real estate activities in section 469(i)(4).

***

I f there is no executor, the trustee treats the electing trust, during the election
period, as an estate for all purposes of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.
Thus, for example, an electing trust is treated as an estate for purposes of the
set-aside deduction under section 642(c)(2), the subchapter S shareholder
requirements of section 1361(b)(I), and the special offset for rental real estate
activities under section 469(i)(4). The trustee may also adopt a taxable year other
than a calendar year.
An important issue is the application of the separate share rules. In this regard, the final regulations state:
Under the separate share rules ofsection 663(c), the electing trust and related estate
are treated as separate shares for purposes of computing distributable net income
(ONI) and applying the distribution provisions of sections 661 and 662. Further,
the electing trust share or the related estate share may each contain two or more
shares. Thus, if during the taxable year, a distribution is made by the electing trust
or the related estate, the ONI of the share making the distribution must be
determined and the distribution provisions ofsections 661 and 662 must be applied
using the separately detennined DNI applicable to the distributing share.
Adjustments to the ONI of the separate shares for distributions between shares to
which sections 661 and 662 would apply. A distribution from one share to another
share to which sections 661 and 662 would apply if made to a beneficiary other
than another share of the combined electing trust and related estate affects the
computation of the DNI of the share making the distribution and the s~are
receiving the distribution. The share making the distribution reduces its ONI by the
amount of the distribution deduction that it would be entitled to under section 661
(determined without regard to section 661(c», had the distribution been made to
another beneficiary, and, solely for purposes of calculating ONI, the share
receiving the distribution increases its gross income by the same amount. The
distribution has the same character in the hands of the recipient share as in the
hands ofthe distributing share. The following example illustrates the provisions of
this paragraph (e)(2)(iii)(B):
There are various filing requirements. In general, the regulations require a TIN be obtained for the QRT.
Further:
Ifa section 645 election will be made for a QRT, the executor of the related estate,
if any, and the trustee of the QRT may treat the QRT as an electing trust from the
decedent's date of death until the due date for the section 645 election.
Accordingly, the trustee of the QRT is not required to file a Form 1041 for the
QRT for the short taxable year beginning with the decedent's date of death and
ending December 31 ofthat year. However, if a QRT is treated as an electing trust
under this paragraph from the decedent's date of death until the due date for the
section 645 election but a valid section 645 election is not made for the QRT, the
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QRT will be subject to penalties and interest for failing to timely file a Form 1041
and pay the tax due thereon.

***
If the trustee of the QRT and the executor of the related estate, if any, do not treat
the QRT as an electing trust as provided under paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section,
or if the trustee of the electing trust and the executor, if any, are uncertain whether
a section 645 election will be made for a QRT, the trustee of the QRT must file a
Form 1041 for the short taxable year beginning with the decedent's death and
ending December 31 of that year (unless the QRT is not required to file a Fonn
1041 under section 6012 for this period).
Requirement to amend Form 1041 if a section 645 election is made -- (1) If there
is an executor. If there is an executor and a valid section 645 election is made for
a QRT after a Fonn 1041 has been filed for the QRT as a trust (see paragraph
(d)(2)(ii)(A) of this section), the trustee must amend the Form 1041. The QRT's
items of income, deduction, and credit must be excluded from the amended Fonn
1041 filed under this paragraph and must be included on the Form 1041 filed for
the first taxable year of the combined electing trust and related estate under
paragraph (e)(2)(ii)(A) of this section.
If there is no executor. If there is no executor and a valid section 645 election is
made for a QRT after a Form 1041 has been filed for the QRT as a trust (see
paragraph (d)(2)(ii)(A) ofthis section) for the short taxable year beginning with the
decedent's death and ending December 3 I of that year, the trustee must file an
amended return for the QRT. The amended return must be filed consistent with
paragraph (e)(3) ofthis section and must be filed by the due date ofthe Fonn 1041
for the QRT, taking into account the trustee's election under section 645.

***
Filing requirements -- (A) Filing the Fonn 1041 for the combined electing trust and
related estate during the election period. If there is an executor, the executor files
a single income tax return annually (assuming a return is required under section
6012) under the name and TIN ofthe relate~ estate for the combined electing trust
and the related estate. Infonnation regarding the name and TIN of each electing
trust must be provided on the Fonn 1041 as required by the instructions to that
fonn. The period of limitations provided in section 650 I for assessments with
respect to an electing trust and the related estate starts with the filing of the return
required under this paragraph. Except as required under the separate share rules of
section 663(c), for purposes of filing the Fonn 1041 under this paragraph and
computing the tax, the items of income, deduction, and credit of the electing trust
and related estate are combined. One personal exemption in the amount of $600 is
pennitted under section 642(b), and the tax is computed under section I(e), taking
into account section l(h), for the combined taxable income.
Filing a Form 1041 for the electing trust is not required. Except for any final Fonn
1041 required to be filed under paragraph (h)(2)(i)(B) of this section, if there is an
executor, the trustee ofthe electing trust does not file a Form 1041 for the electing
trust during the election period. Although the trustee is not required to file a Form
1041 for the electing trust, the trustee ofthe electing trust must timely provide the
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executor of the related estate with all the trust information necessary to pennit the
executor to file a complete, accurate and timely Form 1041 for the combined
electing trust and related estate. The trustee must also insure that the electing trust's
share of the tax obligations of the combined electing trust and related estate is
timely paid to the Secretary. In certain situations, the trustee of a QRT may be
required to file a Form 1041 for the QRTs short taxable year beginning with the
date of the decedent's death and ending December 31 of that year. See paragraph
(d)(2) of this section.

***
Filing the Fonn 1041 for the electing trust. Ifthere is no executor, the trustee ofthe
electing trust must, during the election period, file a Form 1041, under the TIN
'obtained by the trustee under §301.6109-I(a)(3) of this chapter upon the death of
the decedent, treating the trust as an estate. If there is more than one electing trust,
the Form 1041 must be filed by the filing trustee (see paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(B) ofthis
section) under the name and TIN of the electing trust of the filing trustee.
Information regarding the names and TINs of the other electing trusts must be
provided on the Ponn 1041 as required by the instructions to that form. Any return
filed in accordance with this paragraph shall be treated as a return filed for the
electing trust (or trusts, ifthere is more than one electing trust) and not as a return
filed for any subsequently discovered related estate. Accordingly, the period of
limitations provided in section 650 I for assessments with respect to a subsequently
discovered related estate does not start until a return is filed with respect to the
related estate. See paragraph (g) of this section.
The QRT is relieved of the obligation to make estimated tax payments for two-years, as with an estate:
Application of the section 6654(1)(2) to the electing trust. Each electing trust and
related estate (if any) is treated as a separate taxpayer for all purposes of subtitle
F of the Internal Revenue Code, including, without limitation, the application of
section 6654. The provisions of section 6654(1)(2)(A) relating to the two year
exception to an estate's obligation to make estimated tax payments, however, will
apply to each electing trust for which a section 645 election has been made.
Once made, the election is irrevocable. The regulations provide:
Duration ofelection period -- (1) In general. The election period begins on the date
of the decedent's death and tenninates on the earlier of the day on which both the
electing trust and related estate, if any, have distributed all of their assets, or the
day before the applicable date. The election does not apply to successor trusts
(trusts that are distributees under the trust instrument).
Definition of applicable date -- (i) Applicable date if no Form 706 "United States
Estate (and Generation Skipping Transfer) Tax Return" is required to be filed. If
a Form 706 is not required to be filed as a result of the decedent's death, the
applicable date is the day which is 2 years after the date of the decedent's death.
Applicable date if a Form 706 is required to be filed. If a Form 706 is required to
be filed as a result ofthe decedent's death, the applicable date is the later ofthe day
that is 2 years after the date ofthe decedent's death, or the day that is 6 months after
the date of final detennination of liability for estate tax. Solely for purposes of
determining the applicable date under section 645, the date of final detennination
of liability is the earliest of the following --
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The date that is six months after the issuance by the Internal Revenue Service of
an estate tax closing letter, unless a claim for refund with respect to the estate tax
is filed within twelve months after the issuance of the letter;
The date of a final. disposition of a claim for refund, as defined in paragraph
(f)(2)(iii) of this section, that resolves the liability for the estate tax, unless suit is
instituted within six months after a final disposition of the claim;
The date ofexecution of a settlement agreement with the Internal Revenue Service
that determines the liability for the estate tax;
The date of issuance of a decision, judgment, decree, or other order by a court of
competent jurisdiction resolving the liability for the estate tax unless a notice of
appeal or a petition for certiorari is filed within 90 days after the issuance of a
decision, judgment, decree, or other order of a court; or
The date of expiration of the period of limitations for assessment ofthe estate tax
provided in section 6501.
Defmition or" fmal disposition of claim for refund4 For purposes of paragraph
(f)(2)(ii)(B) of this section, a claim for refund shall be deemed fmally disposed of
by the Secretary when all items have been either allowed or disallowed. Ifa waiver
of notification with respect to disallowance is filed with respect to a claim for
refund prior to disallowance of the claim, the claim for refund will be treated as
disallowed on the date the waiver is filed.
After the electing period expires the trust is deemed to have been distributed:
The share (or shares) comprising the electing trust is deemed to be distributed upon
termination of the election period. On the close of the last day of the election
period, the combined electing trust and related estate, ifthere is an executor, or the
electing trust, if there is no executor, is deemed to distribute the share (or shares,
as detennined under section 663(c)) comprising the electing trust to a new trust in
a distribution to which sections 661 and 662 apply. All items of income, including
net capital gains, that are attributable to the share (or shares) comprising the
electing trust are included in the calculation of the distributable net income of the
electing trust and treated as distributed by the combined electing trust and related
estate, ifthere is an executor, or by the electing trust, if there is no executor, to the
new trust. The combined electing trust and related estate, ifthere is an executor, or
the electing trust, if there is no executor, is entitled to a distribution deduction to
the extent pennitted under section 661 in the taxable year in which the election
period tenninates as a result ofthe deemed distribution. The new trust shall include
the amount ofthe deemed distribution in gross income to the extent required under
section 662.
Filing of the Form 1041 upon the termination of the section 645 election -- (i) If
there is an executor-- (A) Filing the Fonn 1041 for the year oftennination4 Ifthere
is an executor, the Form 1041 filed under the name and TIN of the related estate
for the taxable year in which the election terminates includes -The items of income, deduction, and credit of the electing trust attributable to the
period beginning with the first day of the taxable year of the combined electing
trust and related estate and ending with the last day of the election period;
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The items of income, deduction, and credit, if any, of the related estate for the
entire taxable year; and
A deduction for the deemed distribution of the share (or shares) comprising the
electing trust to the new trust as provided for under paragraph (h)( I) ofthis section.
Requirement to file a fmal Form 1041 under the name and TIN ofthe electing trust.
Ifthe electing trust terminates during the election period, the trustee ofthe electing
trust must file a Fonn 1041 under the name and TIN of the electing trust and
indicate that the return is a final return to notify the IRS that the electing trust is no
longer in existence. The items of income, deduction, and credit of the trust are not
reported on this fmal Form 1041 but on the appropriate Form 1041 filed for the
combined electing trust and related estate.
If there is no executor. Ifthere is no executor, the taxable year of the electing trust
closes on the last day of the election period. A Fonn 1041 is filed in the manner
prescribed under paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of this section reporting the items of income,
deduction, and credit of the electing trust for the short period ending with the last
day of the election period. The Form 1041 filed under this paragraph includes a
distribution deduction for the deemed distribution provided for under paragraph
(h)(I) of this section. The Form 1041 must indicate that it is a final return.
Use of TINs following termination of the election -- (i) If there is an executor.
Upon termination of the section 645 election, a former electing trust may need to
obtain a new TIN. See §301.6109-I(a)(4) of this chapter. If the related estate
continues after the termination of the election period, the related estate must
continue to use the TIN assigned to the estate during the election period.
If there is no executor. Ifthere is no executor, the former electing trust must obtain
a new TIN ifthe trust will continue after the termination ofthe election period. See
§301.6109-1(a)(4) of this chapter.
Taxable year of estate and trust upon termination of the election -- (i) Estate -Upon tennination of the section 645 election period, the taxable year of the estate
is the same taxable year used during the election period.
Trust. Upon termination of the section 645 election, the taxable year of the new
trust is the calendar year. See section 644.
Finally, various changes are made to the grantor trust reporting rules under § 1.671-4. The Comments and
Explanation state:
The proposed regulations amend § 1.671-4 to clarify that a trust, or portion of a
trust, reports under § 1.671-4 for the taxable year that ends with the death of the
grantor or other person (decedent) treated as the owner of the trust. Ifthe trust was
filing a Fonn 1041 under § 1.671-4(a) during the life of the decedent, the due date
of the Fonn 1041 for the taxable year ending with the decedenfs death is specified
in §1.6072-1(a)(2). Proposed §1.6072-1(a)(2) provides that the due date for the
Form 1041 for the taxable year ending with the death of the decedent is the
fifteenth day ofthe fourth month following the close ofthe 12- month period which
began with the frrst day of such fractional part of the year. The final regulations
under §1.6072-1 (a)(2) are revised to provide that the due date for the F OITIl 1041
filed for the taxable year ending with the decedent's death is the fifteenth day of the
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fourth month following the close of the 12-month period that began with the first
day of the decedent's last taxable year.
Section 301.6109-1 (a)(3) of the proposed regulations provides that a trust, aU of
which was treated as owned by the decedent, must obtain a new TIN upon the
death of the decedent, if the trust will continue after the decedent's death. One
commentator asked if this provision is intended to apply to an "administrative
trust." Section 1.641 (b)-3 recognizes that a trust does not automatically terminate
upon the happening of the event by which the duration of the trust is measured. A
reasonable period of time is pennitted after such event for the trustee to perfonn
the duties necessary to complete the administration of the trust. Section
301.6109-1(a)(3) is intended to clarify that a trust must obtain a new TIN after the
death 0 f the decedent, if a trust that was treated as owned by the decedent during
the decedent's life will continue for a period of time following the death of the
decedent to allow a winding up ofthe affairs ofthe trust following the death of the
decedent.
For administrative convenience, the proposed regulations provide that ifa decedent
and others are treated as the owners of a trust and following the decedent's death
the decedent's portion remains in the trust, the trust continues to report under the
TIN used by the trust prior to the death ofthe decedent. Commentators found this
provision confusing and asked for clarification. The final regulations clarify that
this provision applies to a trust that has multiple grantors (or other persons treated
as the owners) that must report under § 1.671-4(a) after the death of the decedent
because, although a portion of the trust continues to be treated as owned by a
grantor or another person, the decedent's portion ofthe trust is no longer treated as
owned by the decedent upon his death. The final regulations provide an example
of a situation in which this provision applies.
2.

Self-Employment Tax; Application in Trust Context. In TAM 20030500 I the IRS considered

QTIP and credit shelter trusts with wife as sole trustee, and in TAM 200305002 a "testamentary trust" with wife and
son as co-trustees. The QTIP and credit shelter trusts were managed by wife alone. The testamentary trust owned a
fann and paid the son a fee for managing the fann and wife a fee for maintaining the books and records. The TAMs
state:
Internal Revenue Code section 1402(a) generally defmes net earnings from
self-employment as "the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or
business carried on by such individual, less deductions allowed by this subtitle
which are attributable to such trade or business, plus his distributive share (whether
or not distributed) of income or loss described in section 702(a)(8) from any trade
or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member,ff with certain
exceptions that are not applicable here. Section 1.1402(a)-2(b) of the Income Tax
Regulations provides that a trade or business must be carried on by the individual,
either personally or through agents or employees. The regulation further provides
"[a]ccordingly, income derived from a trade or business carried on by an estate or
trust is not included in determining the net earnings from self-employment of the
individual beneficiaries of such estate or trust.
ft

When the employment-tax provisions were enacted, the Congressional committee
reports provided:
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The trade or business must be carried on by the individual, either
personally or through agents or employees, in order for the income to be
included in his net earnings form self-employment Accordingly, gross
income derived by an individual from a trade or business carried on by
him does not include income derived by a beneficiary from an estate or
trust even though such income is derived from a trade or business carried
on by the estate or trust.
S. Rep. No. 1669, 8Ist Cong., 2ndSess. 155 (1950), 1950-2C.B. 354.
The requirement that income, for purposes of section 1402 of the Code, must be
from the trade or business carried on by the individual is illustrated in Rev. Rul.
59-162, 1959-1 C.B. 224. The example in the revenue ruling involves distribution
of an insurance renewal commission. Under the terms of a contract between the
husband and his insurance company, following the death of the husband, the
insurance renewal commission earned by the husband would be paid to the wife.
Although the insurance ren.ewals would be net earnings from self-employment for
the husband, the ruling found that the insurance renewals would not be considered
net earnings from self-employment for the widow because they were not derived
by a trade or busi.ness carried on by her. See also, Rev. Rul. 59-168, 1959-1 C.B.
625.
The TAMs determine that the trusts are not a "business trust" to be disregarded and then state:
Wife and Son were paid by the Trust for services that they each performed for the
Trust as part of his or her trade or business. Income that Wife and Son received
from the Trust as beneficiaries is separate from any payments Wife and Son should
receive for the performance of services as part of a trade or business on behalf of
the Trust, as an owner of the Farm.
Although we have found that the Trust qualifies as a trust under § 301.7701-4(a),
there could be an issue of whether the Wife and Son received adequate payments
for the services they performed for the Trust as part of a trade or business. In this
regard, we suggest that a detennination be made as to whether the Wife and Son
received payments that were reasonable and ofsufficient amount for services they
provided on behalf of the Trust as part of a trade or business.

3.

Application ofCottage Savings to Trust Reformation. An issue that has become prominent in the.

last several years is he income tax consequences oftrust reformation and divisions. PLR 20023 10 II discusses the issue
in detail. The background was summarized in the ruling:
Section 1.10 14-5(b) provides that in determining gain or loss from the sale or other
disposition after October 9, 1969, of a term interest in property (as defined in §
1.100 1-1(f)(2» the adjusted basis ofwhich is determined pursuant, or by reference,
to § 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent) or § 1015
(relating to the basis of property acquired by gift or by a transfer in trust), that part
of the adjusted uniform basis assignable under the rules of § 1014-5(a) to the
interest sold or otherwise disposed of shall be disregarded to the extent and in the
manner provided by § IOOI(e) and paragraph (f) of § 1.1001-1.

***
Section 1001 (e)( I) provides that in determining gain or loss from the sale or
disposition of a term interest in property, that portion of the adjusted basis of such
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interest which is determined pursuant to §§ 1014, 1015, or 1041 (to the extent that
such adjusted basis is a portion of the entire adjusted basis of the property) shall
be disregarded. Under § lOOI(e)(2), a "term interest in property" includes an
income interest in a trust. Section 1001 (e)(3) provides that the general rule of §
1001 (e)( 1) does not apply to a sale or other disposition which is a part of a
transaction in which the entire interest in property is transferred to any person or
persons.
Section 1.100 I-I (a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that, except as
otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the
conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other
property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as
loss sustained.
Section 1.1001-1 (f)( I) provides that for purposes of determining the gain or loss
from the sale or other disposition ofa term interest in property, a taxpayer shall not
take into account that portion of the adjusted basis of such interest, which is
determined pursuant to § 1014 of the Code, to the extent that such adjusted basis
is a portion of the adjusted unifonn basis of the entire property, as defined in §
1.1014-5.

***
An exchange of property results in the realization of gain or loss under § 1001 if
the properties exchanged are materially different. Cottage Savings Association v.
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991 ). Properties exchanged are materially different
if properties embody legal entitlements different in kind or extent" or if the
properties confer "different rights and powers." Id. at 565. In Cottage Savings, the
Court held that mortgage loans made to different obligors and secured by different
homes did embody distinct legal entitlements, and that the taxpayer realized losses
when it exchanged interests in the loans. Id. at 566. In defming what constitutes a
"material difference" for purposes of § 100 I(a), the Court stated that properties are
"different" in the sense that is "material" to the Code so long as their respective
possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent. Id. at
564-65.
11

The application of § 100 I(a) to trust interests is illustrated by two cases. In Evans
v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 798 (1958), the taxpayer exchanged her income interest
in a trust for an annuity, and the court concluded that this was a realization event.
Taxpayer's income interest had entitled her to dividends paid by a corporation, the
stock of which was owned by the trust. She transferred the income interest to her
husband, who agreed in exchange to pay her fixed sums annually until her death.
A contrary result was reached in Silverstein v. United States, 419 F.2d 999 (7th
Cir. 1969). In that case, the taxpayer exchanged an interest in a trust for a right to
specified annual payments from the remainderman of the trust, and the court held
that taxpayer did not as a result dispose of her trust interest. After the transaction,
taxpayer was to receive the same annual payments from the remainderman as she
had been receiving from the trust. The court distinguished the transaction from that
found to be a realization event in Evans: "the amount of Mrs. Evans' interest in the
trust was not definitive. It varied with the dividend return on the trust stock. She
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exchanged this 'uncertainty' for definitely ascertained yearly payments from her
husband." 419 F.2d. at 1003.
The facts of the ruling were that a trust that was to pay certain amounts to "grandson" for life and then
4istribute the remainder to various charities was converted into a trust for grandson only with the charities being paid
off now. The ruling described the trust:
BEFORE
Decedent died testate on Date 1, prior to 1985. Pursuant to the tenns of Decedent's
will, a residuary testamentary trust (Trust), was established primarily for the benefit
of Decedent's grandson (Grandson). Under the tenus of Trust, Grandson was to
receive S dollars each year during his life. Upon Grandson's death, the corpus was
to be distributed as follows: 1/3 to Charity 1; 1/3 to Charity 2; 1/6 to Charity 3; and
1/6 to Charity 4. The terms of Trust provide that no beneficiary could alienate or
encumber his/her interest in the income or principal and no beneficiary's interest
was subject to claims of his/her creditors prior to distribution. Trust was funded
with stock of Corporation with an approximate value of X dollars.
In Year 1, pursuant to a court order, the investments ofTrust were restructured and
the dispositive provisions of Trust were modified to provide or annual income
distributions to Grandson in accordance with a Performance Chart. The order
required distributions to Grandson of an amount equal to the lesser of the
maximum income amount set forth in the Performance Chart or the actual net
income of Trust. Grandson was guaranteed a minimum income amount even if
actual Trust income was less than that minimum income amount. Thus, if earnings
of Trust are sufficient, Grandson would receive more than the minimum stated
amounts each accounting period. In addition, Charities 1, 2, 3 and 4 received a
lump sum payment. Upon Grandson's death, the remaining corpus was to be
distributed to the Charity 1, Charity 2, Charity 3, and Charity 4 (or their successors)
in the same proportion as set forth in Trust.
AFTER

Under the terms of the proposed agreement, corpus of Trust in excess of Z dollars
will be distributed immediately to Charity 1, Charity 2, Charity J, and Charity 4 (or
their successors) in the same proportion of their current remainder interests in
Trust. Upon distribution, the charities' interest in Trust will terminate. The
remaining assets of Trust will continue in trust for the benefit of Grandson.
Grandson will receive at least annually an amount equal to seven percent ofthe net
fair market value of the property held in Trust determined on a specified date in
each calendar year. In addition, the trustee may distribute income or principal to
provide adequately for the reasonable support of Grandson. On Grandson's death,
the remaining corpus will be distributed pursuant to Grandson's exercise of a
testamentary general power to appoint the remaining corpus to anyone, including
his estate or the creditors of his estate. Any portion of the Trust not effectively
appointed by the exercise this power will be distributed to Grandson's surviving
descendants free of trust.
The IRS determined that gain would be recognized:
The proposed trust modification in this case more closely resembles the situation
in Evans than that in Silverstein and should be considered a realization event.

A - 13

Grandson currently is entitled to trust income, subject to a floor and a ceiling.
Under the proposed order, he would become entitled to annual payments ofseven
percent of the fair market value of the trust property, with the trustee having some
discretion to make additional payments under certain circumstances. Even
assuming that the projected payments under the proposed order approximate those
that would be made under the current tenus of the trust, under the proposed order
Grandson would lose the protection of the guaranteed minimum annual payments
required by the Perfonnance Chart. He also would not be limited by the
Perfonnance Chart's maximum annual payment ceilings. Finally, payments would
be determined without regard to trust income. In short, Grandson's interest in the
modified trust would entail legal entitlements different from those he currently
possesses. This conclusion is reinforced by adding to the Taxpayer's current
entitlement the general power of appointment over any trust corpus, even though
this was a necessary element in a favorable GST conclusion set forth in issue # 3,
below.
The trust at issue was apparently not a charitable remainder trust. FLIP charitable remainder trusts are now
authorized, and in the year 2000 a safe-harbor was created to convert some old charitable remainder trusts to FLIPs.
Is there a principled difference between those facts and these? The possibility ofincome recognition must be considered
in other situations; for example, where income and remainder beneficiaries, unable to agree on how a trust may be
administered, desire to terminate the trust in whole or part.
4.

Passive Activity Losses in Trusts. At issue - fmally! - in Mattie K. Carter, et al. v. United States,

91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1946, was whether a "trust" or a "trustee" must be active in order for a loss in the trust to avoid
being passive. The opinion recited the statute:
IRS could disallow the losses only if they represented a "passive activity loss"
within the meaning of I.R.C. §469(a):
(I) In general. -- If for any taxable year the taxpayer is described in
paragraph (2), neither -(A) the passive activity loss, nor
(B) the passive activity credit, for the taxable year shall be
allowed.
I.R.C. §469(a)(I). A "passive activity" is an activity "(A) which involves the
conduct 0 f any trade or business, and (B) in which the taxpayer does not materially
participate. Id. §469(c)( 1). IRS acknowledges that the ranch operations constitute
a business. The statute defmes "taxpayer" as:
If

(2) Persons described. -- The following are described in this paragraph:
(A)

any individual, estate, or trust,

(B)

any closely held C corporation, and

(C)

any personal service corporation.

***
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In pertinent part, section 469(h) defines "material participation" by a taxpayer in
a business activity as follows:
(1) In general. -- A taxpayer shall be treated as materially participating in
an activity only ifthe taxpayer is involved in the operations ofthe activity
on a basis which is -(A) regular,
(B) continuous, and
(C) substantial.
I.R.C. §469(h)(I).
The facts before the court were simple:
Carter Trust is a testamentary trust established in 1956 under the Last Will and
Testament of Mattie K. Carter, deceased. Fortson has been the trustee of Carter
Trust since 1984, and manages its assets, including the Carter Ranch Ctranch t1 ) ,
which has been operated by Carter Trust since 1956. 1
The ranch covers some 15,000 acres, and is used for a cattle ranching operations
and for oil and gas interests.' Fortson, Jr. DecL ~ 2. In 1994, there were
approximately 4,700 head of cattle on the ranch; there were approximately 3,300
head of cattle on the ranch in 1995. Id ~~ 9-10. At the relevant times, Carter Trust
employed'a full-time ranch manager and other full- and part- time employees who
perfonned essentially all of the activities for the ranch. The ranch manager in 1994
and 1995 was David Rohn ('tRohn"), who managed the ranch's day-to-day
operations, subject to Fortsonts approval. Id. ~ 7. Rohn was "charged with overall
management of livestock production and the management and conservation of
pasture lands, as well as the supervision and direction ofthe other employees ofthe
Trust involved in the Ranch operations. tt Id. ~ 8.
Fortson, as trustee of Carter Trust, dedicated a substantial amount of time and
attention to ranch activities:

4.
I was chosen to be Trustee because of my extensive business, managerial,
and financial experience. My duties include reviewing and approving all financial
and operating proposals for the Ranch and the Trust, budget and budgeting for the
Ranch, all investment decisions for the Trust, asset acquisition and sales,
supervising all employees and agents ofthe Trust and the Trustts service providers,
reviewing all financial information, and responsibility for all banking relationships
of the Trust. My duties and responsibilities as Trustee routinely require a
significant percentage of my time and attention, and I maintain regular office hours
.during which I am consulted regarding any Trust matter that a~ises.

7.
I have delegated certain aspects of the operation and management of the
Ranch. It was necessary for the Ranch to employ someone with extensive
experience in the management and operation of a large, active cattle ranch....
Now, the Trust employs a full-time ranch manager, who is responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the Ranch, subject to my approval
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8.
I routinely discuss management issues pertaining to the Ranch with the
ranch manager....

12.
I have also ~elegated oversight responsibility for the Ranch to Benjamin
J. Fortson III. Mr. Fortson III is a beneficiary of the Trust and takes a very active,
hands-on role in supervising the Ranch manager and general Ranch operations. He
spent well in excess of 500 hours engaged in Ranch operations and management
at the Ranch in both tax years 1994 and 1995.
Id. ~~ 4, 7-8, 12. In this way, Fortson, Rohn, and other employees operated the
ranch on behalf of Carter Trust.
The opinion states the claims of the parties:
The question arises as to how to determine whether Carter Trust materially
participated in the ranch operations. IRS takes the position that the material
participation of a trust in a business should be made by reference only to the
trustee's activities. See, e.g., Br. to IRS Mot. at 8. Carter Trust counters that, as a
legal entity, it can "participate in an activity only through the actions of its
fiduciaries, employees, and agents, n and that through such collective efforts, its
cattle ranching operations during 1994 and 1995 were regular, continuous, and
substantial. Am. Br. to Carter Trust Mot. at 17.
The Court concluded the trust must actively participate:
As discussed above, section 469 says that a trust is a taxpayer, I.R.C.
§469(a)(2)(A), and that a taxp<;lyer is treated as materially participating in a
business if its activities in pursuit of that business are regular, continuous, and
substantial, id. §469(h)(1). It is undisputed that Carter Trust, not Fortson, is the
taxpayer. Common sense dictates that the participation of Carter Trust in the ranch
operations should be scrutinized by reference to the trust itself, which necessarily
entails an assessment ofthe activities ofthose who labor on the ranch, or otherwise
in furtherance of the ranch business, on behalf of Carter Trust Cf. Fojtik v. First
Nat'l Bank, 752 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. App. -- Corpus Christi 1988) (explaining
that "the acts of a corporation's agents are deemed to be acts of the corporation
itself'), writ denied per curiam, 775 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1989).3
IRS' contention that Carter Trust's participation in the ranch operations should be
measured by reference to Fortson finds no support within the plain meaning ofthe
statute. Such a contention is arbitrary, subverts common sense, and attempts to
create ambiguity where there is none. The court recognizes that IRS has not issued
regulations that address a trust's participation in a business, see, e.g., Am. Br. to
Carter Trust Mot. at 16-17, 20; Br. to IRS Mot at 7, and that no case law bears on
the issue. However, the absence of regulations and case law does not manufacture
statutory amQiguity. The court has studied the snippet of legislative history IRS
supplied that purports to lend insight on how Congress intended section 469 to
apply to a trust's participation in a business.4 Nevertheless, the court only resorts
to legislative history where the statutory language is unclear, see Stockwell v.
Comm'r, 736 F.2d 1051, 1053 (5th Cir. 1984), which, as noted above, is not the
case here.
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The court concludes that the material participation of Carter Trust in the ranch
operations should be detennined by reference to the persons who conducted the
business of the ranch on Carter Trust's behalf, including Fortson. The summary
judgment evidence makes clear that the collective activities of those persons with
relation to the ranch operations during relevant times were regular, continuous, and
substantial so as to constitute material participation.
Alternatively, the court concludes that, based on the undisputed summaryjudgment
evidence, Fortson's activities with regard to the ranch operations, standing alone,
were regular, continuous, and substantial so as to constitute material participation
by him, as trustee, during relevant times. Consequently, even if the court were to
accept the legal standard articulated by IRS, through counsel, during the April 3,
2003, telephone hearing, Carter Trust would prevail under the summaryjudgment
record.
The case is favorable for taxpayers on an issue that has been unresolved since the passive activity rules were
enacted.

B.

CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS - Sections 170, 642, 664, 501, 509, 2055, 2522, and
4940-4947
1.

Making Changes to a Charitable Remainder Trust. In PLR 200127023 the Service explained the

income tax consequences of the early termination of a CRT, and determined there was no self-dealing. The trust was
for a 20 year tenn and the donor/unitrust recipient ("A"), trustee, and charitable beneficiary each agreed to terminate
the trust and divide the trust assets actuarially. The ruling states:
Accordingly, we conclude as follows: A is selling A's interest in Trust to the
remaindennan. Provided that the money and other property received by A are
distributed to A in accordance with A's interest in Trust, the amount A will realize
from the sale of A's interest in Trust is the amount of money and the fair market
value of the property received by A.
Pursuant to section 1001 (e)( I ), the portion of the adjusted unifonn basis assigned
to A's interest in Trust is disregarded. The exception contained in section
100 I(e)(3) is not applicable, because the entire interest in Trust's assets is not being
sold, or otherwise disposed of, to a third party. Accordingly, for purposes of this
transaction, A has no basis in A's interest in Trust. Therefore, the amount of gain
A must recognize under section 100 I(c) is the amount A realized from the
disposition of A's interest in Trust The gain realized by A from the disposition of
A's interest will be long term capital gain.
We further conclude that no act of self-dealing, as defined in section 4941 (d)( 1)
will result from the termination of Trust and the distribution of the assets of Trust
to A and the charity.
The above conclusions are based on the assumptions that the proposed tennination
of Trust is not prohibited by state law; that the proposed termination will be made
pursuant to a court order resulting from a proceeding to which the state attorney
general is a party; and that the amounts distributed to A are determined and
distributed pursuant to the valuation rules set forth in section 7520. This ruling is
also contingent on the fact that any distribution of assets in kind is made in a pro
rata manner.
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PLR 200208039 allowed tennination of a net income CRUT where the donor had died and a child ofthe donor
was the only remaining unitrust beneficiary. The CRUT was invested for total return and had typically paid out less
than 3% of net fair market value. The remaindennen consented. Could the CRUT have been terminated ifanyone had
the power to change the charitable remainderman?
If a charitable remainder trust is to be partially terminated and a portion of the trust distributed to charity, the
unitrust recipient may be entitled to an income tax deduction so long as the transaction is not deemed to be an end-run
around the split-interest rules. See, e.g.., 200140027.
In PLR 200301020 the IRS allowed a joint and survivor CRT to be divided as part of a divorce settlement.
The original trust provided for unitrust payments to the spouse jointly and then to the survivor, the survivor could alter
the identity ofthe charitable remaindermen, and the spouses were co-trustees. One of the new trusts would be frrst for
husband, then wife, with husband as trustee, wife as successor, and with husband having the power to alter the charitable
remaindermen. The second trust would have wife in the lead position, but otherwise would be identical to the frrst trust.
The ruling confrrms that no gain would be recognized on the division, that there is no self-dealing, and that the new
trusts qualify under section 664. Also, the trust could pay the legal fees for the division.
PLR 200219012 allowed the recission of a CRT where the donors had been misled, had obtained no benefit
from the charitable gift, filed amended income tax returns, and had a court approve the recission. The ruling states:
In the instant case, based on the representations made and statements contained in
the pleadings submitted to the court., the Donors were misinformed regarding the
operation of Charitable Trust as drafted and the requirement that the unitrust
amount became payable immediately upon execution of Charitable Trust. In view
of the nature of the assets transferred to Charitable Trust (non-income producing
stock) and Donor's understanding that no unitrust payment would be made until the
stock was sold., it appears that the scrivener intended to draft and the Donors
intended to execute a charitable remainder trust described in §§ 664(d)(3)., rather
than one described in §§ 664(d)(2). Further, Donors were incorrectly informed
regarding the tax consequences if Charitable Trust distributed assets in kind in
satisfaction of the unitrust amount.
As noted above, in an attempt to reverse the income tax charitable deductions
claimed by the Donors on the original income tax returns., Donors filed amended
income tax returns on Date 6 and paid the additional tax due. However, also as
noted above, because the period of limitations on assessment for Donors' income
tax return filed on Date 2 has expired, the Donors made a statutory overpayment
for the year in which Charitable Trust was created and funded and the Donors may
make a claim for a refund of the additional tax paid for that year. The remaining
assets of Charitable Trust were returned to Donors pursuant to the court order
issued on Date 5. Traditionally, the tax benefit rule requires taxpayers to recognize
income when the taxpayers "recover" an item or amount deducted in a previous tax
year. Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). The rule is
also applicable in cases involving charitable deductions and provides that if a
taxpayer receives a deduction for a charitable contribution in one taxable year and
recoups that donation in a later year, the value ofthe contribution, up to the amount
of the charitable contribution previously'taken, is treated as income in the year in
which it was recouped. Rosen v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1980),
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anffg 71 T.C. 226 (1978). It is irrelevant that the deduction taken in the prior year
may have been improper or that the period of limitations on assessment has expired
for the year in which the deduction was claimed. Unvert v. Commissioner, 656
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, the amolUlt ofthe charitable deduction, $B, claimed
by Donors on their income tax return filed on Date 2, for the present value of the
remainder interest in the stock of Corporation transferred to Charitable Trust, will
be includible in the Donors income for the year in which the remaining assets of
Charitable Trust were returned to the Donors. Donors have represented that they
will· timely file an amended United States Individual Income Tax Return, Fonn
I040X, for that year reporting the value of the stock up to $B, the value of the
contribution claimed by Donors on their income tax return filed on Date 2.
However, the amended income tax return filed for the year following the year of
the transfer, in which the excess charitable deduction was claimed and the
additional tax was paid, was filed within three years after Date 3, the date of the
original return. Thus, the additional tax was paid for that year, which negated the
charitable deduction claimed in that year for the transfer to Charitable Trust and,
as to that year, the parties are in the same position that they would have been in if
Charitable Trust had never been created.
Because of the application of the tax benefit rule for the year in which the transfer
was made to Charitable Trust, the filing of the amended tax income return and
payment ofadditional tax for the year following the transfer to Charitable Trust and
the fact that Charitable Trust had no income, either ordinary or capital gains, and
the Corporation paid no dividends from Date I until the date of the court order
granting rescission, all parties are in the same position that they would have been
in if Charitable Trust had never been created. Further, the court order rescinding
Charitable Trust is consistent with applicable state law.
Accordingly, we conclude that the rescission will be recognized for federal tax
purposes as effective as of the date Charitable Trust was created.
In PLR 200251010 the donors intended to create a CRUT but their attorney drafted a eRAT instead. The
synopsis received by the client had the correct unitrust payment schedule - quarterly - instead of annual annuity
payments as set forth in the document Upon discovery by the tax preparer ~judicial reformation was undertaken. The
IRS approved the trust as reformed, retroactive to the funding of the trust (assets had been. sold). Similarly, in PLR
200244011 the IRS allowed a NIMCRUT to be reformed judicially to create a CRUT. The grantor was a co-trustee;
the grantor and other trustee each stated they believed the grantor's attorney had created a CRUT and would not have
"signed" otherwise. The trust had been administered as a CRUT.
2.

Assignment of Interest in Exchange for a Gift Annuity.

PLR 200152018 considered the

consequences of a donor/beneficiary of a charitable remainder unitrust assigning the unitrust interest in exchange for
a gift annuity. The Service ruled as follows:
1. For the year in which Taxpayer transfers the entire balance of his unitrust
interest to Academy, Taxpayer will be entitled to a charitable income tax deduction
under §§ I70(a)( 1) ofthe Internal Revenue Code, to the extent the date of transfer
present value of Taxpayer's unitrust interest exceeds the date of transfer present
value of the annuity payments to be made by Academy to Taxpayer.
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In addition, with respect to the income tax consequences of the transfer, the Service ruled:
2. For the year in which Taxpayer transfers the entire balance of his unitrust
interest to Academy, Taxpayer will be entitled to a charitable gift tax deduction
under §§ 2522(a), to the extent the date of transfer present value of Taxpayer's
unitrust interest exceeds the date of transfer present value of the annuity payments
to be made by Academy to Taxpayer.

3. To the extent that Trust realized capital gains income that was not included in the
unitrust amounts paid to, and recognized by, Taxpayer in prior years, Taxpayer's
transfer ofhis unitrust interest to Academy will not cause that capital gains income
to be included in Taxpayer's gross income for the taxable year of the transfer.
The taxpayer stipulated that the creation of the trust, and this transfer, were not an effort to avoid the section
170(f)(3)(A) partial interest rule.
In PLR 200230018 the IRS allowed an IRA distribution to fund a gift annuity. A decedenfs IRA would be
paid to the charity and an annuitant would receive an annuity. The annuitant's "investment in the contract" would be
the value of the proceeds less the estate tax charitable deduction. The charity would have no income tax or unrelated
business income on account of receiving the IRA or issuing the annuity4

3.

Unitrust Interest Included in Bankruptcy Estate. The

U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Minnesota

detennined that the unitrust interest retained by the creator of a charitable remainder trust was properly an asset of the
bankruptcy estate in In Re Mack, 269 B.R. 292 (2002). The opinion summarized its holding as follows:
Basically, the Defendants contend that this court should interpret section 664 and
the regulations, or alternatively Minnesota Statute section 50 I B.32, as creating a
new fonn of unlimited exemption from creditor attack for the settlor's retained
noncharitable interest in a self settled trust. Congress did create such a new fonn
of exemption in ERISA but its purpose in doing so was to increase retirement
savings and accordingly it was necessary to protect such savings from attack by
creditors. The same public policy reasons do not apply here. Whether the Debtor
can or cannot protect the income stream of a noncharitable recipient is of no
consequence to the purpose of encouraging the fonnation of CRUTs, that is
charitable giving. Nothing said in this opinion will in any way impact on the
charitable remainder of the CRUT and there is a total disconnect between
protecting the charitable and noncharitable interests.
The court concluded that the assignment ofthe unitrust interest would not affect the CRUT's tax-exempt status.
The Minnesota statute referred to by the court is a general "savings statute" prohibiting the trustee from violating any

of the private foundation restrictions that apply to charitable remainder trusts.

4.

Payments from Charitable Remainder Trust to Disability Trust. In Rev. Rut. 2002-20,2002-17

I.R.S. 794, the IRS set forth three situations in which payments from a charitable remainder trust may be made for the
life ofa person who is "financially disabled" to a trust for such person. Previously, such arrangements had been limited
to term of years charitable remainder trusts, thus this is a helpful change. The situations are:
An individual concurrently creates Trust A, a trust that otherwise qualifies as a
charitable remainder unitrust, and a separate trust, Trust B. Under the governing
instrument of Trust A, annual unitrust amounts will be paid to Trust B for the life
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of C. C is an individual who is financially disabled~ that is, C is unable to manage
e's own fmancial affairs by reason ofa medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

Situation 1. Under the governing instrument ofTrust B, a designated portion ofthe
amount it receives from Trust A will be paid to C each month. If, at any time in the
sole judgment of the trustee~ the monthly payment to C is insufficient to provide
adequately for the care, support, and maintenance of C, or is insufficient for the
needs of C for any reason, additional amounts will be paid as needed to or on
behalf of C from Trust B. Upon C's death, the balance remaining in Trust B will
be distributed to C's estate.

Situation 2. Under the governing instrument of Trust B, the trustee may make
distributions of income and principal, as detennined in the trustee's sole and
absolute discretion, for the fmancial aid and best interests of C in a manner that
supplements but does not supplant any governmental benefits otherwise available
to C. Upon e's death, the balance remaining in Trust B will be distributed to C's
estate.

Situation 3. Under the governing instrument of Trust B, the trustee may make
distributions of income and principal, as determined in the trustee's sole and
absolute discretion, for the financial aid and best interests of C in a manner that
supplements but does not supplant any governmental benefits otherwise available
to C. Upon e's death, the governing instrument requires the trustee to reimburse the
state for the total costs of medical assistance provided to e under the state's
Medicaid plan. C is given a testamentary general power of appointment over the
balance remaining in Trust B. If C fails to exercise the power, the balance will be
distributed, in equal shares, to CiS sister and to X a charitable organization.
In each situation the disabled person will have the assets included in his estate for estate tax purposes, and in
each instance creditors at death would be able to collect to the extent assets remained in Trust B.

5.

Meaning of "Qualified Appreciated Stock" Contribution to a Private Foundation. Section

170(e) allows only an income tax deduction for basis when making contributions to a private foundation. Section
170(e)(5) contains an exception which allows a fair ma~ket value deduction for "qualified appreciated stock" which the
statute states is any corporate stock:

(i)

for which (as ofthe date ofthe contribution) market quotations are readily
available on an established securities market, and

(ii)

which is capital gain property (as defined in subsection (b)(I)(C)(iv».

At issue in John C. Todd, et ux. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 19 (2002), was whether certain securities were
publicly traded. The opinion discussed the securities:
Baucom and the Bank
On the transfer date, Bancorp was a bank holding company, owning all of the
issued and outstanding shares ofstock of Union Colony Bank, Greeley, Colorado,
a state-chartered Colorado bank (the bank). On that date, shares of Bancorp were
not listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or any
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city or any regional stock exchange, nor were the shares regularly traded in the
national or any regional over-the-counter (OTe) market for which published
quotations are available. The shares were not shares of an open-end investment
company (commonly know as a mutual fund), as provided in section 1.170A13(c)(7)(xi)(A)(3), Income Tax Regs.
Procedure for Purchase or Sale of Shares of Bancom
Before and throughout 1994, the procedure for someone wishing to purchase or sell
shares of Bancorp was to contact an officer of the bank or a local stockbroker
specializing in the shares of Bancorp. The bank or broker would try to match a
potential seller with a potential buyer. That could prove difficult, since Bancorp
shares were not frequently sold. The bank maintained a numerical list, by certificate
number, of all share'transactions (the bank's list). The bank's list showed the date,
seller, buyer, number of shares, share cost (if available), and certificate nwnber.
Gill & Associates, Inc. (Gill & Associates), a member ofthe National Association
of Securities Dealers since 1984, acted as a placement agent or "matchmaker" for
certain of the sales of the shares. As a matchmaker, Gill & Associates maintained
a list of individuals wishing to purchase shares and contacted these individuals
when approached by others interested in selling shares. In order to quote a price to
an interested purchaser, a representative from Gill & Associates would call the
bank to obtain the net asset value on the books of the corporation. Gill &
Associates believed the book value was a fair value for the stock ofBancorp, and
it used the book value to compute what it believed was a fair price for a share of
Bancorp. Gill & Associates did not have access to the bank's list. Although Gill &
Associates could readily quote to an interested buyer what it believed to be a fair
price for Bancorp shares, Bancorp shares were not necessarily then available for
sale. If no shares were available, Gill & Associates would put the interested
person's name on a list and contact that person when shares became available. On
six to eight occasions during the lO-year period from 1984 through 1994, when
Bancorp shares became available for sale, Gill & Associates would place an
advertisement, for a briefperiod, in the local newspaper. Gill & Associates charged
a fee of 25 cents for each share placed, and acted as placement agent as an
accommodation to the bank, to encourage its business relationship with the banle
On December I, 1994, eight individuals, including petitioner, owned or controlled
50.5 percent of the issued and outstanding shares of Bancorp. Petitioner o'wned or
controlled 7 percent of those shares~
The court concluded that a market maker did not make the stock publicly-traded:
2.

Market Quotations Requirement

In general, if a charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the
amount ofthe contribution is the fair market value ofthe property at the time ofthe
contribution. Sec. 1.170A-I (c)( 1), Income Tax Regs. Fair market value is the price
at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. Sec. 1.170A- l(c)(2), Income Tax
Regs. The fair market value of a share ofstock or a security is not necessarily equal
to its market quotation. See sec. 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(D), Income Tax Regs.
Nevertheless, we assume that Congress believed that the existence of readily
available market quotations would substantially assist in, if not detennine, fair
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market valuation (and discourage overvaluation). We do not agree with petitioners
that the market quotations requirement was met because Bancorp shares were
occasionally traded by Gill & Associates, who could provide a suggested share
price based on the net asset value ~fthe bank. Such share price did not necessarily
reflect a price that any willing buyer or seller had accepted or would accept. Gill
& Associates charged a flat fee of 25 cents for each share traded, and acted as a
placement agent as an accommodation to the bank, to encourage its business
relationship with the bank. We do not accept Gill & Associates' procedures for
quoting prices as a reliable proxy for fair market valuation. The intendment of the
market quotations requirement would not be served by accepting procedures such
as those followed by Gill & Associates with respect to Bancorp shares as satisfying
the requirement.
3.

Section 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs.

Section 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., describes circumstances in
which the market quotations requirement is met for purposes of exempting
contributions of certain publicly traded securities from the substantiation
requirements. See sec. 1.l70A-13(c)(I)(i), Income Tax Regs. Section 1.170A13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., does not purport to be applicable to the
interpretation of the term "qualified appreciated stock". Nevertheless, given our
conclusion as to the consistent meaning of the market quotations requirement, we
believe that section 1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., also describes
circumstances in which the market quotations requirement is met for the purpose
of detennining whether the shares constituted qualified appreciated stock.
In the petition, petitioners aver that the market quotations requirement was satisfied
by virtue of the Bancorp shares' satisfying either subdivision (1) or (2) of section
l.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs. During the trial ofthis case, however,
petitioners conceded that, on the transfer date, the Bancorp shares did not satisfy
any of the subdivisions of section 1.170A- 13(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners rely on their plain language reading of the market quotations
requirement and argue that the regulation is invalid because inconsistent with that
reading. Since we reject petitioners' plain language reading, we reject petitioners'
argument based on that reading., that the regulation is invalid.
Petitioners have failed to satisfy the market quotations requirement for purposes of
determining whether the shares were (1) publicly traded so as to he exempt from
the substantiation requirements and (2) qualified appreciated stock.

6.

Dividing and Terminating Private Foundations. A private foundation that terminates has various

obligations under section 507 and mustpay an excise tax ifit does not distribute its assets properly. In Rev. Rut. 200228, 2002-20 IRB 941, the IRS ruled that a private foundation may distribute its assets to other private foundations
including newly fonned foundations that meet the requirements of section 507. In Rev. Rut. 2003-13,2003-4 IRB I,
the Service dealt with private foundations that distribute net assets to section 509(a)( I) organizations (perhaps the most
typical charity classification). The rulings are a useful roadmap.
7.

Retirement Benefits and Charity. PLR 200234019 is very favorable for the taxpayer. IRAs and

a 403(b) annuity were payable to the decedenfs estate. A certain percentage of the residue of the estate was directed
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to charity and various percentages to certain named individuals. The Will contained an allocation power which the
ruling discusses as follows:
Article Fourth, Section 10, provides that Decedent's executor shall have the power
to make distributions in cash or in kind (including non pro-rata distributions of
undivided interests in property), at such values as the executor shall detennine; to
make any income tax elections concerning in-kind distributions; and in making
such distributions the executor may allocate assets to a particular beneficiary
without regard to the bases of such assets.
The ruling allowed the executor to assign the retirement accounts to the charities such that the charities received
the IRD:
Based solely on the facts and representations submitted, we conclude that the
assignment of the Retirement Accounts in satisfaction of their percentage shares
of the Estate will not cause either the Estate or any of the individual beneficiaries
to have taxable income, nor will the assignment cause any amounts to be taken into
account in the computation of the Estate's DNI for the taxable year of the
assignment The charities will realize income in respect of a decedent by reason
ofthe distributions to them from the Retirement Accounts assigned to them, to the
extent of the value of the Retirement Accounts as of 01, but such income will not
be taxable by reason of the charities' exempt status under 501(cX3).
In PLR 200221011, the IRS allowed a section 642(c)(2) deduction to an estate for IRS proceeds. The residue
of the estate went to charity. The executor paid the non-eharitable bequests from other assets.
8.

Assignment of Income Issues ("Palmer Problems"). In PLR 200230004 husband and wife

proposed to transfer 495 of 500 shares of a C corporation to a charitable remainder unitrust and asked whether the
redemption by the corporation would be self-dealing. The ruling detennined it would not be self-dealing because there
is an exception to the self-dealing rules:
Section 53.494 1(d)-3(d)(1) of the foundation regulations provides that, in general,
under section 4941 (d)(2)(F), any transaction between a private foundation and a
corporation which is a disqualified person will not be an act ofself-dealing ifsuch
transaction is engaged in pursuant to a liquidation, merger, redemption,
recapitalization, or other corporate adjustment, organization, or reorganization, so
long as all the securities of the same class as that held (prior to such transaction)
by the foundation are subject to the same tenns and such terms provide for receipt
by the foundation ofno less than fair market value. For purposes ofthis paragraph,
all of the securities are not subject to the same terms unless, pursuant to such
transaction, the corporation makes a bona fide offer on a unifonn basis to the
foundation and every other person who holds such securities.
The taxpayers also asked whether the C corporation dividends would be unrelated taxable income and the
answer was no, even though the corporation would be a controlled corporation, because dividends are excepted:
Section 5 12(b)( 13)(A) 0 f the Code provides that notwithstanding section 512(b)( 1),
(2), and (3), an organization (controlling organization) receiving a specified
payment from another entity which it controIs (controlied entity), shall include such
payment as an item of gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business to
the extent such payment reduces the net unrelated income of the controlled entity
(or increases any net unrelated loss ofthe controlled entity). There shall be allowed
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all deductions of the controlling organization directly connected with amounts
treated as derived from an unrelated trade or business under the preceding sentence.
Section 512(b)( 13)(C) of the Code provides that the term "specified payment
means any interest, annuity ~ royalty, or rent.

H

Section 512(b)(13)(D)(i) of the Code provides, in part, that the term "control"
means in the case of a corporation, ownership (by vote or value) of more than 50
percent of the stock of such corporation, and in any other case (other than a
corporation or a partnership) ownership of more than 50 percent of the beneficial
interests in the entity.
The modifications contained in section 512(b) of the Code, in effect, constitute an
exception to the general rule by excluding from the computation of unrelated
business taxable income items such as dividends, interest, annuities, royalties, and
rents. If these modifications, which are provided in section 512(b)(I), (2), and (3),
are considered an exception to the general rule of taxing the unrelated business
income of exempt organizations, then section 512(b)(13) may be considered an
exception to the exception. Under section 512(b)(13), the exclusion of interest~
annuities, royalties, and rents provided by section 512(b)( I), (2), and (3) does not
apply where such amoWlts are derived from "controlled organizations. u
The exception to the modifications contained in section 512(b) of the Code is not
applicable in this case. Although Trust~ which holds the majority of X stock, is a
"controlling organization" within the meaning of section 512(b)(13), the income
earned by X while part of its stock is owned by Trust will not constitute vaTI to
Trust. The distributions to Trust from X while Trust owns part of its stock are
dividends. The receipt of dividends is not taxable to Trust, because section
512(b)(I) excludes dividends from the UBTI, and the rules of section 512(b)(13)
do not apply to the payment of dividends.
Therefore, the income earned by X while part of its stock is owned by Trust will
not constitute unrelated business taxable income to Trust In addition, distributions
to Trust from X while Trust owns part of its stock will constitute dividends that are
excluded from unrelated business income under section 512(b)(1) of the Code, so
long as they are not interest, annuities, royalties, and rents derived from the
controlied corporation.
Finally, the taxpayers asked whether the redemption would be treated as an assignment of income. The ruling
states:
This request involves Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), affd. on other
grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975), acq., 1978-1 C.B. 2. In the Palmer case,
the Tax Court held that a taxpayer's gift of stock in a closely held corporation to a
private foundation, followed by a redemption, was not to be recharacterized as a
sale or redemption between the taxpayer and the corporation followed by a gift of
the redemption proceeds to the foundation, even though the taxpayer held voting
control over both the corporation and the foundation. The Tax Court based its
opinion, in part, on the fact that the foundation was not legally obligated to redeem
the stock at the time it received title to the shares.
In Rev. Rut. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the Internal Revenue Service announced that
it will treat the proceeds ofa redemption ofstock under facts similar to those in the
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Palmer case as income to the donor only if the donee is legally bound or can be
compelled by the corporation to surrender the shares for redemption.
In the present case, at the time K shares are transferred to Trust, K will be under
no legal obligation to redeem the contributed stock. There is no agreement among
the parties under which K would be obligated to redeem, or Trust would be
obligated to surrender for redemption., the stock. Trust is not legally obligated to
accept any offer of redemption made by K. Accordingly, any redemption by K of
the stock contributed by Grantors to Trust will be respected.
Based on the representations submitted and infonnation described above, we
conclude that a purchase by K of the stock transferred by Grantors to Trust will be
treated as a redemption of the stock from Trust, and will not be treated as a
redemption of stock from Grantors or a distribution by X to Grantors. Therefore,
the sale or redemption by Trust of its X stock will not result in the capital gain in
such sale or the redemption price being attributed for tax purposes to Grantors.
Among the representations made - whether required or given voluntarily - was:
In addition, A, as president and sole shareholder of X and grantor and co-trustee
of Trust, represents the following:
(1)
I, A, grantor and co-trustee of Trust, hereby represent that neither I nor
any family member of me will acquire, offer to acquire, or become obligated to
acquire shares of K stock from Trust earlier than at least one year after the date of
any transfer of shares ofK stock to Trust.
(2)
I, A, President and sole shareholder ofK, hereby represent that K will not
redeem, offer to redeem, or become obligated to redeem shares of K stock from
Trust earlier than at least one year after the date ofany transfer ofshares ofK stock
to Trust, directly or indirectly, by the grantor of Trust or a family member of the
grantor.
(3)
I, A, President and sole shareholder of X, and grantor and co-trustee of
Trust, hereby represent that neither X nor I am aware of any plan or intention of
Trust to transfer any corporate stock, or to have any person acquire any corporate
stock from Trust.
The application of Revenue Ruling 78-197 arose in Gerald A. Rauenhorst, et ux. v. Commissioner, 119 T.e.
No.9 (2002). Arbeit (a partnership) owned warrants enabling it to purchase NMG stock. On September 28, 1993, WCP
(a corporation) offered to purchase all NMG stock. On November 9, 1993 the partnership assigned come warrants to
four charities. On November 19 sold its remaining warrant to WCP, and the charities sold their warrants to WCP. On
November 22, 1993, WCP and NMG agreed on a sale of all the NMG stock.
The government argued that the bright-line rule of Rev. Rut. 78-197 was not controlling. The Opinion states:
Respondent argues that petitioners are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and that genuine issues ofmaterial fact remain for trial. Respondent argues that the
question whether the donees were bound or could be legally compelled to surrender
their NMG warrants is not ftthe critical issue ff to be resolved and, accordingly,
neither Carrington v. Commissioner, supra, nor Rev. Rut. 78-197, supra, controls
this case. It is respondent's position that "the critical issue" in this case is 'fa factual
one": whether petitioners' rights to receive the proceeds of the stock transaction
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involving WCP "ripened to a practical certaintyf1 at the time of the assignments.
Respondent relies on Ferguson v. Commissioner, 174 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999),
Jones v. United States, supra, Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir.
1973), affg. 58 T.e. 259 (1972), Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir.
1972), and Estate of Applestein v. Commissioner, supra.
Respondent purports to distinguish both Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra,
on the facts of the case and the ruling. To that end, he contends that Carrington and
Rev. Rut. 78-197, supra, are not inconsistent with the cases he relies upon above.
Respondent claims that in this case, and the cases upon which he relies, there was
a pending g1obal" transaction for the purchase and sale of all the stock of a
corporation at the time ofthe gift or transfer at issue. He then sunnises that because
Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, did not involve a pending "global
transaction, the legal principles ofthose authorities do not apply. Instead, he argues
that we must apply the principles of the cases he relies upon, and, accordingly, we
must conduct a detailed factual inquiry for purposes of detennining whether the
sale of the stock warrants had ripened to a practical certainty at the time of the
assignments.
f1

rt

We cannot agree that respondent has effectively distinguished Carrington and Rev.
Rul. 78-197, supra, on their facts. First, neither this Court nor the Courts of
Appeals have adopted respondent's theory of a pending "global" transaction as a
means ofdistinguishing cases such as Carrington and Palmer v. Commissioner, 62
T.e. 684 (1974). Indeed, the caselaw in this area applies essentially the same
anticipatory assigrunent of income principles to cases ofa uglobal" nature as those
applicable to cases of a "nonglobal'f nature. See, e.g., Greene v. United States,
supra at 581. We can only interpret respondent's use ofthe phrase Upending global
transaction" as simply a restatement of the principles contained in the cases upon
which he relies. Thus, we cannot agree that respondent's reliance on a pending
global transaction distinguishes either Carrington, Rev. Rut. 78-197, supra, or other
cases upon which petitioners rely. With that being said and leaving Carrington and
those other cases aside at this point, the bright-line test of Rev. Rut. 78-197, supra,
which focuses solely on the doneefs control over the contributed property, stands
in stark cOlJtrast to the legal test and the cases upon which respondent relies and
which consider the donee's control to be only a factor.
The Court took a dim view of the government's urging that Rev. Rut. 78-197 be ignored:
While this Court may not be bound by the Commissioner's revenue rulings, and in
the appropriate case we could disregard a ruling or rulings as inconsistent with our
interpretation of the law, see Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 243,251 (1986), in
this case it is respondent who argues against the principles stated in his ruling and
in favor of our previous pronouncements on this issue. The Commissioner's
revenue ruling has been in existence for nearly 25 years, and it has not been
revoked or modified. No doubt taxpayers have referred to that ruling in planning
their charitable contributions, and, indeed, petitioners submit that they relied upon
that ruling in planning the charitable contributions at issue. Under the
circumstances of this case, we treat the Commissioner's position in Rev. Rul.
78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, as a concession. Accordingly, our decision is limited to
the question whether the charitable donees were legally obligated or could be
compelled to sell the stock warrants at the time of the assignments.
On the facts, the court found in favor of the taxpayer:

A - 27

Petitioners argue that as 0 f November 12, 1993, the date the warrants were
transferred on the books ofNMG, the donees had not entered into any agreement
to sell the warrants and could not be compelled by any legal means to transfer the
warrants. Accordingly, they contend that, as a matter of law, there was not an
assigrunent of income. Petitioners submitted affidavits from representatives ofthe
donees in support of their motion for partial summary judgment Each of those
affidavits outlines the events which preceded the assignments, each states that the
stock warrants were received on November 12, 1993, and each also states that, as
of that date, the donees had not entered into agreements to sell the stock warrants.
Respondent questioned the reliability ofthose affidavits, and he contended that the
affidavits were deficient in that they failed to state the personal involvement of the
representatives with respect to petitioners· contributions. He also asserted that the
testimony of those affiants is Hunknowntf~ and he questioned whether they were
involved in any negotiations or discussions with NMG, WCP, or Arbeit regarding
WCP's proposed acquisition of NMG stock and warrants. Respondent also
questioned the affiants' competency "to opine upon, or reach any conclusion as to,
what constitutes a binding agreement or whether their respective organizations had
indeed entered binding agreements in connection with the transactions at issue."
We do not share respondent's reservations with respect to the affidavits, and we
find those affidavits credible.
First, in response to respondent's allegations, petitioners submitted additional
affidavits from each ofthe affiants. Each ofthose affidavits states: (1) The affiants
were personally involved with respect to petitioners' contributions; (2) before the
donees' execution of the warrant purchase and sale agreement, there were no
agreements amongst the donees, Arbeit, Mr. Rauenhorst, or any other person or
entity regarding the sale ofthe warrants; and (3) through November 12, 1993, there
were no negotiations or communications between the donees and NMG or parties
representing NMG, except for the letters from NMG's legal counsel requesting that
the donees sign an Additional Party Signature Page.
Second, respondent relies on nonspecific allegations of an informal agreement or
understanding between the donees and NMG, WCP, Mr. Rauenhorst, and/or
Arbeit. Summary assertions and conclusol)' allegations are simply not enough
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. [citations omitted]
Respondent alleges no facts or evidence to substantiate his position, and he has
submitted no affidavits in response to the affidavits that petitioners submitted.
Instead, he points out that the record lacks infonnation regarding any discussions,
deliberations, or negotiations which may have taken place between the donees and
the other parties. Respondent has had ample opportunity to investigate the facts
surrounding these transactions, and it is clear that respondent could have requested
additional information from the individuals involved. See Rule 121 (e). He has
requested neither additional discovery nor a continuance for purposes ofadditional
discovery. He has not demonstrated to our satisfaction that the only available
method for opposing the statements in the affidavits is through cross- examination
at trial. Further, it is insufficient for the opposing party to argue in the abstract that
the legal theory involved in the case encompasses factual questions. Hibernia Natl.
Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th CiT. 1993); Daniels v. Commissioner, supra.
Since petitioners have offered affidavits directly supporting their position on a
material issue of fact, and since respondent has failed to counter those affidavits
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with anything other than unsupported allegations, respondent cannot avoid
summary judgment on this issue. See Greene v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 1165,
1171 (S.D.N.Y.1992),affd. 13 F.3d577(2dCir. 1994). Thus, we find that there
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the donees entered into a
legally binding agreement to sell their stock warrants before, or at the time of, the
assigrunents by petitioners.
Footnote 14 states:
The record indicates that no agreement was entered into by the donees before Nov.
19, 1993, the date they signed the warrant purchase and sale agreement. On Nov.
16, 1993, NMG's legal counsel sent letters to each of the donees enclosing a
warrant purchase and sale agreement. Those letters state that pursuant to the
warrant purchase and sale agreement, the donees would agree to sell their reissued
warrants to WCP and Uto abstain from either exercising its Warrant or selling or
otherwise transferring it to any other party through Dec. 31, 1993." Certainly, the
fonnality ofhaving the donees enter into the warrant purchase and sale agreements
suggests that they had not entered into any binding agreements before Nov. 19,
1993.
Subsequent to the decision, the government has reiterated its intention, generally, to follow its own rulings in
litigation.
In PLR 200321010 a retired officer of a corporation intended to give shares of the corporation to a CRUT.
The corporation had the right to purchase the stock if it so desired, and the agreement also bound the trust:
X proposes to establish a CRUT (as defmed in § 664 of the Internal Revenue
Code). Upon establishment of the CRUT, X will notify Company ofX's intent to
transfer a portion of X's Company stock purchased under the Plan to the CRUT,
thereby triggering Company's option to purchase the stock for the formula price set
forth in the stock restriction agreements applicable to such stock. Taxpayer
represents that Company will likely decline to purchase the stock for the fonnula
price set forth in the stock restriction agreements and thus X will be free to transfer
the stock to the CRUT. The stock transferred to the CRUT will continue to be
subject to the tenus of the stock restriction agreements under the Plan in
accordance with the terms of the stock restriction agreements. Therefore, if the
trustee ofthe CRUT wishes to sell or othetwise dispose ofthe stock, Company will
have a right to purchase the stock for the formula price set forth in the stock
restriction agreements. The trustee will notify Company that the CRUT wishes to
sell Company stock prior to any proposed sale or disposition. X represents that
Company has always exercised its option under the stock restriction agreements in
the past for the formula price set forth therein.
The ruling described the "bright-line" test of Palmer, citing Rauenhorst:
The Service has acquiesced in the Palmer decision. See 1978-1 C.B. 2. In Rev. RuL
78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the Service concluded that it will treat the proceeds of a
redemption of stock under facts similar to those in Palmer as income to the donor
only if the donee is legally bound or can be compelled by the corporation to
surrender the shares for redemption. The Tax Court has characterized the "legally
bound" standard in Rev. Rul. 78-197 as a "bright line" test for. determining if a
contribution of stock to a charity followed by a redemption of that stock from that
charity should be respected in fonn or recharacterized as a redemption of the stock
from the donor followed by a contribution of the proceeds by the donor to the
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charity. See generally, Rauenhorst
2002).

V1

Commissioner, 119 T.C. No.9 (October 7,

Thus, the ruling concludes:
Consequently, the test for purposes ofthis ruling request, is whether the CRUTwill
be legally bound or can be compelled by Company to surrender the stock for
redemption at the time ofthe donation. Here, X proposes to transfer the Company
stock to the CRUT. Under the restrictions contained in each year s stock restriction'
agreement, the CRUT must first offer the stock to Company at a set fonnula price
should the CRUT propose to dispose of the shares. This provision amounts to a
right of first refusal. However, it does not mean that the CRUT is legally bound or
can be compelled by Company to surrender the stock to Company at the time ofthe
donation. The information submitted contains no indication that the CRUT will be
legally bound, or could be compelled by Company, to redeem or sell the gifted
stock. That all or a portion of the gifted stock was subject to restrictions upon
transfer to a third party by X, and thus by the CRUT following the transfer, does
not give Company the ability to compel its redemption or sale from the CRUT~ The
CRUT is free to retain title to and ownership of the stock indefmitely.
1

Because the CRUT is not legally bound and cannot be compelled by Company to
redeem or sell the stock, we conclude that the transfer of the Company stock by X
to the CRUT, followed by any subsequent redemption of the stock by Company,
will not be recharacterized for federal income tax purposes as a redemption of the
stock by Company from X followed by a contribution of the redemption proceeds
to the CRUT. See Palmer v. Commissioner, supra, and Rev. RuL 78-197, supra.
The same principles apply if the stock is sold by the CRUT rather than redeemed
by Company. Thus, provided there is no prearranged sale contract whereby the
CRUT is legally bound to sell the stock upon the contribution, we conclude that
any subsequent sale will not be recharacterized for federal income tax purposes as
a sale of the stock by X, followed by a contribution of the sale proceeds to the
CRUT. Accordingly, any redemption proceeds or sales proceeds received by the
CRUT for the stock will not be treated as taxable income received by X.
9.

Contributions to Non-Exempt Trust. In PLR 200235035 the IRS discussed contributions for

income and transfer tax purposes to a charitable trust that never applied for section 50 I(c)(3) treatment. The purpose
of the trust was to make payments for charitable purposes on behalf of a third party. The trust is taxable but
contributions are deductible because the trust is wholly charitable (section 4947(a)(I)). The trust was a private
foundation.

c.

SECTION 408 -- IRAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS

1.

IRA Paid to Revocable Trust. PLR 200317043 is one of a series ofrulings dealing with a common

planning technique:
Taxpayer A, whose date ofbirth was Date 1, 1942, died on Date 2, 2002, at age 60.
As of his date of death, Taxpayer A was the owner of IRA X maintained with
Company M.
On Date 4, 1999, Taxpayer A signed and adopted Trust T for the benefit of his
three children, Taxpayer B, Taxpayer D, and Taxpayer E. Taxpayer B's date of
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birth was Date 3, 1972. Taxpayer B is older than either Taxpayer D or Taxpayer
E. Taxpayer C is the Trustee of Trust T.
Taxpayer B was alive as of the date of this ruling request.
The provisions of Trust T provide, in relevant part, that Trust T is intended to be
the beneficiary of an individual retirement arrangement (IRA) maintained by
Taxpayer A. The terms of Trust T further provide, that upon the death of the
Trustor, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate into equal shares, one (I) for
Taxpayer B ifhe is then living. Each share shall constitute a separate trust and shall
be held and administered as such. The tenns of Trust T also provide that the Trust
T trustee is required to maintain separate accounts on a pro rata basis in accordance
with Proposed Treasury Regulation 1.401(aX9)- 1, Q&A H-2(b), for the separate
beneficiaries of Trust T. Finally, the tenns ofTrust T provide that its Trustee shall
withdraw from the beneficiary's share ofany IRA and distribute to the beneficiary
such beneficiary's share of the minimum distribution required to be distributed
annually from the IRA.
On Date 5, 1999, Taxpayer A signed a beneficiary designation with respect to his
IRA X pursuant to which IRA X was to be distributed to the trustee of Trust T at
the death of Taxpayer A. Said beneficiary designation provides, in relevant part,
that Trust T is to be divided into equal accounts for three beneficiaries named
therein. Taxpayer B is one of the three named beneficiaries. The beneficiary
designation also provides that the Trust T trustee may establish separate IRAs in
the name of Taxpayer A for the benefit of the three above-referenced named
beneficiaries. In effect, the trustee ofTrust T was authorized to establish a separate
IRA for the benefit of Taxpayer B.
Your authorized representative has asserted that Trust T and the separate trusts
created under its terms are valid under the laws ofState N. He has also asserted that
Trust T and the separate trusts created under its tenus became irrevocable upon the
death of Taxpayer A. Company M was provided with a copy of Trust T and ofthe
related beneficiary designation prior to the death of Taxpayer A.
Your authorized representative has provided the Service with documentation which
indicates that, prior to Date 6, 2002,· IRA X was subdivided into three lRAs after
the death of Taxpayer A. Each posthumously created IRA is titled in the name of
Taxpayer A (Deceased) for the benefit ofa distinct individual. Thus, one IRA (IRA
W) is titled Taxpayer A (Deceased) for the benefit of the Trust for Taxpayer B.
IRA W has an Account Number which is different from the Account Numbers
assigned to the IRAs maintained for the benefit ofTaxpayer A's other two children.
Additionally, documentation provided by your authorized representative indicates
that the trust created for the benefit of Taxpayer B under t~e terms of Trust T has
a ,Taxpayer Identification Number which is different from the Taxpayer
Identification Numbers assigned to the trusts created for the benefit of Taxpayer
A's other children.
Your authorized representative has asserted on your behalf that the one-third of
IRA X which became IRA W after IRA X was subdivided is payable to the
subtrust created under the tenus of Trust T for the benefit of Taxpayer B. Your
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authorized representative asserts that distributions from IRA W have not been
made, are not being made, and will not be paid to Trust T.
At issue was whether the division created separate trusts for purposes of calculating the required minimum
distribution rules. The ruling reviews the final regulation:
§ 1.401(a)(9)-8 of the "Final·' Regulations~ Q&A-2(a) provides the ftseparate
account" rules with respect to defined contribution plans. A "separate account is
an account under which the beneficiary or beneficiaries differ from the beneficiary
or beneficiaries of the other accounts. In general, if separate accounts are set up,
for years subsequent to the calendar year containing the date on which the separate
accounts were established~ or the date of death if later, a separate account under a
plan is not aggregated with the other separate accounts under the plan in order to
detennine whether the distributions from such separate account satisfy the
requirements of Code § 40 I(a)(9). Instead, the rules in Code § 40 I(a)(9) apply
separately to each separate account under the plan.
ft

§ 1.401(a)(9)-8 of the "Final" Regulations, Q&A-3, provides that a separate
account is a separate portion of an employee's benefit which reflects the separate
interest of an employee's beneficiary under the plan as of the employee's death for
which separate accounting is maintained. The separate accounting must allocate all
post-death investment gains and losses, contributions and forfeitures, for the period
prior to the establishment of the separate accounts on a pro-rata basis in a
consistent and reasonable manner among the separate accounts.
§ 1.40 1(a)(9)-4 of the "Final u Regulations, Q&A-5(c), provides, in relevant part,
that the separate account rules under A-2 of § 1.401(a)(9)-8 are not available to
beneficiaries of a trust with respect to the trust's interest in the employee's benefit.

***
As noted above, if distributions are made to a trust, even if the trust is a
"see-through" trust within the meaning ofQ&A-5 of § 1.401 (a)(9)-4 ofthe "Final"
Regulations, the separate account rules of A-2 of § 1.40 I (a)(9)-8 of the "Final
Regulations" are not available to the beneficiaries of the trust. Thus, in general,
each beneficiary of a trust must receive minimum required distributions over the
life expectancy of the eldest beneficiary.
The issue raised in this ruling request is whether the general rule, above, applies
where IRA distributions are made directly to a subtrust created under the terms of
a trust.
In this case, distributions from IRA W, which was created for and is being
maintained for the benefit of Taxpayer B, are being made directly to the subtrust
created under the terms of Trust T for Taxpayer B's benefit and are not being paid
to Trust T. Taxpayer B is the only beneficiary of the subtrust created for his
benefit. However, the facts presented in this case indicate that the subtrust for the
benefit of Taxpayer B was created by the trustee of Trust T pursuant to the tenns
of Trust T. Furthennore, as noted above, the tenns of Trust T provide that the
trustee thereof is charged with the responsibility of creating separate accounts.
Although neither the Code nor the ffFinal" Regulations promulgated under Code
§ 40 I(a)(9) preclude the posthumous division of IRA X into three IRAs, including
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IRA W, the "Final" Regulations do preclude ffseparate accounf' treatment for Code
§ 40 I(a)(9) purposes where amounts pass through a trust. In this case, amounts
pass through a trust. Thus, even though IRA X has been divided into three IRAs,
including IRA W, the life expectancy of the eldest beneficiary of all of the IRAs,
not merely IRA W, is the life expectancy to be used to determine the Code §
401(a)(9) payout period for distributions from IRA W. TP B is said eldest
beneficiary.
The rulings substantially limit the usefulness of having IRAs or plan benefits paid to a client's revocable trust,
especially where the difference in ages among beneficiaries is substantial. The rulings arise from a change made in the
section 409 final regulations; the proposed regulations would have allowed a favorable result for taxpayer.

D.

SECTIONS 671-678 -- GRANTOR TRUST RULES
1.

Non-Grantor, Non-Gift Trust Created. PLR 200148028 is very helpful. The taxpayer established

a trust that is not a grantor trust but gifts to which are incomplete. The facts were:
Grantor proposes to establish an irrevocable Trust which will be funded by
intervivos and testamentary transfers. The Trust provides for one trustee (Trustee)
and two members ofa Distribution Committee. Article 1.1 provides that during the
the Trustee shall have no power or
lifetime of the Grantor (Ulnitial Tenn
authority to make any distribution of net income or principal of the trust estate, to,
or for the benefit of, any trust beneficial)' at any time when any person is serving
as a member of the Distribution Committee unless the distribution is made at the
direction ofthe Distribution Committee. Distributions may be made to the Grantor,
the Grantorts Spouse or any of the descendants of the Grantor's parents.
lt

),

Article 3.6 provides that the initial members of the Distribution Committee shall
be the two eldest adult and competent persons eligible to receive distributions out
of the Trust estate (other than the Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). At all times
during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall be comprised of two
persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate (other than the
Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). During the Initial Term, the Distribution
Committee shall direct the Trustee with regard to (i) all discretionary distributions
from the Trust estate to beneficiaries, and (ii) certain of the Trustee's powers. The
Trustee is authorized and directed to follow the direction of the Distribution
Committee. All rights and powers conferred on the Distribution Committee shall
be exercisable only by unanimous action of all members of the Distribution
Committee except that any member ofthe Distribution Committee acting alone may
direct the Trustee to make one or more distributions upon obtaining the Grantor's
prior written consent to each such distribution and filing such consent with the
Trustee.
The Trust lasts during the lifetime ofthe Grantor. Under Article 1.2, upon the death
of the Grantor, income and principal of the Trust estate, as it is then constituted
shall be transferred, conveyed and paid over to such person or persons then eligible
to receive distributions out of the Trust estate, other than the Grantor, as the
Grantor appoints by the Grantor's will. To the extent all, or any portion of the
income and principal of the Trust estate is not so effectively appointed, such
income and principal shall be "divided into a sufficient number of equal shares so
that there shall be set aside one such share for each child ofthe Grantor who is then
living, and one such share for the collective descendants who are then living ofany
child of the Grantor who is not then living. From each such share so set aside for
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the collective descendants who are then living of any child of the Grantor who is
not then living there shall be set aside per stirpital parts for such descendants. If no
descendant of the Grantor is living at the death of the Grantor, the income and
principal of the Trust, to the extent not effectively appointed, shall be distributed,
free from Trust, to the then living descendants per stirpes, ofthe Grantor's parents.
Article 1.3 provides that the Grantor may, at any time during the Grantor's life
release the Grantor's t:"ight to receive discretionary distributions of income and
principal from the trust estate, the right to consent to distributions as described in
Article 3.6, and/or the power ofappointment described in Article 1.2, and may limit
the persons or entities in whose favor the power of appointment described in
Article 1.2 may be exercised. Article 1.3 further provides that notwithstanding any
of the foregoing or any other provision of this Agreemen~ the Grantor shall have
no power or authority to change the class ofpersons eligible to receive distributions
during the Initial Tenn (except to cause the Grantor personally to be excluded from
the class by releasing the Grantor's own right to be eligible to receive such
distributions.)
With respect to why the trust would not be a grantor trust the ruling states:
Because ofthe discretion ofthe Distribution Committee, acting together, or singly
with the consent of the Grantor, to make distributions from income and/or corpus
to one or more ofthe beneficiaries which includes the members ofthe Distribution
Committee, the members of the Distribution Committee have a substantial
beneficial interest in both the income and corpus portions of the Trust. Any
distribution that the Grantor wishes to make from assets contributed to the Trust
by that Grantor, could be made only if one of the members of the Distribution
Committee agrees. Since each of the two Distribution Committee members is a
potential recipient ofTrust distributions, a consent to a distribution could adversely
affect that individual's beneficial interest in the Trust. Thus, with respect to the
Grantor, both of the members of the Distribution Committee are adverse parties
within the meaning of section 672(a).
The requirement in Article 3.6 that the initial members, and any current or
successor member of the Distribution Committee shall be the two eldest adult and
competent persons eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate and that
at all times during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall be comprised
of two persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of Trust estate, ensures
that the Grantor will not be able to act independently of an adverse party. The
restrictions on the powers of the Trustee preclude the Trustee from independently
controlling distributions or making loans without the consent of an adverse party.
The Grantor does not have a reversionary interest in excess of five percent in any
portion of the Trust. Accordingly, section 673 does not apply to treat Grantor as
owner of any portion of the Trust. Because control over the beneficial enjoyment
of, and any distributions of, income and corpus is exercisable by the Grantor, only
with the consent of a Distribution Committee member, who is an adverse party,
Grantor will not be treated as the owner of any portion of the Trust under section
674 or section 677. The Trust agreement does not authorize any of the
circumstances that cause administrative controls to be considered exercisable
primarily for the benefit of the grantor under section 675. Section 676 does not
apply to Grantor because Grantor cannot revest title in the Grantor in any portion
of the Trust. Section 678 is not applicable since none of the trustees and no other
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person will have a power exercisable solely by that person to vest the corpus or
income of the Trust in that person.
The existence of the grantor's special testamentary power of appointment prevented the gift from being
complete until such time as distributions were made from the trust to someone other than the grantor.
In PLR 200247013 the taxpayer was arguably more aggressive. The class ofbeneficiaries was the descendants
of the Taxpaye(s parents, and two of the taxpayers siblings were the Distribution Committee.
This kind of trust will help grantors avoid state capital gains taxes on sales of assets.

E.

SECTION 1361- S CORPORATIONS
No developments.

F.

SECTIONS 2031 and 2512 -- VALUATION
1.

Aggregation of Stock. The holding in Estate ofBonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996)

was followed in a case appealable to the Ninth Circuit by the Tax Court in Estate of Harriett R. Mellinger v.
Commissioner, 112 T.C. No.4 (1999). The decedent and her husband originally owned, as community property, 4.9
million shares of Frederick's of Hollywood, Inc. Frederick died first and left his community property interest of2.46
million shares in a QTIP trust for the benefit of Harriett. The remaining 2.46 million shares were owned by Harriett
in her own revocable trust
Together the two blocks of stock represented 55.7% of the stock. The estate valued these shares as separate
27.8% interests using a discount of about 30%.
The court valued the interests separately but applied a 25% discount. The court rejected the IRS argument that
the decedent should be treated as the owner ofthe QTIP prop~rty for valuation purposes under section 2044. The court
noted that neither decedent had any power of disposition over the assets of the QTIP trust. The Tax Court followed
Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26 (1999) in the Estate of Ambrosinia Blanche Lopes v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1999-225.
Estate of Ethel S. Nowell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-15, came to the same conclusion as Mellinger
with respect to a partnership interest. Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen wrote the" opinion in both Nowell and Mellinger.
Also at issue in Nowell was whether the interest in the partnerships passing at the death ofthe decedent should
be valued as an assignee interest or as partnership interest. The Tax Court determined that the interest should be valued
as an assignee interest because the estate tax is levied on the property interests that were transferred at decedent's death
as detennined by applicable state law.
The partnership was created under the Arizona limited partnership act which provided that a limited partner
could not transfer the partner's interest without the consent of the general partner unless the partnership agreement
provided otherwise. Here, the partnership agreement did not provide otherwise. The-court noted that whether general
partners will consent is a subjective factor that would not be taken into consideration under the objective standard of
the hypothetical buyer, hypothetical seller analysis, citing Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th COiro 1982),
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Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.e. 938 (1982), and Kolom v. Commissioner~ 71 T.e. 235 (1978), affd. 644
F.2d 1282 (9th. Cir. 1981).
The opinion did not state whether the previous practice of the partnership had been to adInit assignees as
limited partners.
In FSA 200119013 the IRS took the position that the Bonner line of cases did not apply to assets held in a
general power of appointment marital trust.
Further, this position is consistent with the recent litigation concluding that
fractional or minority interests in property held in a trust qualifying as qualified
tenninable interest property (QTIP), includible in the decedent's gross estate under
section 2044, is not aggregated for valuation purposes with fractional or minority
interests in property owned outright by the decedent. Estate of Bonner v. United
States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Estate ofMellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.e.
4 (1999), acq., 1999-2 C.B. xvi; Estate ofLopes v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-225;
Estate ofNowell v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-225. As discussed below, the nature
of the surviving spouse's interest in a marital deduction trust subject to a general
power of appointment and includible in the gross estate under section 2041 is
fundamentally different from the QTIP trust situations previously addressed by the
courts.
The FSA discussed one aspect of Mellinger:
The estate next cites language in the Tax Court's decision in Estate of Mellinger v.
Commissioner where the court, in reaching the conclusion that assets includible
under section 2044 are not aggregated with assets includible under section 2031,
stated:
Furthermore, at no time did decedent possess, control, or have any power
of disposition over the ... [property] in the QTIP trust. Cf. secs. 2035,
2036, 2041 (requiring inclusion in the gross estate where a decedent had
control over the assets at some time DURING HER LIFE).
Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 35-36 (emphasis added.)
The estate infers that the reference to control during her life" indicates that the
Tax Court would not view a testamentary general power, which can only be
exercised to dispose of the property at death, as according the decedent sufficient
control over the property to justify aggregation. For several reasons, we do not
agree.
U

First, we believe the statement, as it applies to testamentary powers, merely
recognizes that in the case ofa testamentary power, the power holder has the power
to dispose of the assets at death but exercises that power during life by executing
the appropriate instrument. Thus, the power holder has lifetime control over the
property in the sense that the power holder's control is exercised during life, and
becomes effective on death. Many courts have characterized testamentary general
powers of appointment as providing the holder with lifetime controL For example,
in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945), the
decedent held a 'contingent testamentary general power of appointment and the
Court commented that, n[T]he ultimate disposition of all the trust property was
suspended during the life of the decedent." See also, Goldstone v. United States,
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325 U.S. 687 (1945) (applying the decision in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. to
a decedent's reversionary interest). In Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102
T.e. 790, 800 (1994)~ affd, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996), the Tax Court
characterized the surviving spouse, as the holder of a testamentary general power
ofappointment, as having "maintained effective control over the disposition of the
property in the marital trust until her death. 3 Thus, we do not believe the quoted
language can reasonably be viewed as referencing only inter vivos general powers
of appointment.
tf

In Nowell, the decedent had a testamentary special power of appointment:
Finally, the estate argues that in Estate of Nowell the decedent possessed a
testamentary limited power of appointment over the trust assets~ and, thus, could
exercise a degree of control over the disposition of the trust assets at death.
Nonetheless, the court did not take this power into account in finding that
aggregation was not appropriate. We recognize that in some situations, a limited
power of appointment may afford the holder broad powers of disposition.
However~ the power holder would not, in any event, be authorized to appoint the
property to his or her estate (or his or her creditors) as is the situation presented
with a general power.
Thus, there is a significant practical difference between the two kinds of powers,
and this difference is reflected in the tax treatment accorded the two powers. For
tax purposes, property subject to a limited power is not treated as effectively owned
by the power holder, and is not subject to inclusion in the gross estate. Given the
nature of a limited power, and the fact that a limited power is not recognized for
estate and gift tax purposes as affording the power holder sufficient control to
generate any transfer tax consequences when possessed or exercised, the court in
Estate of Nowell was justified in treating a QTIP trust subject to a limited power
in the same manner as a QTIP trust where the remainder beneficiaries are
designated by the first spouse to die. However, as discussed above, it does not
followthat the same result should obtain in this case where the Decedent possessed
a general power of appointment over Trust A.
The Tax Court agreed with the FSA in Estate of Aldo H. Fontana, et a1. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. No. 16

(2002). The opinion states:
Historically, a GPA has been equated with outright ownership of the property
because the powerholder (i.e., the decedent) can appoint the property to his estate·
and, thus, dispose of it as his or her own property. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S.
657,659 (1942) (stating "For purposes ofestate * * * taxation the power to dispose
of property at death is the equivalent of ownership"); Peterson Marital Trust v.
Commissioner, 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating "For tax purposes, a general
power of appointment has for many, many years been viewed as essentially
identical to outright ownership ofthe propertyff), affg. 102 T.e. 790 (1994). In fact,
the legislative history to section 402(e) ofthe Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,40 Stat.
1097, the predecessor to section 2041, states:
A person having a general power of appointment is, with respect to
disposition of the property at his death, in a position not unlike that of its
. owner. The possessor of the power has full authority to dispose of the
property at his death, and there seems to be no reason why the privilege
which he exercises should not be taxed in the same degree as other
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property over which he exercises the same authority. * * * [H. Rept. 767,
65th Congo 2d Sess. 41-42 (1918), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 86, 10 I.]
In Estate of Melling'er v. Commissioner, supra at 35-36, we reasoned that although
section 2044 required that property held by the QTIP trust be included in Harriett's
(i.e., the surviving spouse's) gross estate, the property "[did] not actually pass to or
from" her, and that she "at no time" possessed "control" or had "any power of
disposition over" the property. Unlike Harriett, who could not control the ultimate
disposition of the property held by the QTIP trust, Aido possessed a testamentary
OPA, which allowed him to control the ultimate disposition of the stock. Thus,
pursuant to the OPA, AIdo, at the moment of death (i.e., the critical, moment for
estate tax valuation purposes), had control and power of disposition over the
property. Accordingly, the Ledyard stock subject to Aldo's testamentary GPA must
be aggregated with Ledyard stock Aldo owned outright.
2.

Relevance of Post-Death Events, and Importance ofCompetent Appraisers. The case ofEstate

ofAlice Friedlander Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-119, illustrates the importance ofhaving a competent
and credible appraiser. At issue was the value of almost 20% of the stock in a closely-held company, Seminole
Manufacturing Co., a maker ofunifonns. The taxpayer contended that the value ofthe shares was $29.77 based on sales
two months after the valuation date of two blocks, one of 4.7% and another of 3.25%, sold to other family members.
The court found that those sales were not truly at ann's length because the sellers were not reasonably infonned about
the facts relating to the stocks' value before they sold.
The estate had engaged an expert as had the IRS. However, the IRS' expert's report used the wrong valuation
date and made other mistakes and thus was held irrelevant other than as a rebuttal to the taxpayer's expert.
The court found that the taxpayer's expert was unpersuasive, and the taxpayer's expert testimony was
unsupported by the record, so that the court gave no weight to the taxpayer's expert and accepted the IRS determination
of the stock which was $56.50 per share. The case contains a lengthy discussion of the inadequacy of the taxpayer's
expert, ranging from confusion about the expert's assumptions, to mistakes in the interpretation of valuation methods.
The case should be reviewed by any expert preparing valuation opinions.
However, on the substance, the Ninth Circuit reversed in James J. Morrissey, et.a!' v. Commissioner, 87
AFTR2d ~200 1-643 (200 I). The Court held that the post-death sales were reliable:
In 1993, A. Max Weitzenhoffer, Jr. (Weitzenhoffer) asked Merrill Lynch to
appraise the value of a minority interest. The Merrill Lynch final report was
delivered to him on July 5., 1994. However, on March 29, 1994 Merrill Lynch
wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its fonnal opinion that the fair market value of a
minority interest was $29.77 per share.
On the basis of this report Weitzenhoffer advised two shareholders that Merrill
Lynch set the value at $29.70 per share, and each sold to him at this price. Edmund
Hoffman sold him his 10,000 shares on May 12, 1994; Jacquelyne Weitzenhoffer
Branch sold him her 6,960 shares on June 16, 1994. Each seller subsequently
testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the sale had been
under no compulsion.
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The Estate filed an estate tax return valuing the stock at $29.77 per share. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the stock at $70.79 per share and
asserted a deficiency based on this amount.

******
No good reason existed to reject the sales by Branch and Hoffman as evidence of
the fair market value of Seminole stock on April 14, 1994. The sales took place
close to the valuation date. The sellers were under no compulsion to sell. There was
no reason for them to doubt Weitzenhoffer's report ofthe Merrill Lynch valuation.
That the final report was delivered only in July did not undercut the weight ofthe
formal opinion letter written in March. The sellers had no obligation to hire another
investment firm to duplicate Merrill Lynch's work.
The Commissioner tries to make something out of the family connections of the
sellers with the buyers. They were not especially close. Hoffman had an uncle
related by marriage to Weitzenhoffer's uncle; there is no English word to name this
relationship. Branch was Weitzenhoffer's frrst cousin. Each seller testified that
there was no intention to make a gift to Weitzenhoffer.
The Commissioner notes that Hoffman was a very successful businessman, so that
the Seminole stock may not have meant much to him. People don't get to be very
successful in business by treating valuable property carelessly. To be sure, there
was a seven cents spread between Merrill Lynch's price and Weitzenhoffer's offer;
the resulting difference of $700 and $487.20 were in context de minimis.
The Commissioner also notes that Branch had a misimpression that Seminole still
owned a losing facility that it had, in fact, already sold. Nonetheless Branch was
rightly aware that a substantial loss had occurred due to this facility in 1991 when
no dividends had been paid. Both sellers were aware that dividends had, even in
prosperous years, been meager.
On the other hand, in William J. Desmond v. Conunissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-76, the courtlargely accepted
the estate's expert. in valuing Deft, Inc. The court looked at two methods to detennine value, what is described as the
income method, the discounted cash-flow method, and the market method, comparing the stock to public companies.
The chart shows the calculations of the court, following the taxpayer's expert:
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$8,109,000

Unadjusted Value

$10,410,000

Less Marketability Discount:
Nonenvironmental

20%

(

Environmental
Add Control Premium

(1,621,800)

25%

Fair Market Value of
100 percent Interest

810,900)
2,027,250

20%

(2,082,000)

0%
0%

7,703,550

8,328,000

x Decedent's
Interest

81.93%

6,311,519

81.93%

6,823,130

x Weight Given

50%

3,155,759

50%

3,411,565

Fair Market Value of
Decedent's Interest

3,155,759 + 3,411,565 =

6,567,324

As the chart shows, there was a significant environmental liability potential in the company because it was a
manufacturer ofpaints, and that went into the lack ofmarketability discount when value was detennined using the cashflow method. In addition, because the decedent owned a majority ofthe stock the decedent could liquidate the company,
which was an S corporation, at any time. Thus the court found that a control premium should be added in the discounted
cash flow method. A control premium had already been added in the market method when reaching the $10,410,000
value.
With respect to calculating the amount of the lack of marketability discount, the court stated:
The following factors favor a high lack ofmarketability discount: (1) There was no
public market for Deft's stock; (2) Deft's profit margins were below the industry
average; (3) all stock in Deft was subject to a restrictive share agreement which
provided that a shareholder could transfer his or her stock to a nonshareholder only
after the shareholder offered the shares to the remaining shareholders; (4) given the
size and low profitability of Deft, a public offering ofthe stock was unlikely in the
future; (5) the size of the interest is so large that it may be hard to find potential
buyers in the future who could fmance such a purchase; and (6) where not already
considered, Deft has large potential environmental liabilities.
Only one factor favors a low lack of marketability discount: Deft had an historical
favorable distribution policy (it distributed most of the company's earnings to its
shareholders through higher-than-market compensation in the past).
We conclude that a 30-percent lack of marketability discount is appropriate for the
Deft stock. Ofthis 30-percent discount, 10 percent is attributable to Deft's potential
environmental liabilities. We shall apply the 30-percent lack of marketability
discount to the unadjusted value we detennined under the income method. We
however shall apply only a 20-percent lack of marketability discount to the
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unadjusted value wedetennined under the market method because as discussed
supra, the environmental liabilities have already been included in the unadjusted
value under that method.
Similar issues arose in Estate of Elizabeth P. O'Neal, et. at. v. United States, 81 F.Supp.2d 1205 (N.D. Ala.
1999), affd in part, vacated in part by 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001), decided on remand at 228 F.Supp.2d 1290
(N.D.Ala. 2002). The District Court stated the issue as follows:
The central issue in this case involves the estate tax deduction by the Estate of
Elizabeth P. O'Neal, deceased, (ftMrs. O'Neal's Estate") under 26 U.S.C. §
2053(a)(3) for claims against Mrs. O'Neal's Estate resulting from transferee gift tax
and generation-skipping transfer tax liabilities asserted against the children and
grandchildren of Elizabeth P. O'Neal ("Mrs. O'Neal") as donees of certain gifts
made by Mrs. O'Neal. The Court of Appeals held that for purposes of the
deduction, the claims are to be valued as ofthe date ofMrs. O'Neal's death without
regarded to events occurring after her death and remanded this issue with
instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to value the claims giving rise to the
deduction as of the date of Mrs. ONeal's death, 258 F.3d at 1266, 1275.
The court summarized the holding of the Eleventh Circuit:
The appeal by Mrs. OfNeal's Estate was based, inter alia, upon its contention that
this Court should have considered only pre-death events in detennining the amount
ofthe deduction and the deduction should be in the amount demanded by the IRS.7
In opposing the arguments presented by Mrs. O'Nears Estate on appeal, the
government argued that the amount of the deduction should be based upon the
post-death settlernent.
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument and held that the
deduction to be taken by Mrs. O'Neal's Estate for the children's and grandchildren's
claims against Mrs. O'Neal's Estate is the value of such claims as of the date of
Mrs. O'Neal's death, determined without consideration of post-death events. 258
F.3d at 1275. The Court of Appeals plainly held that Mrs. O'Neal's Estate is
entitled to a deduction in some amount (clearly not zero). Id. at 1271 n.20. The
Court of Appeals also stated, however, that the value of the deduction is not
necessarily the amount that was demanded by the IRS. Id. at 1275.
The Court of Appeals then remanded the valuation issue with instructions to hold
an evidentiary bearing to value the clainls giving rise to the deduction at the date
ofdeath. Id. at 1276. Events that occurred after Mrs. O'Neal's death that alter value
were to· be disregarded. The mandate of the Court of Appeals included the
following:
On remand, the district court is instructed neither to admit nor consider
evidence of post-death occurrences when determining the date of death
value of the Section 2053(a)(3) deduction. [Citation to Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515, 526 (5th Cir. 1999).] It will be incumbent
on each party to supply the district court with relevant evidence of
pre-death facts and occurrences supporting the date-of-death value ofthe
deductions as advocated by that party. Id. The district court will then, by
using informed judgment, reasonableness and common sense, weighing
all relevant facts and evaluating their aggregate significance, determine a
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sound valuation. See Revenue Ruling, 1959-] C.B. 237, Rev. Rul. 59-60
(1959).
The District Court was frustrated by the government's lack of expert testimony. The opinion states:
The government chose not to offer an expert to assist the Court. Instead, the
government sought to establish a timeline of events by cross-examining Mr.
Aughtry and the taxpayer's experts, and offering the testimony of Mr. Breen, Mrs.
O'Neal's accountant, the IRS estate tax attorney who conducted the tax audit, and
an IRS employee who participated in the engagement of Mr. Kaye. However, the
government offered no evidence which would transform the timeline ofevents into
admissible evidence of value, which is the question that the Court of Appeals
placed before this Court. What this Court needed from the government, and did not
receive, was evidence to assist this Court in detennining the value of the claims as
of Mrs. O'Neal's date of death. [footnote omitted]
In Estate oeSmith v. Conunissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th eire 1999), the Fifth Circuit
offered the following guidance regarding the type of evidence that assists a court
in establishing the date-of-death value of claims against an estate:
The actual value of Exxon's claim prior to either settlement or entry of a
judgment is inherently imprecise, yet "even a disputed claim may have a
value to which lawyers who settle cases every day may well testify, fully
as measurable as the possible future amounts that may eventually accrue
on an uncontested claim. [Footnote citing Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320
F.2d 874,876 (1st eire 1963)]
U

In fact, when addressing situations that are the obverse of the one in the
instant case, i.e., when the decedent-estate taxpayer is a plaintiff rather
than a defendant in a pending lawsuit, the Commissioner has considered
himself capable of detennining the value of a pending lawsuit in exact
dollars and cents, even when the claim has not been reduced to judgment.
[Footnote citing Estate ofDavis V. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2365
(1993)] Furthermore, courts have consistently held that "inexactitude is
often a by-product in estimating claims or assets without an established
market and provides no excuse for failing to value the claims ... in the
light of the vicissitudes attending their recovery." [Footnote citing Estate
of Cuny v. Commissioner, 74 .T.C. (CCH) 540, 551 (1980)]
Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 525 (emphasis in original).
The taxpayer offered two experts whom the court found helpful:
As previously stated, Mrs. O'Neal's Estate offered the reports and testimony oftwo
experts, both of whom currently practice as attorneys and one of whom is also a
recently retired Federal District Judge. Tax cases valuing legal claims often use
attorneys and retired judges as expert witnesses, See, e.g., Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 909,915-916 (2001) (IRS used testimony ofa
lawyer who had settled and mediated numerous cases involving similar disputes to
value claim against estate); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.e.M. (CCH)
2365, 2366 (1993) (lawsuit included as asset in estate valued by attorney with
experience evaluating lawsuits); Estate of Lennon v. Commissioner, 62 T.e.M.
(eCH) 326, 328 (1991) (retired judge who practiced appellate law following
retirement from the bench testified as to value of lawsuit on appeal at death).
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Indeed, both the First Circuit in Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.
1963), and the Fifth Circuit in Estate of Smith held that "lawyers who settle cases
every day" can testify as to the value of disputed claims. Gowetz, 320 F.2d at 876;
Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 525.
Both experts testified as to the date-of-death value of the claims against Mrs.
O'Neal based upon the likely outcome ofthe transferee tax litigation given the facts
known as of Mrs. O'Neal's death.lO Each expert then discounted that value to
reflect contingencies related to restitution litigation between Mrs. ONeal or her
estate as donor and her children and grandchildren as donees. Neither expert
considered or relied upon events, facts or occurrences after Mrs. O'Neal's death on
July 23, 1994.
The court concluded:

In remanding this case, the Court of Appeals instructed this Court to detennine a
sound valuation "using informed judgment, reasonableness and common sense,
weighing all relevant facts and evaluating their aggregate significance. It 258 F.3d
at 1275. Like both [the taxpayer's experts] Judge Pointer and Mr. Apolinsky,
infonnedjudgment, reasonableness and common sense tell this Court that, when
faced with potential transferee liability in excess of$16,000,000.00 as of the date
of Mrs. O'Neal's death, the value of the children's and grandchildren's restitution
claims on that date was at least as great as the $5,835,000.00 value detennined by
, Judge Pointer.
With respect to the opinions of both expert witnesses, the Court concludes that
Judge Pointer's opinion is more persuasive. Since the issue before the Court
involves detenninations of the likely outcome of litigation in the Tax Court and
litigation of a claim for restitution, the Court places great weight on the experience
of Judge Pointer who spent twenty-nine and one-half years on the federal bench
resolving cases, many of which' were of a similar nature. Moreover, having
reviewed the exhibits offered into evidence and having heard the testimony of the
witnesses, particularly the testimony ofthe lead attorneys for the parties in the Tax
Court Cases, the Court has reached the same conclusion as Judge Pointer. The
value of the children's and grandchildren's claims as of Mrs. O'Neal's date ofdeath
is $5,835,000.00.
While the value of the claims is $5,835,000,00, the amount ofthe deduction under
26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(3) is less. 26 U.S.C. § 2053(c)(2) disallows a deduction for
amounts described in 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a) to the extent that the amounts exceed the
value as of the decedent's death of the property subject to claims (except to the
extent that the deductions represent amounts paid before the date for filing the
estate tax return). In this case, the value of Mrs. O~eal's property that was subject
to claims as of the date of her death was $5,303,744.00, and the amount of the
deductions under 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a) cannot exceed this amount.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the value of the children's and grandchildren's claims as of
Mrs. O'Neal's date of death was $5,835,000.00. The Court further fmds that the
amount of the deduction allowed to Mrs. O'Neal's Estate for the children's and
grandchildren's claims is limited by 26 U.S.C. § 2053(c)(2) to $5,303,744.00. Since
the deduction for the children's and grandchildren's claims reduces the taxable
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estate to zero, the Court finds that the full amount of the estate taxes paid by Mrs.
O'Nears Estate, together with interest as provided by law, is due to be refunded.
After the remand, the government argued so persistently for the value of the deduction to be zero that the
District Court awarded attorneys fees against the government 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-7214 (2002):
In spite of the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement that "the estate is entitled to a
deduction with respect to claims against the estate by the nine heirs for
reimbursement of their transferee gift tax liability on the 1987 gifts of stock by
Mrs. O'Neal," O'Neal at 1271, the defendant has repeatedly argued that the value
of that deduction was zero. On March 14,2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
partial summary judgment, requesting this court order that the defendant was
foreclosed from arguing that the value of the claims of the donees was zero.
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summaryjudgment (doc. 81), at1 2. This court ordered
that "the defendant may not allege that the estate of Mrs. O'Neal is not entitled to
any deduction for the value of the claims of the donees." Order of April 2, 2002
(doc. 87), at 2..
On April 3, 2002, the defendant filed a motion requesting this court hold the
motion for partial summary judgment in abeyance pending discovery on the issue
of "the value, ifany, ofthe donees' claims as ofJuly 23, 1994" (doc. 89). The court
found this motion to be moot on April 4, 2002 (doc. 95). On April II, 2002, the
defendant filed a motion asking this court to reconsider its granting ofthe plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 93). The court denied that motion,
stating its April 2, 2002 Order merely required the parties to comply with the
instructions from the Eleventh Circuit regarding the issues on remand. Court Order
of April II, 2002 (doc. ?4), at 2. The court, by footnote, stated:
"the court notes that the plaintiffs filed that motion [for partial summary
judgment] due to a concern that the defendant would argue that the
plaintiffs were estopped from claiming the estate was entitled to any
deduction. As the Eleventh Circuit stated that 'there is no dispute that the
estate is entitled to a deduction ...' this court will not allow the defendant
to argue otherwise, whether before, during, or after discovery is
completed. It
Order of April II, 2002, at n.l. In its trial brief, the defendant again argued that,
because the court could not consider post-death events, the value of the deduction
for the donees' claims would be zero. Trial brief of defendant United States (doc.
121), at 14-15. The defendant then argues in that brief that "[e]xcepting (sic),
arguendo, that the plaintiffs' reading of Smith is correct, the valuations perfonned
by the plaintiffs' (sic) indicate that the deduction for the donees' claims as of July
23, 1994 is zero (citation omitted).... As a consequence, no deduction for the
donees' claims can be pennitted under Treas. Reg. § 20.2053- l(b)(3):' Trial brief
of defendant United States, at 19-20. In its conclusion, the United States argued,
Applying a strict interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit's Opinion in this case, the
amount of the deduction for the donees' claims as ofJuly 23, 1994 is zero because
no cause of action had accrued at the time of Mrs. O'Neal's death. Id. at 24-25.
It

11

At the evidentiary hearing, which commenced June 6, 2002, the court stated it was
tIIconcemed about ... the government's argument that the plaintiffs are entitled to
zero deduction, because I think the Eleventh Circuit closed that out U See Tab II
to plaintiffs' evidentiary submission (doc. 126). The government responded:
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Let me explain.... This is the way we're interpreting. We're not saying
that that restitution claim would not be entitled to a deduction (sic). What
we are saying is is [sic] the value would be ~ero, because the Eleventh
Circuit said, what you will go back and do, is you will value the
deduction.
It's the same thing as if, on July 23rd, 1994 you were valuing stock and it
was detennined to be. worthless.... But we're not saying that there's -there is a difference between they are not entitled to a deduction -- we're
not saying that, Your Honor. What we're saying is is [sic] the value as of
July 23rd, 1994, based on those facts, you have to assign it as I we're
using zero as, in effect, worthless.
Id. This court has repeatedly found this position of the United States to be
irreconcilable with the Eleventh Circuit's finding that "that there is no dispute that
the estate is entitled to a deduction with respect to claims against the estate by the
nine heirs for reimbursement of their transferee gift tax liability on the 1987 gifts
of stock by Mrs. ONeal." O'Neal, supra, at 1271. As such, the court finds that the
government "should have known that [its] position was invalid ft from the time this
case was remanded by the Eleventh Circuit. See Cervin, I I I F.3d at 1262; see also
In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994).
Having considered the foregoing, the court is of the opinion the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees, solely for
costs and fees incurred after July 26, 2001.
In FSA 200217022 the Service detennined that an estate may deduct the entire amount it paid to settle a
wrongful death action. The Service stated:
With respect to whether post-death events may be considered in detennining the
amount of a deduction under §§ 2053(a)(3), the Eleventh Circuit noted recently in
Estate ofO'Neal v. Commissioner, 258 F,,3d 1265, 1271 (11th Crr. 2001), that this
area oflaw is generally governed by "two distinct and irreconcilable lines ofcases"
namely, the cases that follow Ithaca Trust, and the cases that follow Jacobs. The
Commissioner's published position is that post-death events are controlling in
determining the amount that may be deducted as a claim against the estate whether
or not the claim is contested or contingent. Revenue Ruling 77-274 states that
where the right to claim an amount is not fIXed by the deadline for filing the estate
tax return, the taxpayer can protect his right to claim the deduction by filing a
protective claim on F0m1843. Rev. Rul. 77-274, 1977-2 C.B. 326. The Service has
also ruled that regardless of the nature of the claim, no deduction will be allowed
for claims against the estate which have not been paid or will not be paid because
the creditor waives payment, fails to file his claim within the prescribed time limit
and under the conditions prescribed by applicable local law, or otherwise fails to
enforce payment. See Rev. Rut 60-247, 1960-2 C.B. 272 (denying a deduction for
an otherwise valid claim which became void and uncollectible after the date of
death by virtue of noncompliance with a state statute of limitations on filing
probate claims). See also Rev. Rul. 75-24, 1975 C.B. 306, and Rev. Rut. 75-177,
1975-1 C.B. 307.
Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have either held or noted that where the
claim is contested, contingent, or unenforceable on the date of death, post death
events are considered in determining the allowable deduction. Propstra v. United
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States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The law is clear that post-death
events are relevant when computing the deduction to be taken for disputed or
contingent claims. Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963), in
Taylor v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 371 (1962) (denying a deduction for a contested
claim for a marital settlement rendered unenforceable by a spouse s remarriage);
Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.e. 728, 734 (1982), affd, 720 F.2d
1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984) (noting in dicta that postdeath events are relevant in cases where the claims are potential, unmatured,
contingent, or contested at the date ofdeath); Estate ofCourtney v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 317 (1974) (denying a deduction for mortgages that were never presented
to the estate); Estate of Cafaro v. Conunissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-348 (limiting
deductions for contested business debts existing at the date of death to amounts
actually paid).
1f

),

1

The Ninth. Circuit decision in Propstra involved lien claims against an estate that
had been compromised for a lesser amount. Although the government argued to the
contrary, the court found that at the date of death, the estate had no colorable
defense to the claims, and the claimant did not have the ability to compromise the
claim. Props~ 680 F.2d at 1254. The court, citing Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2053-1 (b)(3),
stated that the preliminary detennination to be made was the nature of lien claims
against the estate. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1253. The court then held that "as a matter
oflaw~ when claims are for sums certain and are legally enforceable as of the date
of death, post-death events are not relevant in computing the pennissible
deduction." Props!rn, 680 F.2d at 1254. However, the court noted in dicta that
"[t]he law is clear that post-death events are relevant when computing the
deduction to be taken for disputed and contingent claims. tf Id. at 1253. Based upon
the facts, the court detennined that the lien claims were certain and enforceable at
the time of death, and therefore the post-death compromise of the claim could not
be considered in determining the amount of the deduction.
Estate of Van Home involved an undisputed spousal support obligation calculated
by using actuarial tables. The obligation was tenninated after four monthly
payments when the recipient died. In Van Home the Ninth Circuit makes clear that
its holding is limited to "certain and enforceableu claims. The government argued
that the spousal support obligations were not a "sum certain" and therefore should
not be governed by the rule enunciated in Propstra. The court disagreed and held
that, ftlegally enforceable claims valued by reference to an actuarial table meet the
test of certainty for estate tax purposes. It Van Home, 720 F.2d at 1117.
In the present case, appeal will lie to the Ninth Circuit. The claims filed by Wife,
Daughter and Son with the executor ofDecedent's estate were denied by the estate.
In addition, the estate actively contested the subsequent litigation. The estate
appears to have had affirmative defenses to the suit filed by Family. We believe
that, based upon the Ninth Circuit's dicta in Propstra and Van Horne, the Ninth
Circuit would hold in this case that post-death events are relevant in computing the
permissible §§ 2053(a)(3) deduction because the claims in this case were disputed
and contingent. Based upon published Service position and the Ninth Circuit's
guidance in this area, the estate's deduction should be limited to the amounts
eventually paid in settlement ofthe claims. The estate, accordingly, may deduct $w
as a claim against the estate under §§ 2053(a)(3).
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3.

Valuation ofS Corporation Shares. Walter L. Gross, Jr., et UX., et at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo

1999-254, involved the value of S corporation shares. The court did not allow the taxpayer to reduce the assumed cashflow of the S corporation as if it were a C corporation. That is, the Court rejected "tax-affecting" the earnings.
Arguably this is contrary to the training and audit handbooks of the IRS itself. The court also allowed a 25%
marketability discount.
At 88 AFTR2d ~ 2001-5553, the Sixth Circuit affinned as to the tax-affecting jssue (rehearing denied March
21,2002). Although it is not entirely clear, the court appeared to affinn the Tax Court's refusal to tax-affect in this case,
rather than to try and state an absolute rule. The opinion states:
Overall, the entire valuation process is a fiction - the purpose of which is to
detennine the price that the stock would change hands from a willing buyer and a
willing seller. However, a court is not required to presume hypothetical, unlikely,
or unreasonable facts in detennining fair market value. See Estate of Watts, 823
F.2d 483, 487 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987). Valuation is a fact specific task exercise; tax
affecting is but one tool in accomplishing that task. The goal of valuation is to
create a fictional sale at the time the gift was made, taking into account the facts
and circumstances of the particular transaction. The Tax Court did that and
determined that tax affecting was not appropriate in this case. I do not find its
conclusions clearly erroneous.
The Tax Court refused to tax-affect in Estate ofWilliam G. Adams, ir. v. Commissioner, T.C~ Memo. 2002-80,
on the same grounds as in Gross, namely that an S corporation pays no corporate income tax and thus any reduction for
an "assumed tax" would be hypothetical.
In Estate ofRichie C. Heck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-34, the Tax Court rejected the IRS attempt
to value a 34.62% interest in Korbel, the champagne company, using comparables because~ it found, the governmenCs
expert had not identified any truly comparable companies. The company is an S corporation. Instead, the Tax Court
relied on the discounted cash-flow model-- used by the government's and taxpayer's experts -- followed by a 25% lack
of marketability discount and 10% minority interest discount The opinion states:
This Court considers the discounted cashflow (DCF) method employed by both
experts to be an appropriate method for use in valuing corporate stock. See, e.g.,
N. Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 349, 379 (1986). Moreover, where we have
rejected use of the market approach as unreliable, we have based the value of a
closely held corporation on the DCF approach alone. See Estate of lung v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 412, 433 (1993). We, therefore, find that the DCF
method utilized by both experts in this case is an appropriate method for valuing
the stock of Korbel as of the valuation date.

***
Re~ently, in Estate ofTrue v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2001-167, we described
the DCF method as follows:

The discounted cash-flow method is an income approach based on the
premise that the subject company's market value is measured by the
present value of future economic income it expects to realize for the
benefit of its owners. This approach analyzes the company's revenue
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growth, expenses, and capital structure, as well as the industry in which
it operates. The subject company's future cash-flows are estimated, and
the present value of those cash-flows is determined based on an
appropriate risk-adjusted rate ofretum.
4.

Closely-Held Company Stock. At issue in Okerlund v. United States, 53 Fed.CL 341 (2002) was

the lack of marketability discount, and the value of non-voting stock. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. (SSE) was
capitalized with 99.98% non-voting stock and 0.2% voting stock. Mr. Schwan, founder and CEO, died unexpectedly
on May 9, 1993 and about two-thirds of the SSE's stock went to a foundation. 16.69% of the voting stock was held in
a great-great grandchildren's trust (3G Trust) as well. Various gifts were made in 1992 and 1994:
Marvin Schwan's four children and three oftheir spouses, Lorrie Schwan-Okerlund
(Lorrie) and her husband Jeffrey Okerlund (Jeffrey), David J. Schwan (David) and
his wife Diane (Diane), Paul M. Schwan (Paul) and his wife Christine H.M.
Weigel-Schwan (Christine), and Mark D. Schwan (Mark) established separate
trusts on December 31, 1992 for the primary benefit of their respective children.
Plaintiffs Lorrie, David and Paul each transferred as gifts 50,000 shares of
nonvoting stock to their respective trusts, splitting their gifts with their spouses
pursuant to § 2513 Mark, electing not to split his gift, transferred only 25,000
shares ofSSE which were previously distributed to the Schwan children by Marvin
Schwan's previously established trusts. Plaintiffs obtained a valuation of the SSE
stock from Business Valuation Consultants (Gray) in June 1993. Based on Gray's
per share value of$24.03, each plaintifffiled a gift tax return which reported a gift
of $600,750, a unified credit of $192,800, a Generation-Skipping Tax (GST)
exemption of $600,750, and a tax of $277.
In 1996, Willamette Management Associates (Willamette) provided plaintiffs with
a lower value for SSE minority shares in connection with federal district court
litigation involving a dispute between the Schwan children and SSE over the
redemption of stock after Marvin Schwan's death in 1993. The matter was
ultimately settled, and the nonvoting stock sold back to SSE at a value of $26.00
per share in 1997. The Willamette appraisal reported a value of $17.40 per share
for the valuation date of December 31, 1992. As a result of this reduced appraisal
from $24.03 to $17.40 per share, in July 1996, the plaintiffs filed for a Claim for
Refund and Request for Abatement with the IRS, seeking restoration of their
respective unified credits in the amount of$59, 100, a restoration oftheir respective
GST exemptions in the amount of $165,760 each, and a gift tax refund of $277.

***
In January 1994, Lorrie, Mark, David and Paul each transferred $650,000 in cash
to the Marvin M. Schwan..1992 Grandchildren's Irrevocable Trust. Accordingly, in
April 1995, each plaintifffiled with the IRS agifttaxretum reporting the $650,000
cash transfers. Lorrie, David and Paul consented to split t~eir gifts with their
spouses pursuant to § 2513. As a result, Lorrie, Jeffrey, David, Diane, Paul and
Christine each reported GST exemptions in the amount of$325,000 for their 1994
gifts and $600,750 for their prior 1992 gifts. Each of their taxable gifts for 1994
and prior periods totaled $925,750.
In December 1994, Lorrie also transferred 1,000 shares ofnonvoting SSE stock to
two separate trusts established for her children. Lorrie and Jeffrey reported the
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value of the 2,000 shares of nonvoting capital stock as $12.51 per share and a tax
liability of $ 123,765. In October 1995, Lorrie and Jeffrey each submitted another
gift tax return which added the $12,510 gift, representing the 1,000 share transfer
in 1994, for a total taxable gift of $938,260.
In July 1996, plaintiffs filed claims for refund with respect to their 1994 gift tax
returns, based on the adjustments reported in their 1992 claims for refund.
Specifically, the 1994 refund claims stated that the 1992 transfers of SSE
nonvoting stock were overvalued by $165,750 per transfer, based on the 1992
Willamette appraisal of$17.40 per share, resulting in a reduction from $925,750
to $760,000 in the total individual taxable gifts for 1992. The 1994 claims for
refund reflected a revised gift tax liability of $59,400. Accordingly, each plaintiffs
claim sought a gift tax refund of$64,365.
Dr. Pratt (and Willamette) was the taxpayer's expert and Dr. Spiro (and AVG) was the government's expert.
With respect to the lack of marketability, the opinion states:
Both experts relied on two sources of empirical data for aid in quantifying the
discount for lack of marketability: (I) discounts on sales of restricted shares of
publicly traded companies; and (2) discounts on private transactions prior to initial
public offerings (IPO's). Based on these studies, and an examination of the
perceived risks facing a potential investor in SSE stock, Dr. Pratt concluded that
a 45 percent discount for lack of marketability was appropriate, and Dr. Spiro
concluded that a 30 percent discount was justified.
Dr. Pratt's expert reports contain a far more detailed analysis of the empirical
studies of trading prices of restricted shares and pre-initial public offering
transactions than the A va Report. The eight independent studies ofrestricted stock
transactions reviewed in the Willamette Reports reported average discounts ranging
from 25 to 45 percent. According to Dr. Pratt. the two most important factors in
determining the size of the discount were the amount of dividends paid (more
dividends are associated with a lower discount for lack of marketability) and the
perceived holding period (the longer the holding period the greater the discount for
lack of marketability). (Tr. at 71-72.) The second major line of studies, involving
pre-IPO transactions, observed discounts averaging approximately 45 to 47
percent. IS (Tr. at 74.) Unlike the A va Report, the Willamette Report considered
the pre-IPO studies more relevant for the purpose of determining the appropriate
discount for lack of marketability. According to Dr. Pratt, the discounts observed
in restricted stock studies reflect the existence ofa public market for the stock once
the temporary restrictions lapse. For a variety of reasons, including an increasing
number of transactions under Rule 144(a), which relaxes some of the restrictions,
thus making the restricted securities mor~ marketable, purchasers ofrestricted stock
"generally expect to be able to resell the stock in the public market in the
foreseeable future." (J. Ex. 508, at 78.) Pre-IPO discounts, on the other hand, are
based on purely private transactions before a company enters the public market, a
situation more comparable to closely held companies such as SSE. (Tr. at 205.) A
total discount that "is only slightly above the averages ofthe discounts observed in
the pre-IPa transactions" is appropriate, according to Dr. Pratt, because SSE stock,
unlike the stock observed in the pre-IPO studies, had no prospect of an initial
public offering (Tr. at 74, 205.)
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The AVG Report's discussion of lack ofmarketability discounts relies on a smaller
number ofstudies ofrestricted stock and pre-IPO transaction prices. The restricted
stock studies cited in the AVG Report revealed discounts ranging from 10 to 90
percent, with an average discount of at least 35 percent (Def.'s Ex. 1003, at 6263.), while the pre-IPO study cited reported mean and median discounts of 45
percent. The AVG Report concluded that the discount rate observed by the major
pre-IPQ study cited may be overstated because it reflects factors not reflected in
insider transaction prices. For example, a company's value may increase
significantly leading up to the stock offering, due to the greater growth prospects
typically associated with access to public capital as well as the prevailing market
demand for public offerings." (Def:s Ex. 1603., at 63.) This argument supports a
higher discount for marketability for SSE stock than that observed in the pre-IPO
study for the re3:S0n articulated by Dr. Pratt with respect to restricted stock studies.
There is no public market for SSE Stock, and the company does not contemplate
entering the public market in the future.
ff

Chief among the factors weighing in favor of a higher than average discount rate,
in Dr. Pratt's view., are shareholder risks in the fonn of restrictive stock transfer
provisions, and the provisions of Marvin Schwan's estate plan. The company
by-laws contain a restrictive stock transfer provision in the fonn of a ninety day
right-of-frrst-refusal, which Dr. Pratt viewed as a deterrent to investment and Dr.
Spiro dismissed as a ttred herring tt because he believed it would not impede
long-tenn investment. (Tr. at 318.)
Two restrictions triggered by Marvin Schwan's death would, according to Dr. Pratt,
have a far greater impact on investment in SSE. First, the 30 Trust would severely
impinge upon SSE stock liquidity because the 3G Trust held the controlling share
of SSE voting stock for three generations, amounting to almost 200 years in
perpetuity. Second, Marvin Schwan's estate plan required the implementation ofan
agreement between the company and the Foundation whereby the Foundation
received 5.076 shares ofvoting common stock and 25,910,000 shares ofnon-voting
common stock owned by the Marvin Schwan Revocable Trust. SSE was then
required to redeem the stock from the Foundation. The redemption agreement, once
triggered by Marvin Schwan's death and the implementation of his estate plan,
would increase the company's indebtedness by approximately $869 million, thereby
rendering the company highly leveraged and hindering its ability to grow through
acquisitions. Dr. Pratt opined that the ninety day right of first refusal and the
200-year holding period imposed by the 3G Trust would make SSE stock
unattractive to investors (Tr. at 49, 87).
Based on his discussions with SSE management, Dr. Pratt identified additional
shareholder risks affecting the discount for lack of marketability. First and
foremost, with one exception, SSE had never paid dividends to shareholders and
had no intention of paying dividends in the foreseeable future, thereby closing off
one means of obtaining a return on an investment. Members of management
communicated to Dr. Pratt that SSE would remain a closely-held company and had
no intention of either pursuing a third party sale or public offering, in accordance
with the express wishes of Marvin Schwan. Dr. Pratt's interviews further revealed
that the shareholders did not have easy access to company information because
SSE management did not readily provide an annual report to the shareholders.
Based on these factors, Dr. Pratt's detennined that there was no real market for
SSE's stock.
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Dr. Spiro also identified specific factors influencing the applicable liquidity
discount, which reflects the inability to convert the fair market value of an
investment to its cash equivalent value.20 According to the A VG Report, the
factors suggesting a liquidity discount at the low end of the applicable range
included SSE's high profitability and strong sales and earnings growth and the
company's competitive position and favorable economic outlook. Recognizing that
highly competitive nature of the food industry, the A va Report nevertheless
considered SSE's unique distribution system an advantage, and believed that SSE
was well-positioned as an established leading supplier ofprepared foods for future
growth. (Def. s Ex. 1003, at 54.)
1

Balanced against these advantages, the AVG Report identified three major factors
that would make investment in SSE relatively unattractive to an investor, and thus
increase the applicable liquidity discount: 1] the lack ofdividend payment history,
2] SSE s relative lack of management depth and dependence on Marvin Schwan,
and 3] the company's right of frrst refusal with regard to the purchase of SSE
shares. Unlike Dr. Pratt, who found the restrictive stock transfer provision a very
significant deterrent to an investor, Dr. Spiro concluded that the 90 day right of
first refusal period should "only cause a minor increase in the applicable liquidity
discount" because !fa potential investor would consider an equity interest in SSE
to be a long-tenn investment '12 I (Defs Ex. 1003, at 55.)
1

Dr. Spiro attached minimal ifany significance to the redemption agreement on the
ground that it was not in effect as ofDecember 31, 1992. Instead ofviewing the3G
Trust as a major deterrent to investment, Dr. Spiro hypothesized that shareholders
of SSE stock would not tolerate the tying up of a controlling majority of voting
shares for three generations. Dr. Spiro opined that later generations are often Uno
longer interested in the company," but are "interested in receiving the rewards;"
therefore, the trustees of the 3G Trust would Hhave an obligation to serve their
interests" that might force Schwan to either merge with another company or go
public" to create liquid assets for the 3G beneficiaries. (Tr. at 331.) Consequently,
Dr. Spiro concluded that the 3G Trust was not a relevant factor affecting SSE's
marketability.
tI

The Court finds Dr. Pratt's analysis of the appropriate discount for lack of
marketability more persuasive than that of the government's expert. First, Dr.
Spiro's speculation about the pressure to go public created by the 3G Trust may not
be considered under the objective standard applicable to valuation of closely held
stock. The court is precluded from considering imaginary scenarios as to "who a
purchaser might be, how long the purchaser would be willing to wait without any
return on his investment, and what combinations the purchaser might be able to
effect with [] children or grandchildren and what improvements in management of
a highly successful company an outsider purchaser might suggest." Estate of
Simplot v. Comm'r 249 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 200 I). Dr. Spiro's imaginary
scenario, however plausible, may not be considered in valuing what a hypothetical
willing buyer and willing seller would pay for closely held stock. Second, the
factors identified in the AVG Report that weigh against a high liquidity discount
relating to company perfonnance and competitiveness were already taken into
account in detennining the appropriate pricing multiples under the market
approach. Thus, the re-emphasis of these factors in the liquidity discount analysis
may result in overstatement. Finally, the Court fmds Dr. Pratt's analysis of the
relevant empirical studies and shareholder risks more persuasive than the AVG
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report's rather truncated analysis. In particular, the Court is persuaded that the
Marvin Schwan estate plan provisions would deter investment to a greater extent
than Dr. Sp iro suggests.
However, rather than accepting Dr. Pratt's estimate of 45 percent, the Court holds
that a 40 percent discount for lack of marketability is warranted for the December
3 I, 1992 valuation date. The Court agrees that the company's dividend payment
history, restrictive stock transfer provision, the 30 Trust and the redemption
agreement constitute significant deterrents to investment because of the restraints
they impose on short or long term returns. However, in 1992 the estate plan
provisions, although in place, had neither been triggered nor anticipated in the
immediate future. In other words, they were prospective concerns rather than actual
concerns as ofthe 1992 valuation date. It is well-established that valuation ofthe
stock must be made as of the relevant dates without regard to events occurring
subsequent to the crucial dates.'1 Bader v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 833, 840
(S.D. Ill. 1959); accord Hennes Consol., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 398,
415, n. 28 (1988), Fehrs v. United States, 223 Ct. CI. 488, 620 F.2d 255,264 n. 6
(1980), Central Trust Co. v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 504, 305 F62d 393, 403
(1962).22 In 1992, the major shareholder risks identified in the Willamette Report,
"and in Dr. Prattts testimony, were in place, but had not yet been triggered by
Marvin Schwants death6 The difference between potential versus actual deterrents
to investment supports a 5 percent disparity between the appropriate discount for
lack of marketability in 1992 (40 percent) and in 1994 (45 percent).
If

The court also allowed a discount for a lack of voting rights:
The Court accepts the shared view of the experts that a 5 percent discount for lack
of voting rights is justified6 A prospective buyer usually will pay a premium for
shares with voting power or seek a discount for nonvoting shares. Wallace v.
United States, 566 F. Supp. 904, 917 (D. Mass. 1981) (voting shares appraised at
a 5 percent premium over nonvoting shares). SSEts capital structure reflects a great
disparity between the number of voting and nonvoting shares (7,610 voting to
38,550,000) issued by the company. Where there is a skewed distribution between
the two classes of stoc~ the voting shares are at a premium. Based on their review
of empirical studies, and other relevant literature, which observed lack of voting
rights discounts ranging from 4 to 5.44 percent (in Dr. Spiro's report) and from 3
to 10 percent (in Dr. Pratt's report), both experts applied a 5 percent discount,
which the Court adopts as well-founded.

5.

Discounting Corporate Stock for Built-in Capital Gains. Courts have traditionally been reluctant

to allow a discount for built-in capital gains because, it was believed, the likelihood of incurring those gains would be
speculative. On the other hand, clearly assets with built-in gains have a value different from assets without built-in
gains.
In 1998 the Tax Court decided Estate ofDavis v. Commissioner, 110T.C. No. 35, a reviewed opinion, in which
a reduction for built-in capital gains was allowed as part of a lack ofmarketability discount. The stock to be valued was
of a personal holding company which owned considerable Winn-Dixie stock:
Decedent, who was one of the founders ofWinn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (Winn-Dixie),
died testate on June 11, 1995, while he was a legal resident of Florida. Robert
Davis, the personal representative of decedent's estate, resided in Jacksonville,
Florida, at the time the petition was filed.
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On or about November 2~ 1992 (the valuation date), ADDI&C, a closely held
Florida corporation that was incorporated on December 22, 1947, had a total of97
shares ofcommon stock issued and outstanding, all ofwhich were owned by a trust
(Davis trust) for the benefit of decedent and none of which was subject to any
restrictive sale provisions or buy-sell agreements. On the valuation date, decedent
transferred 25 shares of such stock to his son Robert Davis and 25 shares of such
stock to his son Lee Davis. On that date, each of those two blocks of ADDI&C
common stock constituted 25.77 percent of the issued and outstanding common
stock of ADDI&C.
As of the valuation date, ADDI&C was primarily a holding company for various
assets of decedent, although ADDI&C also had certain cattle operations (both
feeder and breeding cattle) as of that date. Specifically, on the valuation date,
ADDI&C owned 1,020,666 shares, or 1.328 percent~ ofthe issued and outstanding
common stock of Winn-Dixie, which was at all relevant times traded on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 3,456 shares, or .0737 percent, of the issued and
outstanding common stock ofD.O. I., Inc. (DDI), which was a holding company for
various assets ofdecedent and his family and the stock ofwhich was at all relevant
times not publicly traded; various feeder and breeding cattle; certain equipment;
and certain other unidentified assets.
With respect to the built-in gains issue, the opinion stated:
We are convinced on the record in this case, and we find, that, even though no
liquidation of ADDI&C or sale of its assets was planned or contemplated on the
valuation date, a hypothetical willing seller and a hypothetical willing buyer would
not have agreed on that date on a price for each of the blocks of stock in question
that took no account of ADDI&C's built-in capital gains tax. We are also
persuaded on that record, and we find, that such a willing seller and such a willing
buyer of each ofthe two blocks of ADDI&C stock at issue would have agreed on
a price on the valuation date at which each such block would have changed hands
that was less than the price that they would have agreed upon if there had been no
ADDI&C's built-in capital gains tax as of that date. Respondent's position to the
contrary is inconsistent with the record in this case. We have found nothing in the
following cases on which respondent relies that requires us, as a matter of law, to
alter our view: Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v.
Commissioner, 79 T.e. 938 (1982); Estate of Piker v. Commissioner, 72 T.e. 1062
(1979); Estate of Cruikshank v. Commissioner, 9 T.e. 162 (1947); Estate ofLuton
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-539, supplemented by T.e. Memo. 1996-181;
Estate ofFord v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-580, affd. 53 F.3d 924 (8th eire
1995); Estate of Bennett v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1993-34.
We note initially that one ofthe cases on which respondent relies, Estate ofBennett
v. Commissioner, supra, involved a valuation date that preceded the repeal of the
General Utilities doctrine and did not involve a request by the taxpayer for a
reduction in valuing the stock interest in question for the capital gains tax that
would have been due upon liquidation ofthe corporation whose stock was at issue,
absent tax planning to avoid that tax which was pennissible as ofthe valuation date
in that case. Instead, the taxpayer in the Estate of Bennett case asked the Court to
reduce the value of the stock interest in question there by the "estimated costs of
liquidation" which consisted of a "discount for commissions", a "discount for
losses on liquidation'" and a "discount for the costs of overhead and sales costs".
Estate of Bennett v. Commissioner~ supra.
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Turning to the remaining cases on which respondent relies, it is significant to us
that, except for Estate ofLuton v. Commissioner, supra, none ofthe cases on which
respondent relies indicates that any of the expert witnesses who testified in those
cases considered corporate built-in capital gains tax as a factor in appraising the
respective stock interests at issue in those cases. In the Estate of Luton case, one
of the taxpayer's experts, but not respondent's expert, reduced the asset value of
each of the corporations at issue by liquidation costs that included, inter ali~
Federal and State capital gains taxes that would have been incurred on liquidation
of those corporations. Estate of Luton v. Commissioner, supra. In contrast, in the
present case, all of the experts for both parties are of the view that ADDI&C's
built-in capital gains tax must be taken into account as a factor in ascertaining the
fair market value of each of the two blocks of ADDI&C stock in question.
Except for Estate of Luton v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of Ford v.
Commissioner, supra, the other cases on which respondent relies (like Estate of
Bennett v. Commissioner, supra) involved valuation dates that preceded the repeal
ofthe General Utilities doctrine. As we read all ofthose cases, including Estate of
Luton and Estate of Ford, the taxpayers requested the Court for a reduction in
valuing the respective stock interests in question equal to the full amount ofcapital
gains taxes that would have been due upon liquidation of the respective
corporations whose stock was at issue in those cases, absent tax planning to avoid
those taxes which was pennissible as of the respective valuation dates in those
cases. The Court denied each ofthose requests for a reduction for the full amount
of such capital gains taxes where there was no evidence as of those respective
valuation dates that a liquidation ofthe corporation in question or sale ofcorporate
assets was planned or contemplated or that the full amount of such taxes could not
have been avoided.
In the present case, petitioner and all ofthe experts, including respondent's expert,
believe, and we have found, that, in determining the fair market value on the
valuation date of each of the blocks of stock at issue, it is necessary to apply a
discount or adjustment attributable to ADDI&C's built-in capital gains tax because
that is what a hypothetical willing seller and a hypothetical willing buyer would
have done under the facts and circumstances existing on that date. Petitioner
adopts the view of petitioner's expert Mr. Howard and argues that the full amount
of such tax should reduce ADDI&C's net asset value in making that detennination.
On the record before us, we reject petitioner's position and Mr. Howard's opinion.
On that record, we find that, where no liquidation of ADDI&C or sale of its assets
was planned or contemplated on the valuation date, the full amount of ADDI&C's
built-in capital gains tax may not be taken as a discount or adjustment in
determining the fair market value on that date of each ofthe two blocks ofstock in
question, even though we have found that as of that date it was unlikely that
ADDI&C could have avoided all of ADDI&C's built-in capital gains tax, and the
record does not show that there was any other way as of that date by which
ADDI&C could have avoided all ofsuch tax. See Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
78 (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of
Piper v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979).
Footnote 17 of the Davis Tax Court opinion discussed two other cases:
See Estate of Welch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-167, and Eisenberg v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-483, which were decided after the parties filed
their briefs in this case and which involved valuation dates that occurred after the
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repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. In neither of those cases was a liquidation
of the corporation in question or a sale of its assets planned or contemplated as of
the respective valuation dates. In valuing the respective stock interests at issue in
those cases, the taxpayers asked the Court for a reduction equal to the full amount
of capital gains taxes that would have been due upon liquidation of the respective
corporations involved there, absent tax planning to avoid those taxes which was
pennissible as of the respective valuation dates. In neither of those cases does the
Court indicate that any expert believed that such a reduction was warranted. The
Court denied the taxpayers' requests.
On Appeal, the Second Circuit held that built-in capital gains must be considered when valuing a C corporation,
even ifthe corporation has no plan to liquidate. Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 1998), subsequently
acquiesced in by the IRS. 1999-4 IRB 4. The only asset of the corporation was a rental building. The opinion stated:
We disagree with the Commissioner's reasoning that the critical point in this case
is that there was no indication a liquidation was imminent or that "a hypothetical
willing buyer would desire to purchase the stock with the view toward liquidating
the corporation or selling the assets, such that the potential tax liability would be
of material and significant concern." Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 74 I.C.M.
(CCH) 1046, 1048-49 (1997). The issue is not what a hypothetical willing buyer
plans to do with the property, but what considerations affect the fair market value
of the property he considers buying. While prior to the TRA any buyer of a
corporation's stock could avoid potential built-in capital gains tax, there is simply
no evidence to dispute the fact that a hypothetical willing buyer today would likely
pay less for the shares of a corporation because ofthe buyer's inability to eliminate
the contingent tax liability. See John Gilbert, After the Repeal ofGeneral Utilities:
Business Valuations and Contingent Income Taxes on Appreciated Assets, Mont.
Law, Nov. 1995, at 5 (citing a 1994 study that analyzed the impact of contingent
tax liability on a buyer ofa private, closely-held corporation and concluded a large
majority of buyers would discount the stock and negotiate a lower purchase price
due to the existence of a contingent tax liability on the corporation's appreciated
property).

***
Further, we believe, contrary to the opinion of the Tax Court, since the General
Utilities doctrine has been revoked by statute, a tax liability upon liquidation or sale
for built-in capital gains is not too speculative in this case. Courts previously have
allowed discounts for built-in capital gains if, among other factors, payment of tax
on a capital gain is likely. See, e.g., Obenner v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29,3436 (D. Haw. 1964) (finding expert testimony showed built-in capital gains tax
would necessarily adversely affect value of stock at issue to willing buyer, and in
allowing discount, contrasted the facts with Estate of Cruikshank, 9 T.C. 162, a
case relied on by appellee); see generally Clark v. United States, No. 1309, 1309,
1975 WL 610, at *4,5 (E.D.N.C. May 16, 1975) (stating a well-informed willing
buyer ofstock in corporation would consider that underlying assets ofcorporation
included inactive investment portfolio that, upon liquidation, would incur
substantial capital gains tax liability).
Although the Tax Court in this case held that "the primal)' reason for disallowing
a discount for capital gains taxes in this situation is that the tax liability itself is
deemed to be speculative, Eisenberg, 74 T.C. M. (CCH) at 1048, we disagree. We
H
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believe that an adjustment for potential capital gains tax liabilities should be taken
into account in valuing the stock at issue in the closely held C corporation even
though no liquidation or sale of the Corporation or its assets was planned at the
time of the gift of the stock. We therefore remand this matter to the Tax Court to
ascertain the gift tax to be paid by the taxpayer consistent with this opinion.
The only guidance given by the court for the way in which the potential capital gains tax should be considered
was provided by footnote 16:
Where there is a relatively sizable number of potential buyers who can avoid or
defer the tax, the fair market value of the shares might well approach the pre-tax
market value of the real estate. Potential buyers who could avoid or defer the tax
would compete to purchase the shares, albeit in a ~arket that would include similar
real estate that was not owned by a corporation. However, where the number of
potential buyers who can avoid or defer the tax is small, the fair market value ofthe
shares might be only slightly above the value ofthe real estate net of taxes. In any
event, all of these circumstances should be detennined as a question of valuation
for tax purposes.
Subsequently, in Estate ofHelen Bolton Jameson v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-43, the court calculated
the discount as the net present value of the capital gains tax liability as the court estimated it would be incurred. The
company at issue was a timber company. The estate valued the stock on the basis of income not assets but the court
disagreed and accepted the IRS's expert opinion as valuing the assets as a holding company was more appropriate.
As a holding company, the court found that the company would recognize its built-in gain as it cuts timber over
time based on four variables: (I) the rate at which the timber grows, (2) the effects of inflation, (3) capital gains tax
rates, and (4) the discount rate. The court selected variables within the range of figures offered by the various experts
and assumed alU1ual timber growth of 10%, 4% inflation, 34% in capital gains tax rate, and 20% discount rate. The
court assumed 9 years of timber sales on a sustainable yield basis.
The estate owned'virtually all ofthe company stock and the court rejected a 10% lack ofmarketability discount
in favor of a 3% lack of marketability discount primarily because no expert testimony was offered by the taxpayer on
that subject. The court found that approximately 3% of the company's total assets were completely unmarketable.
The Sixth Circuit has reversed and remanded to the Tax Court the case of Estate of Pauline Welch v.
Commissioner, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-1200 (March 1,2000), for a detennination ofthe appropriate built in gains discount.
The opinion gave no guidance on the calculation.
On August 1, 2002 the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the Tax Court in Estate of Beatrice E. Dunn, et
at. v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339. The opinion states:
The sole issue presented by this appeal from the United States Tax Court (the "Tax
Court") is the fair market value of a block of common stock in Dunn Equipment,
Inc. ("Dunn Equipment or the "Corporation") owned by the late Beatrice Ellen
Jones Dunn (the "Decedent") on the date of her death (the tfvaluation date") for
purposes of calculating the estate tax owed by Petitioner-Appellant Estate of
Beatrice Ellen Jones Dunn, Deceased (the "Estate"). The Tax Court valued the
Decedent's shares higher than had the Estate on the Form 706 (the "estate tax
return" or the "return") filed by Jesse L. Dunn III, the Decedent's Independent
Executor (the nExecutor but lower than had Respondent-Appellee Commissioner
U
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oflntemal Revenue (the "Commissioner We conclude that the Tax Court erred
as a matter of law in the valuation methodology that it selected and applied to facts
that are now largely uncontested by virtue of stipulations, concessions, and nonerroneous findings of that court. This legal error produced an incorrect valuation
and thus an erroneous final Tax Court judgment as to the Estate's tax deficiency,
requiring remand to that court.
).

We hold that the correct methodology for detennining the value of Dunn
Equipment as ofthe valuation date requires application ofan 85: 15 ratio, assigning
a weight of 85% to the value of the Corporation that the Tax Court determined to
be $1,321,740 when using its "earnings-based approach" and a weight of 15% to
the value that the court detennines on remand using its asset-based approach'f but
only after recomputing the Corporationfs value under this latter approach by
reducing the market value of the assets by 34% of their built-in taxable gain -- not
by the 5% as previously applied by that court-- of the built-in gain (excess of net
sales value before taxes over book value) of the assets, to account for the inherent
gains tax liability of the assets.
f1

We therefore remand this case to the Tax Court for it to (1) redetennine the assetbased value using a 34% reduction for built-in tax liability; (2) recalculate the fair
market value of the Corporation based on that 85: 15 weighting ratio; (3) calculate
the value ofthe Estate's ratable portion ofthe total value ofthe Corporation as thus
redetennined; (4) discount the value of that ratable portion by 22.5% for lack of
market and lack of super- majority; (5) based on that result, redetennine the estate
tax liability of the Estate as well as any resulting overpayment of such taxes by the
Estate; and (6) render a final judgment consistent with this opinion and our
judgment.
The opinion discussed the built-in gains issue in a straightforward manner:
None can dispute that if Dunn Equipment had sold all of its heavy equipment,
industrial real estate, and townhouse on the valuation date, the Corporation would
have incurred a 34% federal tax on the gain realized, regardless of whether that
gain were labeled as capital gain or ordinary income. The question, then, is not the
rate of the built-in tax liability of the assets or the dollar amount of the inherent
gain, but the method to employ in accounting for that inherent tax liability when
valuing the Corporation·s assets (not to be confused with the ultimate task of
valuing its stock).
The Estatefs expert took the position that, when determining the asset-based value
to be used in calculating the fair market value of the Corporation, its assets must
be treated as though they had in fact been sold., in which event the Corporation
would have incurred federal income tax equal to 34% of the gain realized on the
sale. This in tum would have instantly reduced the Corporationfs fair market value,
dollar for dollar, for taxes payable. But, if the willing buyer were to purchase the
Decedent's block of stock with the assets still owned by the Corporation, then
regardless ofwhether thereafter that buyer could and would cause all or essentially
all of the Corporation's assets to be sold, either in the ordinary course of business
or globally in liquidation, the value to the Corporation of its assets qua assets
would still be the amount that the Corporation could realize on disposition ofthose
assets, net of all costs (including gains tax). The Estate contends that, like
advertising and transportation costs, commissions, and other unavoidable expenses
of disposition of these assets accepted by the Tax Court, the assets' gross value
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must be reduced by their built-in gains tax liability to reach their net fair market
value for purposes of calculating the asset-based value of the Corporation.
In diametric opposition, the Commissioner argued to the Tax Court that no
reduction for built-in tax liability should be allowed. He grounded this contention
solely on the assertion that liquidation was not imminent or even likely.
Although the Tax Court accepted the 34% rate and acknowledged that the value of
the Corporation had to be reduced by some factor to account for inherent tax
liability of its assets., the court followed the Commissioner's "no imminent
liquidation" red herring and concluded that only if the hypothetical willing buyer
of the Decedent's block of stock intended to liquidate the Corporation in the short
term -- which the holder of that block of stock, acting alone, could not force -would that buyer seek a substantial reduction for built-in capital gain. The Tax
Court then proceeded to discuss such a postulational buyer's alternatives to
liquidation and to calculate the present value (actually, negative value) offuture tax.
liability. The court concluded that the asset-based value ofDunn Equipment should
be reduced by only 5% for potential tax costs, not by the full 34% gains tax that the
Corporation would have to pay when and if its assets were sold, whether in globo
or seriatim.
The Tax Court's fundamental error in this regard is reflected in its statement that -for purposes of an asset-based analysis of corporate value -- a fully-infonned
willing buyer of corporate shares (as distinguished from the Corporation's
assemblage of assets) constituting an operational-control majority would not seek
a substantial price reduction for built-in tax liability, absent that buyer's intention
to liquidate. This is simply wrong: It is inconceivable that, since the abolition ofthe
General Utilities doctrine and the attendant repeal of relevant LR.C. sections, such
as §§§§ 333 and 337, any reasonably infonned, fully taxable buyer (1) of an
operational- control majority block of stock in a corporation (2) for the purpose of
acquiring its assets, has not insisted that all (or essentially all) of the latent tax
liability of assets held in corporate solution be reflected in the purchase price of
such stock.
We are satisfied that the hypothetical willing buyer of the Decedent's block of
Dunn Equipment stock would demand a reduction in price for the built-in gains tax
liability ofthe Corporation's assets at essentially 100 cents on the dollar, regardless
of his subjective desires or intentions regarding use or disposition of the assets.
Here, that reduction would be 34%. This is true "in spades" when, for purposes of
computing the asset-based value of the Corporation, we assume (as we must) that
the willing buyer is purchasing the stock to get the assets, whether in or out of
corporate solution. We hold as a matter of law that the built-in gains tax liability
of this particular business's assets must be considered as a dollar-for-dollar
reduction when calculating the asset-based value of the Corporation, just as,
conversely, built-in gains tax liability would have no place in the calculation of the
Corporation's earnings-based value.
The Tax Court made a more significant mistake in the way it factored the
"likelihood ofliquidation into its methodology, a quintessential mixing of apples
and oranges: considering the likelihood of a liquidatIon sale of assets when
calculating the asset-based value of the Corporation. Under the factual totality of
this case, the hypothetical assumption that the assets will be sold is a foregone
ff

A-58

concluaion •• a given - for purposes of the asset..based test. The process of
detennining the value of the 88ICtB for tbiB face of the uset-based valuation
metb.od.o1oaYmust start with the buic assumption that all assets will be sold, eith!r
by Dum Equipment to the willing buyer or by the wiDing buyer oftha Decedent's
block of stock after he acquires her stoc:k. By defiDiti~ the asset-based value of
a corporation is arounded in the fair I!Y!km value of its 8IIets (a figure fouDd by
the Tax Court IDd not contested by the estata), which In tum is determinecl by
applying the wnerable willina buyer-willingseBer test, By its very definition, this
eaatemplates the consummatfo n oftbe pwdlaso and sale ofthe property, i.e., the
asset being wIued. Otherwise 1he hypotbetical willing parties would be called
something other than "buyer" and "seller. tt
In other words, when one facet of the valuation process requires a subdctennination baed onthe value oftha compIIty'l assets, thai value must be tested
In the same willing buyerlwilUns seUer crucible as is the stock itself, which
presupposes that the property being valued is in fact bought aDd sold. It is
lXiamatic that an asset-baseel valWitioa starts with the gross market (sales) value
of the underlying assets dtemaelves, and, u observ~ the Tax Coutt'. finding in
that regard it uncbal1qed on appeal: When the startin& point is the UIUDlptkm of
sale, the "likelihood.tt is 100%1

This truism is confirmed by its obverse in todaYs dual. polar-opposite approad1ca
assumption in the inoome or cash-flow
approach is that the assets are retained by the Corporation, i.e.t • globally
disposed of in liquidation or otherwise. Sot just as the Itartins point for the UIetbaed approach in this case ia the assumption that the usets are sold, the ItIrtiDg
point torthe eamiDga-based approach is thatthe Corpotationts llsets are retainedare 00l sold, (other than as trade-ins for new rcp1aoemeDt assets in the ordinary
course ofbuiiness) - and will be UBed as an integral part of its onsoing business
operations. This duly accounts for·the value of assets - unsold - in the active
operations of the Corporation IS one inextricably intertwined element of the
(cash flow; 1SSetS), The _

~~~~~~.

.

Bottom Line: The likelihood of liquidation has no place in either of the two
disparate approaches to valuiDs this particuJar operating company. We hasten to
add, however, that the Jjlq;lihgod ofligyidation does play a key role in appraisq
the Decedents block ofstock, and that role is in the _
of the relative
wc;SgbtJI to be given to those two approaches: The lesset· tbe IikS'ihMd of
liquidation (or sale of essentially all assets), the greater the SIIi (perceDtaae)
that must be usianed tothe eaminp{cash flow)-based approach and, perforce, the
letser the weiaht to be assigned to the aaet-bascd approach.

Belabored as our point misht be, it illustrates the reason why, in conchlctiDs its
uaet-bued approach to valuing Dunn Equipman, the Tax Court erred wbeb it
grounded its time-use-of.-rnoneyreduorion ofthe 34% pins tax factor to 5% 011 the
usumption that the corporation's usets would ~ likely be sold in liquidation. As
explained, the likelihood of liquidation is inapposite to the asset-bascd approach
. to valuation.
In our recentrapome to a similarly missuided applioation ofthe built-in pins tax
fiotor by the Tax Court, we rejected its treatmeDt u based on "iDtemaIJy
lncoDsistentUlUDlptlons. tI In that case we reYersecl and remanded with iDstructions
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for the Tax Court to reconsider its valuation of the subject corporation's timber
property values by using a more straightforward c<qJital gains tax reduction.
Similarly, because valuing Dunn Equipment's underlying corporate assets is not the
equivalent of valuing the Company's capital stock on the basis of its assets, but is
merely one preliminary exercise in that process, the threshold assumption in
conducting the asset-based valuation approach as to this company must be that the
underlying assets would indeed be sold. And to whom? To a fully infonned, noncompelled, willing buyer. That is always the starting point for a fair market value
detennination of assets qua assets. That determination becomes the basis for the
company's asset-based value, which must include consideration of the tax
implications of those assets as owned by that company.
We must reject as legal error, then, the Tax Court's treatment of built-in gains tax
liability and hold that -- under the court's asset-based approach -- detennination of
the value ofOunn Equipment must include a reduction equal to 34% ofthe taxable
gain inherent in those assets as of the valuation date. Moreover, the factually
detennined, ttrealworldtt likelihood of liquidation is not a factor affecting built-in
tax liability when conducting the asset-based approach to valuing Dunn Equipment
stock. Rather, the probability of a liquidation's occurring affects only (but
significantly) the relative weights to be assigned to each of the two values once
they have been determined under the asset- based and income-based approaches,
respectively -- which brings us to the second methodology issue presented in this
appeal.
[footnotes omitted]
6.

Discounting Other Assets For Built-In Income Taxes. The Tax Court of New Jersey rejected the

argument that an IRA should be valued "net" of income taxes in Carlin v. Director, 2001 WL 1677449 (N.J. Tax):
New Jersey Transfer Inheritance Tax is computed "upon the clear market value of
the property transferred" subject to certain specific deductions, none of which
expressly includes income tax liability, "and no others. N.J.S.A. 54 :34-5. Plaintiff
contends that his claimed reduction in the taxable value of the IRA is not a *547
deduction under N.J.S.A. 54:34-5. He characterizes the reduction as a discount in
value resulting froin the income tax liability inherent in the IRA. Defendant
responds that plaintiffs attempt to reduc~ the taxable value of the IRA represents
an effort to take a deduction not pennitted by N.J.S.A. 54:34-5 and further
contends that, even ifthe reduction in taxable value is treated as a discount to clear
market value, the discount is not allowable under In re Estate ofRomnes, supra 79
N.J. 139, 398 A.2d 543.
tt

The Romnes decision is critical to the detennination of this appeal. Accordingly,
a detailed explanation and analysis of that decision is warranted. There, the
executors of the estate of Haakon I. Romnes sought a reduction, based on income
tax liability, in the value for Transfer Inheritance Tax purposes of an annuity
providing annual fixed income payments to the decedent's widow for the duration
of her life. The fund from which the annuity was to be paid was accumulated
during the decedent's lifetime from contributions to a pension plan by his employer.
Income taxes on contributions to the fund were deferred, and, as a result, the
annual annuity payments to Mrs. Romnes were subject to federal income tax. The
estate argued that, as ofthe date of death, the deferred tax obligation was a burden
upon the annuity payments to be received by Mrs. Romnes, and reduced their
value. "Otherwise expressed, it is argued that since Mrs. Rornnes will never enjoy
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in a beneficial sense that portion of her annuity payments that must be devoted to
paying income taxes, she should not now be required to pay an inheritance tax upon
what she will never beneficially receive:' Id. at 143, 398 A.2d 543. The estate
sought a value discount equal to the taxes payable by Mrs. Romnes with respect to
the annuity payments, assuming each payment was added to her other income.
In analyzing the estate's argument, the Supreme Court defined "clear market value"
under N.J.S.A. 54:34-5 as the equivalent of fair market value, that is, the price
which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller when neither is under
compulsion to buy or sell and both parties have reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts. Id. at 144-45, 398 A.2d 543. The Court commented that, in
detennining the clear market value ofassets for which there is not an active market,
a court must "create a hypothetical buyer and a hypothetical seller, whom we then
place in a hypothetical market place. We attribute to each of these persons all
infonnation which might affect value, and then, weighing all relevant factors,
decide how they would reach a price satisfactory to each.'t Id. at 145, 398 A.2d
543. This price or value must be detennined objectively without consideration of
any factors personal to either the hypothetical buyer or the hypothetical seller. "The
use ofan objective standard necessarily precludes resort to any factors personal to
the seller or the buyer. Courts have consistently so held." Id. at 1.47,398 A.2d 543.
In applying these principles to the annuity in question, the Supreme Court
concluded that neither a hypothetical seller nor a hypothetical buyer would be
concerned with Mrs. Romnes' tax liability.
A hypothetical purchaser ofsuch an income interest as this annuity would
be interested in the alUluitant's health, in her life style, and in the solvency
of the payor.... He would be utterly unconcerned with the annuitant's
personal income tax picture.
Nor would a hypothetical seller, about to divest himself of the income
interest, be concerned in any way with a presumptive future liability he
would never be called upon to meet. As soon as he divested himselfofthe
interest, the prospective future liability would cease to exist. The same
would be true if Mrs. Romnes herself is thought of as the seller. She
would have no interest in a prospective liability that was about to end.
Finally, is there any even remote possibility that Mrs. Romnes would
accept as the purchase price of her annuity the amount of money that she
asks the State of New Jersey to accept as being the value of this asset?
There is of course no such possibility.
[Id. at 148-49, 398 A.2d 543.]
The Court also noted that the result of pennitting a valuation discount calculated
in the manner suggested by the estate would be that the wealthier the recipient, the
greater the tax liability attributable to the annuity (because of the graduated tax
rates under the Internal Revenue Code) and, therefore, the greater the discount in
value which would be claimed.
Thus it would follow that the rich would pay a smaller [transfer
inheritance] tax than the less affluent and the very rich less than the rich.
This rather startling result must again rest upon presumed legislative
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intent. But of course neither this nor any other tax statute has ever been
intentionally drafted to classify taxpayers according to wealth and then
impose graduated taxes in such a way that the richest pay the least.
[Id. at 153, 398 A.2d 543.]

***
The law is well established that each taxpayer should pay his or her fair share of
taxes. See Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 8 N.J.Tax
354,358-59 (1986). IfTransfer Inheritance Taxes are reduced on a purely artificial
or hypothetical basis, without taking into account the actual amount that will be
received by the beneficiary, then the beneficiary may pay less than his or her fair
share oftaxes, or may pay excessive taxes. Calculating a proper valuation discount,
therefore, must involve consideration of the actual tax circumstances of the
beneficiary. However, consideration of those circumstances results in a deviation
from the objective standard of value applicable for purposes of determining
Transfer Inheritance Tax. In re Estate of Romnes, supra, 79 N.J. at 147, 398 A.2d
543.
Plaintiff is correct in asserting that, without a discount in the value of the IRA, he
will pay Transfer Inheritance Tax on a portion of the IRA which must be used to
pay federal and New Jersey income taxes. There appears to be some degree of
unfairness in this result. But, as the preceding analysis demonstrates, allowing a
discount based on income tax liability is not appropriate for two reasons: 1)
detennining the proper discount requires abandonment ofthe objective standard of
value, because calculating income tax liability without regard to the actual tax
circumstances of the beneficiary could result in an excessive or inadequate
discount, and 2) the Romnes decision precludes such a discount.
In TAM 200247001 the IRS agreed. The TAM states:
In Estate of Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 T.e. 222 (1977), during her lifetime,
the decedent sold stock in exchange for a promissory note. The decedent properly
elected to report the gain on this sale ratably as each payment was received, under
the installment method pursuant to section 453. The decedent died before the note
was satisfied. In detennining the value of the note includible in the gross estate,
Decedent's executor discounted the note to reflect the potential income taxes that
would be payable on" receipt of subsequent installment payments. The court
concluded that under the "willing buyer-willing seller" standard ofthe regulations,
property is to be valued at the price a hypothetical willing buyer would pay a
willing seller and not the intrinsic value of the property in the hands of the
individual decedent or his beneficiaries. In this case, on purchase of the note, a
willing buyer's basis in the note would be increased to the purchase price, and thus,
the buyer would not incur any income tax on receipt of the installments. The fact
that the willing seller might incur income tax on the sale of the note does not
impact on the sales price. Accordingly, a willing buyer would not take potential
income tax into account in detennining what he would be willing to pay for the
note, and a willing seller would not accept any discount for potential income tax
in determining the price of sale. The court also noted that taking potential income
tax into account would require consideration of many factors that are peculiar to
the individual decedent, the decedent's estate and the beneficiaries. Consideration
of these subjective factors would not be consistent with the "willing buyer-willing
seller" standard that looks to hypothetical parties.
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Finally, the court in Estate of Robinson stated that Congress focused on the
problem of income tax inherent in certain assets included in the gross estate by
allowing an income tax deduction under section 691(c). As discussed above,
section 691(c) provides an income tax deduction determined by reference to the
estate tax attributable to the assets. The court reasoned that Congress recognized
that an installment obligation which includes income in respect of a decedent is
subject to both income tax and estate tax. Congress chose to ameliorate the impact
of the income taxation of the property by allowing an income tax deduction under
section 691(c). The court found that there was no basis for supplementing this
income tax relief with additional estate tax relief.
We believe the court's rationale in Estate of Robinson is equally applicable in the
instant case involving Decedent's IRAs. As was the case in Estate of Robinson, the
fact that these assets are subject to income tax on distribution, should not impact
on the application of the "willing buyer- willing seller" standard. The IRA .
distributee can sell the assets at market price without any discount. A willing seller
would not accept any discount on the sales price. The situation is analogous to that
presented where a donor transfers low basis property by gift. The value of the gift
for gift tax purposes is the undiscounted value of the property because that is the
amount a willing buyer would be willing to pay for the property, and it is also the
minimum amount for which the willing seller would sell the property. The fact that
the donee might incur income tax upon a later sale of the property does not
decrease the value ofthe gift, which is detennined under the "willing buyer-willing
seller" standard.
Further, as was the case in Estate of Robinson, the adverse impact of the potential
income tax inherent in the IRAs is alleviated by the section 691 (c) deduction. Thus,
this income tax benefit functions as a statutoI}' substitute for the valuation discount.
Under these circumstances, any additional reduction in estate tax for the potential
income tax would be unwarranted. See Estate of Robinson, 69 T.e. at 226 - 227.
Finally, the value of the IRAs should not be discounted due to lack of
marketability. While section 408(e) imposes penalties on the transfer or assignment
of the IRA, there are no restrictions preventing the distribution of assets to the
beneficiaries after decedenfs death. The beneficiaries can request that the custodian
distribute the assets ofthe lRAs and the beneficiaries can then sell the assets to any
willing buyer. Furthermore, short administrative delays in processing the
beneficiaries' request for distribution should not warrant a discount. The underlying
assets are marketable, so no valuation discount should apply. Accordingly, the
value of Decedent's IRAs should not be discounted for estate tax purposes to
reflect income taxes that will be payable by the beneficiaries upon receipt of
distributions from the IRAs, or for lack of marketability.
The TAM distinguished Eisenberg v. Commissioner, ] 55 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998):
The situation in Eisenberg is distinguishable from the facts in this case. Upon sale
of the stock of the corporation, a hypothetical buyer ofthe stock in Eisenberg will
obtain a cost basis for the stock that he purchases~ but the corporation's bas is in its
assets will not change. When the corporation liquidates or distributes the assets, a
capital gains tax will be imposed. This potential liability reduces the inherent value
of the corporation to the buyer. However, in the instant case, if we assume
arguendo that the IRAs could be sold, the hypothetical buyer, as in Estate of
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Robinson, would receive a cost basis in the assets and would not incur any income
tax on the resale of those assets, unless the assets appreciate in value. Therefore,
the hypothetical buyer will be willing to pay the full value ofthe underlying assets
for the IRA. Although the seller might incur income tax on the sale (see section
408(e)(2», this income tax liability cannot be the basis for an estate tax valuation
discount.
Further, we do not believe that for valuation purposes an IRA is properly viewed
as a separate entity, like a corporation. Rather, an IRA is a custodial arrangement
and the stocks, bonds, and mutual funds held in the IRA are properly viewed as
individual assets no different than stocks and bonds held in a brokerage account.
Finally, and most significantly, Eisenberg did not involve a situation where the
adverse impacts of the potential income tax is alleviated by the section 691(c)
deduction as is the case here. As discussed above, we believe that this deduction
is a statutory remedy for the adverse income tax impact and makes any valuation
discount inappropriate, if the deduction applies.
The estate also cites Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.
1999), rev g 108 T.C. 412 (1997), nonacq. 2000-19 IRB I (May 8,2000). In Estate
of Smith, prior to his death, the decedent had been paid oil and gas royalties and
had reported the payments as income. Subsequently, the corporate payor of the
royalties sued the decedent for $2.48 million dollars, claiming the payments had
been excessive by that amount The proceeding was still pending at the time of
decedent's death. Fifteen months after decedents' death, the estate settled the suit
for $681,840. The estate claimed a deduction under section 2053, as a claim against
the estate, for $2.48 million, the amount the decedent was being sued for at the date
of death. The Fifth Circuit held that the amount deductible was the value of the
claim as of the date of death detennined without consideration of the post-death
settlement. Further, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the income tax benefit inuring
to the estate under section 1341 (providing relief in the form of an income tax
deduction or credit to taxpayers who are forced to repay an amount previously
taken into income) was one ofthe factors to be considered in valuing the claim, and
was not to be included as a separate asset, as the Tax Court had concluded.
Similarly, in the instant case, it could be argued that tax benefit available ,under
section 691(c) is merely a factor to be taken into account in determining the
appropriate discount
1

In TAM 2003030 10 the IRS refused to allow income taxes due on accrued interest on Series E u.s. savings
bonds to create a lack of marketability discount The TAM states:
In Rev. Rut. 55-278, 1955-1 C.B" 471, in 1948, A purchased entirely with his own
funds Series E United States savings bonds and registered the bonds in the names
of A and his son B. In 1953, the bonds were reissued in the name ofB alone in
order to effect a gift to him. The Service held that the redemption value of Series
E United States savings bonds at the time reissued is the proper value to be used
by A with respect to the gift for federal gift tax purposes. In the ruling, the Service
stated since Series E United States savings bonds are generally nonnegotiable and
nontransferable, they are nonmarketable and, accordingly, have no particular
'market' value. Although ownership therein is transferable by death and by reissue
in certain cases, (citing Department Circular No. 530, supra) their only definitely
indicated or ascertainable value is the amount at which they are redeemable by the
United States Treasury. In that ruling, the Service referred to an earlier
1f

If
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memorandum issued by the Service in which the Service held that Series E United
States savings bonds are includible in the gross estate at their redemption value.
Mim. 5109, C.B. 1940-2,283, and Mim. 5002, C.B. 1941-2,241.
The estate asserts that the interpretation by the Service in Rev. RuL 55-278 "clearly
contravenes the definition ofwilling buyer discussed in section 20.2031-1 (b)." The
estate argues that "[t]he contractual limitation on U.S. Savings Bonds, that they are
only redeemable by the United States Treasury, does not change the definition of
a hypothetical willing buyer." According to the estate, a hypothetical willing buyer
of the bonds would consider the built-in income tax liability in detennining the
amount he would be willing to pay for those bonds. In support ofthis position, the
estate relies on Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998) and Estate
of Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998).
tf

ff

***
Under consideration in this case and in the revenue ruling is an issue similar to the
issue considered by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973). In Cartwright, the Court granted certiorari to
detennine the value of shares of mutual funds to be included in a decedent's gross
estate under section 2031. The mutual fund shares were not traded on exchanges
or generally in the over-the-counter market, but were sold by the investment fund
through a principal underwriter, and redeemed by the fund, at prices which were
related to the net asset value. The Court stated that in implementing section 2031,
the value of property is to be determined by its fair market value at the time of
decedent's death and the fair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts.
The Court recognized the fact that the fund was under an obligation to redeem its
shares at the redemption price and stated "that shares so held are, in important
respects, similar to ordinary corporate stock held subject to a restrictive agreement,
... so long as the restriction is a bona fide one, the value of the shares in the hands
of the restricted stockholder is detennined in accordance with the tenns of the
restriction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h). Outstanding mutual fund shares are
likewise held subject to a restriction, as the Court of Appeals noted.... Those
shares may not be "sold" at the public offering price. By statute, they may be "sold"
back to the mutual fund only at the redemption price. We see no validjustification
for disregarding this reality connected with the ownership of mutual fund shares. 1f
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the redemption price was the value to be
used in reporting the funds in the gross estate of the decedent.
Similarly, in this case and the revenue ruling, the only willing seller is the decedent
or decedent's estate and the only willing buyer is the United States government. By
contractual arrangement, the Bonds will be redeemed by the United States Treasury
at the redemption price.
Eisenberg and Davis are distinguishable from this case. In those cases, the
taxpayers transferred stock in a closely held corporation to family members. In
valuing the stock for gi ft tax purposes, the taxpayers discounted the value of the
stock to take into account the potential capital gains tax liabilities that may be
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incurred by the corporation ifthe corporation were to liquidate or distribute and sell
its appreciated assets. In each case, the court held that the taxpayer was entitled to
a discount for the potential capital gains tax liabilities because the court detennined
that a hypothetical buyer would take the corporationts potential capital gains tax
liabilities into account in determining the value of the stock.
Eisenberg and Davis involve situations in which the hypothetical willing buyer
acquires stock in a corporation that owns appreciated assets with built-in capital
gain. The fact that the buyer will pay tax on the sale ofthe appreciated assets may
be a factor in determining the price the willing buyer would pay for the stock. This
case involves a situation in which the hypothetical willing seller must include in
his/her gross income the interest accrued on the Bonds prior to the date of the
t1 sale" (the redemption). Under section 454(c), the accrued interest on the Bonds
is includible in the gross income of the taxpayer in the taxable year in which the
obligation is fmally redeemed or in the taxable year offinal maturity, whichever is
earlier. The income tax on the accrued interest is paid by the seller in this case. The
courts recognize that it is not appropriate to allow a discount for the hypothetical
willing seller's costs in detennining the fair market value of an asset for estate tax
purposes.

G.

SECTION 2032 -- ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A -- SPECIAL USE
VALUATION
No developments.

H.

SECTIONS 2035-2038 -- RETAINED INTERESTS
1.

Retained Interest in Residence. Clients often want to make gifts of interests in a residence while

continuing to live in the residence. In general, it is prudent to avoid doing so.
The issue arose in Estate of Rebecca A. Wineman v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2000-193, and was resolved
favorably for the taxpayer. The opinion states:
The first issue for decision is whether decedent retained a life interest in the partial
interests in her homestead property that she gave to her children. Respondent
increased decedent's gross estate by the value of a life estate in the aggregate 24percent interest of her homestead property (parcel 3) that decedent gave to her
children. Respondent asserts that the value of that interest is properly includable
in decedent's gross estate pursuant to section 2036(a) because she retained a life
estate in that interest. Petitioner does not dispute respondent's valuation of the
purported life estate but contends that decedent retained no such interest in her
homestead property. Petitioner bears the burden of proof. See Rule 142(a); Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U.S. III (1933).
In support of its contention that decedent retained no life estate in the children's
partial interests, petitioner points out that decedent used much less than 76 percent
of parcel 3 and the main house. Petitioner also points to Dean's [one of the
decedent's children] testimony to the effect that no agreement existed, implied or
otherwise, for decedent to retain the possession and enjoyment of the partial
interests at the time she transferred those interests to her chiIdren. Respondent
argues that Dean's testimony is self-serving and contrary to the objective facts and
circumstances. Although Dean's testimony was clearly self-serving, we disagree
with the assertion that the testimony was contrary to the objective facts and
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circumstances~

and we ultimately agree with petitioner that decedent did not retain
a life estate includable in her gross estate under section 2036.

A decedent's reservation of a life interest need not be provided for expressly in the
instrument oftrans fer or enforceable under local law to be includable under section
2036. See Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 29 T.e. 1179 (1958), affd. 265
F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959). An implied agreement at the time of transfer for the
decedent to continue possession or enjoyment ofthe property is sufficient and may
be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the transfer. See Guynn v.
United States, 437 F.2d 1148~ 1150 (4th Cir. 1971). In detennining whether an
implied agreement existed, "all facts and circumstances surrounding the transfer
and subsequent use of the property must be considered. Estate of Rapelje v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 82, 86 (1979); sec. 20.2036-1(a), Estate Tax Regs.
1t

Decedent gave her children, collectively, a 24-percent interest in parcel 3. Parc~l
3 consisted ofjust over 10 acres and had two houses, two large barns, a small bam,
a granary, a fann shop, cattle scales and corrals, two garages, and a small orchard.
Pursuant to its leases of decedent's properties, Coastal Ranches stored hay in the
barns, used the corrals and fann shop, and kept vehicles in a garage and one of the
big barns. Decedent occupied the larger house, although Dean kept his desk and
bookkeeping papers in one of the bedrooms and used it as an office. Another
bedroom was used primarily by Marian when she visited from Montana. Coastal
Ranches used an office in the main house. Dean resided in the smaller house on the
homestead property. Other than the main house, decedent's personal use of parcel
3 was limited to the garden and small orchard next to the main house.
Decedent's limited personal use of the property does not prove the absence of an
implied agreement. In fact, the record is silent as to whether decedent could
designate who might enjoy the property. See sec. 2036(a)(2); see also United States
v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 145 (1972) (possession and enjoyment are synonymous
with substantial present economic benefit). The fact that decedent personally
usedless than all of the property does not demonstrate that she did not possess and
enjoy the entire property.
In contrast, where a decedent continues exclusive possession and continues to pay
taxes and other property expenses after the transfer and the owner of record title
neither charges rent nor takes possession of the property, these facts are highly
indicative of an implied agreement. See Guynn v. United States, supra at 1150;
Estate of Rapelie v. Commissioner, supra at 87. Here~ however, decedent shared
the property with Dean and his wife and rented the property at a below-market rent
(discussed in more detail infra sec. [I) to Coastal Ranches. Pursuant to its leases,
Coastal Ranches paid the taxes and other property expenses associated with parcel
3. These facts do not of themselves prove the absence of an implied agreement.
On balance, the objective facts convince us that an implied agreement giving
decedent continuing possession and enjoyment ofthe entire homestead property did
not exist. Unlike the authority that has been cited in respondent's brief, this case
involves a transfer of less than a fee simple interest in property. The majority
owner's continued use and possession of real property following tra~sfer of a
minority interest is not unusual. Cf. Gutchess v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 554, 557
(1966) (where a husband transferred his entire interest in a homestead property to
his wife, who then allowed him to live in the house without charge, the donor's
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continued use and enjoyment is a natural use which does not diminish the wife's
enjoyment and possession). In this case, decedent's continued use and possession
of parcel 3, of which she owned a controlling interest, is natural in light of the
children's minority ownership. It is not surprising that the children did not seek to
partition the property" since they also used the property regularly and they had only
a minority interest in the property.
In addition to the objective facts, our decision rests heavily on Dean's testimony
that there was no understanding between decedent and her children. While his
testimony was clearly self- serving, Dean's testimony was straightforward,
unequivocal, and credible. Respondent's counsel chose not to cross-examine him
on this point. Because we credit his testimony, we hold that petitioner has carried
its burden of proving that there was no implied agreement. Cf. Hendry v.
Commissioner, 62 T.e. 861, 872 (1974).
In re Estate of Grace Fracasso, 2000 WL 1262639 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 2000) (an unpublished decision) the
grantor gave her residence to her three children as tenants in common but lived there rent free. The court did not apply
an Ohio estate tax statute that is similar to section 2036. The court attached great significance to the children paying
all the expenses and taxes on the property and that they leased a portion to third parties. Estate of Maxwell v.
Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993), was decided against the taxpayer on section 2036 grounds; there the court
concluded there was an "understanding" the decedent could live in the residence.
More recently, the Tax Court in Estate of Eleanor T.R. Trotter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-250, 82
T.C.M. (CCH) 633, also decided against the taxpayer. In December, 1993 Mrs. Trotter gave her condominium to a
Crummey trust for the benefit of her grandchildren with her daughter as trustee. The trust also provided for Mrs.
Trotter~s

husband to live there rent-free for one year after Mrs. Trotter's death ifhe paid the expenses. Me Trotter could

rent or buy the condominium after that. The opinion described subsequent events:
Following the trust's creation, none of the beneficiaries attempted to exercise a
right of withdrawal. Decedent and Mr. Trotter continued to live in the
condominium as their primary residence until decedent's death on January 31,
1996. No rental payments were made by decedent and/or Mr. Trotter to the trust
from December 17,1993, to January 31,1996. During this period, decedent paid
all occupancy expenses related to the condominium, including maintenance
expenses, utilities, property taxes, condominium fees, and premiums for insurance
coverage. No bank account was maintained by or for the trust, and, with the
exception ofthe above-referenced transfer oftitle to the condominium, the trust did
not receive or distribute any cash or other property during this time.
As previously indicated, decedent died on January 31, 1996. Thereafter, for a
period of3 months, Mr. Trotter continued to reside in the condominium. He made
no rental payments to the trust with respect to his occupancy. During this period,
and until at least June of 1996, the trust expended no funds for maintenance,
utilities, taxes, or fees; received no further cash or property; and distributed no
assets for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
On July 12, 1996, the condominium was sold for a purchase price of$ 155,000. The
proceeds ofthe sale were distributed by the closing agent to the beneficiaries ofthe
trust, and the trust \vas tenninated.
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The court looked to the absence of rent and the fact that occupancy expenses were paid as indicia of a section
2036 retained interest. The opinion goes on to state:
Furthermore, we find the particular terms ofthe trust instrument at issue here to be
highly supportive ofan implied arrangement that decedent would retain possession
of the condominium. Specifically, we emphasize that the express tenns of the
agreement granted Mr. Trotter a right to possess the property for a period following
decedent's death. We believe that there would have been little, if any, reason to
include such language absent an understanding that decedent and her husband
would be living in the home at the time of her death.
Moreover, we are satisfied that the logical conclusion to be drawn from these terms
is not negated by the withdrawal provisions upon which the estate so heavily relies.
The numerous indicia discussed above are equally supportive of an implied
understanding that the withdrawal rights would not be exercised, an interpretation
buttressed by the awareness that the beneficiaries were decedent's grandchildren
(and three of the five were minors). We cannot blind ourselves to the reality ofthe
family relationships involved, and the estate has failed to show that the withdrawal
rights were anything more than a paper formality without intended economic
substance. In addition, such construction is strengthened still further by fact that
the trust's having been funded solely with a single piece of real estate would have
made any attempt to effectuate a withdrawal complex and burdensome at best.
While it is not entirely clear from the document how the provision would operate
in this circumstance, we doubt that any beneficiary would seriously have
contemplated forcing the trustee to sell the home so that he or she could collect
$10,000.
In PLR 200240020 husband bought a 50 year leasehold in a house and a few months before he died gave it to
his non-U.S. citizen wife. The ruling states:
Where a decedent transfers a residence to family members and then continues to
reside in the residence until death, the property will be includible in the decedent's
gross estate under § 2036(a)(I), ifthe decedent continues to occupy the residence
pursuant to an understanding between the parties, either express or implied, that the
decedent would retain possession or enjoyment ofthe property. See, e.g., Estate of
Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F. 3rd 591 (2d Cir.1993); Estate of Trotter v.
Commissioner, TCM 2001-250; Rev. Rut 70-155, 1970-1 C.B. 189. On the other
hand, where the decedent transfers the residence to his or her spouse, the decedent's
continued co-occupancy ofthe residence with the spouse after the transfer does not
raise any inference of an agreement or understanding as to retained possession or
enjoyment ofthe property by the decedent, such that the property would be subject
to inclusion under § 2036. Rev. Rut. 70-155, citing Estate of Gutchess v.
Commissioner, 46 T.e. 554 (1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2.
In the instant case, on Date I, prior to his death, Decedent irrevocably transferred
his leasehold interest in Residence to Spouse. We conclude that the transfer on
Date I was a completed gift for gift tax purposes under § 2511. The value of the
leasehold interest on Date I is subject to gift tax under § 250 I. Under § 2523(i),
the transfer does not qualify for the gift tax marital deduction. Further, as discussed
above, under the facts presented, the leasehold interest in Residence is not
includible in Decedent's gross estate under § 2036. Accordingly, §§ 2056(d) and
2056A are not applicable with respect to the leasehold interest.
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A different result was reached in PLR 200308046. There the facts presented were:
Father and Mother have two children, Son A and Son B. In 1992~ Mother died
from Alzheimer's disease. Father, concerned with his own medical situation and
desiring a simple and orderly accounting of his affairs, deeded his personal
residence, Residence, to his sons while retaining a life estate in Residence. Prior
to the execution of the deed, Father requested and received an oral promise from
his two sons to reconvey the property to Father in the event Father wanted the
Residence returned. The deed was executed on Date I. In early 1999,
approximately 3 years later, Father desired to move to another state and requested
a return of Residence in order to sell the property. Son A and B refused. Shortly
thereafter, Father commenced a lawsuit in State court seeking to create a
constructive trust and a reconveyance of the Residence to Father. After opposing
Father's law suit, the Sons, under a stipulation of settlement dated, Date 2, and
ordered by the court, deeded Residence to Father.
The ruling concluded there was no gift:
Section 25.2511-2(c) provides in part, that a gift is incomplete in every instance in
which a donor reserves the power to revest the beneficial title to the property in
himself. Similarly, in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Federal gift tax "is not aimed at every transfer
of the legal title without consideration. Such a transfer there would be if the
trustees were to hold for the use of the grantor. It is aimed at transfers of the title
that have the quality ofa gift, and a gift is not consummate until put beyond recall."
See also Rev. Rul. 54-537, 1954-2 C.B. 316, where the right to revest the beneficial
title to property transferred in trust by the donor is an incomplete gift, and Rev.
Rut. 74-365, 1974-2 C.B. 324, where the Service held a gift causa mortis was not
a completed gift because the gift was revocable and the subsequent return of the
property did not result in a gi ft.
In Faranov. Stephanelli, 183 N.Y.S. 2d 707 (N.Y.App. Div. 1959), a father deeded
his house and two other properties to his three daughters with an oral agreement
that if the father wanted the properties returned, the daughters would reconvey the
properties to their father. The father continued to live in the house. Six months later
the father requested a return 0 f the properties and one 0 f the daughters deeded her
interest back to the father. The remaining daughters refused an~ father brought suit
on the theory that a constructive trust was created. The trial court found there was
no express promise of reconveyance. On appeal, the court cited the Restatement,
Trusts, § 44, and, and other authorities that eta constructive trust will be imposed
if the transfer was procured, among other things, by fraud or in an abuse of a
confidential relationship. U The case was remanded for a new trial (even though the
trial court found no express promise of conveyance) to detennine, whether or not
there ·was a tacit promise or understanding that the properties were to be
reconveyed.
In the present case, Father deeded Residence to his sons reserving not only a life
estate but also the power to revest the property in himself. There is little doubt
under the facts of this case and under State law, that Father was entitled to a return
of Residence. As such, pursuant to a stipulated settlement, Sons deeded Residence
to Father. Accordingly, we conclude Father's conveyance of Residence to Sons A
and B is not a completed gift under § 2511 and will not be subject to tax under §
2501. See also § 25.2511-2(c) and Rev. Rul. 54-537. In addition, the reconveyance
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of Residence from Sons A and B to Father is not a gift by Son A and Son B under
§ 2511 and will not be subject to tax under § 2501.
2.

Inclusion of GRATin Estate. If the grantor/annuitant dies during the ORAT term, how much is

included in his or her estate? In TAM 200210009 the grantor died in year six and subsequent payments were made to
his estate. The charitable, remainder annuity trust rule includes only part of the assets. The TAM describes that rule:
Section 2036(a) provides that the value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein ofwhich the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in the case ofa bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money·s worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death, (I) the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income from the property.
In Rev. Rut. 82-105, 1982-1 C.B. 133, the decedent, prior to his death, created a
charitable remainder annuity trust, pursuant to which the decedent retained the right
to receive an annuity of 12x dollars for life. The ruling concludes that the
decedent's retained annuity represents the retained right to receive all ofthe income
from all or a specific portion ofthe trust for purposes ofsection 2036. Under Rev.
Rut. 82-105, the amount ofthe corpus with respect to which the decedent retained
the income is that amount of corpus that would be sufficient to yield the annual
annuity based on the assumed rate of return prescribed by the regulations as ofthe
applicable valuation date. The revenue ruling prescribes the following fonnula for
this determination:
(Annual Annuity) / (Assumed Rate of Return)

=

Amount Includible

That portion ofthe trust corpus with respect to which the decedent retained a right
to receive all of the income, as determined under the fonnula, is includible in the
decedent's gross estate under section 2036(a)(I). The ruling states that the holding
applies only to the portion ofthe value of a charitable remainder annuity trust that
is includible in the gross estate under §§ 2036. The ruling expressly does not
consider the amount, if any, that may be includible in the gross estate under any
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Here, however, the TAM goes on to apply section 2039 to include all of the GRAT:
We also believe that, under § 2039(a), 100 percent of the value of the GRAT
corpus on Decedent's date ofdeath is includible in the gross estate. In this case, the
annuity payable to the Decedent, and the payments to be made after Decedent's
death, are all payable under the terms of a trust instrument, which constitutes a
contract or agreement, as required under § 2039(a). Further, the annuity was paid
to Decedent for a period that did not in fact end before his death. Finally, under the
terms of the ORAT, the annuity and other payments receivable by the estate (and,
thus, the estate beneficiaries) and the remainder beneficiaries of the ORAT, are
receivable by reason ofsurviving the Decedent. Decedent's estate contends that this
final requirement is not satisfied in this case because, under the tenns of the
ORAT, Daughter, or any successor alternative remainder beneficiary, must survive
the tenn of the GRATin order to receive the remainder interest. Thus, the
remainder interest is not receivable by any person by reason of surviving the
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Decedent. Rather~ because an annuity is first payable to the estate for the balance
of the GRAT term, the remainder interest will be receivable by Daughter (or the
alternative successor beneficiaries) only by reason ofsurviving the 10 year tenn of
theGRAT.
However~ we

disagree that §2039(a) is not applicable to the entire GRAT corpus

in this case merely because the annuity or other payment is first payable to the
Decedent's estate for a tenn ofyears and then to the remainder beneficiaries, if they
are then living. For example, assume payments are to be made to a decedent for 10
years or his prior death, and on the earlier of the decedent's death or the expiration
of the 10 year period, the payments are to be made to the decedent's child (or the
child's issue if the child is not then living) for 15 years. It seems clear that if the
decedent died within the initial 10 year tenn and the payments continued to the
child, the survivor payments would be subject to inclusion under § 2039(a). The
payments to the child (or the child's issue) are receivable because of the decedent's
death, and because the child (or issue) survived the decedent. See, C. Lowndes, R.
Kramer, J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, §§ 10.6 (3rd ed. 1974). The
result should be the same if the payments commencing after the decedent's death
are first payable to the decedent's estate (and through the estate to the estate
beneficiaries) for a tenn of years and then to the child. The annuity and other
payments, whether payable initially to the estate beneficiaries and then to the child,
or initially to the child, commence by reason of the decedent's death and will be
received by the ultimate beneficiaries because they survived the decedent. The fact
that the total benefit payable after the decedent's death is divided between several
beneficiaries on a temporal basis should have no effect on the application of §§
2039(a). See also, Rev. Rul. 76-404, 1976-2 C.B. 294, in which a nonqualified
pension plan provides for a payment to the surviving spouse until death or
remarriage. Ifthe spouse dies or remarries, the annuity is payable to the decedent's
child under age 21 until they attain age 21. The primary focus ofthe revenue ruling
is whether the spouse's interest qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction.
However, the ruling states that the value ofthe annuity payments receivable by the
spouse and the child are includible under § 2039(a). Thus, the child's annuity is
viewed as receivable by reason of surviving the decedent, even though additional
conditions were imposed on the child's receipt of the annuity; that is, the child
could only receive the annuity if the spouse died or remarried before the child
attained age 21.
We believe this position is consistent with Congressional intent in
enacting § 2039(a) and (b). Prior to the enactment of § 2039, courts had
repeatedly concluded that a commercial survivor annuity payable after the
death of the primary annuitant/purchaser was includible in the primary
annuitant/purchaser's gross estate under the predecessor statutes to §
2036. See, e.,g., Commissionerv. elise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941). See
also, Rev. Rut. 55-302, 1955-1 C.B. 446. Section 2039 was added to the
Internal Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1954 to codify this result
and to provide rules for the estate taxation of survivor annuities payable
under employee pension plans. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess.
123 (June 18, 1954).
In enacting § 2039(a) and (b), Congress borrowed many aspects of § 2036 and its
predecessors, which had previously been held applicable to survivor annuities. For
example, § 2036 applies ifthe decedent retained an interest in transferred property
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for life or for a period not ascertainable without reference to death or for a period
that did not in fact end before death. Section 2039(a) applies if the decedent
received payments under a contract or agreement for these same periods. Section
2036 does not apply to transfers prior to March 4, 1931. Similarly, § 2039(a)
contains the identical effective date. Thus, it is clear tha~ in enacting § 2039(a) and
(b), Congress incorporated the operating rules for § 2036. Clearly~ § 2036 applies
where the decedent's retained interest in property, in fact, terminates at death and
the benefit of the property passes to others. Section 2039 applies under the same
circumstances; that is, where the decedent's annuity, in fact, terminates at death and
the benefits payable under the contract or agreement pass on to the survivors. As
is the case under § 2036, it should make no difference that, after the decedentts
death, the benefits are first payable to the decedent's estate for a tenn of years and
then to specified designated beneficiaries if they are then living.
3.

Application ofSection 2036 to Family Limited Partnerships. The IRS has attempted to minimize

or eliminate the discounts claimed by taxpayers through family limited partnerships with various arguments, some based
on general tax principles like the step-transaction doctrine and others more specifically Code based, typically sections
2703 and 2704. None of these arguments have been proven winners for the government. In fact, to date, most of the
instances in which taxpayers have had difficulty have been when the form ofthe partnership was not respected by those
involved. Stated another way, mistakes by the taxpayer and the taxpayer's family have generated about as many wins
for the government as the government has earned on its own. However, most recently the government has scored a
significant victory in Strangi.
The case of Estate of Morton B. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121, illustrates how taxpayers
often hurt their case. The decedent, Mr. Harper, and his children formed a limited partnership using the assets in Mr.
Harper's living trust. The particular facts recited by the court are important:
At a time not entirely clear from the record, decedent made the decision to form a
limited partnership and to contribute thereto the majority of his assets. An
Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial Company, L. P. (HFLP),
was prepared and sets forth the governing provisions for the entity. The document
begins with language stating that the Agreement was made "as of the Ist day of
January, 1994", but later recites that the partnership shall commence its existence
upon the date a certificate of limited partnership is duly filed with the California
Secretary of State.

***
Michael and Lynn were named as the general partners ofHFLP and the Trust as the
sole limited partner, with interests of .4 percent, .6 percent, and 99 percent,
respectively. Michael was also designated to serve as the managing general partner.

***
H

Although "the Portfolio is not defined in the Agreement, there appears to be no
dispute between the parties that it consisted of: (I) Securities held in a brokerage
account at M. L. Stem & Co., Inc., (2) securities held in a Putnam Investments
account, (3) securities held in two Franklin Fund accounts, (4) 2,500 shares of
Rockefellet Center Properties, Inc., and (5) a $450,000 note receivable from Jack
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P. Marsh. The parties·· value these assets at between $1.6 and $1.7 million
(rounded), an amount representing approximately 94 percent of decedent's total
assets. The Trust's capital account in HFLP was credited with 99 percent of the
value of the property contributed. Decedent retained, personally or through the
Trust, his personal effects., a checking account, an automobile, and his Palm
Springs condominium.

***
The Agreement was signed by decedent on behalfofthe Trust, by Michael., and by
Lyon. Although the signatures are undated, the document was executed by Michael
in Mayor June of 1994. Lynn could not remember when she signed the Agreement
and did not read it prior to signing. A certificate oflimited partnership was filed on
behalf of HFLP with the California Secretary of State on June 14, 1994.
From June 17 to June 20, 1994, decedent was hospitalized in Palm Springs.
Medical records prepared at that time contain the explanation set forth below:
This is one of multiple Desert Hospital admissions for this 85-year-old
Caucasian who is well known to have metastatic colonic carcinoma and
prostatic carcinoma and admitted at the prese~t time for poor oral intake,
poor fluid intake, dehydration and for further rehydration, close
observation, nutrition support, etc.
After his release, decedent went to Oregon, where he resided until his death. He
fIrst stayed with Michael for approximately a month and then moved into a nearby
Oregon retirement facility known as Cannen Oaks. Cannen Oaks served
independent individuals and was not a nursing center.
Thereafter, by a document entitled Assignment of Partnership Interest and
Amendment No. I to Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial
Company, L. P., dated and made effective as ofJuly 1, 1994, the Trust transferred
to Michael and Lynn 60 percent of the Trust's partnership interest. As a result,
Michael and Lynn became holders of 24-and 36-percent limited partnership
interests, respectively, and were given corresponding percentages of the Trust's
capital account balance. The limited partnership interests held by Michael and Lynn
were designated as tlClass B Limited Partnership Interest[slit and were entitled to
60 percent of the income and loss of the entity, with 40 percent thereof going to
Michael and 60 percent to Lynn.
The Amendment also reclassified the Trust's remaining 39- percent limited
partnership interest as a "Class A Limited Partnership Interest" which was entitled
to 39 percent of the entity's income and losses and to a "Guaranteed Payment" of
"4.25% annually of its Capital Account balance on the Effective Date, payable
quarterly no later than twenty (20) days after the close ofany such calendar quarter
(or sooner, if cash flow pennits)." Decedent, as trustee of the Trust, Michael, and
Lynn signed the document.
On July 26, 1994, decedent conunenced the process of transferring the Trust's
portfolio to the partnership, which process continued for approximately the next 4
months. On July 26, 1994, decedent executed as trustee an allonge endorsement
assigning to HFLP the Trust's interest in the Marsh note. A collateral assignment
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of the Trust's interest in property securing the note was also signed on that date.
Then, on August 28, 1994, a letter agreement confirming and/or finalizing the
transfer was executed by or on behalf of Mr. Marsh, the Trust, and HFLP.
Next, a letter dated September 29, 1994, was sent by decedent to M. L. Stem & Co.
confinning instructions for (I) the sale of all securities held in the Trust's account
and (2) the use of the proceeds for the immediate repurchase ofthe same securities
for an account established on behalf of the partnership. Michael, as managing
general partner., completed the requisite fonn opening a new account with M. L.
Stem & Co. for the partnership. The fonn designated Michael as the f1individual
* * * authorized to enter orders on behalf of customer". Neil Hattem served as
decedent's broker and subsequently as the broker on the HFLP account.
Letters dated September 30, 1994, were then sent by decedent to Putnam Investor
Services and to Franklin Templeton requesting transfer of the respective Putnam
and Franklin Fund accounts to HFLP. Lastly, by a letter dated November 22, 1994,
decedent requested transfer ofth~ Trust's stock in Rockefeller Center Properties to
the partnership.
During this period, on September 23, 1994, Michael opened a checking account at
Bank of America in the name of the partnership with a $200 deposit. Thereafter,
the frrst activity in the account, other than the debiting ofa monthly service charge,
was a deposit on October 13, 1994, of $3,750 representing interest paid on the
Marsh note.
The Tax Court concluded that the form of the partnership was not respected. Again, the facts are instructive:
As previously indicated, section 2036 mandates inclusion in the gross estate of
transferred property with respect to which the decedent retained, by express or
implied agreement, possession, control, enjoyment, or the right to income. The
focus here is on whether there existed an implicit agreement that decedent would
retain control or enjoyment, Le., economic benefit, of the assets he transferred to
HFLP.
Respondent avers that section 2036's applicability is established on these facts,
emphasizing in particular actual conduct with respect t.o partnership funds.
Respondent further maintains that this case is indistinguishable from the situations
presented in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1997-242. The estate, on the other
hand, discounts the evidence and cases relied on by respondent, emphasizing
instead the formal terms of the partnership arrangement and the accounting
treatment of entity assets.
In Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 147-148, the decedent formed a
family limited partnership, the general partner of which was a revocable trust
created on the same date. The decedent and his two children were named as
cotrustees, but only the decedent perfonned any meaningful functions as trustee.
Id. at 147, 152. He was the only trustee to sign the articles of limited partnership,
to open brokerage accounts, or to sign partnership checks. Id. at 152. He
transferred his residence and all of his other property (except for his car, personal
effects, and a small amount ofcash in his checking account) to the partnership and
subsequently gave his two children limited partnership interests. Id. at 148-149,
152-153. The decedent deposited partnership income in his personal account, used
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the partnership checking account as his personal account, anq lived at his residence
without paying rent to the partnership. Id. at 152. Based on these facts, we
concluded that nothing but legal title changed in the decedent's relationship to his
assets after he transferred them to the partnership. Id. at 152-153.
In Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, the decedent fonned three
limited partnerships. The decedent and one ofher three children were named as the
general partners of each partnership, with the decedent's being designated as the
managing partner. Id. The decedent transferred business assets, including real
estate, partnership interests, and notes receivable, to the partnerships in undivided
one-third shares. Id. Limited partnership interests in these entities were given to
family members. Id. Partnership bank accounts were opened, but the decedent
deposited the income earned by the partnerships into the account she used as her
personal checking account, where it was commingled with funds from other
sources. Id. Checks were then written from this account to pay both personal and
partnership expenses. Id. The decedent's children later acknowledged at trial that
formation of the partnerships was merely a way to enable the decedent to assign
interests in the partnership assets to family members, with the assets to be managed
by the decedent exactly as in the past. Id. We therefore found the assets includable
under section 2036(a). Id.
We agree with respondent that the circumstances before us bear many similarities
to those in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.e. 144 (2000}, and Estate
of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, and are convinced that a like result
should obtain. We focus particularly on the commingling of funds, the history of
disproportionate distributions, and the testamentary characteristics of the
arrangement in support of our conclusion that there existed an implied agreement
that decedent would retain the economic benefit ofthe assets transferred to HFLP.
As regards commingling of funds, we note that this fact was one of the most
heavily relied upon in both Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 152, and
Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra. We find the disregard here for
partnership fonn to be equally egregious. The Agreement specified: nAIl funds of
the Partnership shall be deposited in a ,separate bank account or accounts". Yet no
such account was even opened for HFLP until September 23, 1994, more than 3
months after the entity began its legal existence. Prior to that time, partnership
income was deposited in the Trust's account, resulting in an unavoidable
commingling of funds.
Michael testified concerning this delay as follows:
Inadvertently, either my account or I failed to apply timely for any -- an
employee [sic] identification number. That is required before a checking
account is open. So Ijust made the detennination that without a checking
account and I wanted the flow of cash, what we would do is use the
Morton B. Harper Trust account as a holding account, and then I
instructed the accountant to properly credit and account for those funds.

***
This explanation, however, seems to beg the question. Had Michael sought
promptly upon HFLP's creation to establish a bank account, he would have been
iInmediately alerted to the need for an EIN. Hence, he either neglected to attempt
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opening and/or using an account or allowed the lack of an EIN to continue for
several months after having been reminded of its necessity. Both reflect at best a
less than orderly approach to the fonnal partnership structure so pressed by the
estate.
Moreover, we find Michael's reliance on post mortem accounting manipulations to
be especially unavailing. Michael and Mr. Blankstein, HFLpts accountant, each
testified that no moneys actually changed hands in connection with the adjustments.
In response to similar contentions in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra
at 154-155, we stated:
The 1993 yearend and 1994 post mortem adjusting entries made by
Hannah's ftrnl were a belated attempt to undo decedent's commingling of
partnership and personal accounts. There is no evidence that the
partnership or decedent transferred any funds to the other as a result 0 f the
adjusting entries. After-the- fact paperwork by decedent's C. P. A. does
not refute that decedent and his children had agreed that decedent could
continue to use and control the property during his life. [Pn. ref. omitted.]
Here Michael did not even hire Mr. Blankstein until after decedent's death,
strengthening the inference that the partners had little concern for establishing any
precise demarcation between partnership and other funds during decedent's life.
Closely related to the delay in opening the partnership bank accoWlt and
consequent commingling of income is the delay in fonnally transferring the
underlying portfolio assets to HFLP. No attempt was made to begin the process of
title transfer until July 26, 1994, when decedent executed an allonge endorsement
assigning the Marsh note to HFLP. No action was taken with respect to any of the
other securities until September 29 and 30, 1994, when letters addressing transfer
of the M. L. Stem & Co., Putnam, and Franklin accounts were drafted and an
account with M. L. Stem & Co. was opened on behalfofHFLP. A letter requesting
transfer of the Rockefeller Center Properties stock was not prepared until
November 22, 1994.
When Michael was asked on cross-examination to explain this delay between the
effective date of the partnership and the foonal transfer ofassets into the entity, he
replied: "Probably for different reasons, some mechanical delays and who we're
dealing with, but generally, there was no rush to do it. We were just doing it in an
orderly fashion." Next, in response to a further question asking why there was no
rush, he continued: "There was no rush. [ mean, we werejust handling the business
in an orderly fashion. There wasn't any deadline or urgency to do it and get it
done." The following colloquy then ensued:

Q

Now let's talk for a moment about the income from the portfolio assets.
Before the title to the assets was transferred to the partnership, your father
or his trust continued to receive the income from those assets. Isn't that
right?

A

Would you restate that? I'm lost.

Q

Okay. At a certain point in time the assets were contributed to the
partnership., correct?
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A

Yes.

Q

Okay. Before that happened., your father's trust continued to receive the
income from those assets, correct?

A

Probably.

Q

Well, why isn't it Yes?

A

Well., before he contributed it, he was in control of that. Who else would
get it? I say probably.

Hence, we are again met with an example of indifference by those involved toward
the fonnal structure of the partnership arrangement and, as a corollary, toward the
degree of separation that the Agreement facially purports to establish. Moreover,
until title to the assets was transferred to HFLP, decedent would not have forfeited
the control over the underlying securities that he through the Trust possessed as
legal holder. Thus, at the time ofthe June 14, 1994, creation ofHFLP and for some
months following, decedent's Trust retained title to the underlying assets and was
issued the dividends and interest generated thereby. In addition, according to
Michael's own testimony, the partners were in no hurry to alter this state ofaffairs.
This speaks volumes concerning how little the partners understood to have changed
in decedent's relationship to his assets as a result of the entity's foonation.
Turning to facts regarding distribution of partnership funds, we fmd equally
compelling indicia of an implied understanding or agreement that the partnership
arrangement would not curtail decedent's ability to enjoy the economic benefit of
assets contributed to HFLP. In addition to the deemed distributions engendered by
the commingling discussed above, even the distributions made by Michael from the
partnership checking account are heavily weighted in favor ofdecedent. The check
register indicates that during the period extending from September of 1994 through
early November 1995, partnership funds were distributed for the benefit ofMichael
and Lynn in the amounts of$5,800 and $8,700, respectively. These distributions
occurred on November 9, 1994, December 19, 1994, and January 10, 1995. During
that same time frame, partnership checks totaling $231,820, were remitted to the
Trust, with the last being written on October 30, 1995. Only then did distributions
to Michael and Lynn resume with checks drawn on November 15, 1995, in the
amounts of$4,800 and $7,200, respectively. Given this pattern, we would be hard
pressed to conclude other than that the partnership arrangement did little to curtail
the access of decedent or his estate to the economic benefit of the contributed
property.
Similarly significant is the evidence that certain of the distributions to the Trust
were linked to a contemporaneous expense of decedent personally or of his estate.
These amounts, variously labeled by Michael "additional distribution "return of
capital", or "capital return", totaled $220,520 and even included $4,000 to enable
decedent to complete a gift 2 days before he died. This evidence buttresses the
inference that decedent and his estate had ready access to partnership cash when
needed.
tf

,

The estate also argued that the partnership units were consideration sufficient to move the transaction out of
section 2036. The court rejected the contention:
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Having decided that decedent retained enjoyment of the transferred assets for
purposes of section 2036(a)~ we tum to the question whether the statute's
application may nonetheless be avoided on the basis ofthe parenthetical exception
for "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth The estate contends:
tf

•

The primary reason why LR.C. 2036 does not apply to Petitioner is that
the Trust's transfer of the Portfolio to the Partnership in exchange for a
credit to its capital account for 99% of the fair market value of the
Portfolio assets and a 99% interest in profits and losses is a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
tt

***
We, however, disagree on the ground that the estate's position fails to take into
account significant aspects of the jurisprudence addressing this exclusionary
language. The phrase, as used in a predecessor statute, was explained in early
caselaw of this Court, as follows:
Accordingly, the exemption from tax is limited to those transfers of
property where the transferor or donor has received benefit in full
consideration in a genuine arm's length transaction; and the exemption is
not to be allowed in a case where there is only contractual consideration
but not "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." *
* * [Estate of Goetchius v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 495,503 (1951).]

***
On the facts before us, HFLP's fonnation at a minimum falls short of meeting the
bona fide sale requirement. Decedent, independently of any other anticipated
interest-holder, detennined how HFLP was to be structured and operated, decided
what property would be contributed to capitalize the entity, and declared what
interest the Trust would receive therein. He essentially stood on both sides of the
transaction and conducted the partnership's fonnation in absence ofany bargaining
or negotiating whatsoever. It would be an oxymoron to say that one can engage in
an ann's-length transaction with oneself, and we simply are unable to find any other
independent party involved in the creation ofHFLP.
Furthermore, lack of a bona fide sale aside, we believe that to call what occurred
here a transfer for consideration within the meaning of section 2036(a), much less
a transfer for an adequate and full consideration, would stretch the exception far
beyond its intended scope. In actuality, all decedent did was to change the fonn in
which he held his beneficial interest in the contributed property. We see little
practical difference in whether the Trust held the property directly or as a
99-percent partner (and entitled to a commensurate 99-percent share of profits) in
a partnership holding the property. Essentially, the value ofthe partnership interest
the Trust received derived solely from the assets the Trust had just contributed.
Without any change whatsoever in the underlying pool of assets or prospect for
profit, as, for example, where others make contributions of property or services in
the interest of true joint ownership or enterprise, there exists nothing but a
circuitous "recycling" of value. We are satisfied that such instances of pure
recycling do not rise to the level of a payment of consideration. To hold otherwise
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would open section 2036 to a myriad of abuses engendered by unilateral paper
transformations.
We note that the foregoing interpretation is supported by our holdings in both
Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 +T.C. 144 (2000), and, by implication,
Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242. In Estate of
Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 155-156, the taxpayer contended that the
parenthetical exception should apply. We, however, rejected this argument,
observing that neither did the decedent's children give anything to him or to the
partnership at the time he contributed his assets nor did he sell the transferred
property to the entity. Id. In Estate of Schauerhamer V. Commissioner, supra, the
contributed assets were included in the decedent's gross estate under section
2036(a) without discussion ofthe exception, leading to the inference that it would
not apply in such circumstances.
We further are convinced that the cases cited by the estate do not require a contrary
conclusion. The estate points in particular to Estate ofJones v. Commissioner, 116
T.C. 121 (2001); Estate of Strangi V. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000);
Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 376 (2000), affd. 283 F.3d 1258 (11th eire
2002); Estate of Harrison V. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1987-8; and Church V.
United States, 85 AFTR 2d 2000-804, 2000-1 USTC par. 60,369 (W;. D. Tex.
2000), affd. without published opinion 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001). The estate
apparently argues that thejust-cited cases establish that a proportionate partnership
interest constitutes per se adequate and full consideration for contributed assets.
We believe, however, that any such global fonnulation would overreach what can
be drawn from the decisions.
First, with respect to Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, supra, Estate ofStrangi v.
Commissioner, supra, and Shepherd v. Commissioner, supra,' none of these
opinions involved section 2036. Rather, they considered whether gifts were made
at the inception offamily limited partnership arrangements. [citations omitted] The
cases therefore do not control interpretation of the requirements of section 2036.
Furthennore, while section 2512(b) describes a gift as a transfer of property "for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth", there
exists an equally fundamental principle that a gift requires a donee -- some other
individual must be enriched. In this connection, we note that Estate of Jones V.
Commissioner, supra at 127-128, and Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, supra at
489-490, which find no gift at inception, say nothing explicit about adequate and
full consideration but do refer to enhancement, or lack thereof, of other partners'
interests. Hence, even if relevant here, we would be unable to conclude that these
rulings resolve the question of whether a proportionate entity interest, in and of
itself, constitutes adequate and full consideration for contributed assets.
Second, although Estate ofHarrison v. Commissioner, supra, and Church v. United
States, supra, do address section 2036, there exist significant differences between
these cases, on the one hand, and Estate of Reichardt V. Commissioner, supra, and
Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, on the other, which distinguish
the two groups. In both Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra, and Church v.
United States, supra, the other partners made contributions at the formation of the
entity which were not de minimis in nature. The partnership entity th"us served as
the vehicle for a genuine pooling of interests. The court in each case then went on
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to conclude that the partnerships had been created for a business purpose. Estate
of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra; Church v. United States, supra.
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that a genuine pooling for business
purposes injects something different into the adequate and full consideration
calculus than does mere, unilateral value "recycling" as seen in Estate of Reichardt
v. Commissioner, supra, Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, and the
present matter. In the former situation, there is at least the potential that intangibles
stemming from a pooling for joint enterprise might support a ruling ofadequate and
full consideration. We also note that section 25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs., specifies
that transfers "made in the ordinary course ofbusiness (a transaction which is bona
fide, at ann's length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
tt

We therefore hold that where a transaction involves only the genre of value
"recycling" described above and does not appear to be motivated primarily by
leg.itimate business concerns, no transfer for consideration within the meaning of
section 2036(a) has taken place. Hence, the exception provided in that statute is
inapplicable. Furthennore, although section 2043 can entitle taxpayers to an offset
for partial consideration in cases where a transfer is otherwise subject to section
2036, this section, too, is inapplicable where, as here, there has been only a
recycling of value and not a transfer for consideration.
Similarly, the Tax Court applied section 2036 in Estate of Theodore R. Thompson v. Commissioner,
T.e.Memo. 2002-246 (2002). The opinion states:
In this ~ase, the circumstances surrounding establishment ofthe partnerships show
that, at the time of the transfer, there was an implied agreement or understanding
that decedent would retain the enjoyment and economic benefit ofthe property he
had transferred. Before the partnerships were formed, Betsy [decedent's daughter]
sought assurances from the financial advisers that decedent would be able to
withdraw assets from the partnerships in order to make cash gifts each year to his
children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren. In late November 1993 after the
partnerships were fonned, George [decedent's son-in-law] asked the advisers how
decedent could get $40,000 out of the partnerships to give as Christmas presents.
The implied agreement among decedent, Robert [decedent's son], Betsy, and
George that decedent would retain the enjoyment and economic benefit of the
transferred property is reflected also by the distributions made by the partnerships
to decedent. Late in 1993 and again in 1994, both the Turner Partnership and the
Thompson Partnership made distributions to decedent of$40,000 so that he could
continue his practice of giving substantial gifts at Christmastime to his family
members.
The circumstances also demonstrate an understanding that decedent's interest in the
transferred property would last until his death. When the partnerships were
established, decedent parted with almost all of his wealth, retaining enough to
support himself for less than 2 years. Betsy's correspondence in early 1995 to
Robert shows that the amount decedent retained was insufficient -- his original
holdings had diminished to $31 ~806, while his expenses for the prior year totaled
$57,202. Betsy informed Robert that decedent would need "an infusion" offunds
to cover the balance ofdecedent's anticipated 1995 expenses. She proposed that the
Turner Partnership and the Thompson Partnership transfer assets ofequal value to
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their father. In March 1995 the Thompson Partnership distributed $12,500 to
decedent.
We are not persuaded otherwise by the insistence ofdecedent's estate that decedent
always asked Betsy and Robert, in their respective capacity as officers of the
corporate general partners of their partnerships, for the cash decedent needed to
provide Christmas gifts. I I The fact that decedent requested those sums does not
vitiate the existence of an understanding that he would receive them.
Here, decedent's outright transfer of the vast bulk of his assets to the partnerships
would have deprived him of the assets needed for his own support. Thus, the
transfers from the partnerships to decedent can only be explained if decedent had
at least an implied understanding that his children would agree to his requests for
money from the assets he contributed to the partnerships, and that they would do
so for as long as he lived.
While we acknowledge that, as a result ofthe creation of the partnerships, prior to
decedent's death some change ensued in the fonnal relationship of decedent to the
assets he contributed to the partnerships, we are satisfied that the practical effect
ofthese changes during decedent's life was minimaL Decedent continued to be the
principal economic beneficiary of the contributed property after the partnerships
were created. Based on these facts, we conclude that nothing but legal title changed
in the decedentfs relationship to his assets after he transferred them to the
partnerships. Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 1~2-153.
Any control over management and distributions by Betsy and Robert is likewise of
little import. Documents in the record show that the composition of the portfolio
changed little prior to decedenes death. We place little weight on averments
concerning change, during decedent's life, in the partners' relationships to the
contributed property.
Reichardt, Schauerhamer, Harper, and Thompson guide those who create and operate family limited
partnerships, but are not generally troubling because they do not attack the theory behind those entities. Stated
differently, those cases are based on section 2036(a)( 1) which include in the gross estate property over which decedent
has the right to enjoyment.
In David A. Kimbell, Sr. v. United States, 244 F.Supp.2d 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003) detennined that section
2036(a)(2) would apply to assets in a partnership where the decedent was a 99% limited partner and the partnership
agreement allowed a 70% partner to remove and replace the general partner. The opinion states:
Plaintiffargues that Decedent's transfer ofassets to the Partnership was a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. The Tax
Court has explained, and this Court agrees, that "applicability of the [bona fide
sale] exception rests on two requirements: (I) [a] bona fide sale, meaning an
ann's-length transaction, and (2) adequate and full consideration. tf Harper, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2002-121, *21.
In the instant case, Decedent'~ transfer fails both requirements. Plaintiff has
produced no credible evidence that the fonnation of the Partnership was the
product of an arm's length transaction~ i.e. a transaction tfbetween two parties who
are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly equal
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bargaining power." Black's Law Dictionary I03 (7th ed. 1999). Indeed, one cannot
even find two parties, much less two parties conducting an arm's length negotiation
leading to a "bona fide sale". See Mollenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d
698, 701 (2d Cir. I 949)(quoted in Harper, T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-121, *21)(defining
a 'sale' as "an exchange resulting from a bargain"). Ownership interests in the
Partnership are held by two entities: 99% by the Trust which was wholly-owned
by Decedent, and 1% by the LLC which was 50% owned by the Trust. Therefore,
Decedent not only "stood on both sides of the transaction," but, for all intensive
purposes, was both sides of the transaction. Harper, T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-121, *21
(noting that "it would be an oxymoron to say that one can engage in an arm's length
transaction with oneself').
Moreover, even ifone assumes the Partnership was the result of "a bona fide sale,"
Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Decedent received "adequate and full
consideration" for the sale. While "adequate and full consideration" is not dermed
in the Code, Wheeler v. U.S., 116 F.3d 749, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1997), this Court
agrees with the Tax Court that the meaning of "adequate and full consideration
does not include paper transactions such as the one at issue in the current case. The
Decedent, through the Trust, contributed 99% ofthe capital for the Partnership and
in return received a 99% interest in the partnership. Decedent received no
consideration other than the interest in the Partnership. Plaintiff, before becoming
the general partner of the Partnership, was already managing both the Trust, from
where 99% ofthe assets ofthe Partnership came and the LLC from where the other
I % came (ofwhich 0.5% were from the Trust). Nothing appears to have changed.
ll

The taxpayer also argued that the fiduciary duty of the general partner precludes the application of section
2036:
Plaintiffcontends that Decedent did not have the power to take over the partnership
because she had fiduciary duties. Plaintiff makes much of a Supreme Court case,
u.S. v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), in which the Court held that §§2036 did not
apply to a decedent who retained voting interest in several corporations. However,
IhTI!m, is not only distinguishable on its facts from our case, but was expressly
overruled by Congressional enactment of§§2036(b) which states that "the retention
of the right to vote (directly or indirectly) shares of stock of a controlled
corporation shall be considered to be a retention ofthe enjoyment ofthe transferred
property." Moreover, section 2.95 of the Partnership Agreement states: ffThe
General Partner will not owe a fiduciary duty to the Partnership or to any Partner."6
If Decedent, at any time, could remove the general partner and herself become
general partner, then, by the tenns ofthe Agreement, she would not owe a fiduciary
duty to the other Partners, who, in any case, own only a minuscule share of the
Partnership. Assuming such fiduciary duties exist, to whom does a party which
owns 99.% of the Partnership owe them? The fiduciary argument falls flat.
On June 17, 2002 the Fifth Circuit remanded Estate of Strangi, now called Rosalie Gulig v. Commissioner,
No. 01-60538, so that the Tax Court could consider section 2036. In Strangi the decedent's attorney-in-fact formed the
partnership two month's before the decedent's death. The decedent retained a 99% limited interest and a 47% interest
in the I o~ corporate general partner. The decedent's children paid for the other shares in the general partner. Over 75%
ofthe partnerships' assets were marketable securities. The point here is not only section 2036(aXI) but also 2036(a)(2),
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namely that by having an interest in the general partner the decedent had the right to designate those who would enjoy
property.
In its initial Strangi opinion, which did not consider section

2036~

the Tax Court first detennined that the

"business purposes'· for the partnership were bogus but that the partnership would be respected anyway because the
partnership was validly formed under state law. The Tax Court then rejected the applicability ofsection 2703 and went
on to consider whether there was a gift on fonnation:
In this case, the estate claims that the assets 'were transferred to SFLP for the
business purposes discussed above. Following the fonnation of SFLP, decedent
owned a 99-percent limited partnership interest in SFLP and 47 percent of the
corporate general partner, Stranco. Even assuming arguendo that decedent's
asserted business purposes were real, we do not believe that decedent would give
up over $3 million in value to achieve those business purposes.
Nonetheless, in this case, because we do not believe that decedent gave up control
over the assets, his beneficial interest in them exceeded 99 percent, and his
contribution was allocated to his own capital account, the instinctive reaction that
there was a gift at the inception of the partnership does not lead to a detennination
ofgift tax liability. In a situation such as that in Kincaid, where other shareholders
or partners have a significant interest in an entity that is enhanced as a result of a
transfer to the entity, or in a situation such as Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
_, _ (2000) (slip. op. at 21), where contributions of a taxpayer are allocated to
the capital accounts of other partners, there is a gift. However, in view of
decedent's continuing interest in SFLP and the reflection ofthe contributions in his
own capital account, he did not transfer more than a minuscule proportion of the
value that would be "losf' on the conveyance of his assets to the partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest. See Kincaid v. United States, supra at 1224.
Realistically, in this case, the disparity between the value of the assets in the hands
of decedent and the alleged value of his partnership interest reflects on the
credibility ofthe claimed discount applicable to the partnership interest. It does not
reflect a taxable gift.
Clearly the court thought another theory should be asserted, but was not -- section 2036:
The actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined with the 99-percent limited
partnership interest in SFLP and the 47- percent interest in Stranco, suggest the
possibility of including the property transferred to the partnership in decedent's
estate under section 2036. See, e.g., Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
144 (2000). Section 2036 is not an issue in this case, however, because respondent
asserted it only in a proposed amendment to answer tendered shortly before triaL
Respondent's motion to amend the answer was denied because it was untimely.
Applying the economic substance doctrine in this case on the basis of decedent's
continuing control would be equivalent to applying section 2036(a) and including
the transferred assets in decedent's estate. As discussed below, absent application
of section 2036, Congress has adopted an alternative approach to perceived
valuation abuses.
The IRS expert allowed a 31 % discount which the court, reluctantly, accepted.
The Fifth Circuit stated on remand:
Fifty-two days before trial, the Commissioner filed a motion to amend to add a
claim that under §§ 2036 the estate should include the value of SFLp·s assets
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transferred from the decedent. The tax court denied the motion to amend,
apparently because it considered the motion untimely. We review the tax court's
decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion~ Halbert v. City of
Sherman, Tex., 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). HA decision to grant leave is
within the discretion of the court, although if the court lacks a substantial reason
to deny leave, its discretion is not broad enough to pennit deniaL" State of
Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal
citations and quotes omitted). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason
-- such as undue delay~ bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility
of amendment, etc. -- the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely give.'''
Fomanv. Davis, 371 u.s. 178, 182(1962).
The only insight we have into the tax court's reasoning for the denial is its
statement that, even though §§ 2036 might apply on the facts, it was "not an issue
in this case, however, because respondent asserted it only in a proposed amendment
to answer tendered shortly before trial. Respondent's motion to amend the answer
was denied because it was untimely." However,. the motion was made nearly two
months, not "shortly," before trial and was unlikely to cause delay or prejudice. If
the tax court's true reasoning was that the Commissioner could have sought to
assert the applicability of §§ 2036 earlier in the proceedings, it did not assert such
and did not discuss any evidence ofbad faith or dilatory motive. We cannot assume
bad faith on the record here. The record does not present an obvious reason for
denial of leave to amend. See Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1993)
("Where reasons for denying leave to amend are 'ample and obvious,' the district
court's failure to articulate specific reasons does not indicate an abuse of
discretion."). We find that the denial was an abuse of discretion.
Judge Cohen issued the second Tax Court opinion in Strangi on May 20,2003. T. C. Memo 2003 - 145. The
opinion is not a reviewed decision. Because of an unusual procedural posture - - the IRS deficiency notice was for less
than the taxpayer would owe given the Tax Court decision - - the decision may not be appealed.
The opinion deals with both section 2036(a)(I) and 2036(a)(2). The latter analysis will cause more concern.
The opinion summarizes the relevant facts as follows:
The SFLP agreement provides that distributions of proceeds and assets from the
entity shall be made in the sole discretion of the managing general partner. The
SFLP agreement also designates Stranco as the managing general partner. Stranco,
in tum, executed the management agreement employing Mr. Gulig to manage the
day-to-day business of SFLP, as well as of Stranco itself. Yet Mr. Gulig was
already decedent's attorney in fact pursuant to the 1988 general power of attorney.
Under this instrument, Mr. Gulig was granted full and durable authority to act for
decedent in his ft name, place and stead". Mr. Gulig set 'up the SFLP/Stranco
arrangement to facilitate decedent's estate planning goals and capitalized the
partnership primarily with decedent's property.
When distilled to their most essential tenns, the governing documents gave Mr.
Gulig authority to specify distributions from SFLP, which is entirely consistent
with his authority under the 1988 power of attorney. Although the estate protests
that Mr. Gulig's authority under the management agreement was limited to
managing "the day-to-day business" of the partnership and did not extend to
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making distributions or loans, the pertinent instruments provide no basis for
concluding that making distributions would be outside the day-to-day business of
a partnership capitalized nearly exclusively with investment assets. As a practical
matter, actual disbursement of funds occurred when checks were issued by Mr. and
Mrs. Gulig in their various related capacities, pursuant to rights granted to them by
decedent, acting through Mr. Gulig.
Hence, to summarize, the SFLP agreement named Stranco managing general
partner with the sole discretion to detennine distributions. The Stranco
shareholders, including decedent (through Mr. Gulig), then acted together to
delegate such authority to Mr. Gulig under the management agreement. Decedent's
attorney in fact thereby stood in a position to make distribution decisions. Mrs.
Gulig effectuated these decisions by signing checks to the recipients so designated.
The fITst issue for the court was the application of section 2036(a)(1). The taxpayer attempted to distinguish
this case from the Schauerhamer to Reichardt and Harper line ofcases. The court acknowledged that the taxpayer here
dotted more "i's" and crossed more "t's" than in the aforementioned cases but ultimately reached the same result. Judge
Cohen writes:
At the outset, we acknowledge that, in contrast to certain of the prior cases, the
participants involved in the SFLP/Stranco arrangement generally proceeded such
that "the proverbial 'i's were dotted' and 't's were crossed'." Strangi I at 486. Steps
were taken to abide by the formal terms of the structure created. Such measures
may give SFLP and Stranco sufficient substance to be recognized as legal entities
in the context of valuation, which requires assumption ofa hypothetical buyer and
seller. They do not preclude implicit retention by decedent of economic benefit
from the transferred property for purposes of section 2036(a)(I).
First, we cannot lose sight of the fact that decedent contributed approximately 98
percent of his wealth, including his residence, to the SFLP/Stranco arrangement.
Respondent alleges that the transfer left decedent with inadequate assets and cash
flow to meet his living expenses, to which the estate takes objection. The estate
goes to great lengths to counter respondent's assertion, claiming that decedent at his
death possessed liquefiable assets of at least $172,000 and received on a monthly
basis a pension of$1,438.18 and Social Security of$I,559. The estate also stresses
that respondent has not established the amount of decedent's living expenses and
maintains that, even if the $33,323.22 in checks paid from decedent's account in
August and September were used as an estimate, the purported liquefiable assets
would have covered decedent's needs for his concededly short life expectancy of
12 to 24 months. However, the relative dearth of liquefied (decedent's Fonn 706
showed two bank accounts with funds totaling $762), as opposed to "liquefiable",
assets persuades us that decedent and his children and Mr. Gulig all expected that
SFLP and Stranco would be a primary source of decedent's liquidity. It is
unreasonable to expect that decedent would be forced to rely on sale of assets to
meet his basic costs of living.
A second feature highly probative under section 2036(a)( I) is decedent's continued
physical possession ofhis residence after its transfer to SFLP. The estate maintains
that any otherwise negative implications ofthis circumstance are neutralized by the
fact that SFLP "charged Mr. Strangi rent" on occupancy ofthe home and reported
rental income on its 1994 tax return. Decedent likewise reported a rent obligation
on his estate tax return. For accounting purposes, the accrued rent was recorded by
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SFLP on its books. Yet the accrued amount was not paid until January 1997. A
residential lessor dealing at ann's length would hardly be content merely to accrue
a rental obligation for eventual payment more than 2 years later. As we have
remarked, accounting entries alone are of small moment in belying the existence
of an agreement for retained possession and enjoyment Estate of Reichardt v.
Commissioner, 114 T.e. at 154-155; Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-121.
Concerning factors that relate to use ofentity funds, the estate emphasizes that each
disbursement for decedent or his estate was accompanied by a pro rata allotment
to Stranco. Where, as here, the only interest in the partnership other than that held
by the decedent is de minimis, a pro rata payment is hardly more than a token in
nature. In these circumstances, pro rata disbursements are insufficient to negate the
probability that the decedent retained economic enjoyment of his or her assets.
After all, distributing 1 percent to Stranco would not in any substantial way operate
to curb decedent's ability to benefit from SFLP property. Accordingly, we direct
our attention to the purpose, as opposed to the mechanics, of partnership
distributions and expenditures.
The record reveals several instances where SFLP expended funds in response to
a need of decedent or his estate. SFLP paid for Ms. Stone's back surgery to
alleviate an injury she sustained in caring for decedent prior to the fonnation of
SFLP. In 1994, SFLP expended nearly $40,000 for funeral expenses, estate
administration, and related debts, including a $19,810.28 check to Olsten to pay for
nursing services rendered to decedent before his death. These sums were followed
in 1995 and 1996 by further payment of over $65,000 for estate expenses and a
specific bequest. SFLP also disbursed approximately $3 million directed toward
decedent's estate and inheritance taxes.
The estate seeks to justify these payments primarily by emphasizing that they were
accounted for on SFLP's books as advances to partners and later closed as
distributions, with pro rata amounts either advanced or distributed to Stranco. The
evidence also indicates that the $65,OOO-plus amount was repaid in January 1997.
The estate further explains that certain of these payments from SFLP were
necessitated by the delay in probate ofdecedent's estate engendered by the process
of getting TCB to decline executorship.
To the extent that the estate's arguments focus on accounting manipulations, they
are unavailing. As demonstrated in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at
154-155, and Estate 0 f Harper v. Commissioner, supra, accounting adjustments do
not preclude a conclusion that those involved understood that the decedent's assets
would be made available as needs materialized. Belated repayment of certain
amounts likewise does not refute the inference ofan implicit agreement for retained
enjoyment that arises from the demonstrated and contemporaneous availability of
large sums. Furthermore, to the extent that the estate's explanations focus on a
delay in probate, they lack specificity. The more salient feature would appear to be
the insufficiency of the assets not contributed to SFLP and Stranco to cover the
significant expenses reasonably to be expected to ensue in connection with
decedent's poor health and death. That, in tum, speaks to retained enjoyment.
Regarding testamental)' characteristics, the SFLP/Stranco arrangement also bears
greater resemblance to one man's estate plan than to any sort of ann's-length, joint
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enterprise. As in Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, supra, "the largely unilateral
nature of the fonnation, the extent and type of the assets contributed thereto, and
decedent's personal situation are indicative. n Mr. Gulig established the entities
using Fortress documents with little, ifany, input from other family members. The
contributed property included the majority of decedent's assets in general and his
investments, a prime concern of estate planning, in particular. Decedent was
advanced in age and suffering from serious health conditions. Furthennore, as
discussed in Strangi I at 485-486, the purpose of the partnership arrangement was
not to provide a joint investment vehicle for the management ofdecedent's assets,
but was consistent with testamentary intent.
Moreover, the crucial characteristic is that virtually nothing beyond formal title
changed in decedent's relationship to his assets. Mr. Gulig managed decedent's
affairs both before and after the transfer. Decedent's children did not obtain a
meaningful economic stake in the property during decedent's life. They raised no
objections or concerns when large sums were advanced for expenditures of
decedent or his estate, thus implying an understanding that decedent's access
thereto would not be restricted.
In face of the foregoing realities, the estate argues that whatever possession or
enjoyment ofthe contributed property decedent may have experienced was neither
"retained" by means of a contemporaneous agreement nor "with respect to the
transferred property". As regards the first point, the estate contends that respondent
has offered no evidence to prove a contemporaneous agreement requiring the
distributions made, as opposed to an independent subsequent decision by Stranco
to make the same outlay. According to the estate:
Even if decisions to make distributions were made based on "sympathy
for poor old dad," i. e., "Oops, Mr. Strangi imprudently put too much
money into SFLP and we need to give some back" that would not meet the
criteria set by judicial precedent for determining the existence of a
retained expectation ofpossession of [sic] enjoyment: which is that there
must have been an implied agreement that was contemporaneous with the
transfer ofthe property at issue, not a subsequent agreement or act. * * *
[Fn. ref. omitted.]
We are persuaded that the evidence and circumstances detailed above render such
a contemporaneous agreement more likely than not.
The second point mentioned stems from the estate's view that pro rata distributions
were made not with respect to the transferred property, in which decedent
possessed no legal interest under the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act
(TRLPA), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a-l, sec. 7.01 (Vernon SUpPa 2003),
but with respect to his partnership interest. Yet this argument relies on paper title
to the exclusion of the practicalities that are the focus of section 2036(a)(I). The
property contributed by decedent was the source of the payments made.
Furthennore, the record suggests that the impetus underlying a number of
significant SFLP disbursements was needs of decedent or his estate, rather than
exigencies pertaining to Stranco or the partnership itself.
To this point, the opinion has been a bit more aggressively anti-taxpayer than the previous 2036(a)(I) cases
have been, but nonetheless the issues raised were essentially the same. However, the court did not stop there. Noting
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that the taxpayer and the government argued extensively about the application of section 2036(a)(2) the court decided
to weigh in. (So, before going further, remember this is arguably dicta in an unreviewed Tax Court opinion.)
Judge Cohen describes the application of section 2036(a)(2) and the meaning of!!Yrnm as follows:
As stated above, section 2036(a)(2) mandates inclusion in the gross estate of
transferred property with respect to which the decedent retained the right to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or its income. This
provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. 125 (1972), and both parties devote a significant portion of their respective
arguments to the implications of that decision. We address these arguments as an
alternative to our conclusions concerning section 2036(a)(I) and with particular
consideration of the facts of this case.
In United States v. Byrum, supra at 126, the decedent, Mr. Byrum, created an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children. He funded the trust with shares of
three closely held corporations but retained the right to vote the shares and to veto
any sale or transfer ofthe stock. Id. at 126-127. As a result, Mr. Byrum at his death
continued to have the right to vote not less than 71 percent ofthe common stock in
each ofthe three corporations. Id. at 128-129. The three corporations were involved
in lithography-related businesses and had a substantial number of minority
shareholders unrelated to Mr. Byrum. Id. at 130 & n. 2, 142 & n.20. (The Supreme
Court noted that 11 of 12, 5 of 8, and 11 of 14 stockholders, respectively, in the
three corporations appeared to be unrelated to Mr. Byrum. Id. at 142 n.20.) The
trust instrument specified that there be, and Mr. Byrum named, an independent
corporate trustee. Id. at 126. The trustee was authorized in its "absolute and sole
discretion" to pay income and principal to or for the benefit ofthe beneficiaries. Id.
at 127.
The Commissioner argued that, by retaining voting control over the corporations,
Mr. Byrum was in a position to select the corporate directors and thereby to control
corporate dividend policy. [d. at 131-132. According to the Commissioner, the
scenario in dispute gave Mr. Byrum the ability to regulate the flow of income to the
trust, which ability was characterized as tantamount to a grantor-trustee's power to
accumulate trust income for remaindermen or to distribute to present beneficiaries.
Id. at 132. The Court had previously ruled that the latter power to accumulate rather
than disburse constituted a right to designate under section 2036(a)(2). Id. at
135-136; United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627,631 (1966).
Given the above facts, the Supreme Court held "that Byrum did not have an
unconstrained de facto power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much
less the 'right' to designate who was to enjoy the income from trust property."
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143. The Court rejected the Commissioner's
"control rationale" as it "would create a standard -- not specified in the statute -- so
vague and amorphous as to be impossible ofascertainment in many instances." Id.
at 137 n. 10. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on a series of 1t economic
and legal constraints" to which any power that Mr. Byrum might have had was
subject and which prevented such power from being equivalent to a right to
designate persons to enjoy trust income. Id. at 144.
The Court emphasized that the independent corporate trustee alone had the right
under the trust instrument to payout or withhold income. Id. at 137. Even if Mr.
Byrum had managed to flood the trust with dividends, he had no way ofcompelling
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the trustee to payout or accumulate that income. Id. at 143. The Court also noted
that the power to elect directors conferred no legal right to command them to pay
or not pay dividends. Id. at 137. Moreover, the flow of dividends from the
corporations would be subject to economic vicissitudes, retained earnings policies,
and business needs. Id. at 139-140. In this regard, the Court explained:
There is no reason to suppose that the three corporations controlled by
Byrum were other than typical small businesses. The customary
vicissitudes of such enterprises -- bad years; product obsolescence; new
competition; disastrous litigation; new, inhibiting Government
regulations; even bankruptcy -- prevent any certainty or predictability as
to earnings or dividends. There is no assurance that a small corporation
will have a flow of net earnings or that income earned will in fact be
available for dividends. Thus, Byrum's alleged de facto upower to control
the flow of dividends" to the trust was subject to business and economic
variables over which he had little or no control. [ Id. at 249.]
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed that "A majority shareholder has a
fiduciary duty not to misuse his power by promoting his personal interests at the
expense of corporate interests" and the directors ofa corporation "have a fiduciary
duty to promote the interests of the corporation." Id. at 137-138. Such duties were
legally enforceable by means of, for example, a derivative suit. Id. at 141-142.
The court then noted that in fact Mr. Strangi had the ability to designate who would receive the benefits ofthe
partnership acting in conjunction with others, namely the general partner. The simplest illustration of the principle is
that Mr. Strangi, as limited partner, could act with the general partner to liquidate the partnership, and thus receive the
vast majority of the partnership assets. The opinion states:
With respect to SFLP income and as previously recounted in greater detail, the
SFLP agreement named Stranco managing general partner and conferred on the
managing general partner sole discretion to determine distributions. The Stranco
shareholders, including decedent (through Mr. Gulig), then acted together to
delegate this authority to Mr. Gulig through the management agreement. The effect
ofthese actions placed decedent's attorney in fact in a position to make distribution
decisions. Mrs. Gulig effectuated such decisions by executing checks to the
recipients so designated.
In addition to the rights described above related to income, decedent also retained
the right, acting in conjunction with other Stranco shareholders, to designate who
shall enjoy the transferred SFLP property itself. The Supreme Court indicated in
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143 n.23 (citing Commissioner v. Estate of
Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946)), that a "power to terminate the trust and thereby
designate the beneficiaries at a time selected by the settlor" would implicate section
2036(a)(2). Pursuant to the SFLP agreement, the partnership would be dissolved
and terminated upon a unanimous Yote of the limited partners and the unanimous
consent of the general partner. The shareholders agreement likewise specifies that
dissolution ofSFLP requires the affirmative Yote ofall Stranco shareholders. Once
dissolution and termination occur, liquidation is accomplished as set forth in the
SFLP agreement. The managing general partner is named as the liquidator, which
in tum disburses partnership assets first in payment ofdebts and then in repayment
of partners' capital account balances. Authority is expressly granted for
distributions in kind. Accordingly, decedent can act together with other Stranco

A - 90

shareholders essentially to revoke the SFLP arrangement and thereby to bring about
or accelerate present enjoyment ofpartnership assets. Furthennore, it is noteworthy
that such action would likely revest in decedent himself, as the 99-percent limited
partner, the majority of the contributed property.
As regards property transferred to Stranco and income therefrom, decedent held the
right, in conjunction with one or more other Stranco directors, to declare dividends.
The corporation's bylaws authorize the board ofdirectors to declare dividends from
the entity. For the board to take such action, a majority vote of the directors at a
meeting with a quorum present is sufficient Under the bylaws, a majority of the
directors then serving constitutes a quorum. Because Stranco had five directors, a
quorum would consist ofthree, so two directors (e. g., decedent through Mr. Gulig
and one other) could potentially act together to declare a dividend. The Stranco
shareholders agreement further provided that each ofthe initial five directors would
be reelected annually, thus effectively ensuring decedenfs position on the board.
In response to various ofthe above concepts pertaining to joint action, particularly
by stockowners, the estate suggests: UIfthe mere fact that a shareholder could band
together with all of the other shareholders of a corporation and such banding
together would be sufficient to cause inclusion under Section 2036, then it would
have been impossible for the United States Supreme Court to reach the decision
that it did in !hTI!m." The estate's observation ignores the existence in United
States v. Byrum, supra, of the independent trustee who alone had the ability to
detennine distributions from the disputed trust, notwithstanding any prior action
by corporate owners or directors. It also ignores the identity ofthe shareholders in
this case and the dual roles played by Mr. Gulig.
To summarize, review of the documentary evidence discussed above reveals that
decedent here retained rights of a far different genre from those at issue in United
States v. Byrum~ supra. Rather than mere "control"~ management, or influence,
there are traceable to decedent through the explicit provisions of the governing
instruments ascertainable and legally enforceable rights to designate persons who
shall enjoy the transferred property and its income. The estate's reliance on a
limited partner's lack under the TRLPA of participation in control and under the
SFLP agreement of management authority is thus misplaced. The alleged absence
ofsuch powers cannot negate the dispositive rights granted in the instant case. The
SFLP/Stranco arrangement placed decedent in a position to act, alone or in
conjunction with others, through his attorney in fact, to cause distributions of
property previously transferred to the entities or of income therefrom. Decedent's
powers, absent sufficient limitation as discussed infra, therefore fall within the
purview of section 2036(a)(2).
What about the fiduciary duty argument that saved the taxpayer in.fuTI!m? The court gave the argument
short-shrift finding that the fiduciary duties which existed mostly ran to Mr. Strangi himself:
The fiduciary duties present in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), ran
to a significant number of unrelated parties and had their genesis in operating
businesses that would lend meaning to the standard of acting in the best interests
of the entity. As a result, there existed both a realistic possibility for enforcement
and an objective business environment against which to judge potential dereliction.
Given the emphasis that the Supreme Court laid on these factual realities, Byrum
simply does not require blind application of its holding to scenarios where the
purported fiduciary duties have no comparable substance. We therefore analyze the
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situation before us to determine whether the fiduciary duties relied upon by the
estate would genuinely circumscribe use of powers to designate.
The estate summarizes its contentions regarding fiduciary duties as follows:
Just like Mr. Byrum, Mr. Strangi's "rights" (whatever those rights appear
to be) were severely limited by the fiducial)' duties of other people who
(according to Byrum) presumably could be counted on the [sic] observe
those restraints against whatever desires they might o.therwise have had
to run pell-mell to do the bidding of the Decedent: (I) Mr. Gulig, who
(separate and apart from his role as attorney-in-fact for Mr. Strangi) had
fiducial)' duties to Stranco, whom he served as manager; (2) the directors
of Stranco, who had fiduciary duties to both Stranco and to SFLP as a
whole; and (3) McLennan County Community College ("MCCC"), which
had rights as a minority shareholder ofStranco and a fiduciary obligation
to enforce such rights for the benefit of its own beneficiaries as well as
the people of the State of Texas (with the Attorney General of Texas
having the ability to step in to enforce such rights if MCCC failed in its
duties). * * *
None of the foregoing obligations cited by the estate is sufficiently on par with
those detailed in United States v. Byrum, supra, to bring the present case within the
Supreme Court's rationale.
Concerning Mr. Gulig, any fiduciary duties that Mr. Gulig might have had in his
role as manager of Stranco (and thereby of SFLP) are entitled to comparatively
little weight on these facts. Prior to his instigation of the SFLP/Stranco
arrangement, Mr. Gulig stood in a confidential relationship, and owed fiduciary
duties, to decedent personally as his attorney in fact. Thus, to the extent that
Stranco or SFLP's interests might diverge from those of decedent, we do not
believe that Mr. Gulig would disregard his preexisting obligation to decedent.
As regards fiduciary obligations ofStranco and its directors, these duties, too, have
little significance in the present context. Although Stranco would owe a fiduciary
duty to SFLP and to the limited partners, decedent owned the sole, 99-percent
limited partnership interest. The rights to designate traceable to decedent through
Stranco cannot be characterized as limited in any meaningful way by duties owed
essentially to himself. Nor do the obligations ofStranco directors to the corporation
itself warrant any different conclusion. Decedent held 47 percent of Stranco, and
his own children held 52 ofthe remaining 53 percent. Intrafamily fiduciary duties
within an investment vehicle simply are not equivalent in nature to the obligations
created by the United States v. Byrum, supra, scenario.
With respect to the role of MCC Foundation, United States v. Byrum, supra,
affords no basis for permitting outcomes under section 2036(a)(2) to tum on
factors amounting to no more than window dressing. A charity given a gratuitous
I-percent interest would not realistically exercise any meaningful oversight.
Finally, and not unsurprisingly, Judge Cohen concluded that the arrangement had not been entered into for full
and adequate consideration. She writes:
We see no distinction of consequence between the scenario analyzed in Estate of
Harper v. Commissioner, supra, and that ofthe present case. Decedent contributed
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more than 99 percent ofthe total property placed in the SFLP/Stranco arrangement
and received back an interest the value of which derived almost exclusively from
the assets he had just assigned. Furthermore, the SFLP/Stranco arrangement
patently fails to qualify as the sort of functioning business enterprise that could
potentially inject intangibles that would lift the situation beyond mere recycling. Cf.
Estate ofHarrison v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1987-8; Church v. United States,
85 AFTR2d2000-804, 2000-1 USTC par. 60,369 (W.O. Tex. 2000), affd. without
published opinion 268 F.3d 1063 (5th CiT. 2001) (both involving contributions by
other participants not de minimis in nature, for a genuine pooling of interests). We
therefore hold that decedent did not engage in any transfer for consideration upon
the creation and funding of SFLP and Stranco. Accordingly, the estate is entitled
to no exception to the treatment mandated by section 2036(a).
If the limited interests had been held in a marital trust included in Mr. Strangi's estate would the result have
been different? What if Mr. Strangi had transferred the limited interests to a trust over which he retained a special
power of appointment but no other rights? Would the presence of a trustee in either circumstance be sufficient to deny
that Mr. Strangi had control in conjunction with another person over the partnership? Supposing such were the case,
presumable section 2035 would impose the three-year rule. Is the effect any different were the limited interests given
away prior to death?
The practical effect ofStrangi will be to embolden the IRS to argue against significant discounts when valuing
limited partnership interests in estates. The theoretical underpinnings ofStrangi are more suspect. The opinion pushes
taxpayers to create partnership arrangements and avoid ever having control over the partnership. In turn, that raises the
possibility that the "gift on formation" issue reappears. Arguably, the Tax Court analysis dealing with the gift on
formation has not directly confronted a situation in which the Tax Court believes the creator did not retain de facto
control over the partnership.

I.

SECTION 2040 -- JOINT INTERESTS

1.

Adequate Consideration Test Met. In Estate of Marie L. Concordia, et at. v. Commissioner,

T.e.Memo. 2002-216, the decedent died owning halfof a house called "Western." The other half had been deeded by
the decedent to her niece in exchange for (I) being able to live with and be cared for by the niece, and (2) the niece's
husband managing certain rental property ("Bradley property"). The opinion described other facts as follows:
Around that same time decedent conferred with Mr. McReady [niece's husband]
about other alternatives. Decedent inquired whether she could live at Primrose
[niece's home] with her dogs and pay rent that she could finance by either renting
or selling Western. The McReadys were not willing to board her dogs, because they
already had two dogs of their own. Further discussions and negotiations resulted
in an agreement under which decedent agreed to deed Western to the McReadys,
and Mr. McReady would manage the rental activity at Bradley for decedent. It was
also understood that decedent would live with the McReadys at Primrose, that
decedent's dogs could remain at Western, and that the McReadys' daughters would
reside at Western during breaks from college and after their graduations. It was also
expressly understood that as long as the McReady children used Western, decedent
would have access to visit and care for her dogs.
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Decedent did not execute a deed to Western until November 1990, when she
deeded Western to herself and her niece Mrs. McReady as joint tenants. The
transfer by deed did not take place until almost 4 years after the agreement because
of Mr.· McReady's request for a delay. He was the subject of a lawsuit and did not
wish to have additional property in his name. Me McReady was not made a joint
tenant of Western. At the time of the transfer by deed, it was agreed to make
decedent a joint tenant on Western in .order to continue to take advantage of
homestead and senior citizen deductions available in the District of Columbia.
In accord with the agreement, decedent resided at Primrose with the McReadys
from February 1987 through the time ofher death, June 1996. During most of that
period, decedent continued to be in good health, and she took care of her own
needs. Decedent was also financially self-sufficient during that period. During that
period, various of the McReady children, occupied Western in accord with the
agreement. Also, Mr. McReady managed the Bradley rental property during the
period 1987 through decedent's death, placing tenants, negotiating leases, collecting
rents, and seeing to its maintenance.
Mr. McReady lent decedent $95,000 to enable her to payoff an existing mortgage
and refinance the Bradley mortgage to obtain more favorable interest rates.
At the time of decedent's death, Western had a fair market value of $270,000, 50
percent ($135,000) ofwhich was included in the gross estate. The remainder ofthe
principal assets in the gross estate consisted of: Bradley ($280,000); securities
($227,913); and cash and bank accounts ($56,983). The deductions from the gross
estate included: Funeral expenses ($11,736); attorney's fees ($1,481); other
expenses ($1,653); fmancing and closing costs incurred to refinance Bradley
($10,070); and debts of decedent ($109,152, $95,000 of which was due to Mr.
McReady).
The court concluded:
We recognize that Mrs. McReady, along with her sister, was the natural object of
decedent's bounty and named as the sole heir of decedent, and that fact causes us
t02 more closely scrutinize their transactions. However, it does not automatically
negate their agreements. See Caligiuri v. Commissioner., 549 F.2d 1155, 1157 (8th
Cir. 1977), affg. T.C. Memo. 1975-319; Perry v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 470,481
(1989), affd. 912 F.2d 1466 (5th Cir. 1990).
It is important to note that Mrs. McReady and her sister, as beneficiaries, each
received a distribution ofassets worth $225,800. The consideration received by the
McReadys is outside of that distribution. In other words, the deeding of Western
in 1990, 6 years before decedent's death, was outside of the equal division of the
probate estate. Upon the death of decedent, Mrs. McReady became the sole owner
of Western.
Although respondent questions whether the facts in the record support the ultimate
conclusion that there was an agreement and that consideration was exchanged, the
credible and uncontradicted testimony of witnesses and corroborating evidence in
the record support the existence of the agreement and the exchange of
consideration between the parties.
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Having decided that there were an agreement and the exchange of consideration,
we must now decide the amount of adequate and full consideration given by the
McReadys in exchange for an interest in Western. The estate contends that there
are two types of the consideration exchanged for Bradley -- the rental value of
Primrose and the value of Mr. McReady's services in managing Bradley.
H

1t

With respect to the fair rental value, the estate called two expert witnesses and
through their testimony was able to establish an indexed fair rental value for
Primrose. We have found that the fair rental value of Primrose for the period under
consideration was $408,560. With three adults sharing Primrose, we use one-third
of the rental value or $136,187 as the consideration attributable to the decedent's
use of Primrose. The rental value was calculated for the amount of time that
decedent actually survived from the time of the 1987 agreement.6
We note that $136,187 is greater than one-half the $270,000 fair market value of
Western at the time of decedent's death. However, the standard for evaluating the
amount of consideration in this context is specifically set out in section
20.2040-1 (a), Estate Tax Regs.7 That formulaic approach to determining the
portion ofthe fair market value of a jointly held asset that should be excluded from
the gross estate, may be expressed as follows: the fair market value ofthe property
at the date of death is multiplied by a ratio that has the consideration furnished by
the survivor as the numerator and the total consideration paid to acquire and
improve the property as the denominator. See Estate of Young v. Commissioner,
110 T.e. 297,315 (1998); Estate of Van Tine v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo.
1998-344.
The approach used in section 20.2040-I(a)(2), Estate Tax Regs., measures the
survivor's contribution to the jointly owned property against the decedent's
contribution. At the time ofthe 1987 agreement, decedent's sister hadjust died, and
decedent had become the sole owner of Western. However, the regulation, with
respect to the denominator of the exclusionary fOImula, uses the language "total
cost of acquisition and capital additions.
ff

It is somewhat difficult to apply the concept of cost to the circumstances of this
case. In 1987, decedent had just acquired the sole ownership ofthe property as sole
surivivor of three joint tenants culminating a 36-year period. In 1987, decedent
exchanged an undivided one-half interest for a place to live and for services. As it
relates to decedent, it could be said that her cost might have been the amount she
paid, if any, at the time (1951) she began occupying Western.
No matter which approach we use, the cost, plus improvements of Western, would
not exceed its $270,000 agreed fair market value as ofthe time of decedent's death
in 1996. Using the $270,000 in the denominator ofthe fraction clearly sets a higher
bar for the estate's quest for exclusion ofMes. McReady's joint interest. We are not
called upon to decide whether an exclusion ofmore than one-hal f ofthe fair market
value from decedent's gross estate may have been warranted because the McReadys
may have paid more consideration than decedent; the parties have not placed these
aspects in issue or addressed them.
Our holding that $136,187' was the indexed fair rental value exchanged for the
undivided one-half interest in Western satisfies the estate's burden ofshowing that
Mrs. McReady's acquisition was for an adequate and sufficient consideration to
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support the estate's claim that $135,000 of the $270,000 fair market value can be
excluded from the gross estate.
Although the estate has satisfied its burden with respect to excluding $135,000
from the gross estate, we note that we have not decided the value of the services
perfonned by Mr. McReady in managing the Bradley rental property. On this
record, his services would likely be difficult to value, but if those services should
be included in the numerator ofthe fonnula for exclusion, it is clear that additional
value would be added to the numerator ofthe exclusionary equation because ofhis
performance over 9 years. Because the estate has shown sufficient consideration
to warrant the exclusion of one-half of the fair market value of Western (th~
amount claimed' by the estate), we need not address the value of Mr. McReady's
services in managing Bradley.

J.

SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 -- GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
No developments.

K.

SECTIONS 83, 2042 AND 7872 - LIFE INSURANCE
1.

Interim Guidance on Split-Dollar Life Insurance; Notice 2002-8. TAM 960400 1 stated that ifthe

cash surrender value ofa policy exceeded the premiums paid by the employer, section 83 would cause the excess to be
treated as income. Following much consternation, nothing else was heard from the IRS for five years on this issue until
IRS Notice 2001-10, 2001-5 IRB 459, which set forth various issues and potential IRS approaches. That Notice set
forth the background and existing authority on the split-dollar issue:
II.

BACKGROUND

Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, and Rev. Rut 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12,
addressed the Federal income tax treatment of split- dollar arrangements under
which an employer and employee join in the purchase of a life insurance contract
on the life of the employee subject to a contractual allocation of policy benefits
between the employer and employee. The rulings described two contractual fonns:
(1) the endorsement method, under which the employer is fonnally designated as
the owner of the contract, and the employer endorses the contract to specify the
portion ofthe proceeds payable to the employee's beneficiary; and (2) the collateral
assignment method, under which the employee is fonnally designated as the owner
of the contract, the employer's premium payments are characterized as loans from·
the employer to the employee, and the employer's interest in the proceeds of the
contract is designated as collateral security for its loans.
These rulings conclude that all economic benefits conferred on an employee under
such an arrangement, excluding economic benefits attributable to the employee's
own premium payments, constitute gross income to the employee. See also
Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177 (1945). Under the rationale ofthese rulings, the determination ofan employee's
gross income is unaffected by whether the endorsement method or the collateral
assignment method is used.
Under the specific split-dollar arrangement addressed in Rev. Rut 64-328, all
amounts 'credited to the cash surrender value of the life insurance contract inured
to the benefit of the employer. Thus, the only economic benefit inuring to the
employee was the value ofthe insurance protection attributable to the portion ofthe
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contract's death benefit payable to the employee's beneficiary. Rev. Rul. 64-328
holds that, in such a case, the employee's gross income in any year includes the
value ofthe life insurance protection provided to the employee in that year, less any
amount actually paid by the employee.
Rev. Rul. 66-110 amplified Rev. Rul. 64-328 by holding that the value of any
economic benefits in addition to current insurance protection that are provided to
an employee under a split- dollar arrangement are also includible in the employee's
gross income. More specifically, Rev. Rul. 66-110 held that an employee has
additional gross income equal to the amount of any policyholder dividends
distributed to the employee or applied to provide additional insurance for the
exclusive benefit ofthe employee. Thus, where the employer has no interest in the
dividend applied to provide paid-up additional insurance, the taxable economic
benefit is the dividend itself, not the value of the insurance protection resulting
from the dividend.
Rev. Rul. 64-328 and Rev. RuL 66-110 each addressed a situation in which the
employer possessed all beneficial interest in the cash surrender value of the life
insurance contract (exclusive of any separate cash surrender value of paid-up
additions attributable to dividends 1), and the employee was entitled only to certain
other economic benefits generated by the employer's investment in the contract,
specifically, current insurance protection or dividends. Consistent with that, Rev.
Rul. 64-328 revoked Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B.. 23, which had treated a splitdollar arrangement similar to that addressed in Rev. Rul. 64-328 as a secured loan
from the employer to the employee. In rejecting the loan characterization, Rev.. RuL
64-328 stated that the substance of the split-dollar arrangement differed from that
of a loan because the employee was not expected to make repayment except out of
the cash surrender value or proceeds of the life insurance contract. But see
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983)(ltwe read [Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)] to have approved the Commissioner's decision
to treat a nonrecourse loan in this context as a true loan. tt).
Rev. Rul. 64-328 held that the table of one-year premium rates set forth in Rev.
Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, commonly referred to as the "P.S. 58" rates, may be
used to determine the value of the current life insurance protection provided to an
employee under a split-dollar arrangement Rev. RuL 66-110 amplified Rev. Rul.
64-328 in this respect by holding that the insurer's published premium rates for
one-year term insurance may be used to measure the value ofthe" current insurance
protection if those rates are lower than the P.S. 58 rates and available to all
standard risks. Rev. RuL 67-154,1967-1 C.B. II, modified Rev. Rul. 66-110 by
holding that an insurer's published tenn rates must be available for initial issue
insurance (as distinguished from rates for dividend options) in order to be
substituted for the P.S. 58 rates set forth in Rev. RuL 55-747.
Similarly, the IRS has ruled that the economic benefit inuring to a third-party donee
under an employer-employee split- dollar arrangement or to a shareholder under a
corporation- shareholder split-dollar arrangement is to be determined under the
principles and valuation methods set forth in Rev. Rul. 64-328, as amplified by
Rev. RuL 66-110. See Rev. RuL 78-420, 1978-2 C.B. 67; Rev. Rul. 79-50, 1979-1
C.B. 138. Also, the same premium rate alternatives may be relied upon to measure
the value of current life insurance protection provided to an employee under a
qualified retirement plan. See Rev. Rul. 55-747, supra.
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In Notice 2002-8, 2002-4 IRB 1, the IRS revoked Notice 200 1-10. The Notice also:
o Announces that the Treasury and the Service intend to publish proposed
regulations providing comprehensive guidance regarding the Federal tax treatment
of split-dollar life insurance arrangements;
o Outlines rules expected to be included in the forthcoming proposed regulations
and the expected effective date of those regulations; and
o Provides guidance regarding the valuation of current life insurance protection
under a split-dollar life insurance arrangement, under qualified retirement plans and
under employee annuity contracts.
The Notice states that the proposed regulations will provide for taxation ofsplit-dollar arrangements either as
transfers or loans to the benefitted party:
The proposed regulations are expected to provide that, in an employment-related
split-dollar life insurance arrangement, ifthe employer is fonnally designated as the
owner of the life insurance contract, then the benefits provided to the employee
under the arrangement are subject to tax under the frrst regime. Under this regime,
the employer is treated for Federal tax purposes as the oWner ofthe life insurance
contract prior to termination ofthe arrangement, and is treated as providing current
life insurance protection and other economic benefits to the employee, which are
taxable under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code. A transfer of the life
insurance contract to the employee is taxed under section 83. The proposed
regulations will not treat an employer as having made a transfer ofa portion ofthe
cash surrender value of a life insurance contract to an employee for purposes of
section 83 solely because the interest or other earnings credited to the cash
surrender value ofthe contract cause the cash surrender value to exceed the portion
thereof payable to the employer.
The proposed regulations are expected to provide that if the employee is formally
designated as the owner of the life insurance contract under a split-dollar
arrangement, then the premiums paid by the employer are treated as a series of
loans by the employer to the employee if the employee is obligated to repay the
employer, whether out of contract proceeds or otherwise. Under this second
regime, the loans are subject to the principles, where applicable, of sections 12711275 (regarding the taxation of original issue discount) and section 7872 (in the
case of a compensation- related below-market loan, section 7872 deems an interest
payment by the employee to the employer, which is funded by deemed additional
compensation paid by the employer to the employee). If the employee is not
obligated to repay the premiums paid by the employer, then such amounts are
treated as compensation income to the employee at the time the premiums are paid
by the employer.
The same principles are expected to govern the Federal tax treatment ofsplit-dollar
life insurance arrangements in other contexts, including arrangements that provide
benefits in gift and corporation-shareholder contexts.
Ofgreat importance to the life insurance industry has been the effective date ofthe proposed regulations. The
Notice states that the proposed regulations will be effective for "arrangements" entered into after the date ofpublication
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offmal regulations. However, that does not protect all such arrangements. Four "safe-harbors" are created, as is a catch
all safe-harbor.
I.

Economic Benefit Safe-Harbor.

For split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of final regulations, in cases where the value of current life insurance
protection is treated as an economic benefit provided by a sponsor to a benefited
person under a split-dollar life insurance arrangement, the Service will not treat the
arrangement as having been terminated (and thus will not assert that there has been
a transfer of property to the benefited person by reason of termination of the
arrangement) for so long as the parties to the arrangement continue to treat and
report the value of the life insurance protection as an economic benefit provided
to the benefited person. This treatment will be accepted without regard to the level
of the remaining economic interest that the sponsor has in the life insurance
contract.

2.

Loan Safe-Harbor.

For split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of fmal regulations, the parties to the arrangement may treat premium
or other payments by the sponsor as loans. In such cases, the Service will not
challenge reasonable efforts to comply with the requirements of sections 12711275 and section 7872. All payments by the sponsor from the inception of the
arrangement (reduced by any repayments to the sponsor) before the first taxable
year in which such payments are treated as loans for Federal tax purposes must be
treated as loans entered into at the beginning of that first year in which such
payments are treated as loans.

3.
4.

Tennination Before January 1,2004
and
Loan After January 1, 1004 Safe-Harbors

For split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before January 28, 2002
under which a sponsor has made premium or other payments under the arrangement
and has received or is entitled to receive full repayment of all of its payments, the
Service will not assert that there has been a taxable transfer of property to a
benefited person upon termination of the arrangement if (i) the arrangement is
terminated before January 1, 2004, or (ii) for all periods beginning on or after
January 1, 2004, all payments by the sponsor from inception of the arrangement
(reduced by any repayments to the sponsor) are treated as loans for Federal tax
purposes, and the parties to the arrangement report the tax treatment in a manner
consistent with this loan treatment, including sections 1271-1275 and section 7872.
Any such payments by the sponsor before the frrst taxable year in which such
ayments are treated as loans for Federal tax purposes must be treated as loans
entered into at the beginning of that first year in which such payments are treated
as loans.
5.

Potential Catch-All Safe-Harbor

Except for Part III (Revised Standards for Valuing Current Life Insurance
Protection), no inference should be drawn from this notice regarding the
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appropriate Federal income, employment and gift tax treatment of split-dollar life
insurance arrangements entered into before the date of publication of final
regulations. However, taxpayers may rely on this notice (including a reasonable
application of the rules to be proposed as described in Part II) or Notice 2001- 10
for split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of final regulations.
[Categories are the author's; the descriptions are from the Notice.]
The 2002 Notice changes both the old P.S. 58 Tables and the provisions set forth by the 200 I Notice. The new
Notice states:
III.

REVISED STANDARDS FOR
INSURANCE PROTECTION

VALVING

CURRENT

LIFE

Pending the consideration of comments and publication of further guidance, the
following interim guidance is provided on the valuation of current life insurance
protection:
I.
Rev. Rut. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228, remains revoked, as
provided in and with the transitional relief for 2001 described in Part
IV.B.I of Notice 2001-10. Notwithstanding such revocation, for a splitdollar life insurance arrangement entered into before January 28,2002, in
which a contractual arrangement between an employer and employee
provides that the P.S. 58 rates will be used to determine the value of
current life insurance protection provided to the employee (or to the
employee and one or more additional persons), the employer and
employee may continue to use the P.S. 58 rates set forth in Rev. Rul. 55747 to determine the value of current life insurance protection.

2.
For arrangements entered into before the effective date of future
guidance, taxpayers may use the premium rate table set forth at the end of
this notice to determine the value of current life insurance protection on
a single life· that is provided under a split- dollar life insurance
arrangement, in a qualified retirement plan, or under employee annuity
contracts. (This table is captioned as Table 200 I and was originally
published in Notice 2001-10.) Taxpayers should make appropriate
adjustments to these premium rates ifthe life insurance protection covers
more than one life.
3.
For arrangements entered into before the effective date of future
guidance, to the extent provided by Rev. Rut. 66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 12, as
amplified by Rev. Rul. 67-154, 1967-1 C.B. 11, taxpayers may continue
to determine the value of current life insurance protection by using the
insurer's lower published premium rates that are available to all standard
risks for initial issue one-year tenn insurance. However, for arrangements
entered into after January 28,2002, and before the effective date offuture
guidance, for periods after December 31, 2003, the Service will not
consider an insurer's published premium rates to be available to all
standard risks who apply for tenn insurance unless (i) the insurer
generally makes the availability ofsuch rates known to persons who apply
fortenn insurance coverage from the insurer, and (ii) the insurer regularly
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sells tenn insurance at such rates to individuals who apply for term
insurance coverage through the insurerfs normal distribution channels.

TABLE 2001
INTERIM TABLE OF ONE-YEAR TERM PREMIUMS
FOR $1,000 OF LIFE INSURANCE PROTECTION
Section 79
Extended
and
Interpolated

Section 79
Extended
and
Interp 0 lated

Section 79
Extended
and
Interpolated

Attained
Age

Annual
Rates

Attained
Age

Annual
Rates

Attained
Age

Annual
Rates

0

$ 0.70
$ 0.41
$0.27
$ 0.19
$ 0.13
$ 0.13
$ 0.14
$ 0.15
$ 0.16
$ 0.16
$ 0.16
$ 0.19
$0.24
$ 0.28
$ 0.33
$ 0.38
$ 0.52
$ 0.57
$ 0.59
$ 0.61
$ 0.62
$0.62
$ 0.64
$0.66
$ 0.68
$ 0.71
$ 0.73
$ 0.76
$ 0.80
$ 0.83
$ 0.87
$ 0.90
$ 0.93
$ 0.96
$ 0.98

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

$ 0.99
$ 1.01
$ 1.04
$ 1.06
$ 1.07
$ 1.10
$ 1.13
$ 1.20
$ 1.29
$ 1.40
$ 1.53
$ 1.67
$ 1.83
$ 1.98
$ 2.13
$ 2.30
$2.52
$ 2.81
$ 3.20
$ 3.65
$ 4.15
$4.68
$ 5.20
$ 5.66
$ 6.06
$ 6.51
-$ 7.11
$ 7.96
$ 9.08
$ 10.41
$ 11.90
$ 13.51
$ 15.20
$ 16.92
$ 18.70

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

$ 20.62
$ 22.72
$ 25.07
$ 27.57
$ 30.18
$ 33.05
$ 36.33
$ 40.17
$ 44.33
$ 49.23
$ 54.56
$ 60.51
$ 66.74
$ 73.07
$ 80.35
$ 88.76
$ 99.16
$ 110.40
$ 121.85
$ 133.40
$ 144.30
$ 155.80
$ 168.75
$ 186.44
$ 206.70
$ 228.35
$ 250.01
$ 265.09
$270.11
$ 281.05

I
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
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2.

Correction to Life Insurance Trust for Scrivener's Error. In PLR 200314009 the settlor ofa trust

intended to include restrictions that would not allow her to appoint herself or a person subordinate to he as trustee, but
due to scrivener's error the restriction was omitted. the IRS approved the effectiveness ofa court refonnation to fix the
problem.

3.

Selling Life Insurance Policies From One Trust to Another. Suppose a life insurance policy is

owned by an irrevocable trust with undesirable terms. Traditionally there have been three simple alternatives.
First, the insured could purchase the policy from the trust That purchase is not a transfer for value because
a purchase by the insured is an exception to the transfer for value rules. Recall that if an insurance policy is ever
transferred for value the death proceeds become taxable under section 101.
The downside to this option is that the insured now owns the policy and it is included in the insureds estate.
If the insured gives the policy to a new irrevocable trust, section 2035 imposes a three year waiting period before the
policy is excluded.
The second option is to create a new irrevocable trust and.have the insured and the new trust fonn a partnership.
The insured then contributes cash to the new trust and the new trust purchases the policy from the original trust That
is not a transfer for value because the new trust is a partner ofthe insured, and, again, that is an exception to the transfer

for value rules. The downside to the second option is that a partnership has to be formed. The upside is that there is
no three year inclusion issue because the insured never owned the policy. PLR 20012007 confrrmed the favorable
transfer for value result using an LLC taxed as a partnership.
The third option is to create a new trust that is a grantor trust for income tax purposes. The grantor may
contribute cash to the new trust which will purchase the policy from the original trust. Because the new trust is a grantor
trust it is the same as the grantor for all income tax purposes, including section 101. For many years the primary
authority for the application of the grantor trust rules to section 101 was Swanson v" Commissioner, 518 F.2d 59 (8th
Cir. 1975). In Swanson the trust was a grantor trust for all kinds of reasons, not just for technical reasons.
In PLR 200228019, the IRS accepted the Swanson rationale (without citing it). The ruling states:
Taxpayer [the purchasing trust] has requested a ruling that section 10 l(a)(I) ofthe
Code will be applicable to the proceeds of the Policies which are paid upon the
deaths of Husband and Wife. Taxpayer represents that both it and Trust 2 are
grantor trusts owned by Husband. Under Rev. Rut. 85-13, a transaction cannot be
recognized as a sale for federal income tax purposes if the same person is treated
as owning the purported consideration both before and after the transaction.
Husband is treated for federal income tax purposes as owning the assets of Trust
2 and Taxpayer. Therefore, the transfer of the Policies is disregarded for federal
income tax purposes and will not affect the application of section 101(a)(I) to
amount that the beneficiaries ofthe Policies will receive upon the death ofHusband
and Wife.
See PLR 200247006 for a similar ruling. The purchasing trust must be a grantor trust with respect to both
income and principal. A trust with Crummey withdrawal powers may be such a trust but that result is not foreordained.

A - 102

A withdrawal right, as in a Crummey trust, makes the power-holder the grantor of that portion of the trust.
What if the trust contains other provisions that would make the real grantor - the person putting money in the trust the grantor? Do those provisions trump the withdrawal rights? Stated in Code tenus, do sections 671-677 trump section
6781 The IRS ruling position with respect to income is yes, and most commentators believes that is the right result with
respect to principal as well. However, the authority is sparse on the issue.
Is it significant that both the buying and selling trusts were grantor trusts? The tax status of the selling trust
should not affect the transaction.
If the

gra~tor engages

in this transaction may the IRS argue that the grantor has, in effect, retained the right

to change the terms ofthe trust thus creating an incident ofownership? The IRS would have the same argument whether
the transaction lli engaged in or merely "could be." There should be no such argument.

L.

SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
1.

Deduction of Administration Expenses Allowed By Probate Court. In Estate of Grant v.

Commissioner, 294 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002) the court determined that probate court approval is not sufficient:
Many ofour sister circuits have concluded that finding an expense allowable under
state law is simply a threshold requirement that must be satisfied before
considering § 2053's federal requirements for allowability. See Estate of Millikin
v. Comm'r, 125 F.3d 339,344 (6th (Cite as: 294 F.3d 352, *354) Cir.1997); Estate
of Love v. Comm'r, 923 F.2d 335,337-38 (4th Cir.1991); Marcus v. DeWitt, 704
F.2d 1227, 1229-30 (II th Cir.I983); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741,
744-46 (9th Cir.1978); Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir.1967).
These federal requirements, which are set forth in the regulations, include that the
expense be "necessary," that it be for the benefit of the estate rather than for the
beneficiaries, and that it be a result of the transfer of property. Estate of Love, 923
F.2d at 337-38; Hibernia Bank, 581 F.2d at 746.
Our court has never directly addressed the question whether allowability under §
2053 rests on both state law and federal law requirements. In Estate of Smith v.
Comm'r, however, the majority indicated its agreement with the conclusion of the
Fifth Circuit in Pitner that the allowability of an expense under § 2053 is
"ultimately a question offederal law." 510 F.2d479, 482-83 n. 4 (2d Cir.1975). We
said there that "federal courts cannot be precluded from reexamining a lower state
court's allowance ofadministration expenses to determine whether they were in fact
necessary to carry out the administration of the estate[.]" Id. at 482-83.
Today we hold explicitly what we implicitly determined in Estate of Smith: that in
order for an expense to be deductible under § 2053, it must qualify as an
"administration expense" under both the applicable state law and the federal law
as delineated in the Treasury regulations. In so holding, we join the consistent
position taken by the other circuits that have examined this issue.
In Estate of Frances C. Glover, T.C.Memo. 2002-186, the Court refused to allow an estate to deduct amounts
received in settlement of a malpractice action that were paid to certain co-plaintiffs because the obligation to the coplaintiffs did not arise before the decedent's death and was not contracted for full and adequate consideration. The court
concluded that the co-plaintiffs claims in the malpractice action were not "worth" the portion the estate agreed to give
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them. The agreement had been approved by the trial court but not in an adversarial proceeding (the estate and coplaintiffs were on the same side). The co-plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the estate as well.
2.

Deduction For Interest Overpayments. Succession ofBetty F. Helis, et al~ v. United States, 52 Fed.

Cl. 745 (2002), involved an interesting situation. The court originally found for the

taxpayer~

then granted the

govemmenfs motion for reconsideration and reversed itself fmding for the government. The original opinion states
the facts simply:
The decedent owned, among other things, a fifty-percent interest in a partnership
named "Estate of William G. Helis," which qualified as a closely held business
under 26 U.S.C. (hereafter, "I.R.e.") § 6166 (1994). On July 10,1981, plaintiff
filed its Form 4768 "U.S. Estate Tax Return" which reported that the average
appraised value ofthe partnership interest was $35,900,000 at date ofdeath. After
an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audit, it detennined that the value of the
partnership interest was $44,500,000. The assessed taxes were increased,
accordingly. In July 2001, we detennined that the fair market value of the
partnership interest as of the date of death was $35,900,000.
Plaintiff paid the disputed estate tax in the amount of $19,430,645.88 and interest
in the amount of$16,690,452.11 .. Plaintiffchose to defer payment on the estate tax
over the period allowed by LR.C. § 6166 to in closely held businesses~ thereby
incurring an interest obligation. See I.R.e. § 6166.
Thus, the estate paid, and deducted, interest on the payment which turned out to be an overpayment. What
effect should the overpaid interest have on the federal estate tax return? The original opinion stated:
The estate claimed as an expense the amounts paid to the IRS as interest.
Defendant argues that the overpayment of interest may not properly be deducted
from the estate because improperly paid interest will be returned to the estate upon
payment of fmal judgment. It contends that the amount ultimately passing to the
heirs will thus not be reduced. The interest will therefore not have been actually
and necessarily incurred in the administration of the decedent's estate.
Defendant relies primarily on Estate ofO'Daniel v. United States, 6 F.3d 321 (5th
Cir. 1993), in which a taxpayer was assessed an additional estate tax and deficiency
interest by the IRS. The estate later received a refund of a portion of the additional
tax as well as the corresponding deficiency interest. O'Daniel, 6 F.3d at 329. The
court held that the deficiency interest was not an expense "actually" incurred and
thus the estate could not deduct the refunded deficiency interest. Id. It is not clear
from O'Daniel whether the refund had already been reimbursed fully to the
plaintiff~ but it is clear that the court had already awarded a specific amount in
estate tax refund, deficiency interest refund, and statutory interest. It is also clear
that, unlike the present case, the question involved the deductibility of "deficiency
interest" pursuant to LR.C. § 660 I instead of statutory interest under the I.R.e. §
6166 election.
To the extent that O'Daniel stands for the proposition that any future recovery of
statutory interest must be taken into account in calculating deductions from the
estate, which is not at all clear, we respectfully decline to follow it.
Plaintiffs interest in Estate of William G. Helis, A Partnership, qualified as a
closely held business under I.R.C. § 6166. This enabled plaintiff to pay the estate

A - 104

tax due on the partnership interest in installments for fifteen years. Each installment
included tax and interest. Plaintiff had the choice of either taking an estate tax
deduction or an income tax deduction for the interest payments. See Rev. Rut. 79252, 1979-2 C.B. 333 ( 1979) (allowing post-death interest on an income deficiency
to be deducted from an estate as an administration expense). Plaintiffchose to take
the deduction on its estate tax retum.5
The estate tax assessed will be calculated as of the date of ultimate judgment,
because at that time all administrative deduction issues will be resolved. But
defendant proposes that after the estate's net value is detennined, the amount of
interest refunded to the estate should then be folded back into the estate, increasing
net value. Once the estate is increased, the tax on it would also be increased, thus
decreasing the amount of overpayment and associated interest overpayment, thus
triggering a recalculation of the size of the estate, thus. . .. The process would
theoretically never end. It would be comparable to closing a door half the distance
repeatedly. The door never closes. Similarly here, there would be no way to
detennine the exact size of the estate or refund.
In any event, the court orders the refund as ofthe day ofjudgment. As of that date,
the interest is still outstanding. By law, plaintiff can claim the interest as an estate
tax deduction. Plaintiffs methodology -- which would require it to recognize the
refunded interest as income in a later year -- is both legally correct and not
encumbered by imprecision.
In the second opinion the court summarizes its original opinion in this way:
Defendant does not dispute that interest on borrowing can be a proper
administrative expense under I.R.C. § 2503. Instead, defendant disputes whether
all of the interest was "actually and necessarily incurred" as required under Treas.
Reg. § 20.2503-3(a) (1979). Defendant contends that the unnecessarily paid § 6166
interest will be returned, plus interest, thereby eliminating the deduction in the
same amount.
In its earlier decision on this question, the court ruled against the government on
two grounds. The first was that there appeared to be no legal reason not to treat the
interest payments as anything other than final at the time they were made. In other
words, there was no dispute that plaintiff made a series of interest payments over
the course of fifteen years. At the time made, plaintiffwas entitled to treat each one
as a deduction. The deduction, although cumulative, was applied, nunc pro tunc,
back to the estate as of the date of valuation, July 10, 1981.
The second reason we agreed with plaintiff previously was that, because
defendant's model requires a theoretically infinite series of iterative calculations
based on two mutually dependent variables (the size of the estate and the amount
of the tax), the court assumed the calculation would not be precise. The amount of
the tax depends on the size of the taxable estate, which depends on the amount of
the deductions, which in tum depends on the amount borrowed to pay tax, ad
infmitum.
We deal with the latter rationale first. It was incorrect. Defendant asserts, and
plaintiffdoes not contest, that algebraic models are available which can manipulate
two mutually dependent variables. It is thus possible to calculate and adjust
simultaneously the precise amount of borrowing, deduction, and tax due in a way
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that minimizes the borrowing and maximizes the tax return. OUf predecessor court
employed such a calculation in Bush v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 161, 618 F.2d
741 (1980).
With respect to the first rationale, the court appeared to struggle. After reviewing various cases and rulings
that it found inapplicable, the opinion states:
Ultimately, we think defendant's approach is more consistent with the way in which
estate tax is determined. Unlike income tax, which builds on the concept of
independent tax years, each becoming a virtually sealed compartment, estate tax is
structured around a single event. The estate is created at death, but it can be
affected by events in succeeding calendar years. Detennination ofthe final amount
of the taxable estate is therefore an open-ended process which may take years to
finalize.
To apply that consideration here dictates an acknowledgment that, as part of the
judgment, plaintiff is going to receive a return of interest because, in retrospect, it
need not have been borrowed. Unlike the compartmentalized character of the
income tax year, no curtain is drawn down on the estate tax calculation. Cf.
Hillsborough Nat'} Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 377-80 (1983) (discussing the
income tax benefit rule and the implications of a deduction taken and the
corresponding return of capital in the same tax year). So long as the recovery or
gain, in this case the cancellation of interest, is more properly attributable to the
creation of the estate, as opposed to subsequent income of the estate, it is
appropriate to fold the recovery into the estate tax calculation. That is particularly
so when the estate elected to take the deduction under estate rather than income tax
laws.
As in O'Daniel, the estate ultimately will not "actually" have incurred the disputed
interest expense. The estate is still open, and it will continue to be open after entry
ofjudgment. Prior to closing, the estate will have received the amount ordered by
way ofjudgment. Prior to a final reconciliation, in other words, plaintiff will have
recovered the interest overpayment, along with statutory interest on that
overpayment. The economic reality to the estate is that it will not be diminished
beyond what it would have consisted ofin the event plaintiffs figure had been used
from the beginning.
As defendant correctly observes: "the interest due and owing to the Government
depends on the tax liability, while the amount of the tax liability depends on the
interest deduction." Motion ofOctober 25, 2002, p. 15. What is now known is that
the amount of interest paid was not the amount due. This is not because of the
open-ended effect of an increasing interest deduction on the size of the estate, but
because a major adjustment must be made for the over-valuation of the oil and gas
partnership interest. In short, more than one third of the interest paid was
unnecessarily incurred ($16,690,452 paid; $10,080,713 due under defendant's
model), and, after final judgment, will not in fact have been paid.5
Plaintiffargues that such treatment creates an imbalance. It argues that ifthe estate
had borrowed money from a third party lender instead ofthe government, it would
be entitled to deduct all interest paid on the loan, irrespective of whether it
eventually received a refund of overpaid tax and statutory interest. Plaintiff
suggests that the estate's use of I.R.C. § 6166, which was intended to assist
taxpayers by allowing the government to function as a lender, should produce the
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same result. In that case, however~ the estate would not recover interest paid to the
third party lender. Therefore, the expenses would be "actually and necessarily
incurred" and fully deductible under § 2053.
We acknowledge that the precise economic consequences of borrowing from a
third party lender might be different. 6 We note, however, that, as defendant argues,
plaintiffs preferred approach would create its own inconsistency between treatment
ofrefund claims versus deficiency claims. [n the case ofdeficiency claims brought
in the Tax Court, the taxpayer, of necessity, eventually pays only the net tax due.
The governmen~ in effect, becomes a lender to the extent ofthe estate tax liability.
The interest on that unpaid tax, likewise, is of necessity the precise amount due.7
Such treatment is comparable to defendantfs proposed treatment ofthe refund claim
here.
M.

SECTIONS 2056, 2056A AND 2519- MARITAL DEDUCTION

1.

Construction of Power of Appointment Language. In TAM 200244002, the issue was whether

a surviving spouse had a general power ofappointment over the marital trust. The IRS construed the following language
as creating an inter vivos general power of appointment:
Anything in this Will to the contrary notwithstanding and whether or not any
reference is made in any other provision ofthis Will to the limitations imposed by
this Section XIV, my Trustee shall not have or exercise any authority, power or
discretion over the Marital Trust or the income thereof, or the property constituting
the same, nor shall any payment or distribution by my Trustee be limited or
restricted by any provision of this Will, which would in any way (a) adversely
affect the qualification of the Marital Trust, (b) prevent my estate from receiving
the benefit of the maximum marital deduction, or (c) affect the right of my said
wife to all income therefrom or her right to dispose of the principal and income
thereof in the amount and to the extent necessary to qualify the Marital Trust for
the marital deduction for Federal estate tax purposes under the provisions of the
law applicable to my estate.
The TAM states:
It can be inferred from the language in Item XIV, that by precluding the trustee
from taking any action that would adversely affect Decedentfs right to all the
income or her right to dispose ofthe principal and income in the amount and to the
extent necessary to qualify the Marital Trust for the marital deduction, that Spouse
intended Decedent to have the right to dispose of the trust principal and income in
favor of herself. Therefore, under the facts presented, we conclude that Spouse's
will provided Decedent with an inter vivos general power of appointment under §
2041 (b). Even though Decedent's general power could be exercised only during her
life, and not by will, Decedent is treated as having the power at her death. See
Snyder v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 195 (W.O. Ky. 1962); Jenkins v. United
States, 428 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1970). Accordingly, the Marital Trust is includible
in Decedent's gross estate under § 2041(a).
The TAM also applied the duty of consistency:
In addition, we believe that the doctrine of duty of consistency is applicable to the
facts of this case. The equitable doctrine of duty of consistency is:
based on the theory that a taxpayer owes the Commissioner the duty to be
consistent with his tax treatment ofthe same or related items and will not
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be pennitted to benefit in a later year from an error or omission made in
a prior year which cannot be corrected because the statute of limitations
has expired. Erickson v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1991-97, citing
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497,
838-39 (1980).
The doctrine requires the presence of three elements: (1) a representation by the
taxpayer; (2) reliance on the representation by the Service; and (3) an attempt by
the taxpayer, after the statute has run, to change the representation.
This doctrine is generally applied in cases where the same taxpayer takes
inconsistent positions with respect to separate taxable years. In additio~ courts
have applied the doctrine where two taxpayers are in a "privity-type" relationship.
See, e.g., Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 464 (Ct Cl. 1976); cf. Cluck v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324 (1995). In Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.
290 (1997), the court said:
A husband and wife can have interests so closely aligned that one may be
estopped under the duty of consistency by a prior representation of the
other. Cluck v. Commissioner, [105 T.C. at 331-37.] The same can be true
ofthe estates ofa husband and a wife. Whether there is sufficient identity
of interests between the parties to apply the duty of consistency depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 335.
The Commissioner s position is that there is privity between the estate of a
deceased spouse and the estate of the surviving spouse. The decedent's estate and
the spouse's estate are closely related because one derives a benefit from the marital
deduction of the other. Cf. Estate of Shelfer v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 10, 19
(1994) (Parr, J., dissenting), rev d on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 1996).
Moreover, we believe the facts here demonstrate privity between Decedent's estate
and Spouse's estate. Decedent was named co-executor and trustee of the Marital
Trust by Spouse's wilL Moreover, Decedent received the income from the Marital
Trust, the value of which had not been decreased by estate taxes because of the
marital.deduction allowed to Spouse's estate. In LeFever v. Commissioner, 100
F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996), the court found privity between the taxpayer and the
decedent where the taxpayer was the executor ofthe decedent's estate. Accordingly,
we conclude that Decedent's estate and Spouse's estate are in privity.
1

1

Since there is a strong case for privity of the two estates, the duty of consistency
should apply. Here, all three criteria of the duty of consistency are met. A
representation was made by Spouse's estate that taxation ofthe funds in the Marital
Trust would be deferred from his estate and would be included in Decedent's estate.
That representation was reinforced by the return filed by Decedent's estate, which
included the Marital Trust in her estate. The Service relied on that representation
during the audit of Spouse's estate. That reliance was to the Service's detriment,
however, since the period of limitations under which the Service might have been
able to retrieve the proper tax owed by Spouse's estate has expired. Finally, at
present, Decedent's estate is attempting to retrieve the tax it paid on the amounts,
asserting that the amounts should have been taxed as assets of Spouse's estate.
Accordingly, we believe all three elements of the duty of consistency are satisfied.
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2.

Division of Trust for Section 2519 Purposes. PLR 200116006 detennined that where a spouse

renounced the income interest in a part ofa QTIP trust that had been divided, the spouse would not be treated as having
disposed of an income interest under section 2519 in the other part of the trust. See also PLR 200137022.
In 200230017 the spouse sold her income interest in one of seven new QTIPs (created out of one) to the
remainder beneficiary. The IRS ruled the sale proceeds would be long-term capital gain (husband had died more than
a year before).

3.

Disposition For Section 2519 Purposes is a Net Gift. Proposed regulations issued on July 19,2002

(Reg. 123345-01 T.O. 8522, 1994-1 C.B. 236) provide that a gift caused by section 2519 will be calculated as a net gift.
The donee spouse will be able to recover the amount ofthe gift tax caused by the transfer, and that right will reduce the
amount ofthe gift. Failure to recover the gift tax will he a gift. On this point, Treas. Reg. § 25.22070A-I was amended
to add a new paragraph:
(b) Failure of a person to exercise the right of recovery. The failure of a person
to exercise a right of recovery provided by section 2207A(b) upon a lifetime
transfer subject to section 2519 is treated as a transfer for Federal gift tax purposes
of the unrecovered amounts to the person(s) from whom the recovery could have
been obtained. See 25.2511-1. The transfer is considered to be made when the
right to recovery is no longer enforceable and is treated as a gift even if recovery
is impossible. Any delay in the exercise ofthe right of recovery shall be treated as
an interest-fee loan with the appropriate gift tax consequences.
4.

Restriction on Income. The following clause was found not to give the surviving spouse "all the

income" for purposes ofsection 2056 by the Tax Court in Estate of Ralph H. Davis, et at v. Commissioner, T.e.Memo
2003-55:
After the death of trustor survived by his spouse and during the lifetime of his
surviving spouse, the trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, in quarter annual or more frequent installments, all ofthe net income from
the trust estate as the trustee, in the trustee's reasonable discretion, shall determine
to be proper for the health, education, or support, maintenance, comfort and
welfare of grantor's surviving spouse in accordance with the surviving spouse's
accustomed manner of living.
The opinion states:
Pursuant to Section Two of the amended trust, the surviving spouse's right to
receive income is significantly restricted. In determining the appropriate amount
of income to distribute to the surviving spouse, Section Two of the amended trust
charges the trustee to consider, in the trustee's reasonable discretion, the surviving
spouse's health" education, support, maintenance, comfort, and welfare, in light of
her accustomed manner of living.
The expression, "in accordance with the surviving spouse's accustomed manner of
living" modifies and limits the expression that precedes it: "all of the net income
from the trust estate as the trustee, in the trustee's reasonable discretion, shall
determine to be proper for the health, education, or support, maintenance, comfort
and welfare". In Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, 964 F.2d 959, 964-965 (9th
Cir. 1992), revg. 96 T.e. 760 (1991), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
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the circuit to which any appeal of the instant case would lie, stated that, the
language used by the Nicholson trust [in Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner, 94
T.e. 666 (1990)] -- 'usual and customary standard of living' -- is much narrower
and more specific than that used in this case -- 'best interests.' Interpreting the
Nicholson trust as qualifying for the QTIP deduction would have required the Tax
Court to 'rewrite the trust instrument.'
The "usual and customary standard of living" clause under consideration in the
instant case is analogous to the clause in Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner,
supra, and distinguishable from the "best interests" clause directly considered by
the court in Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra. The language in the
amended trust is more restrictive than the "best interests" language in the trust in
Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra. The use ofthe word "comfort" in the
amended trust is limited by the expression, "in accordance with the surviving
spouse's accustomed manner of living." Accordingly, we interpret the language of
the amended trust to mean that the surviving spouse does not have such "command
over the income that it is virtually hers". See sec. 20.2056(b)-5(t)(8), Estate Tax
Regs.9 In the instant case, Section Four of the amended trust provides that the
trustee, in exercising reasonable discretion, may consider "any other income or
resources of the beneficiary known to the trustee and reasonably available." 10 In
the instant case, Section Two of the amended trust limits the surviving spouse's
entitlement to income without using the tenn "best interests". Moreover, in the
instant case, the clause under consideration is much narrower and more specific
than the "best interests" clause considered by the court in Estate of Nicholson v.
Commissioner, supra. We conclude that the foregoing limitations prevent the
surviving spouse from being entitled to the entire income from the trust.
Moreover, the surviving spouse's role as sole trustee under the trust does not assure
her the requisite control over the trust income for life, because, by the terms of the
amended trust, decedent's daughters could become sole or cotrustees of the trust,
in the event of the surviving spouse's resignation or her incapacity to serve as a
trustee. Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra at 962 (citing Estate of Kyle v.
Commissioner, 94 T.e. 829 (1990)). Additionally, unlike the UMarital Deduction
Trust in Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra, there is no language in the
amended trust which explicitly refers to a marital deduction under section 2056.
Accordingly, we conclude that the decedent did not intend to grant the surviving
spouse the entire income interest for life from the surviving spouse's interest in the
estate.
tt

N.

SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS
1.

Reciprocal Gifts. In Estate of Robert V. Schuler v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2002),

the Eighth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's extension of the reciprocal gift doctrine to transfers of different assets. The
facts were:
Two brothers, Robert Schuler (Robert) and George Schuler, Jr. (George), owned
interests in two family operated companies -Minn- Kota Ag Products, inc. (MinnKota) and Sigco Sunplant, Inc. (Sigco). Prior to the stock transfers at issue,
George's son, Jody, owned all Minn-Kota Class A voting common stock, and
Robert's son, Jay, George, and lody owned ali the restricted Class B common
stock. Sigco was equally owned by Robert and George.
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Before Robert's death, he and George had discussed with their insurance agent their
desire to have their families succeed them in the businesses. The brothers told their
insurance agent they wanted Robert's family to control Sigco and George's family
to control Minn-Kota. Together, with assistance from the insurance agen~ Robert
and George devised two three-step plans to transfer divided ownership of MinnKota and Sigco to each other's family and to employ section 2503(b) ofthe Internal
Revenue Code to exclude the transfers from estate taxes.
The frrst step for gaining family control of Sigco required Robert and his wife to
make joint gifts of Sigco stock equal to approximately $20,000 each to their
children, their spouses and grandchildren and to lody, his wife and son during
December 1994 and January 1995. The second step required George and his wife
to make joint transfers ofstock equal to approximately $20,000 to each of Robert's
children and their spouses. The third step required several of Robert's children to
transfer their shares to four siblings, including Jay and his children.
Similarly, the first step for gaining family control of Minn-Kota required George
and his wife to make joint gifts of Minn- Kota stock valued at approximately
$20,000 to each 0 f their children and grandchildren in December 1994 and January
1995. The second step required Robert and his wife to transfer approximately
$20,000 of Minn-Kota stock each to George, his wife and their children. The third
step required some of George's children and their spouses to transfer stock valued
at approximately $10,000 each to Jody~ his wife, and their children.
.Between December 1994 and January 1995, Robert transferred stock valued at
$440,467.20 to George's family, and George transferred stock valued at $382,140
to Robert's family. After these stock transfers, Ro.bert's family owned nearly 80
percent ofSigco, George's family owned nearly 68 percent of Minn-Kota, and Jody
retained ownership of all Minn-Kota voting common stock.
Robert and George separately filed Form 709s 2 for the years 1994 and 1995. On
both Form 709s Robert and his wife claimed twelve gift tax exclusions for gifts
made to George's family along with additional exclusions for gifts made to their
own family members. On both Form 709s George and his wife claimed nine gift
tax exclusions for gifts made to Robert's family along with additional exclusions
for gifts made to their own family members.
In October 1995, Robert died. His sons, Jay and Thomas Schuler, filed a Fonn 7063
excluding gifts of Sigco and Minn-Kota stock made in 1994 and 1995 from their
deceased father's taxable gifts. Thereafter, on December 18, 1996, January 2, 1997,
and January 2, 1998, George and his wife made transfers ofMinn-Kota stock, each
valued at $19,926, to Robert'~ son, Jay. The aggregate value of these three
subsequent stock transfers totaled $59,778, which, when added to the value of
George's 1994-95 stock transfers, amounted to $441,918, or just $1 ,451 more than
the value of stock Robert had transferred to George's family in 1994 and 1995.
The opinion states:
We have jurisdiction over appeals from the tax court pursuant to 26 U. S.
C. §§ 7482. We review the tax. court's factual findings for clear error and
its legal conclusions de novo. Bean v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 553, 556
(8th Cir. 200 I). "Whether a transaction lacks economic substance, and
whether several transactions should be considered integrated steps of a
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single transaction~ are both fact questions which we review for clear
error." Sather v. Commissioner, 251 F.3d 1168, 1173 (8th eir. 2001)
(citations omitted).
For purposes of this appeal~ we must determine whether the gifts at issue, similar
stock transfers made by Robert and George to each other's children, were reciprocal
cross gifts, that is, indirect gifts to each donor's own children. In doing so, we are
guided by our recent decision in Sather. Id. at 1173-76 (applying the reciprocal
trust doctrine4 in a gift tax, context to detennine the economic substance of gift
transfers).
We explained in Sather that the reciprocal trust doctrine is a variation of
the substance over fonn concept which developed in the trust context "to
prevent taxpayers from transferring similar property in trust to each other
as life tenants, thus removing the property from the settlor's estate and
avoiding estate taxes~ while receiving identical property for their lifetime
enjoyment that would likewise not be included in their estate.4( Id. at 1173
(citing Estate of Grace~ 395 U. S. at 320). The application of the
reciprocal trust doctrine is not limited only to identifying the true
transferor or transferee~ but also applies to determining the nature of the
property transferred. Sather, 251 F.3d at 1174. The doctrine applies to
multiple transactions which are interrelated and which, Uto the extent of
mutual value, leave ... the settlors in approximately the same economic
position as they would have been in had they created trusts naming
themselves as life beneficiaries." Id. at 1173-74 (quoting Estate ofGrace,
395 U. S. at 324).
Applying these trust principles to gifts in Sather, we ruled the gifts were part of a
jointly designed and executed plan devised for the purpose of benefitting each
brother's own <;hildren. Id. at 1174-75. The Sather case involved three brothers,
each ofwhom had three children. The Sather brothers made identical gifts of stock
in a family-owned corporation on the same date to each of their children and to
each of their six nieces and nephews for a total of nine gifts. A fourth, unmarried
brother also made identical gifts of stock on the same date to his nine nieces and
nephews. Id. at 1I70-71.
Subsequent to the stock transfers, each child (transferee) was left iil the same
economic position as ifhis father had given the stock directly to him. Id. at 117475. We deemed as immaterial the fact that the brothers circuitously routed the gifts
to their own children through their nieces and nephews, and we upheld the tax
court's ruling that each brother was entitled to only three annual exclusions. We
also concluded that the result was not affected by the fact the fourth, unmarried
brother had made gifts of stock to his nieces and nephews which resulted in a net
decrease in his economic value. The effect of uncrossing the reciprocal transfers
left each ofthe transferors (except the unmarried brother) with children in the same
economic position as ifhe had made stock transfers only to his own children. Id.
at 1175.
Applying the reciprocal trust doctr.ine to this case, we cannot say the tax court was
clearly erroneous in finding the gifis ofstocks were interrelated. Robert and George
Schuler jointly sought the advice of their insurance agent on how to have their
children succeed them in the family-owned businesses. With their insurance agent's
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assistance, they devised a plan whereby Robert's family would increase its interest
in Sigco while George's family would increase its interest in Minn-Kota. The 1994
and 1995 reciprocal transfers of stock were identical in type and amount and
occurred on the same days. Similar to the Sather brothers, the Schuler brothers
received no direct economic benefit from the stock transfers, but they received an
economic benefit indirectly by benefitting their children as successors to the
family-contro lied businesses.
The Schulers contend their case is distinguishable from Estate ofGrace and Sather,
inter alia, because those cases involved transfers of identical property. In contrast,
Schulers argue this case involves transfers of stock in two distinct companies
whose assets, businesses, and management are different. We fmd such distinctions
immaterial. Certainly, the three-part plans jointly executed in this case were more
complicated than the transfers in Sather. However, the net effect was the same simultaneous cross transfers ofstock amounting to transfers ofeach brother's stock
to his own children.
Nor are we persuaded the tax court was clearly wrong in fmding inter-relatedness
when Robert and George had a business purpose in separatingthe ownership ofthe
two businesses between the children of the two Schuler families. Intrafamily
transfers demand close scrutiny "precisely because the genuineness of the
transaction cannot reasonably be inferred'1 from assurances of business purpose.
Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Fehrs v.
United States, 620 F.2d 255, 260 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). In this case, the tax court flatly
rejected the assertion that business purpose was the primary motivation for making
the reciprocal stock transfers. Instead, the tax court reached the "inescapable
conclusion that decedent and his brother made the circuitous transfers for the
primary purpose of increasing the number ofexclusions under section 250~(b) that
otherwise would have been available to them."
After uncrossing the gifts to discern the taxability of the transactions, the tax court
found Robert's children received stock from George of approximately the same
economic value as they would have received by direct transfers from Robert. The
tax court rested its finding on the fact that the difference in the value of the 1994
and 1995 cross stock transfers, which amounted to $58,327.20, was all but
eliminated by George's transfers of stock valued at $59,778 to Robert's son in the
three years following Robert's death.
The Schulers contend the tax court ignored the substantial changes in ownership
and control that resulted from the reciprocal transfers. After the stock transfers, the
Schulers claim Robert's family interest in Sigco increased from 75 percent to 80
percent. s In analyzing the effect ofthe stock transfers, the tax court recognized the
stock transfers resulted in a small shift in Sigco ownership from 75 percent to
almost 80 percent. Before the transfers, Robert owned 25 percent of Sigco shares
outstanding and his son, Jay, owned 50 percent; together they owned a 75 percent
majority. Before and after the transfers, George's son, Jody, owed 100 percent of
the Minn-Kota voting stock. Thus, the tax court found that acquiring control ofthe
family business was not the purpose of the transfers.
2.

Gift under Federal Law. In Wells Fargo Bank New Mexico, et at. v. United States, 319 F.3d 1222

(10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the question ofwhether a completed gift had been made.
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Essentially, wife created a lifetime QTIP but the QTIP election was not made, thus creating an unwanted gift. The estate
of the now deceased wife argued there was no gift under state law because her intent was foiled. The opinion states:
At this point, two propositions emerge. First, the language employed in the trust
instrument concerning the fmality ofthe transfer of funds could not be any clearer.
Indeed, the architect ofthe trust employed virtually every word in a legal scrivner's
lexicon to denote the complete abandonment by Ms. Nielsen of any interest in the
transferred property. Second, had the election required by § 2325(t)(I) been made,
Ms. Nielsen's intent to create a QTIP would have been achieved, and no gift tax
would have attached to the transfer ofthe $550,000. Unfortunately for Ms. Nielsen,
for the want of an election, the exemption was lost
In an attempt to recover from this loss, the Estate paid the tax and filed this refund
action in the district court, contending under New Mexico law, the transfer offunds
to the lifetime QTIP trust was incomplete because Ms. Nielsen's donative intent
was foiled. The district court granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment
predicated upon its reading·of Estate of Davenport v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d
1176 (10th Cir. 1999). The court relied upon our holding "in federal taxation cases,
state law controls only to the extent that certain statutory provisions ofthe federal
revenue laws make their application dependent on state law. n Id. at 1176. The
district court believed Davenport mandated application of state law to determine
the nature of the ownership interest before applying federal law to decide the
taxability of that property. Finding donative intent, a required element of a
completed gift under New Mexico law, was absent here, the court concluded the
Commissioner wrongfully assessed a gift tax against the Estate. We disagree with
this analysis.
We believe the point at which the district court's reasoning strayed from the proper
path was in not recognizing the settled principle that for federal tax purposes, the
essence of a completed transfer is determined by whether there was a "passage of
dominion and control over the economic benefits of property. n Estate of Sanford
v. Commissioner, 308 u.S. 39, 43 (1939). There is nothing within the applicable
parts of the Internal Revenue Code that even suggests state law overrides this rule
of federal law. The notion is buttressed by Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-1(gXl)
which states:
Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in
the application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the tax is
based on the objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances under
which it is made, rather th~n on the subjective motives of the donor.
See also Tres. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (a gift is complete for federal tax purposes
when "the donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no
power to change its disposition.").
Under the previously described language of the trust instrument, can it be any
plainer that Ms. Nielsen intended to give up dominion and control of the trust
property? We think not. The verbiage of the meticulous legal scrivner drove that
point home.
Though this analysis is sufficient for the proper disposition of the case, the
obviously sincere efforts thoughtfully expended by the district court require further
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comment. We do not believe that Davenport points to the conclusion the district
court reached. First, in that case, we looked to state law merely to determine
whether the donor had an ownership interest in property she attempted to transfer
to the donee. This search did not implicate a determination of whether the transfer
was complete for federal tax purposes. Second, we did not hold that, for federal gift
tax purposes, all essential state law elements of a valid gift must be satisfied.
Indeed, whether a transfer is complete for federal tax purposes is strictly a matter
of federal law.
More importantly, the Supreme Court has made plain that the "elusive state of
mind" involved in the formation ofdonative intent has been eradicated from the tax
code by Congress. Commissioner v. Wernyss, 324 U.S. 303,306 (1945). The Court
has substituted the search for donative intent with the "much more workable
external test, that where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, the excess in such money value shall for
purposes of the tax ... be deemed a gift." Id. (internal quotes omitted) We
conclude while a donor's intent to make a gift' may be a helpful factor in the
ultimate detennination of whether a gift has been made, for federal tax purposes,
that determination in no way turns upon the absence of evidence ofsuch an intent
3.

Self-Cancelling Installment Note. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the general validity ofSCINs and

remanded to the Tax Court the question ofvaluation in Estate ofDuilio Costanza, et at. v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 595
(2003). The facts were simple:
Duilio Costanza was born in Italy in 1919. He immigrated to the United States and
worked as a welder for General Motors, Inc. in Flint, Michigan until 1966. Upon
retiring from OM, Duilio opened an Italian restaurant on property he owned in
Flint. He later built a small office plaza on nearby property that he also owned.
Both properties were appraised in 1991 at a value of $830,000.
In October of 1992, when he was 73 years old, Duilio wanted to return to Italy and
sell his Flint properties. He accordingly sought the advice of his attorney, John
Spath, who suggested that Duilio sell the restaurant and properties to Michael in
exchange for a SeINe In late December of 1992 or early January of 1993, Michael
signed a SCIN in the amount of$830,000. A mortgage fully securing the obligation
was recorded in February of 1993. The SCIN, which provided for payment,in
monthly installments over a period of 11 years, contained a cancellation-upon-death
provision.
Duilio orally told Michael that he need not make a payment every month, instead
authorizing Michael to remit the payments on a quarterly basis. Accordingly, on
March 8, 1993, Michael made the note payments for January, February, and March
by means ofthree back- dated checks. Michael tendered no further payments on the
SCIN prior to Duilio's death on May 12, 1993.
Duitio unexpectedly died from a toxic reaction to bypass surgery perfonned the
previous day. He had been suffering from heart disease during the final 15 years
of his life. Nevertheless, Duilio's life expectancy at the time be executed the SCIN
was between 5 and 13.9 years.
As the executor of his father's estate, Michael filed a federal estate tax return
declaring that the estate had no estate tax liability. The estate tax return identified
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the SCIN as an estate asset, but claimed that the note had no value to the estate due
to the cancellation-upon-death provision.
The opinion states:
Michael affinnatively testified that it was the Costanzas' intention for Michael to
satisfy all of the payments due pursuant to the SCIN. Attorney Spath also testified
that the Costanzas expected the note to be paid in full:

Q: Was Duilio Costanza willing to simply gift these properties to
Michael?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: Because ... [h]e wanted payment over time so he could retire
in Italy.
The tax court, however, questioned the parties' sincerity, expressing concerns about
the actual date the documents were signed., the date on which the three payments
were made, and the fact that Michael altered the dates of the checks. But Michael
satisfactorily explained all three circumstances. A briefdelay in execution after the
stated date of December 15, 1992 was simply due to the need of the attorney to
pick a date upon which to base an amortization schedule where the documents were
to be circulated by mail for signature. The fact that all of the documents were
signed within several weeks thereafter is thus entirely inconsequential.
As for the delay in making the frrst three installments, Michael testified that his
father wanted to be paid "on a quarterly basis to limit the number of bank
transactions." Although issuing three separate checks would not technically
decrease the number of bank transactions, since the bank would need to process
each check individually, this method of payment obviously served to ease the
burden of having to deposit one check every month.
The quarterly payment plan also explains why Michael altered the dates of the
checks. As Michael explained in his brief., he re-dated the checks 1·S0 as to clearly·
document the months for which Note payments had been made." The fact that he
obviously wrote a different date on top ofthe original dates is further evidence that
he was not trying to hide anything by the alterations. Moreover, pursuant to Duilio's
oral instructions concerning the payment plan, it is not surprising that Michael did
not make another payment on the note after tendering the three checks in March.
The next quarterly payment would not have taken place until June, which was after
Duilio had died.
Finally, the Commissioner argues that Michael and DuBio entered into the SCIN
agreement because they presumed that Duilio would die prior to Michael fully
satisfying the note. Ifthey had thought Duilio would outlive the final payment due
under the SCIN, the Commissioner reasons, there would have been no reason to
have signed the SCIN, as opposed to an unconditional promissory note. This
contention, however, basically questions the validity ofany SCIN, an argument that
the tax court has long since rejected. Estate of Moss v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1239,
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1247 (1981 ) (upholding the validity of a SCIN). See generally Sheldon L Banoff
& Michael O. Hartz, New Tax Court Case Expands Opportunities for SelfCancelling Installment Notes, 76 J. Tax'n 332 ( 1992) (discussing the permissibility
of and reasons for executing a SCIN).
Moreover, despite Duilio's heart problems, there was no evidence that either
Michael or Duilio presumed that Duilio would die within a few years ofsigning the
SCIN, let alone within five months ofthe signing. Medical experts testified at trial
that Duilio was expected to live somewhere between 5 and 13.9 years from the time
that he signed the SCIN. His premature death due to complications from surgery
was clearly not anticipated. In addition, the fact that the SCIN was fully secured by
a mortgage on the properties further refutes any inference that the sale was not
bona fide.
The petitioners have thus rebutted the presumption against the enforceability ofan
intrafamily SCIN by affirmatively showing that there existed at the time of the
transaction a real expectation of repayment and intent to enforce the collection of
the indebtedness. As such, we conclude that the tax court clearly erred in finding
that the execution of the SCIN was not a bona fide transaction. Cf. Estate of
Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. CL 657 (1995) (holding that the sale of
property via a SCIN was not a bona fide transaction when the taxpayer declared
that he was not likely to demand payment on the note).
Perhaps of most interest is the Circuit Court's reversal on factual findings.
4.

LLC Gifts as Gifts of a Present Interest. In a very important case, Christine M. Hackl v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 14 (2002), the Tax Court held that LLC gifts were not gifts of a present interest that qualified
for the annual exclusion. The case has been appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The opinion sets forth its understanding
of the law regarding present interests:
For example, in Fondren v. Commissioner, supra at 20-21, the Court explains the
meaning of future versus present interest in general terms, stating:
it is not enough to bring the exclusion into force that the donee has vested
rights. In addition he must have the right presently to use, possess or
enjoy the property. These terms are not words of art, like "fee" in the law
of seizin * * *, but connote the right to substantial ·present economic
benefit. The question is oftime, not when title vests, but when enjoyment
begins. Whatever puts the barrier ofa substantial period between the will
of the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and
that enjoyment makes the gift one of a future interest within the meaning
of the regulation.
The Court thus says that the terms "use, possess or enjoy" connote the right to
substantial present economic benefit. This phraseology is broad and is in no way
limited to the factual context presented. It defines the root words ofthe regulatory
standard which no party disputes is a generally applicable and valid interpretation
ofsection 2503(b). See sec. 25.2503-3, Gift Tax Regs. We therefore would be hard
pressed to construe "use, possession, or enjoyment" as meaning something
different or less than substantial present economic benefit simply because ofa shift
in the factual scenario or fonn of gift to which the test is being applied.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that section 2503(b), regardless of whether a gift is
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direct or indirect, is concerned with and requires meaningful economic, rather than
merely paper, rights.
Furthennore, this idea is buttressed by rec~gnition that in an earlier case we quoted
the very language from Fondren v. Commissioner, supra, set forth above in a
context that involved outright gifts. In Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, T.e.
Memo. 1997-302, we quoted the Fondren text en route to concluding that outright
gifts in the form of $10,000 checks, which had been properly endorsed and
deposited, were gifts of a present interest.
In a similar vein, previous caselaw from this Court reveals that the principles
established inUnited States v. Pelzer. supra at 403-404, and Ryerson v. United
States, supra at 408, regarding contingency and joint action are not restricted in
their applicability to indirect gift situations. In Skouras v. Commissioner, 14 T.e.
523, 524-525 (1950), affd. 188 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951), the taxpayer assigned
outright all incidents of ownership in several insurance policies on his life to his
five childrenjointly and continued to pay the premiums thereon. Given these facts,
we, citing United States v. Pelzer, supra, stated broadly that "where the use,
possession, or enjoyment of the donee is postponed to the happening of future
uncertain events the interest of the donee is a future interest within the meaning of
the statute." Id. at 533. Then, relying on Ryerson v. United States, supra, and in
spite of the taxpayer's argument that "there was not a grant to trust as in the
Rye'rson case", we ruled that the taxpayer, by "making the assignments to his five
children jointly, had postponed the possession and enjoyment of the rights and
interests in and to the policies or the proceeds thereof until his death or until such
time as the children, actingjointly, might change or negative the action he had thus
taken." Id. at 534.
In sum, we reject petitioners' contention that when a gift takes the fonn of an
outright transfer ofan equity interest in a business or property, UNo further analysis
is needed or justified." To do so would be to sanction exclusions for gifts based
purely on conveyancing form without probing whether the donees in fact received
rights differing in any meaningful way from those that would have flowed from a
traditional trust arrangement.
Petitioners' advocated approach could also lead to situations where gift tax
consequences turned entirely upon distinctions in the ord:ering of transactions,
rather than in their substance. For example, while petitioners contributed property
to an LLC and then gifted ownership units to their children and grandchildren, a
similar result could have been achieved by first transferring ownership units and
then making contributions to the entity. Yet petitioners would apparently have us
decide that the latter scenario falls within the rubric ofestablished precedent while
the fonner is independent thereof. We decline to take such an artificial view.
We are equally unconvinced by petitioners' attempts to avoid the principles
discussed above with the assertion that the postponement question deals with rights
to present use, possession or enjoyment of the transferred property, not the
likelihood of the actual use, possession, or enjoyment of the property. See, Estate
ofCristofani v. Commtr, 97 T.C. 74 (1991); Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d82 (9th
Cir. 1968); Kieckhefer v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951); Gilmore v.
Comm'r, 213 F.2d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 1954) * * *
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Each ofthe above-cited cases involved trusts in which beneficiaries were given an
absolute right to demand distributions and have not been interpreted to establish a
rule inconsistent with those enunciated by the Supreme Court. See Rassas v.
Commissioner, 196 F.2d 611,613 (7th Cir. 1952) (distinguishing Kieckhefer v.
Commissioner, supra), affg. 17 T.C. 160 (1951). Thus, instead of adopting an
approach which would undennine the purpose and integrity ofthe section 2503(b)
exclusion, we for the reasons explained above conclude that petitioners are not by
virtue of making outright gifts relieved of showing that such gifts in actuality
involved rights consistent with the standards for a present interest set forth in
regulations and existing caselaw.
To recapitulate then, the referenced authorities require a taxpayer claiming an
annual exclusion to establish that the transfer in dispute conferred on the donee an
unrestricted and noncontingent right to the immediate use, possession, or
enjoyment (I) of property or (2) of income from property, both of which
alternatives in tum demand that such immediate use, possession, or enjoyment be
of a nature that substantial economic benefit is derived therefrom. In other words,
petitioners must prove from all the facts and circumstances that in receiving the
Treeco units, the donees thereby obtained use, possession, or enjoyment of the
units or income from the units within the above-described meaning of section
2503(b).
The interests given were LLC interests in Treeco which owned land and a tree-fanning business. The Tax
Court concluded the donees received insignificant rights:
Beginning with the property itself, we reiterate that the donees in these cases did
receive, at least in the sense of title, outright possession of the Treeco units.
Nonetheless, as previously explained, the simple expedient of paper title does not
in and of itself create a present interest for purposes of section 2503(b) unless all
the facts and circumstances establish that such possession renders an economic
benefit presently reachable by the donees. It therefore is incumbent upon
petitioners to show the present (not postponed) economic benefit imparted to the
donees as a consequence of their receipt of the Treeco units.
In considering this issue, we first address the role of the Treeco Operating
Agreement in our analysis. Petitioners state that each gifted Treeco unit
"represented a significant bundle of legal rights in the venture, rights which are
defmed by the Operating Agreement, Treeco's Articles of Organization, and
Indiana statutory and common lawn. At the same time, petitioners aver: "The
postponement question is not conceme~ with contractual rights inherent in the
transferred property, but rather in whether, in the transfer of the property, the
transferor imposed limitations or restrictions on the present enjoyment of the
property." They then go on to quote the language fr~m section 25.2503-3(a), Gift
Tax Regs., which references contractual rights in a bond, note, or insurance policy
that do not result in a future interest characterization. Hence, while petitioners seem
to acknowledge that the Operating Agreement in large part defines the nature ofthe
property received by the donees, they also apparently would have us ignore any
provisions of the Agreement which limited the ability of the donees to presently
recognize economic value as akin to the contractual rights mentioned in the
regulation.
However, petitioners' reliance on section 25.2503-3(a), Gift Tax Regs., is
misplaced. This Court has previously taken a much narrower view of the cited
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regulatory language. In Estate ofVose v. Commissioner~ T.C. Memo. 1959-175,
vacated and remanded on another issue 284 F.2d 65 (I st Cir. 1960), we opined that
the regulations were "designed to cover notes and bonds which, although perhaps
not containing all ofthe attributes ofnegotiable instruments, are at least definitely
enforceable legal obligations payable on a day certain and immediately disposable
by the obligee. LLC units hardly fall within these parameters, and we observe that
the quoted reasoning is consistent with our focus on requiring some presently
reachable economic benefit.
tt

Furthermore, petitioners' attempts to find in these regulations support for a
distinction between limitations contractually inherent in the transferred property
and restrictions imposed upon transfer are not well taken. All facts and
circumstances must be examined to determine whether a gift is ofa present interest
within the meaning ofsection 2503(b), and this will be true only where all involved
rights and restrictions, wherever contained, reveal a presently reachable economic
benefit. Since here the primary source ofsuch rights and restrictions is the Treeco
Operating Agreement, its provisions, in their cumulative entirety, must largely
dictate whether the units at issue conferred the requisite benefit. Accordingly, we
now tum to the Operating Agreement to flesh out the nature ofthe property rights
transferred to the donees at the time ottheir receipt ofthe Treeco units and whether
such rights rose to the level of a present interest on account of either the units
themselves (considered in this section) or the income therefrom (considered in
section IV. C., infra).
Petitioners offer the following summary of the rights inuring to the donees upon
their receipt of the LLC units:
Upon transfer the Donees acquired membership rights and obligations in
the gifted Treeco units which were identical to those which Petitioners
had in the Treeco units they retained, including the rights under the
Treeco Operating Agreement to have all net income or capital gains
allocated, all cash distributions made~ and net loss allocated (subject to an
allocation of losses to A.J. Hackl for a period which was designed to
ensure.the·current deductibility of Treeco losses for federal income tax
purposes) based on the number of units held in relation to the total
number of units, the right to have capital accounts established and
maintained on behalf of each member in the manner provided by Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.704- I(b)(2)(iv), the right to offer units for sale to Treeco, or to
sell their units to third parties (subject to manager approval), the rights
(voting members) to remove the manager, amend Treeco's organizational
documents, dissolve Treeco, approve salaries or bonuses paid to any
manager, etc., all of which rights are entitled to court enforcement. * * *
At the outset, we note that petitioners' repeated assertions that the rights conferred
on the donees were identical to those retained by the donors have little bearing on
our analysis. A similar fact did not dissuade us from fmding only a future interest
in Blasdel v. Commissioner, 58 T.e. 1014 (1972}, and we are satisfied that it
should be given no more weight here.
The taxpayers in Blasdel v. Commissioner, supra at 1015-1016, 1018, created a
trust, named themselves as 2 of the trust's beneficiaries, and conveyed beneficial
interests to 18 other family members. Although we explicitly observed that "the

A - 120

donees acquired their fractional beneficial interests subject to the same tenns and
limitations as petitioners held theirs", we nonetheless based our decision on the
nature of those terms, without regard to any identity of rights between donors and
donees. Id. at 1018- 1020; see also Hamilton v. United States, 553 F.2d 1216, 1218
(9th CiL 1977). In addition, given the authority granted here to A.J. Hackl as
manager, we observe that the alleged equality, when viewed from a practical
standpoint, is less than petitioners would have us believe.
Concerning the specific rights granted in the Operating Agreement, we are unable
to conclude that these afforded a substantial economic benefit ofthe type necessary
to qualify for the annual exclusion. While we are aware of petitioners' contentions
and the parties' rather conclusory stipulations that Treeco was a legitimate
operating business entity and that restrictive provisions in the Agreement are
common in closely held enterprises and in the timber industry, such circumstances
(whether or not true) do not alter the criteria for a present interest or excuse the
failure here to meet those criteria.
As we consider potential benefits inuring to the donees from their receipt of the
Treeco units themselves, we find that the terms ofthe Treeco Operating Agreement
foreclosed the ability of the donees presently to access any substantial economic
or fmancial benefit that might be represented by the ownership units. For instance,
while an ability on the part of a donee unilaterally to withdraw his or her capital
account might weigh in favor of finding a present interest, here no such right
existed. According to the Agreement, capital contributions could not be demanded
or received by a member without the manager's consent. Similarly, a member
desiring to withdraw could only offer his or her units for sale to the company; the
manager was then given exclusive authority to accept or reject the offer and to
negotiate terms. Hence some contingency stood between any individual member
and his or her receipt from the company ofeconomic value for units held, either in
the form of approval from the current manager or perhaps in the form of removal
of that manager by joint majority action, followed by the appointment of and
approval from a more compliant manager. Likewise, while a dissolution could
entitle members to liqu~dating distributions in proportion to positive capital account
balances, no donee acting alone could effectuate a dissolution.
Moreover, in addition to preventing a donee from unilaterally obtaining the value
of his or her units from the LLC, the Operating Agreement also foreclosed the
avenue of transfer or sale to third parties. The Agreement specified that UNo
Member shall be entitled to transfer, assign, convey, sell, encumber or in any way
alienate all or any part of the Member's Interest except with the prior written
consent of the Manager, which consent may be given or withheld, conditioned or
delayed as the Manager may detennine in the Manager's sole discretion. Hence,
to the extent that marketability might be relevant in these circumstances, as
potentially distinguishable on this point from those in indirect gift cases such as
Chanin v. United States, 393 F.2d at 977, and Blasdel v. Commissioner, supra at
1021-1022 (both dismissing marketability as insufficient to create a present interest
where the allegedly marketable property, an entity or trust interest, differed from
the underlying gifted property), the Agreement, for all practical purposes, bars
alienation as a means for presently reaching economic value. Transfers subject to
the contingency of manager approval cannot support a present interest
characterization, and the possibility of making sales in violation thereof, to a
transferee who would then have no right to become a member or to participate in
If
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the business, can hardly be seen as a sufficient source of substantial economic
benefit. We therefore conclude that receipt of the property itself, the Treeco units,
did not confer upon the donees use, possession, or enjoyment of property within
the meaning of section 2503(b).
With respect to avoiding Hackl a number ofapproaches have been suggested, the most common being to give
a limited partner the right to withdraw from the partnership within a set period - 30 days for example - after receiving
the limited partnership interest. Another approach, which is perhaps simpler, is to allow the recipient to "put" the
interest back to the donor for cash equal to fair market value within a 30 day period.

o.

SECTION 2518 - DISCLAIMERS
1.

Disclaimer of Remainder Interests. In Thomas J. Walshire, et at. v. United States, 288 F.3d 342

(8th Cir. 2002), the Eighth Circuit upheld the validity of the Treasury Regulations under section 2518 which prohibit
the disclaimer of a remainder interest while keeping the life interest. The opinion states:
Walshire attempted to disclaim a portion ofthe property he was entitled to receive
from his brother by dividing it horizontally, that is, by disclaiming the remainder
interest but retaining the right to the income and use of the property during his
lifetime, or the life estate. The regulation at issue in this case requires that the
undivided portion tf consist ofa fraction or percentage ofeach and every substantial
interest or right owned by the disclaimant in such property and must extend over
the entire tenn of the disclaimant's interest in such property and in other property
into which such property is converted." Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518- 3(b). In other
words, the regulation requires a vertical division of the property. The regulation
specifically excludes the disclaimer attempted by Walshire. See id. (ftThus, for
example, a disclaimer made by the devisee of a fee simple interest in Blackacre is
not a quali tied disclaimer if the disclaimant disclaims a remainder interest in
Blackacre but retains a life estate. ff)
The executors argue that the regulation is contrary to the plain language of §§
2518(a), which allows the disclaimer of "any interest in property. ft The executors
argue that a remainder interest is "any interest in property" as that phrase is used
in §§ 2518(a) and that Walshire did not partition the remainder interest but
disclaimed all of it, so that we need not even look at §§ 2518(c). This construction
interprets subsection (a) in isolation. Congress specifically enacted subsection (c)
as a limitation on subsection (a). See LR.C. §§ 2518(c) ("For purposes of
subsection (a) ...."). To allow the disclaimant to partition the interest bequeathed
to him in any manner he chooses as tt any interest in property" under §§ 2518(a)
ignores the requirement in §§ 2518(c) that only an "undivided portion" of an
interest may be disclaimed and violates a fundamental rule of statutory
interpretation to give effect to all words and phrases used in the statute. See
Herman v. Associated Elec. Co-oD., Inc., 172 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1999). We
therefore must construe subsection (a) in light of subsection (c) since Walshire
attempted to disclaim only a portion of what he was entitled to receive under his
brother's will.
The executors argue that even under subsection (c), a remainder interest falls
within the clear and unambiguous meaning ofan "undivided portion ofan interest. tf
LR.C. §§ 2518(c). The statute does not define "undivided portion of an interest"
as that term is used in §§ 2518(c) and we find the tenn to be, at best, ambiguous.
Because "the statute is silent ... with respect to the specific issue" of whether a
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horizontal division of property could be considered an undivided portion of an
interest, we must determine "whether the agency's [regulation] is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."'Miller, 65 F.3d 690 (internal quotations
omitted) (construing the failure to define a term as "an implicit legislative
delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify" the undefmed tenn).
The tenn "undivided" in its common usage means "not separated out into parts or
shares." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2492 (1986). We are most
familiar with the concept of undivided interests in the context of a tenancy in
common, which is "[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in equal or unequal
undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the whole property."
Black's Law Dictionary 1478 (17th ed. 1999). IttThe central characteristic ofa
tenancy in common is simply that each tenant is deemed to own by himself, with
most ofthe attributes of independent ownership, a physically undivided part ofthe
entire parcel.'" [d. (quoting Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates
in Land and Future Interests 54 (2d ed. 1984)). From these uses of the tenn
"undivided, we discern that an undivided portion of an interest is a portion that
does not separate out the bundle of rights associated with the interest being
apportioned. Thus, if a disclaimant is bequeathed a fee interest, as was Walshire,
an undivided portion of that interest would have to include all of the rights
associated with the fee. Apportioning a fee into a life estate and a remainder
interest does not give the remainder interest all of the rights associated with a fee
because the remaindennan is not entitled to immediate possession, a fundamental
right ofa fee holder. A remainder interest simply is not an undivided portion ofthe
fee. See Estate of Brock v. Comm'r2, 630 F.2d 368, 369 n. I (5th Cir. 1980)
(addressing similar tenninology under I.R.e. §§ 170(t)(3)(B), which allows a
charitable deduction for a contribution of "an undivided portion ofthe decedent's
entire interest in property," and noting that "it cannot be contended seriously that
the church received an undivided interest in the property" where decedent left a life
estate to his wife and a remainder interest to the church). We do not believe it was
unreasonable for the Secretary to determine that such a division does not meet the
defmition of an undivided portion when it promulgated the regulation that allows
only vertical divisions of an interest, as opposed to horizontal divisions, to come
within the purview of §§ 25 I 8.
tf

P.

SECTIONS 2601-2654 - GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX
1.

Extension to Allocate" CST Exemption. Rulings have begun to be issued with respect to section

9100 relief and late allocations of GST exemptions. To date, the ruling position seems liberal. See, e.g., PLR
200227017,2002234026,200320006,200320009, 200320010, 200320016, 200318005, 200318006, 200318007,
200318008, 200318009, 200318010, 2003180 II, 200318012, 200318013, 200318014, 200318056, 200318057,
200318063,200317012,200317013,200316031, 200316033, 200316034,200316035,200316036,200315006,
200315008~

200315023,200314006, 200314010,200313008,200313012,200313013, 200311009, 200311013,

200310013,200310016, 200309005,200309007, 200309010, 200309026, 200308037, 200307078, 200307082,
200307088,200306015,200306016,200306017, 200306018, 200306020, 200306031, 200306035, 200305022,
200304024, 200303022, 200303053, 200302017, 200302033, 200302035,
200301028, 200301037. The standards are:
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20030203~

200302038,

20030102~

Section 301.9100-3(b)(I)(v) provides that a taxpayer is deemed to have acted
reasonably and in good faith if the taxpayer reasonably relied on a qualified tax
professional, including a tax professional employed by the taxpayer, and the tax
professional failed to make, or advise the taxpayer to make, the election.
Q.

SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
1.

Family Limited Partnerships. In general, taxpayers have won arguments that neither section 2703

nor 2704(b) apply.
The Tax Court allowed a combined 40% minority and marketability discount in Estate of Elma M. Dailey, et
at. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-263, 82 T.. C.M. (CCH) 710. The FLP transaction was straightforward:
On October 20, 1992, Mrs. Dailey executed a will, a Revocable Living Trust
(Trust), and an Agreement ofLimited Partnership (Agreement) ofElma Middleton
Dailey FLP. The will provided that Mrs. Dailey's residuary estate would pass to the
Trust, from which her son would receive the corpus outright.
Upon execution ofthe Agreement, Mrs. Dailey took a 1- percent general and a 98percent limited partnership interest, and Mr. Dailey [her son] received a I-percent
limited partnership interest. On November 13, 1992, Mrs. Dailey contributed, to
the FLP, 400 AT&T, 20,000 Exxon, and 895 Bell South Corp. shares. Mr. Dailey
did not contribute any assets to the FLP. On December 4, 1992, the Texas
Secretary of State filed the FLP's Certificate of Limited Partnership.
On December 8, 1992, Mrs. Dailey signed a letter which stated that by tithe tenns
of the Elma Middleton Dailey Family Limited Partnership, this letter shall be
sufficient evidence of my transfer and conveyance to you ofthe following limited
partnership interest", giving 45-, 15-, and 38-percent interests to Mr. Dailey, his
wife, and the Trust, respectively.

******
On March 16, 1995, Mrs. Dailey appointed Mr. Dailey as the FLP managing
partner. On July 26, 1995, he -replaced her as the trustee of the Trust and FLP
general partner, and her I-percent general partnership interest became a limited
one.
Mrs. Dailey died on January 10, 1997.
The opinion first discusses whether the FLP should be respected for valuation purposes. The entire discussion
is as follows:
The FLP was validly formed pursuant to Texas law, and we do not disregard it for
tax purposes. See Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. 478, 487 (2000);
Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506, 513-515 (2000).
The court declined to value the interests as assignee interests and went on to discuss the discount issue:
Mrs. Dailey gave Mr. Dailey a I-percent limited partnership interest on formation,
but the FLP had no assets on that date. Mrs. Dailey made gifts of 45- and 15percent limited partnership interests to her son and daughter-in-law, respectively,
and thus retained 39 percent in the trust at death. The parties stipulated, however,
that Mrs. Dailey retained 40 percent. Respondent inexplicably does not contend
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that the initial I-percent limited partnership interest transferred to Mr. Dailey had
gift tax consequences at formation or funding.
Both parties agree that the given and retained interests were, on December 8, 1992,
and January 10, 1997, worth their proportionate share ofthe NAV of$I,267,619
and $1,047,603 for gift and estate tax purposes, respectively. They disagree,
however, about the size of the minority and marketability discounts. Both parties'
experts compared the FLP to closed-end mutual funds, which trade at a discount
to NAV, but disagreed on the amounts ofthe discounts. Petitioners' expert, citing
published data, opined that the aggregate discount is 40 percent for lack of
marketability, control, and liquidity and testified that he considered the significant
amount of unrealized capital gains relating to the Exxon stock.
Respondent's expert, on the other hand, relied in part on an unpublished study that
he coauthored and, in arevised report submitted at trial, increased the marketability
discount purportedly substantiated by his unpublished study from 12.5 percent to
14.1 percent. Respondent's expert opined that an aggregate discount of 15.72
percent on December 8, 1992, and 13.51 percent on January 10, 1997, should be
applied. At trial, respondent's expert testified that he could not recall reviewing the
Agreement and, although he believed that unrealized capital gains are an important
source ofdiscounts", he did not review the documents to detennine ifthe FLP had
any such gains. Respondent's expert's testimony was contradictory, unsupported by
the data, and inapplicable to the facts.
ft

In Charles T. McCord v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. No. 13 (2003), the IRS presented expert testimony as did
the taxpayer. The net result was a 15% minority interest discount and 20% lack of marketability discount on the
marketable securities portion of the partnership. Essentially the court averaged the various studies of comparable
transactions with which it was presented.
2.

Valuing Annuity Interest in GRAT. Cases have clarified what are, and are not, qualified interests

for purposes of section 2702. In William A. Cook, et ux. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No.2 (2000), the Tax Court held
that a spousal interest that took effect after the grantor's death was not a qualified interest. The opinion states:
Respondent agrees that each grantor's retained annuity to the extent it is for a tenn
of years or the grantor's earlier death constitutes a qualified interest. Respondent,
however, chall~nges the provision ofeach trust which continues the annuity for the
spouse, if the spouse survives the grantor, for the remaining term of the trust or
until the spouse's earlier death.
We agree with respondent that as to each trust, the interest retained in favor ofthe
grantor's spouse, whether viewed as an independent interest or as an expansion of
the grantor's interest, is not qualified and therefore must be valued at zero. Thus,
we reject petitioners' contention that they are entitled to value each grantor's
retained interest as an annuity based on two lives.
We first consider the nature ofthe spousal interests themselves. In the trusts before
us, the spousal interests are contingent upon surviving the grantor, so they may
never take effect. We, however, do not believe section 2702 permits a transferor
to reduce the value of a remainder interest by the simple expedient of assigning a
value to a retained interest which may, in fact, never take effect.
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As indicated above, the regulations provide that "The governing instrument must
fix the term of the annuity or unitrust interest." Sec. 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax
Regs. We construe this language to require that the term be fixed and ascertainable
at the creation of the trust. The regulations contain two examples which illustrate
this requirement, as follows:
EXAMPLE 5. A transfers property to an irrevocable trust, retaining the
right to receive 5 percent ofthe net fair market value ofthe trust property,
valued annually, for 10 years. If A dies within the 10-year term, the
unitrust amount is to be paid to A·s estate for the balance ofthe tenn. Ats
interest is a qualified unitrust interest to the extent of the right to receive
the unitrust payment for 10 years or until A·s prior death.
EXAMPLE 6. The facts are the same as in Example 5, except that if A
dies within the 1O-year tenn the unitrust amount will be paid to Ats estate
for an additional 35 years. The result is the same as in Example 5, because
the IO-year term is the only term that is fixed and ascertainable at the
creation ofthe interest. [Sec. 25.2702-3(e), Example (5) and Example (6),
Gift Tax Regs.]
In each of these examples, only the retained interest for the shorter of a tenn of
years or the transferorts life is fixed and ascertainable at the creation ofthe interest,
and is therefore a qualified interest under section 2702. In Example (5) and
Example (6) above, the unitrust interests that may be paid to A·s estate are both
contingent upon A's death before the completion ofthe 10-year fixed tenn, and are
therefore not qualified interests. In the trusts before us, the spousal interests are not
fixed and ascertainable at the creation of the trusts but, rather, are contingent in
each case upon the spousets surviving the grantor. For this reason, the spousal
interests are not qualified interests and therefore must be valued as zero under
section 2702(a)(2)(A).
Legislative history reflects that Congress was"concerned about potential estate and
gift tax valuation abuses", specifically, "undervaluation ofgifts valued pursuant to
Treasury tables: t 136Cong. Rec. 815629, S15680-S15681 (dailyed. Oct. 18,
1990). As explained by the lawmakers in the context oftrusts and term interests in
property: ffBecause the taxpayer decides what property to give, when to give it, and
often controls the return on the property, use of Treasury tables undervalues the
transferred interests in the aggregate, more often than not. ff Id. at S 15681. Hence,
a statute was enacted which Congress intended would ffdeter abuse by making
unfavorable assumptions regarding certain retained rights. Id. at S 15680.
tf

This congressional purpose is advanced by a rule which ensures that only value that
is fixed and ascertainable at the creation of the trust, and therefore is not
contingent, may reduce the value of the gift of the remainder. In contrast, if gifts
in trust may be reduced by the value ofspousal interests which are contingent and
which in fact never take effect, the retained interests have the potential for
overvaluation and the gift ofthe remainder for undervaluation. We are satisfied that
such would be contrary to the intent of section 2702.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that the spousal interests here, standing'
alone, were qualified, the retained annuities to the extent based on two lives would
fail to achieve qualified status for an additional reason. As previously noted, the
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regulations provide that retention of a power to revoke a qualified annuity interest
(or unitrust interest) of the transferor's spouse is treated as the retention of a
qualified annuity interest (or unitrust interest). See sec. 25.2702-2(a)(5), Gift Tax
Regs. In each of the trusts under scrutiny, however, if the interest over which the
grantor has retained a power to revoke is treated as an interest retained by the
grantor, the requirement of section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax Regs., that the term
ofthe annuity must be the lesser ofa term ofyears or the life ofthe term holder has
not been met. Under the trust tenns the spousal interests create the possibility that
the retained annuity will extend beyond the life ofthe tenn holder; i.e., the grantor.
Section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax Regs., precludes this result
The Seventh Circuit has affirmed Cook. 88 AFTR 2d

~

2001-5448 (2001). The Tax Court followed its

decision in Cook in Patricia A. Schott, et vir v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 200 1-110. The Ninth Circuit reversed
Schott, 319 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). The opinion cites Examples 6 and 7 of the section 2702 regulations and states:
Example 6. A transfers property to an irrevocable trust, retaining the right
to receive the income for 10 years. Upon expiration of 10 years, the
income of the trust is payable to A's spouse for 10 years if living. Upon
expiration ofthe spouse's interest, the trust terminates and the trust corpus
is payable to A's child. A retains the right to revoke the spouse's interest
Because the transfer of property to the trust is not incomplete as to all
interests in the property (i.e., A has made a completed gift of the
remainder interest), section 2702 applies. A's power to revoke the spouse's
term interest is treated as a retained interest for purposes ofsection 2702.
Because no interest retained by A is a qualified interest, the amount ofthe
gift is the fair market value of the property transferred to the trust.
Example 7. The facts are the same as in Example 6, except that both the
term interest retained by A and the interest transferred to A's spouse
(subject to A's right of revocation) are qualified annuity or unitrust
interests. The amount of the gift is the fair market value of the property
transferred to the trust reduced by the value of both A's qualified interest
and the value of the qualified interest transferred to A's spouse (subject
to A's power to revoke).
On the face of it, the Schotts' trusts fit within Example 7 and are therefore qualified
and deductible from the value of their gifts. The annuity in each Schott trust is a
fixed percentage of the capital to the grantor for life, then to the grantor's spouse,
with a fixed tennination of fifteen years if the grantor and spouse live that long. A
two-life annuity table makes the value of the gift ascertainable. The value of the
grantor's power to revoke is treated as the retention of a qualified interest as
specified in Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(5).
The Commissioner argues that the Schott spouses have contingent and therefore
unqualified interests, but that the provision in Example 7 that the spouse be living
does not make that gift "contingent" and therefore unqualified. The distinction is
not apparent. Neither the statute nor the regulations exclude contingent interests as
such. Every annuity given to a person, if living, is contingent on that person's
survival: yet life annuities as such are not excluded by the statute or the regulations.
The Commissioner argues that the date when the spouse's interest begins is not
fixed because that date depends on the grantor's death. This argument merely
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restates an unfounded objection to life annuities. As the end ofthe grantor's life can
be ascertained with acceptable probability by an annuity table, so can the date and
duration of the spouse's annuity be ascertained with acceptable probability.
The Commissioner points to Treas. Reg. § 25.2702- 3(d)(3) that states: "The term
must be for the life of the tenn holder, for a specified tenn of years, or for the
shorter (but not the longer) of those periods. n The Commissioner argues that as
Uterm holder" is in the singular, the use ofthe lives oftwo tenn holders is excluded.
But singulars normally include plurals, just as "heft nonnally includes "she." See,
for example, 1 U.S.C. § 1; Treas. Reg. § 403.5.
The Court distinguished Cook:
The Commissioner cites Cook v. Commissioner, 269 F.3d 854,858 (7th Cir. 2001).
Cook did treat an annuity to a grantor and spouse, if living, as unqualified; but
there was an additional contingency in the trust, which could not be ascertained by
any annuity table. The contingency was that the grantor and spouse be married at
the time the spouse's annuity began. This contingency is different from the
contingency necessarily built into interests dependent on a life.
The Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion, has agreed that payments to a decedent's estate are qualified interests.
Audrey J. Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 41 (2000). There were two GRATs involved:
According to the provisions of each GRAT, petitioner was to receive an annuity
amount equal to 49.35 percent ofthe initial trust value for the first 12-month period
of the trust tenn and 59.22 percent of such initial value for the second 12-month
period of the trust term. In the event that petitioner's death intervened, the annuity
amounts were to be paid to her estate. The sums were payable on December 31 of
each taxable year but could be paid up through the date by which the Federal
income tax return for the trust was required to be filed. The payments were to be
made from income and, to the extent income was not sufficient, from principal.
Any excess income was to be added to principal.
Upon completion of the 2-year trust term, the remaining balance was to be
distributed to the designated remainder beneficiary.
The opinion describes the issue as follows:
Respondent contends that in establishing each GRAT, petitioner created three
separate and distinct interests: (1) The annuity payable to her during her lifetime,
(2) the ffcontingent tt interest of her estate to receive the annuity payments in the
event of her death prior to expiration ofthe 2-year trust tenn, and (3) the remainder
interest granted to her daughter. Ofthese three, it is respondent's position that only
the first interest, but not the second, constitutes a qualified retained interest within
the meaning of section 2702 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Respondent particularly relies upon section 25.2702-3(e), Example (5), Gift Tax
Regs. (hereinafter Example 5), as a valid interpretation of the statute and as
governing the issues involved in this case.
Hence, according to- respondent, only the value of an annuity payable for the
shorter of2 years or the period ending upon-petitioner's death may be subtracted
from the fair market value of the stock in calculating the value of the taxable gift
made by reason of petitioner's establishment of the ORATs.

******
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Conversely, petitioner maintains that for valuation purposes under section 2702,
each ORAT is properly characterized as creating only two separate interests: (1)
A retained annuity payable for a fixed term of2 years, and (2) a remainder interest
in favor ofher daughter. Petitioner further asserts that the former, in its entirety, is
a qualified interest within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, it is petitioner's
position that the retained interest to be subtracted in computing the amount of the
taxable gift occasioned by each GRATis to be valued as a simple 2~year tenn
annuity, without regard to any mortality factor.
The IRS relied on Example 5 for its position; the taxpayer argued that Example 5 was an invalid interpretation
of section 2702.
Overturning a regulation is difficult. The court described the standard of review in this way:
The regulations at issue here are interpretative regulations promulgated under the
general authority vested in the Secretary by section 7805(a). Hence, while entitled
to considerable weight, they are accorded less deference than would be legislative
regulations issued under a specific grant of authority to address a matter raised by
the pertinent statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984) (Chevron); United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982). A legislative regulation is to be upheld
unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra at 843-844.
With respect to interpretative regulations, the appropriate standard is whether the
provision implement[s] the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.'"
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., supra at 24 (quoting United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299,307 (1967». In applying this test, we look to the following two-part
analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court:
ftt

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent ofCongress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence ofan administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. [Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., supra at 842-843; fn. refs. omitted.]
A challenged regulation is not considered such a pennissible construction or
reasonable interpretation unless it harmonizes both with the statutory language and
with the statute's origin and purpose. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
supra at 25-26; National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S.
472,477 (1979) (National Muffler).
We pause to note that before the Chevron standard ofreview was enunciated by the
Supreme Court, the traditional standard was simply "whether the regulation
hannonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose", as
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· prescribed by the Supreme Court in National Muffler Dealers Association v.
United States, supra at 477. As we have observed in a previous case, the opinion
of the Supreme Court in Chevron failed to cite National Muffler and may have
established a different fonnulation ofthe standard of review. See Central Pa. Save
Association v. Commissioner, 104 T.e. 384,390-391 (1995). In the case before us,
we conclude that it is unnecessary to parse the semantics ofthe two tests to discern
any substantive difference between them, because the result here would be the
same under either.
The IRS argument was that an annuity paid to an estate is essentially a contingent reversion, which is not a
qualified interest.
Respondent alleges that Congress sought to curb the then- current practice of
bifurcating trusts into numerous interests and selectively retaining interests based
on mortality, such as reversions. Respondent points out the common estate
planning device ofcreating a trust, with a tenn short enough that the grantor's risk
of dying during the tenn would be minimal, in which the grantor retained both an
income interest and a contingent reversion in the trust corpus to take effect in the
event ofhis or her death during the term. The value ofthe gift to the remaindermen
would then be calculated by subtracting actuarial amounts for each of these
interests, despite the negligible chance that the reversion would become operative.
Respondent then goes on to frame the annuities payable to petitioner's estate as no
different in substance from such reversions. Respondent's position is that both
represent separate rights to receive property contingent upon the grantor's death
during the trust tenn. Because contingent rights, not fixed or ascertainable at the
creation of the trust, do not fall within any of the three fonus defined as qualified
in section 2702(b), respondent maintains that both are properly valued at zero. On
this basis, respondent argues that Example 5 is consistent not only with the purpose
of section 2702 but also with other regulations which deal with post- death
interests, particularly section 25.2702-3(e), Example (1), Gift Tax Regs.
Respondent further contends that Congress' reference to a trust consisting only of
a fixed-term annuity and a noncontingent remainder was describing a situation
different from that of petitioner here. Respondent avers that the scenario
contemplated by the lawmakers was one in which the donor transferred the lead
annuity to an entity with perpetual life and retained a noncontingent remainder.
According to respondent, only in that context is it possible for a donor to create
strictly an annuity for a tenn ofyears and a noncontingent remainder. Hence, it is
only that kind of situation which respondent claims is sanctioned by the mention
of an annuity "for a specified tenn of years" in section 25.2702-3(d)(3), Gift Tax
Regs., with the result that there exists no inconsistency between Example 5 and
such regulatory section.
The court rejected the IRS argument:
With respect to the text itself, the short answer is that an annuity for a specified
tenn of years is consistent with the section 2702(b) defmition of a qualified
interest; a contingent reversion is not.
As regards policy, permitting reduction to gift value for reversionary interests was
resulting in arbitrary and abusive elimination of value which was intended to, and
typically did, pass to the donee. Donors were subtracting the full actuarial value of
a reversionary interest in the trust corpus and were not merely treating their
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retained interests as an annuity for a fixed tenn ofyears. Although we acknowledge
that, in the case ot a reversion, at least the equivalent of the term annuity's value
would be payable to the grantor or the grantor's estate in all events, Congress was
entitled to require that interests be cast in one of three specified forms to receive
the favorable treatment afforded qualified interests. Accordingly, the
Commissioner is equallyjustified in assigning a zero value to reversionary interests
outside the scope of the statutory definition and refusing to consider whether such
interests can have the practical effect of a different fonn of interest not chosen by
the grantor. See sec. 25.2702-3(e), Example (I), Gift Tax Regs.
In contrast, there exists no rationale for refusing to take into account for valuation
purposes a retained interest of which both the fonn and the effect are consistent
with the statute. We further observe that respondent's attempts to equate the estate's
rights here with other contingent, post-death interests are premised on the
bifurcation of the estate's interest from that of petitioner. Yet, given the historical
unity between an individual and his or her estate, we believe such separation is
unwarranted where the trust is drafted in the form of a specified interest retained
by the grantor, with the estate designated only as the alternate payee ofthat precise
interest. This is the result that would obtain if the governing instrument were
simply silent as to the disposition of the annuity in the event of the grantor's death
during the trust term. Additionally, any other construction would effectively
eliminate the qualified teon-of-years annuity, a result not contemplated by
Congress.
Moreover, we note in this connection that the Commissioner has defined
noncontingent for purposes of determining a qualified remainder interest as
follows: f1 an interest is non-contingent only if it is payable to the beneficiary or the
beneficiary's estate in all events." Sec. 25.2702-3{f)( I )(iii), Gift Tax Regs. We are
satisfied that this principle is equally applicable in the circumstances at bar. For
similar reasons, we decline respondent's invitation to treat term annuities payable
to a grantor or the grantor's estate as having two separate "holders" for purposes of
the regulatory requirement of section 25.2702-3(b)( 1)(i), Gift Tax Regs., that the
annuity amount "be payable to (or for the benefit of) the holder of the annuity
interest for each taxable year of the tenn."
Lastly, we observe that the legislative history indicates section 2702 was to draw
upon the rules for valuing split-interest gifts to charity under section 664. Section
664 deals with charitable remainder annuity trusts and unitrusts for which a tax
deduction is available. Yet under this statute, respondent apparently acknowledges
that an annuity payable for a tenn ofyears to an individual or the individual's estate
is valued as a fixed-term interest. Section 1.664-2(c), Income Tax Regs., provides
that the present value of an annuity is to be computed in accordance with
regulations promulgated under section 2031. Such regulations, in turn, contain the
following example:
EXAMPLE 4.
ANNUITY PAYABLE FOR A TERM OF YEARS.
The decedent, or the decedent's estate, was entitled to receive an annuity
of $10,000 a year payable in equal quarterly installments at the end of
each quarter throughout a term certain. At the time of the decedent's
death, the section 7520 rate was 9.8 percent. A quarterly payment hadjust
been made prior to the decedent's death and payments were to continue
for 5 more years. Under Table B in section 20.2031-7(d)(6) for the
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interest rate of9.8 percent, the factor for the present value ofa remainder
interest due after a tenn of5 years is .626597. Converting the factor to an
annuity factor, as described in paragraph (d)(2)(iv)(A) ofthis section, the
factor for the present value of an annuity for a tenn of 5 years is 3.8102.
The adjustmentfactor from Table K in section 20.2031-7(d)(6) at an
interest rate of9.8 percent for quarterly annuity payments made at the end
of the period is 1.0360. The present value of the annuity is, therefore,
$39,473.67 ($10,000 x 3.8102 x 1.0360).
[Sec. 20.2031-7T(d)(5), Example (4), Temporary Estate Tax Regs.,64
Fed. Reg. 23214 (April 30, 1999); see also pre-1999 sec.20.2031-7(d)(5),
Example (4), Estate Tax Regs.]
It strikes us as incongruous that respondent is willing to recognize the full value of
a term annuity, whether payable to a taxpayer or to the taxpayerts estate, when to
do so will reduce the amount of a charitable deduction, but refutes this approach
when it will decrease the amount of a taxable gift.
Walton's significance is that it allows a ORAT to be created with a zero remainder interest, as does Schott.
The government did not appeal Walton. Interestingly, the IRS may not be ready to concede that a true "zero-out" result
is possible. In TAM 200245054, dealing with a charitable allocation clause, the Service stated:
Similarly, the fonnula for defining a retained annuity contained in § 25.27023(b)(ii)(B) sanctions a practical method which, when utilized in a bona fme
manner, enables a donor to take advantage of a Congressionally approved
mechanism for transferring a remainder interest in trust property, in situations
where assets that may be difficult to value, such as real estate or stock in a closely
held business, are transferred to the trust. Further, this regulation should not be
viewed as sanctioning the utilization of the fonnula to "zero-out'~ a gift, as is the
c3:se in the situation presented here. The preamble accompanying the promulgation
ofthis regulation explicitly expresses concern regarding the use ofgrantor retained
annuity trusts that are structured such that the value of the remainder interest (and
thus, the amount ofthe gift) is zero or ofnominal value relative to the total amount
transferred to the trust. The preamble states that the Service and Treasury view
these gift arrangements as contrary to the principles of § 2702. See, Preamble to
T.C. 8395,1992-1 C.B. 316, 319.
In TAM 2003 19001 taxpayers who had created Schott type GRATs attempted to convert them to Walton type

ORATs many years after the creation, retroactively. The TAM states:
Initially, we note that under Paragraph VIII, the trustee's authority is limited to
amending the GRATs to restrict or remove powers, duties, rights, etc. that might
cause the retained annuity to fail to qualify as a "qualified annuity interest tt within
the meaning of § 2702(b)( I ). We believe this provision was intended to allow
amendment in order to preserve the qualification of the interest under § 2702. In
this case, the Grantors' retained annuities, to the extent payable to the Grantor for
a term ofyears or until the Grantor's earlier death, were qualified annuities. Thus,
refonnation was not required to ensure qualification under § 2702. Rather the
refonnation, which involved a complete change in the dispositive provisions ofthe
trusts, was undertaken to enhance (and not preserve) the tax benefit available under
§ 2702. We do not believe this kind of refonnation is within the purview of
Paragraph VIII.
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Even assuming Paragraph VIII authorized the modification~ the courts and the IRS
have generally found that savings clauses that are intended to reverse any adverse
tax consequences arising after the transaction is completed, are not effective for tax
purposes. For example, in Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944)
the Court characterized a provision, which voided any portion of a transfer
detennined by a Court to be subject to gift tax, as "a device" that was contrary to
public policy. The Court noted, inter alia, that the provision at issue in that c·ase had
the effect of discouraging the collection of tax by the public officials charged with
its collection, since the only effect of an attempt to enforce the tax would be to
defeat the gift. Further, the effect of the provision was to obstruct the
administration ofjustice by requiring the courts to pass upon a moot case. See also,
Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986); Rev. Rut. 65-144,1965-1 C.B. 442.
Similarly, in this case, the modifications pursuant to Paragraph VIII were initiated
to reverse the adverse detennination the IRS regarding the revocable spousal
interests. I We believe that, in this case, Grantors' utilization of Paragraph VIII as
a mechanism to reverse these adverse tax consequences presents the same
administrative and public policy concerns as did the clause at issue in Procter.
Finally, in general, the retroactive amendment or refonnation ofa trust instrument
is not effective to change the tax consequences of a completed transaction. For
example, in Estate of La Meres v. Commissioner, 98 T.e. 294 (1992), the trustees
retroactively refonned a governing instrument solely for the purpose ofqualifying
the bequest for the estate tax charitable deduction. The Court held that the
retroactive reformation, undertaken solely for tax considerations, was not effective
for tax purposes~ stating as follows:
This and other courts have generally disregarded the retroactive effect of
State court decrees for Federal tax purposes. See Van Den Wymelenberg
v. United States, 397 F.2d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1968); Straight Trust v.
Commissioner, 245 F.2d 327, 329-330 (8th Cir. 1957), affg. 24 T.C. 69
(1955); Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 666, 673 (1990);
Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680, 695 (1982), affd. without published
opinion 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984); American Nurseryman Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 271, 275 (1980), affd. without published
opinion 673 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1981). See Estate of Kraus v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-154, affd. on this issue 875 F.2d 597
(7th Cir. 1989).
We recognize that the revocable trust authorized the trustees to take the
actions which they took... " While we will look to local law in order to
determine the nature ofthe interests provided under a trust document, we
are not bound to give effect to a local court order which modifies the
dispositive provisions of the document after respondent has acquired
rights to tax revenues under its terms. [citations omitted]. As the Court of
Appeals explained in Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, supra at
445:
Were the law otherwise there would exist considerable
opportunity for "collusive" state court actions having the sole
purpose of reducing federal tax liabilities. Furthermore, federal
tax liabilities would remain unsettled for years after their
assessment if state courts and private persons were empowered
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to retroactively affect the tax consequences of completed
transactions and completed tax years.
Estate of La. Meres v. Commissioner, 98 T.e. at 311-312. See also, Rev. Rul.
93-79, 1993-2 C.B. 269. The court in La Meres reached this conclusion
notwithstanding that the governing instrument in that case authorized the trustees
to refonn the instrument, and that the trustees may have had a fiduciary duty to
refonn the instrument in order to reduce taxes and conserve assets, as the Grantors
maintain is the situation in this case. Estate of La Meres v. Commissioner, 98 T.e.
at 302, 308. We believe this case presents an even more compelling situation than
La Meres for denying the efficacy ofthe retroactive refonnation. The parties in this
case are seeking to effect a retroactive change to the instrument, so that the
instrument as revised produces a tax benefit that only became available after the
document was executed and the transfer became complete. Further in the case of
GRATs I and 3, the parties are seeking to effect a retroactive change to the
instruments after the interests effected by the change had terminated. We do not
believe the courts would uphold this use ofhindsight to "retroactively affect the tax
consequences of completed transactions and completed tax years."

3.

Qualified Personal Residence Trust Form. Rev. Proc. 2003-42 contains a form for a Qualified

Personal Residence Trust. The fonn is not surprising. With respect to a sale back to the grantor the fonn provides:
Prohibition on Sale of Residence to Transferor or Related Parties. The Trustee is
prohibited from selling transferring (as defined in § 25.2702-5(c)(9) of the
regulations) the Residence, directly or indirectly, to the Transferor, the Transferor's
spouse, or an entity controlled by the Transferor or the Transferor's spouse during
the retained term interest of the QPRT, or an any time after the termination of the
retained tenn interest in the QPRT while the trust is treated as owned in whole or
in part by the Transferor or the Transferor's spouse under §§ 671 through 678 of
the Code.
The Annotation states:
(4) Prohibition on Sale of Residence to Transferor or Related Person (Article II,
Paragraph 8(5)). The governing instrument must prohibit the trust from selling or
transferring the residence directly or indirectly to the transferor, the transferor's
spouse, or an entity controlled by the transferor or the transferor's spouse during
the retained term interest in the trust or any any time after the expiration of that
interest when the trust is a grantor trust. For these purposes: (A) a sale or transfer
to another grantor trust of the transferor or the transferor's spouse is considered a
sale or transfer to the transferor ofthe transferor's spouse; and (B) a "grantor trust"
is a trust that is treated as owned in whole or in part by the transferor or the
transferor's spouse pursuant to §§ 671 through 678, and "control" is as defined in
§ 25.270 1-2(b)(5)(ii) and (iii).
This prohibition, however, does not apply to a distribution for no consideration
either to: (i) another grantor trust ofthe transferor or the transferor's spouse, ifthe
distributee-grantor trust includes the same prohibition against a sale or transfer; (ii)
the transferor's spouse after the tenn ofthe QPRT; or (iii) any person pursuant to
the trust instrument or the exercise of the transferor's retained power of
appointment, if any, ifthe transferor dies prior to the expiration ofthe retained term
interest. Section 25.2703-5(c)(9).
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R.

SECTION 6166 -- EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX
No developments.

s.

T AX ADMINISTRATION
1.

Determination of Domicile. In Estate of Robert A. Jack, et at v. United States, No. 01-41 OT (27

Nov 2002), the Court discussed a physician's "subjective intent" to become a U.S. domiciliary. Dr. Robert Jack was
a Canadian veterinarian. The opinion recites more facts:
Until October, 1992, Dr. Jack resided and was domiciled in Canada, where he
practiced veterinary medicine. In October, 1992, Dr. Jack was offered a two-year
employment contract with the University of California in Davis, California, as
Equine Medical Director in its School of Veterinary Medicine, for the period of
January, 1993 through December, 1994. On November 2, 1992, Dr. Jack applied
for admission to the United States as a TC class nonimmigrant and obtained TC
Temporary Professional status, allowing him to be admitted to, and remain in, the
United States for a period of one year. In December, 1992, Dr. Jack moved to
Davis, California, under his TC Temporary Professional visa, and in January, 1993,
commenced his duties as Equine Medical Director of the School of Veterinary
Medicine.
According to the plaintiff, while living in California, Dr. Jack maintained bank
accounts in Canada, continued affiliations with Canadian professional associations,
remained a licensed Canadian veterinarian, maintained his Canadian driver's license
and voter registration, and also maintained a Canadian mailing address.
On or about December 13, 1993, Dr. Jack obtained an extension of his TC
Temporary Professional visa through December 31,1994. On or about December
2, 1994, Dr. Jack obtained Temporary Professional classification available under
the newly-enacted NAFTA, enabling him to continue his employment in the United
States. In January, 1995, Dr. Jack extended his contract with the University of
California at Davis as Equine Medical Director in the School of Veterinary
Medicine for two years, through December, 1996. Due to the January, 1995
contract extension, on or about May 25, 1996, Dr. Jack obtained an extension on
his TN Temporary Professional visa through November 17, 1996. Approximately
three months later, on August 27, 1996, Dr. Jack died in Davis, California, at the
age of forty-nine.
The Court held:
The defendant asserts that it should be permitted to attempt to show that Dr. Jack
was in the United States in violation of his TN Temporary Professional visa at the
time of his death. "While Dr. Jack had to satisfy the immigration authorities that
he did not intend to reside permanently in the United States in order to obtain the
annual TC and TN classifications," the defendant states that it should not be
prevented from "demonstrating that his intent changed, or was other than what he
represented to the INS officers who stamped his passport." Plaintiff alleges that
there is a presumption that Dr. Jack's domicile remained in Canada and that the
defendant should be precluded from arguing that Dr. Jack had the intent to
establish domicile in the United States because such an intent was specifically
precluded by the visa held by Dr. Jack.
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Although in order to hold a TN Temporary Professional visa Dr. Jack should not
have had the legal intent to establish domicile, the defendant has rebutted the
plaintiff's allegation ofa presumption that at the time ofhis death Dr. Jack intended
to remain domiciled in Canada by virtue of holding a TN visa. In the Notice of
Deficiency (which was followed by an IRS assessment based on the Notice of
Deficiency) the IRS detennined that "the decedent was domiciled in the United
States on the date ofdeath. "It is well established in the tax law that an assessment
is entitled to a legal presumption of correctness -- a presumption that can help the
Government prove its case against a taxpayer in court." United States v. Fior
O'italia, Inc., 122 S. Ct 2117, 2122 (2002) (citations omitted). The presumption
in favor of the defendant, based on the assessment, presumably made following
proper inquiry by the government officials, outweighs the vague alleged
presumption for which the plaintiff has cited no support. The government should
be allowed an opportunity to prove, consistent with the notice ofdeficiency and the
assessment, that Dr. Jack had developed the intent to domicile in the United States,
even though in violation of the tenns of his visa at the time of his death.
ff

Whether Dr. Jack intended to make the United States his domicile is "mainly a
question offacttuming on [decedent's] intent to remain indefinitely in [the United
States] or a lack of intent to make his home elsewhere." Carrasco-Favela v. INS,
563 F.2d 1220, 1222 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974»). The United States Supreme Court, in Texas v.
Florida, held:
While one's statements may supply evidence of the intention requisite to
establish domicile at a given place of residence, they cannot supply the
fact of residence there; and they are of slight weight when they conflict
with the fact. This is the more so where, as here, decedent's declarations
are shown to have been inspired by the desire to establish a nominal
residence for tax purposes, different from his actual residence in fact.
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398,425 (1939) (citations omitted).
As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, "If [the
decedent] complied with the terms of his temporary worker visa, then he could not
have had the intent necessary to establish a domicile in this country. On the other
hand, if he did plan to make the United States his domicile, then he violated the
conditions ofhis visa and his intent was not lawfuL" Graham v. INS, 998 F.2d 194,
196 (3rd Cir. 1993). The IRS has previously determined that an illegal alien can
establish domicile in the United States, allowing the agency to tax all assets in the
alien's estate, both inside and outside the United States, upon the alien's death. Rev.
Rut. 80-209,1980-2 C.B. 248 (1980).
The decedent may have developed the intent to be domiciled in the United States
although that would have put him in violation of the terms of his visa. The
defendant has raised enough of an issue regarding Dr. Jack's domiciliary status at
the time of his death and should be allowed an opportunity to establish that Dr.
Jack had fonned the intent to be domiciled in the United States at the time of his
death for the purposes of assessing estate taxes. Although never to be assumed,
there are those individuals who violate the terms of their visas. The defendant
should be allowed to offer proof regarding Dr. Jack's intent.
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. SECTION A(a)

CHARITABLE ALLOCATION CLAUSES
A charitable allocation clause is an attempt to minimize the negative effects that can result from the audit
adjustment by the Internal Revenue Service ofthe value ofnoncharitable gifts4 The donor makes annual exclusion gifts
or adjusted taxable gifts, or both, to a trust which contains a charitable allocation clause4 The clause directs the trustee
to allocate contributed assets having a certain value to a fund for the benefit ofthe donor's noncharitable beneficiaries,
and to allocate all contributed assets having value in excess of the certain value to charity4
To illustrate, suppose parents fund a limited partnership with $2,100,000 in marketable securities. The
partnership has 100 general partnership units and 9900 limited partnership units. Parents give the 9900 units to a trust
at an appraised value of $ 1,260,000 (a 40% discount). The trust provides that the first $1,250,000 of assets added to .
it will be allocated to a fund for the benefit ofparents' children, grandchildren and other descendants with the remainder
to be allocated to the parent's donor advised fund at the community foundation. Trustee reviews the appraisal and
provides a copy to the community foundation. The community foundation agrees that it should receive $10,000 worth
of units from the transfer but no more.

1.

Benefits.
The benefits ofa charitable allocation clause would seem to be two-fold. First, presumably the IRS

would be reluctant to audit gifts made to a trust containing such a clause because gift or estate tax could be collected.
Second, if the IRS did audit a gift made to such a trust, and increased the value of gifts, all that would result would be
the reallocation ofassets from the noncharitable fund to the designated charity. Ifthat charity were a donor advised fund
at a community foundation, the funds could be said to remain "available" for the benefit of the family.

2.

Drafting the Clause.
Such a clause could be drafted like a traditional fonnula marital deduction -- exemption equivalent

funding clause so that the maximum amount of a donor's $1,000,000 exemption is used. However, a simpler clause
would simply specify a sum4 For testamentary transfers the flexibility of a clause that is tied to the amount that can be
disposed of without generating estate tax is desirable. Such flexibility is less useful for inter vivos gifts.

3.

Role of the Charity.
The charity must act independently ofthe donor and the donor's familY4 The trustee should notify the

charity of the arrangement. Once the trustee obtains an appraisal of the gift the trustee should notify the charity of the
amount the charity is to receive, if anything, and should furnish the charity a copy of the appraisal. The charity should
not be asked to consent to having received all it is entitled to but rather should retain the option of an action against the
trustee to receive additional assets.
In many instances a reasonable charity will be uncomfortable as the certifying recipient if it receives nothing.
Thus, having "too much" added to the trust, so that some assets are allocated to the charity would seem to be valuable4
The charity receives assets today for its time and trouble and the trust appears to work because assets actually went to
charity.
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May the donor's private foundation be the beneficiary? In principle the answer is yes. However, the purpose
of the clause is to reduce IRS challenges. If the donor's private foundation is the potential recipient then not only may
the IRS claim that no independent party valued the gift, but also that the private foundation improperly surrendered its
legal right to collect from the trust thereby making a gift to a disqualified person, (Treas. Reg. §53.4946-1 (a)(vii)). Such
a gift would be an act of self-dealing. Treas. Reg. §53.4941(f).

4.

Contrast with Marital Allocation Clause.
A marital deduction clause may be considered as an alternative to the charitable allocation clause.

The reason is to avoid any assets passing outside the family. If such a clause is used the spouse may be charged by the
IRS with making a gift ifthe value ofthe assets has been incorrectly determined. In addition, ifthe trust is to be a QTIP
trust a QTIP election will need to be made on the donor's next gift tax return, which must he timely filed, in order to
avoid a tax. The filing may be avoided by using a general power of appointment marital trust.
The purpose ofthe charitable allocation clause is to avoid an IRS audit by having evidence that an independent
party has looked at the values and that no increase in value will result in any gift tax. The marital deduction alternative
would not appear to accomplish but the second of these objectives. In Rev. Rul. 84-105, 1984-2 C.B. 197, the IRS
detennined that the surviving spouse made a gift by acquiescing to the under funding of a pecuniary marital bequest.
In TAM 200245053 (discussed in detail below) the IRS distinguished charitable allocation clauses generally
from marital deduction allocations:
Taxpayer also argues that the Service has sanctioned the use of valuation formula
clauses in other situations. For example, testamentary marital deduction formula
clauses pursuant to which the amount ofthe marital bequest (and the amount ofthe
marital deduction allowable under §§ 2056) fluctuates depending on the value of
the gross estate as finally determined for estate tax purposes, are widely used, in
order to take maximum advantage of the marital deduction and the unified credit
available under §§ 2010.

* * *
However, in order for most estates to take maximum advantage of the marital
deduction and unified credit, as intended by Congress, utilization of a funding
fonnula clause (~ither for the marital bequest or the "credit shelter trust) is a
necessity. That is, full utilization ofthese benefits is dependent on the value ofthe
testator's property as determined for estate tax purposes on the date of death or
alternate valuation date. A testator cannot anticipate when he or she will die or the
value ofthe property at the time ofdeath. Further, in the case ofcertain assets, such
as an interest in a closely-held business, opinions can reasonable differ as to value.
It is not feasible to continuously redraft testamentary instruments each time asset
values change, or to account for differences of opinion that may arise in the
valuation process. Thus, utilization of a testamentary marital deduction or credit
shelter valuation fonnula clause is the only practical way a testator can take full
advantage of these Congressionally authorized benefits.
tt
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5.

Use after 1987 Change in the Gift Tax Statute of Limitations.
Charitable allocation clauses were less attractive before the change in the gifttax statute oflimitations.

If the IRS could examine all gifts at the time of the estate tax audit, the auditing agent had tremendous leverage by
increasing the value of gifts made in prior years to trusts with charitable allocation clauses and causing assets to be
reallocated to charity. The family would be somewhat happier having assets go to charity rather than to the government
but at the same time the donor had not known of the readjustment and had not planned for it.
If gifts to the trust are properly disclosed, the gift tax statute of limitations will expire three years after the
return is filed. Thus the IRS will have to examine the trust within that period. Suppose the examination results in the
increase of gift values and assets are allocated to charity; the donor knows of that result (unless the donor has died
before the audit is complete which is unlikely in most instances) and can plan accordingly.

6.

Income Tax Deduction.
There appears to be no reason why a charitable allocation clause would

~ot result

in an income tax

deduction for the donor. All other rules - e.g. an appraisal- would need to be followed.
The IRS could argue that the gift was of a partial interest. That argument was made in McCord, discussed in
detail below, with a different type of clause. Here the donor has prescribed the required formula and the trustee is
obligated to implement it. With respect to the initial allocation to charity, if any, it should be clear that the donor
mandated the distribution. A stronger negative argument may be made with respect to future allocations to charity if
values are increased.

7.

Does the Clause Work to Minimize Gift Taxes?
The IRS takes a dim view ofarrangements that limit its ability to change values and collect tax. For

instance, a donor may not give assets to a donee with the proviso that assets having a value in excess of $X will be
returned to the donor. On the other hand, marital deduction-exemption equivalent clauses have been used for decades,
. as have testamentary formula clauses of various types (e.g. a formula that zeros out charitable lead trust gifts). Which
analysis is more appropriate for charitable allocation clauses?
The key case is Commissionerv. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 756 (1944). The
applicable provision that was struck down in that case read as follows:
Eleventh: The settlor is advised by counsel and satisfied that the present transfer
is not subject to Federal gift tax.. However, in the event it should be detennined by
final judgment or order of a competent federal court of last resort that any part of
the transfer in trust hereunder is subject to gift tax it is agreed by all the parties
hereto that in that event the excess property hereby transferred which is decreed by
such court to be subject to gift tax shall automatically be deemed not to be included
in the conveyance in trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of Frederic
w. Pro~ter free from the trust hereby created.

A(a) - 3

The Tax Court considered a savings clause in a private annuity situation in Estate of McClendon v. C.I.R.,

T.e. Memo. 1993-459. There the court stated:
The private annuity agreement includes a paragraph allowing for an adjustment to
the amount to be paid to Gordon in the event that a higher value is assigned to the
remainder interest through a settlement with the Internal Revenue Service or as a
result of a fmal decision of this Court. The paragraph in question states:
The parties hereto recognize that the valuation of many of the assets set out on
attached Exhibit A are, by their nature, as determined by the best judgement ofthe
parties and independent consultants engaged to assist in the valuation process and
may be subject to differing opinions. Therefore, the parties agree that, to the extent
any of the values on the attached Exhibit A are changed through a settlement
process with the Internal Revenue Service, or a fmal decision of the United States
Tax Court, the purchase price hereunder shall be adjusted accordingly, with interest
on said adjustment at the rate often percent (10%) from the date hereof until said
fmal determination of value, and the annuity payments due and payable hereunder
shall likewise be adjusted to reflect any such change in valuation.
The parties disagree whether this provision affects the Court's determination
respecting petitioner's gift tax liability.
Petitioner, relying on King v. United States, 545 F. 2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976), asserts
that we should respect the adjustment paragraph. In light of our determination that
the private annuity agreement resulted in a gift, petitioner argues that the
adjustment provision will operate to require the obligors to pay additional amounts
to Gordon's estate, thereby eliminating the gift but at the same time increasing the
gross estate that is subject to Federal tax.
Respondent counters that the Court should follow cases such as [Procter] revg. on
other grounds a Memorandum Opinion ofthis Court dated July 6, 1943, and Ward
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986), and hold that the adjustment provision has no
effect under the circumstances presented. We agree with respondent.
In [Procter], the taxpayer transferred certain property interests to a trust for the
benefit of his children. However, the trust instrument provided in pertinent part
that, if a competent Federal court of last resort should find any part of the transfer
to be subject to gift tax, then that portion ofthe property subject to such tax would
not be considered to have been transferred to the trust. In refusing to respect this
adjustment provision the court concl4ded:
We do not think that the gift tax can be avoided by any such device as this.
Taxpayer has made a present gift of a future interest in property. He attempts to
provide that, if a federal court of last resort shall hold the gift subject to gift tax, it
shall be void as to such part of the property given as is subject to the tax. This is
clearly a condition subsequent and void because contrary to public policy. A
contrary holding would mean that upon a decision that the gift was subject to tax,
the court making such decision must hold it not a gift and therefore not subject to
tax. Such holding, however, being made in a tax suit to which the donees of the
property are not parties, would not be binding upon them and they might .later
enforce the gift notwithstanding the decision of the Tax ~ourt. It is manifest that
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a condition which involves this sort of trifling with the judicial process cannot be
sustained. [Id. at 827.]
The court went on to point out that the adjustment clause should be viewed as
contrary to public policy on the grounds that: (I) Public officials would be
discouraged from attempting to collect the tax since the only effect would be to
defeat the gift; (2) the adjustment provision would tend to obstruct the
administration ofjustice by requiring the court to address a moot case; and (3) the
provisions should not be permitted to defeat a judgment rendered by the court. Id.
We followed Procter in Ward v. Commissioner, supra. In the latter case., the
taxpayers, husband and wife, each .transferred 25 shares of stock to each of their
three sons. At the time of the gifts the taxpayers and their sons executed a "gift
adjustment agreement" that was intended to ensure that the taxpayers' gift tax
liability for the stock transfers would not exceed the unified credit against gift tax
that the taxpayers were entitled to at that time. Id. at 87-88. In particular, the
agreement stated that if it should be fmally determined for Federal gi ft tax purposes
that the fair market value of the transferred stock either was less than or greater
than $2,000 per share, an adjustment would be made to the number of shares
conveyed so that each donor would have transferred $50,000 worth ofstock to each
donee. Id. We concluded that the fair market value of the stock exceeded $2,000
per share for each of the years in issue. Id. at 109. In rejecting the taxpayers'
position in Ward, we frrst noted that honoring the adjustment agreement would run
counter to the policy concerns articulated in Procter. Id. at 113.
In addition, we were not persuaded by the taxpayers' argument that the mere
possibility of the application of the Federal estate tax to the excess gift was
sufficient to distinguish Procter. Finally, we concluded that upholding the
adjustment agreement would result in unwarranted interference with the judicial
process, stating:
Furthennore, a condition that causes a part of a gift to lapse if it is detennined for
Federal gift tax purposes that the value of the gift exceeds a given amount, so as
to avoid a gift tax deficiency, involves the same sort of "trifling with the judicial
process" condemned in Procter. Ifvalid, such condition would compel us to issue,
in effect, a declaratory judgment as to the stock's value, while rendering the case
moot as a consequence. Yet, there is no assurance that the petitioners will actually
reclaim a portion of the stock previously conveyed to their sons, and our decision
on the question of valuation in a gift tax suit is not binding upon the sons, who are
not parties to this action. The sons may yet enforce the gifts.
Based upon our review of Procter and Ward, the adjustment clause at issue in the
instant case does not merit consideration for purposes of determining petitioner's
gift tax liability, and we so hold. In our view, it makes little sense to expend
precious judicial resources to resolve the question of whether a gift resulted from
the private annuity transaction only to render that issue moot Equally important,
our detennination that the private annuity agreement resulted in a taxable gift is not
directly binding on Bart or the McLendon Family Trust who are not parties to this
case. See Ward v. Commissioner, supra at 114. Consequently, there being no
assurance that the tenus ofthe adjustment clause will be respected, it shall have no
impact on this case.
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Petitioner's reliance on King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.1976) is
misplaced. That case involved a sale of stock which the court found to be an
ann's-length transaction, free from any donative intent. Like that in Ward v.
Commissioner, 87 T.e. 78, 116 (1986), however, the transaction at issue in the
instant case was not an arm's-length deal, and thus we distinguish the King case on
this basis. Further, we have previously questioned the factual findings supporting
the holding in King. See Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 239,271 n. 23 (1984).
In Harwood, the facts were these:
On December 29, 1976, Jack and Margaret Harwood and Bud and Virginia
Harwood each created a trust for the benefit of their respective children~ with the
Bank of America acting as trustee for each trust. Each trust received from its
grantors an 8.89-percent limited partnership interest in HIC. The trust agreements
contained the following clause:
Article FIRST. Property subject to this instrument listed in Schedule "A"
is referred to as the "trust estate" and shall be held, administered, and
distributed in accordance with this instrument. In the event that the value
of the partnership interest listed in Schedule 'tA" shall be fmally
determined to exceed $400,000 for purposes of computing the California
or United States Gift Tax, and in the opinion of the Attorney for the
trustee a lower value is not reasonably defendable, the trustee shall
immediately execute a promissory note to the trustors in the usual fonn at
6 percent interest in a principal amount equal to the difference between
the value of such gift and $400,000. The note shall carry interest and be
effective as of the day of the gift.
The court concluded:
We do not believe that the savings clause here under consideration falls within the
ambit of Procter. The clause in issue provides that if the value of the gifts of
interests in HIC are "fmally determined to exceed $400,000 for purposes of
computing the * * * United States Gift Tax and in the opinion of the Attorney for
the trustee a lower value is not reasonably defendable," the trustees shall execute
notes to the respective grantors for any value in excess of $400,000. Procter is
apposite only if we read the words "finally determined" to refer to a fmaljudgment
by a court ofcompetentjurisdiction. Such an interpretation, however, would render
a nullity the succeeding phrase "and in the opinion of the Attorney for the trustee
a lower value is not reasonably defendable~"since it would be absurd for the trustee
to defend a lower value after a final judgment had been rendered. We believe the
more reasonable interpretation ofthe clause at issue is to read" finally determined"
to mean either eventually detennined by appraisers or Udetermined by the IRS."
Thus, if an appraisal of HIe or, alternatively, an IRS determination was received
by the trustees which valued the donated interests at more than $400,000 each, and
the trustees accepted such appraisal, the trustees were to execute promissory notes
to the trust grantors in an amount sufficient to insure that no more than $400,000
worth of property was given to each trust.
On this reading ofthe savings clause, the trustee has no power to issue notes to the
grantors upon a detennination by a court that the value of property transferred to
the trustee exceeded $400,000.
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In TAM 200245053 the clause was phrased as a fractional share of partnership interests. The specific facts
of the transaction are worth reviewing in detail:
On Date 1, Taxpayer and Spouse established Family Trust, a revocable trust, and
designated themselves as co-trustees. Under the tenus of Family Trust, the trust
assets are divided into two trusts, Trust A and Trust B. The trust agreement states
that Spouse and Taxpayer each transferred to Trust A and Trust B, respectively,
that individual's separately-held property or that individual's undivided one-half
interest in property held by the spouses as tenants in common. Under the tenns of
Trust B, during Taxpayer's life, the trustees are directed to pay to Taxpayer so
much ofthe net income and principal ofthe trust as she may elect to withdraw. At
Taxpayer's death, if Spouse has predeceased Taxpayer, the Trust B corpus is to be
distributed to the children of Spouse and Taxpayer in equal shares. In Year 2,
Spouse died and Taxpayer became sole trustee of Trust B.
On Date 2, Taxpayer as Trustee of Trust B of.Family Trust (Trust B), and
Taxpayer's three children, Child 1, Child 2, and Child 3, formed Partnership. The
Partnership agreement states that Taxpayer as Trustee of Trust B transferred $F
($A in cash, $B in publicly traded securities, and $C in real estate) in exchange for
a 0.85 percent general partnership interest and a 99 percent limited partnership
interest. Child 1, Child 2, and Child 3 each transferred $D in cash (of which
roughly $E was gifted to each child by Taxpayer) in exchange for a 0.05 percent
general partnership interest.
Also on Date 2, the following transactions occurred. Taxpayer created Irrevocable
Trust for the benefit of Taxpayer's lineal descendants. Taxpayer is designated as
trustee. The trust provides that during the tenn of the trust, trust income and
principal is to be distributed in such amounts and at such times as the trustee deems
appropriate for the health, support, maintenance or education of any oftaxpayer's
descendants selected by the trustee. The Taxpayer's children are granted the right
to substitute property in exchange for trust assets of equivalent value.
As trustee of Trust B, Taxpayer assigned a 0.1 percent limited partnership interest
in Partnership to herself as trustee of Irrevocable Trust. In addition, Taxpayer, as
trustee of Trust B, executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement (Sales Agreement)
pursuant to which Taxpayer as trustee ofTrust B (Seller) sold to herself, as trustee
of Irrevocable Trust (Purchaser), a fractional share of the 98.9 percent limited
partnership interest in Partnership owned by Trust B. Sales Agreement describes
the fractional share subject to the sale as follows:
The numerator of such fraction shall be the Purchase Price, and the
denominator of such fraction shall be the fair market value of [the 98.9
percent limited partnership interest]. The fair market value of [the 98.9
percent limited partnership interest] shall be such value as finally
determined for federal gift tax purposes based upon other transfers of
limited partnership interests in the Partnership by Seller as of [Date 2], in
accordance with the valuation principles set forth in Regulation Section
25.2512-1 as promulgated by the United States Treasury under Section
2512 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
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(Emphasis added.) Under the Sales Agreement, the "Purchase Price" is defined as
the value determined by an appraisal ofthe 98.9 percent limited partnership interest
made as soon as practicable after Date 2.
In payment of the "Purchase Price," Taxpayer as trustee of Irrevocable Trust
executed a promissory note in the amount of $X (identified in the note as the
Purchase Price under the Sales Agreement) with interest at the rate of 6.2 percent
compounded annually. Interest is payable annually and the note principal is due 9
years less one day after Date 2. The note may be prepaid in whole or in part at any
time within the term.
Under a security agreement, the promissory note was secured by all of Irrevocable
Trust's interests in Partnership, whenever acquired by the trust. Child I, Child 2,
and Child 3 executed a guarantee, guaranteeing payment on the note.
Subsequently, the parties agreed that the charity should be bought out at a stated price. They entered into an
agreement which provided:
[T]he parties hereto agree that the Assignment effected a transfer ofa ninety-eight
and nine tenths percent (98.9%) limited partnership interest in the Partnership from
Seller to Purchaser, and that the books and records of the Partnership shall reflect
this Agreement.
The parties acknowledge that this Agreement is subject to modification if within
the statute of limitations applicable to the Assignment it shall be determined that
the Assignment actually conveyed a different percentage than that set forth above.
The parties agree that ifthere shall be such a determination, the ownership interests
in the Partnership and distributions previously made from the Partnership shall be
adjusted.
The IRS applied Procter and Ward to ignore the effect of the charitable allocation. The TAM states:
We see no difference between the effect ofthe adjustment clauses at issue in Ward
-and Rev. RuL 86-41, and the adjustment provision in this case. In the instant case,
Spouse, as trustee ofTrust B, transferred the entire 98.9 percent limited partnership
to the Irrevocable Trust pursuant to the Sales Agreement and The Agreement.
However, if the Service adjusts the value of the gift of the 0.1 percent limited
partnership interest transferred by the Spouse on Date 2, then under the formula in
the Sales Agreement, the denominator of the fraction must be adjusted, but not the
numerator, thereby reducing the fractional portion of the 98.9 percent interest
subject to the sale and compelling a retransfer of a portion of the 98.9 percent
interest back to Trust B. Thus, we believe the case is indistinguishable from the
facts presented in Ward and Situation 1 of Rev. Rul. 86-41. In all three situations,
under the adjustment clause at issue, if the Service, or the courts, determined that
the property subject to the transfer exceeds the value initially placed on the
property by the donor, then a portion of the property sufficient to eliminate the
imposition ofany additional tax liability is transferred backto the transferor. As the
court noted in Ward v. Commissioner, if in the instant case the condition is given
effect, there would be no incentive for the Commissioner to challenge the value of
the limited partnership interest subject to the sale, because any adjustment to value
would be rendered moot. Similarly, any attempt by a court to opine on the value of
the interests would also be rendered moot. Further, as was the case in Ward~ there
is no assurance that the agreement would be enforced and any excess partnership
interest transferred back.
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Rev. Rut. 86-41, 1986-1 C.B. 300, dealt with the transfer of an interest in income producing real estate from
A to B with B receiving a one-half interest. The TAM discusses the situations addressed by the Ruling:
In Situation I, the deed provided that, if for federal gift tax purposes, the Service
detennined the value of the one-half interest was more than $ 10,000, then B's
interest would be reduced so that its value equaled $10,000. Under local law, the
adjustment clause would compel B's reconveyance of a fractional share of the
property. On examination of A's gift tax return, the Service detennined the date of
gift fair market value of the one-half interest to be $15,000. Situation 2 addresses
the same facts except that, instead of reconveying any portion of the one-half
interest, B was required to pay to A consideration equal to the excess value.
The revenue ruling states that, in both caSes, the purpose ofthe adjustment clause
was not to preserve or implement the original, bona fide intent ofthe parties, as in
the case of a clause requiring a purchase price adjustment based on an appraisal by
an independent third party retained for that purpose. Rather, the purpose of the
clause was to recharacterize the nature of the transaction in the event of a future
adjustment to A's gift tax return by the Service. Accordingly, the revenue ruling
concludes that in both situations, the adjustment clause will be disregarded for
federal tax purposes.
The taxpayer argued that the IRS expressly allows fonnula clauses in the marital deduction context and with
respect to grantor retained annuity trusts. The TAM distinguishes both of those situations:
Taxpayer also argues that the Service has sanctioned the use of valuation formula
clauses in other situations. For example, testamentary marital deduction formula
clauses pursuant to which the amount ofthe marital bequest (and the amount ofthe
marital deduction allowable under §§ 2056) fluctuates depending on the value of
the gross estate as fmally determined for estate tax purposes, are widely used, in
order to take maximum advantage of the marital deduction and the unified credit
available under §§ 2010. Similarly, §§ 25.2702-3(b)(ii)(B) provides that the
retained annuity in a grantor retained annuity trust may be a specified fraction or
percentage of the initial fair market value of the trust "as finally determined for
federal tax purposes." Taxpayer argues that these clauses, that adjust the value of
a testamentary or inter vivos gift based on the transfer tax value of the property as
fmally determined, have the same operative effect as the clause at issue in this case.
However, in order for most estates to take maximum advantage of the marital
deduction and unified credit, as intended by Congress, utilization of a funding
fonnula clause (either for the marital bequest or the "credit shelter" trust) is a
necessity. That is, full utilization ofthese benefits is dependent on the value ofthe
testator's property as detennined for estate tax purposes on the date of death or
-alternate valuation date. A testator cannot anticipate when he or she will die or the
value ofthe property at the time 0 f death. Further, in the case ofcertain assets, such
as an interest in a closely-held business, opinions can reasonable differ as to value.
It is not feasible to continuously redraft testamentary instruments each time asset
values change, or to account for differences of opinion that may arise in the
valuation process. Thus, utilization of a testamentary marital deduction or credit
shelter valuation fonnula clause is the only practical way a testator can take full
advantage of these Congressionally authorized benefits.
Similarly, the fonnula for defming a retained annuity contained in §§
25.2702-3(b)(ii)(B) sanctions a practical method which, when utilized in a bona
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fide manner, enables a donor to take advantage of a Congressionally approved
mechanism for transferring a remainder interest in trust property, in situations
where assets that may be difficult to value, such as real estate or stock in a closely
held business, are transferred to the trust. Further, this regulation should not be
viewed as sanctioning the utilization of the formula to "zero-out" a gift, as is the
case in the situation presented here. The preamble accompanying the promulgation
ofthis regulation explicitly expresses concern regarding the use ofgrantor retained
annuity trusts that are structured such that the value of the remainder interest (and
thus, the amount ofthe gift) is zero or ofnominal value relative to the total amount
transferred to the trust. The preamble states that the Service and Treasury view
these gift arrangements as contrary to the principles of §§ 2702. See, Preamble to
T.D.8395, 1992-1 C.B. 316, 319.
We believe the legitimate and accepted uses of formula clauses as a practical way
to implement Congressionally sanctioned tax benefits are in stark contrast to the
situation presented in the instant case. The creation of the partnership and the use
of the valuation formula clause in the sale of the partnership interests are all part
ofan integrated transaction the primary purpose 0 f which is to transfer assets to the
natural objects of Taxpayer's bounty at a discounted value, while foreclosing any
realistic opportunity to challenge the transaction. The Taxpayer created and funded
the limited partnership primarily, ifnot solely, to generate valuation discounts, with
the goal of enabling her irrevocable trust to acquire the interests at a reduced
purchase price. Taxpayer employed the formula clause as part ofthe transaction in
an attempt to ameliorate any adverse consequences if the Service challenged the
transaction and thereby to discourage any such challenge. The clause does not serve
a legitimate purpose, such as ensuring that the purchase price accurately reflects
fair market value. Rather, the clause recharacterizes the nature of the transaction
in the event of a future adjustment to the value of the partnership interests by the
Service. Under these circumstances the adjustment clause should not be effective
for gift tax purposes.
The Service also ignored the fact that an increase in the value of the partnership did in fact increase the value
of the gift because the increase was de minimis:
In this case, the gift of the 0.1 percent interest and the sale to Irrevocable Trust
were part of an integrated transaction. The Taxpayer has placed an insignificant
portion ofthe transaction at issue in order to circumvent well-established case law
that has developed regarding savings clauses. We do not believe the courts would
permit these decisions to be so easily avoided. For example, in Procter, under the
clause at issue, the gift was revoked to the extent it was finally determined that the
gift was subject to gift tax. The court determined that the savings clause "device"
was contrary to public policy. It is doubtful that the court would have reached a
contrary conclusion~ if the gift was revoked in its entirety but for $1.00, thus
creating the potential for a nominal deficiency, in the event the Service contests the
matter. Such a provision would have the same effect ofdiscouraging the collection
of tax by public officials, and would constitute the same "trifling with the judicial
process," as the actual clause involved in Procter. Accordingly, we do not believe
the clause at issue is in any meaningful way distinguishable from those presented
in Procter and Ward.
In an earlier FSA, 200122011, a family limited partnership was formed between parents and sons. Parents then
transferred limited interests to the sons, trusts for the sons, and charities pursuant to a transfer document that allocated
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certain specific dollar amounts to the sons and trusts with the charities receiving the remainder. The sons bought out
the charities six months later. The interests were appraised when the charities received the interests and were bought
out. In the buy-out the charities acknowledged payment in full for their interests.
The IRS audited, adjusted the value ofthe gifts and denied an increase in the charitable deduction. The Service
had three theories. First, that the step-transaction doctrine made illusory the charities' right to receive increased value.
Second, that the buy-out cut-offthe charities' rights so they would not actually receive any increase in value if the IRS
audited. Third, that the clause's primary purposes was to defeat the gift tax and thus it violated public policy.
Most recently, the Tax Court issued Charles T. McCord v. Commissioner, 120 T. C. No. 13 (2003). In addition
to the majority opinion there was a concurrence, two partial dissents, and a full dissent. The case is important for what

it says about partnership valuation as well as charitable allocations.

The specific facts are important and were described

by the majority opinion as follows:
On November 20, 1995, petitioners assigned their respective class A limited
partnership interests in MIL [the family partnership] to the Hazel Kytle
Endowment Fund ofThe Southfield School Foundation (the foundation) pursuant
to an Assignment ofPartnership Interestand Addendum Agreement (the Southfield
agreement). The recitals to the Southfield agreement provide that "all of the
partners of the Partnership desire that Assignee become a Class A Limited Partner
of the Partnership upon execution of this Assignment of Partnership Interest" and
"all consents required to effect the conveyance ofthe Assigned Partnership Interest
and the admission ofAssignee as a Class A Limited Partner ofthe Partnership have
been duly obtained and are evidenced by the signatures hereto". All of the initial
MIL partners executed the Southfield agreement.
Further Assignments
On January 12, 1996 (the valuation date), petitioners, as assignors, entered into an
assignment agreement (the assignment agreement) with respect to the"ir class B
limited partnership interests in MIL. The other parties to the assignment agreement
(the assignees) were the children, four trusts for the benefit of the children (the
trusts), and two charitable organizations -- Communities Foundation ofTexas, Inc.
(CFT) and Shreveport Symphony, Inc. (the symphony). By the assignment
agreement, petitioners relinquished all dominion and control over the assigned
partnership interests and assigned to the assignees all of their rights with respect
to those interests. The assignment agreement does not contain language s~ilar to
that quoted above from the Southfield agreement regarding the admission of the
assignees as partners ofthe partnership, and two ofthe partners ofthe partnership,
McCord Brothers Partnership and the foundation, did not execute the assignment
agreement in any capacity. The interests that petitioners assigned to the assignees
by way of the assignment agreement (collectively, the gifted interest) are the
subject of this dispute.
Under the terms of a "formula clause" contained in the assignment agreement (the
fonnula clause), the children and the trusts were to receive portions of the gifted
interest having an aggregate fair market value of $6,9 I 0,933; if the fair market
value ofthe gifted interest exceeded $6,910,933, then the symphony was to receive
a portion of the gifted interest having a fair market value equal to such excess, up
to $ 134,000; and, ifany portion ofthe gifted interest remained after the allocations

A(a) - 11

to the children, trusts, and symphony, then CFTwas to receive that portion (i.e., the
portion representing any residual value in excess of $7,044,933). The children
(individually and as trustees of the trusts) agreed to be liable for all transfer taxes
(i.e., Federal gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer taxes, and any resulting
State taxes) imposed on petitioners as a result of the conveyance of the gifted
interest.
The assignment agreement leaves to the assignees the task of allocating the gifted
interest among themselves; in other words, in accordance with the formula clause,
the assignees were to allocate among themselves the approximately 82-percent
partnership interest.assigned to them by petitioners. In that regard, the assignment
agreement contains the following instruction concerning valuation (the valuation
instruction):
For purposes of this paragraph, the fair market value of the Assigned
Partnership Interest as of the date ofthis Assignment Agreement shall be
the price at which the Assigned Partnership Interest would change hands
as of the date of this Assignment Agreement between a hypothetical
willing buyer and a hypothetical willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or· sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. Any dispute with respect to the allocation ofthe Assigned
Partnership Interests among Assignees shall be resolved by arbitration as
provided in the Partnership Agreement.
The Confmnation Agreement
In March 1996, the assignees executed a Confirmation Agreement (the
confinnation agreement) allocating the gifted interest among themselves ...

* * *
The assignees based that detennination on an appraisal report, dated February 28,
1996, prepared at the behest of the children's counsel2 by Howard Frazier Barker
Elliott, Inc. (HFBE). That report (the 1996 HFBE appraisal report) concludes that,
taking into account discounts for lack ofcontrol and lack of marketability, the fair
market value ofa I-percent "assignee's interest in the Class B Limited Partnership
Interests" on the valuation date was $89,505.
Representatives ofCFT and the symphony, respectively (including their respective
outside counsel), reviewed the 1996 HFBE appraisal report and detennined that it
was not necessary to obtain their own appraisals. Furthermore, under the terms of
the confirmation agreement, eFT and the symphony (as well as the other assignees)
agreed not to seek any judicial alteration of the allocation in the confitmation
agreement and waived their arbitration rights granted under the assignment
agreement.
MIL's Exercise of the Call Right

.

On June 26, 1996, MIL exercised the call right with respect to the interests held by
the symphony and eFT. It did so pursuant to a document styled "Agreement -Exercise of Call Option By McCord Interests, Ltd., L.L.P." (the exercise
agreement). The purchase price for the redeemed interests was based on a two-page
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letter from HFBE (the HFBE letter) previewing an updated appraisal report to be
prepared by HFBE. The HFBE letter concludes that the fair market value of a
I-percent "assignee's .interest in the Class B Limited Partnership Interests" as of
June 25, 1996 was $93,540. CFT and the symphony raised no objections to the
value found in the HFBE letter and accepted $338,967 and $140,041, respectively,
in redemption of their interests.
The majority goes on to discuss the effect ofthe assignment agreement with respect to the charitable allocation:
By way of the assignment agreement, petitioners transferred to CFT the right to a
portion ofthe gifted interest. That portion was not expressed as a specific fraction
of the gifted interest (e.g., one-twentieth), nor did petitioners transfer to eFT a
specific assignee interest in MIL (e.g., a 3-percent assignee interest). Rather, eFT
was to receive a fraction of the gifted interest to be determined pursuant to the
formula clause contained in the assignment agreement. The formula clause
provides that CFT is to receive that portion of the gifted interest having a fair
market value equal to the excess of (I) the total fair market value of the gifted
interest, over (2) $7,044,933. The formula clause is not self- effectuating, and the
assignment agreement leaves to the assignees the task of (1) detennining the fair
market value of the gifted interest and (2) plugging that value into the formula
clause to detennine the fraction of the gifted interest passing to CFT.
Petitioners argue that, because the assignment agreement defines fair market value
in a manner that closely tracks the defmition of fair market value for Federal gift
tax purposes, see sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs., the assignment agreement effects
a transfer to CFT of a portion ofthe gifted interest determinable only by reference
to the fair market value of that interest as fmally determined for Federal gift tax
purposes. We do not believe that the language of the ·assignment agreement
supports petitioners' argument. The assignment agreement provides a fonnula to
determine not only CFT's fraction ofthe gifted interest but also the symphony's and
the children's (including their trusts') fractions.44 Each of the assignees had the
right to a fraction of the gifted interest based on the value of that interest as
detennined under Federal gift tax valuation principles. If the assignees did not
agree on that value, then such value would be detennined (again based on Federal
gift tax valuation principles) by an arbitrator pursuant to the binding arbitration
procedure set forth in the partnership agreement. There is simply no provision in
the assignment agreement that contemplates the allocation of the gifted interest
among the assignees based on some fIXed value that might not be determined for
several years. Rather, the assignment agreement contemplates the allocation ofthe
gifted interest based on the assignees' best estimation ofthat value. Moreover, each
ofthe assignees' percentage interests was determined exactly as contemplated in the
assignment agreement (without recourse to arbitration), and none can complain that
they got any less or more than petitioners intended them to get.45 Had petitioners
provided that each donee had an enforceabIe right to a fraction ofthe gifted interest
detennined with reference to the fair market value of the gifted interest as finally
determined for Federal gift tax purposes,46 we might have reached a different
result. However, that is not what the assignment agreement provides.
Of course, the assignees' detennination of the fair market value of the gifted
interest, while binding among themselves for purposes of determining their
respective assignee interests~ has no bearing on our detennination of the Federal
gift tax value of the assignee interests so allocated;
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Footnote 46 states:
See, e.g., sec. 1.664-2(aXl)(iii), Income Tax Regs. (providing that a sum certain
may be expressed as a fraction or percentage of the value of property "as fmally
determined for Federal tax purposes", but requiring that actual adjusting payments
be made if such finally determined fair market value differs from the initially
determined value); sec. 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vi)(a), Estate Tax Regs. (similar); sec.
25.2702-3(b)(I)(ii)(B), Gift Tax Regs. (similar); Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 C. B.
682 (discussing conditions under which the Federal estate tax marital deduction
may be allowed where, under the terms of a will or trust, an executor or trustee is
empowered to satisfy a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust to a decedent's
surviving spouse with assets at their value as finally detennined for Federal estate
tax purposes).
The majority opinion fmds it signficant that the value of what each party received was based on what they
agreed, or what an arbitrator detennined if they failed to agree, were the values of the various interests, detennined in
the same manner as for federal gift tax purposes. Footnote 46 suggests that the lack of an "enforceable right" by the
charity is ultimately the problem with the assignment.
Judge Chiechi, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagrees that there was no "enforceable right" under
the clause:
As can be seen from reading the foregoing paragraph, the purported valuation
instruction consists ofa paragraph in the assignment agreement which defines the
tenn It fair market valueIt. Petitioners required the donees to use that defmition when
they allocated among themselves the respective portions ofthe gifted interest which
petitioners transferred to them under the assignment agreemenl The definition of
the term "fair market value" for that purpose is the same definition used for Federal
gift tax purposes. See sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs. The last sentence of the
above-quoted paragraph merely requires that any dispute with respect to the
allocation of the gifted interest among the donees be resolved by arbitration as
provided in the partnership agreement. Nothing in that paragraph mandates that if
the fair market value of the gifted interest to which the various donees agreed is
ultimately detennined not to be the fair market value ofthat interest, no adjustment
may be made to the respective assignee percentage interests allocated to eFT and
the other donees, as set forth in the confmnation agreement. I believe that the
majority opinion's constructio~ of the above-quoted paragraph is strained,
unreasonable, and improper and leads to illogical results.
In essence, the majority opinion concludes that the donees of the gifted interest
made a mistake in detennining the fair market value of that interest and that
petitioners are stuck with that mistaken value solely for purposes of detennining
the respective assignee percentage interests transferred to the donees under that
agreement.
The majority opinion states that:
the assignment agreement contemplates the allocation of the gifted
interest based on the assignees' best estimation of that value. Moreover,
each of the assignees' percentage interests was deterrninated exactly as
contemplated in the assignment agreement (without recourse to
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arbitration), and none can complain that they got any less or more than
petitioners intended them to get. * * * [Majority Ope p. 63.]
The assignment agreement does not "contemplate", as the majority opinion states,
that the allocation ofthe gifted interest be "based on the assignees' best estimation
of that [fair market] value." Id. Under the assignment agreement, petitioners
transferred to the donees specified portions of the gifted interest detennined by
reference to the fair market value of such portions, as defined in that agreement,
and not upon some ttbest estimation of that value."
The assignment agreement required that the allocation be based upon fair market'
value as defmed in that agreement, which the majority opinion acknowledges is the
same defmition ofthat tenn for Federal gift tax purposes. The majority opinion has
found that the donees did not make the allocation on the basis of that defmition.
The donees thus failed to implement the donors' (Le., petitioners') mandate in the
assignment agreement when they arrived at amounts which they believed to be the
respective fair market values of the specified portions of the gifted interest that
petitioners transferred to them but which the majority opinion has found are not the
fair market values of such portions.
Judge Foley, in concurrence and dissent, went further in support of the taxpayer, stating that the IRS did not
prove a substance over fonn argument and that the allocation clause did not violate public policy:
Respondent contended that formation of the limited partnership, assignment of
partnership interests, confinnation of the assignment, and redemption of the
charities' partnership interests were all part of an integrated transaction where
petitioners intended to transfer all of their assets to their sons and the trusts.
Respondent simply failed to meet his burden.
Courts have employed the substance over form doctrine where a taxpayer,
intending to avoid the gift tax, transfers property to an intermediary who then
transfers such property to the intended beneficiary.? In some instances the
intennediary was used to disguise the transferor. See Schultz v. United States, 493
F.2d 1225, 1226 (4th Cir. 1974) (fmding that brothers planned to avoid gift taxes
through repeated reciprocal gifts to each others' children); Griffm v. United States,
42 F. Supp. 2d 700, 707 (W.O. Tex. 1998) (finding that husband and wife engaged
in a scheme where the wife "was merely the intennediary through which the stock
passed on its way to the ultimate beneficiary"); Estate ofMurphy v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo. 1990-472 (disregarding an intrafamily stock transfer where the Court
found an informal family agreement to control the stock collectively). In Heyen v.
United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991) (disregarding as shams 27 transfers
ofstock to intermediate beneficiaries who then transferred the stock to the original
transferor's family), however, the intennediary was used in an attempt to disguise
the transferee. Respondent, relying on Heyen, asserts that the Symphony and eFT
were merely intermediaries in petitioners' plan to transfer their MIL interests to
their sons and the trusts.
In Heyen, a taxpayer, seeking to avoid the gift tax by taking advantage of the
annual gift tax exclusion, transferred stock to 29 intennediate recipients, all but two
of whom made blank endorsements of the stock, which the issuing bank
subsequently reissued to the intended beneficiaries. The court stated:
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The [intermediate] recipients either did not know they were receiving a
gift ofstock and believed they were merely participating in stock transfers
or had agreed before receiving the stock that they would endorse the stock
certificates in order that the stock could be reissued to decedent's family..
[ Id. at 361.]
The court further stated:
The evidence at trial indicated decedent intended to transfer the stock to
her family rather than to the intennediate recipients. The intermediary
recipients only received the stock certificates and signed them in blank so
that the stock could be reissued to a member of decedent's family.
Decedent merely used those recipients to create gift tax exclusions to
avoid paying gift tax on indirect gifts to the actual family member
beneficiaries. [ Id. at 363.]
In order for us to ignore petitioners' allocation in the assignment agreement,
respondent must establish that petitioners coordinated, and the charities colluded
in or acquiesced to, a plan to avoid petitioners' gift taxes by undervaluing the
transferred interests and intended to divert CFTs interest to their sons and the
trusts. See Heyen v. United States, supra; Schultz v. United States, supra; Griffm
v. United States, supra; Estate ofMurphy v. Commissioner, supra. Respondent did
not present the requisite evidence for us to invoke the substance over fonn
doctrine.
Respondent stated on brief that, after execution of the assignment agreement,
petitioners "washed their hands" of the transaction, and the donees took over.
Petitioners' sons' involvement in the subsequent allocation of the transferred
interests does not affect the petitioners' gift tax liability, particularly in the absence
ofa showing that petitioners retained some control over the subsequent allocation.
See sec. 25.2511-2(a), Gift Tax Regs. (stating that the gift tax is measured by the
value of the property passing from the donor). Petitioners' sons and the estate
planner made all the arrangements relating to the valuation. This Court, however,
will not impute to petitioners an intent to avoid the gift tax merely from the
appraiser's valuation ofthe transferred partnership interests, the sons' involvement
in the planning process, or. the hiring of an estate planner charged with tax
minimization. See Estate of Strangi v. -Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 484-485
(2000) ("Mere suspicion and speculation about a decedent's estate planning and
testamentary objectives are not sufficient to disregard an agreement in the absence
ofpersuasive evidence"), revd. on other grounds 293 F.3d279 (5th Cir. 2002); Hall
v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312 (1989).
Respondent failed to establish that the Symphony or eFT participated, knowingly
or otherwise, in a plan to facilitate petitioners' purported avoidance of gift tax.
Indeed, the testimony and evidence established that the Symphony and eFT acted
independently. CFT did not hire its own appraiser because it had confidence in the
appraiser hired by petitioners' sons. While in hindsight (i.e., after this Court's
valuation) it was imprudent for the charitable organizations to forgo an independent
appraisal,8 these organizations were not sham intennediaries. Prior to signing the
confirmation agreement, the Symphony and eFT could have independently valued
MIL, forced arbitration, and thwarted any purported plan to avoid the gift tax. Cf.
Compaq v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining, in an
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income tax case, to disregard a transaction that involved even a minimal amount of
risk and was conducted by entities separate and apart from the taxpayer), revg. I 13
T.e. 214 (1999).
There is no evidence of an implicit or explicit agreement, between petitioners and
either the Symphony or CFT, that the Symphony or eFT would accept less than
that which petitioners transferred to each organization. In fact, respondent
stipulated that "Before the call right was exercised, there was no agreement among
Mr. or Mrs. McCord, the McCord brothers, the Symphony or eFT as to when such
a buyout would occur or to the price at which the buyout would occur."

In sum, respondent failed to establish that the undervaluation ofMIL, reallocation
of MIL interests, and subsequent transfer ofa portion ofCFT's MIL interest to the
sons and the trusts, were parts of a plan by petitioners to avoid the gift tax. CFTs
retention of a much smaller interest (i.e., 3.62376573 percent) than petitioners
transferred, pursuant to the assignment agreement, has no effect on the value ofthe
transferred property on January 12, 1996, the date the gift became complete.
III. Formula Clause Does Not Violate Public Policy
Relying primarily on Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4thCir. 1944),
respondent contended that petitioners' formula clause was against public policy,
and therefore void, because such clause "is a 'poison pill' created to discourage
audit of the gifts and to fabricate phantom charitable gift and income tax
deductions. "
In Commissioner v. Procter, supra, the court considered a clause causing a gift to
revert to the donor if a court detennined that the gift was taxable. The court held
that such a clause "is clearly a condition subsequent and void because contrary to
public policy. n Id. at 827. The court reasoned that the clause would discourage the
collection of tax because attempted collection would defeat the gift, the clause
would "obstruct the administration ofjustice by requiring the courts to pass upon
a moot case", ·and the clause, if allowed to stand, would defeat the judgment of a
court. Id. Likewise, in Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78 (1986), a clause allowed
the taxpayer to revoke a gift ofstock ifit was determined that, for gift tax purposes,
the fair market value ofsuch stock exceeded $2,000 per share. The Court similarly
concluded that such a clause was a condition subsequent and void because it was
against public policy.
Contrary to the valuation clauses in Commissioner v. Procter, supra, and Ward v.
Commissioner, supra, which adjusted the amount transferred based upon a
condition subsequent, petitioners' valuation clause defined the amount ofproperty
transferred. Simply put, petitioners' gift does not fail upon a judicial
redetennination of the transferred property's value. Petitioners made a legally
enforceable transfer ofassignee interests to eFT, with no provision for the gift to
revert to petitioners or pass to any other party on the occurrence of adverse tax
consequences. CFT merely failed to protect its interest adequately. Procter and
Ward are distinguishable. Petitioners' fonnula clause was notagainst public policy.
Going the other way, in dissent Judge Laro stated that the clause should be ignored because it violates public
policy and no increased charitable deduction should be allowed:
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To reach the result that the majority desires, the majority decides this case on the
basis of a novel approach neither advanced nor briefed by either party and
concludes that the Court need not address respondent's arguments as to public
policy and integrated transaction. Majority Ope p. 64 note 47. Specifically, under
the majority's approach (majority's approach), the term "fair market value" as used
in the assignment agreement denotes simply the value ascertained by the parties to
that agreement (or, in certain cases by an arbitrator) and not the actual amount
determined under the finnly established hypothetical willing buyer/hypothetical
willing seller test that has been a fundamental part of our Federal tax system for
decades on end. Majority Ope p. 64 note 47; see also United States v. Cartwright,
411 U.S. 546, 550-551 (1973) ("The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market
value is nearly as old as the federal income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves").
Whereas the majority ostensibly recognizes that fmnly established test in its
determination of the fair market value of the subject property, majority Ope p. 64
note 46, the majority essentially holds that the parties to the assignment agreement
are not bound by that test when they themselves ascertain the fair market value of
that property, ide at 61-64.
As I understand the majority·s rationale, the parties to the assignment agreement are
not bound by that test because the assignment agreement only uses the phrase "fair
market value" and not the phrase "fair market value as finally determined for
Federal gift tax purposes". To my mind, the subject property's fair market value is
its fair market value, notwithstanding whether fair market value is ascertained by
the parties or "finally determined for Federal gift tax purposes". I know ofnothing
in the tax law (nor has the majority mentioned anything) that provides that property
such as the subject property may on the same valuation date have one "fair market
value t1 when nfinally determined" and a totally different "fair market value" if
ascertained beforehand. 1 The majority's interpretation ofthe assignment agreement
is at odds with the interpretation given that agreement by not only the trial Judge,
but by both parties as welL
The majority allows petitioners an increased charitable contribution that would be
disallowed under either the public policy or integrated transaction doctrine. In that
both of these doctrines are fundamental to a proper disposition of this case, it is
incumbent upon the Court to address one or both of them. The majority
inappropriately avoids discussion ofthese doctrines by relying on the principle that
the Court "may approve a deficiency on the basis ofreasons other than those relied
upon by the Commissioner". Majority op.. p. 64 note 47. The majority, however,
fails to recognize that the majority is not approving respondent's deficiency in full
but is rejecting a portion of it. In fact, the majority even acknowledges that "the
application of respondent's integrated transaction theory would result in an initial
increase in the amount of petitioners' aggregate taxable gift by only $90,011 ". Id.
Whereas the majority attempts to downsize the significance of a $90,011
adjustment by recharacterizing it as "only" and "less than I percent", id., the fact
ofthe matter is that the dollar magnitude of a $90,011 increase is significant to the
fisc (as well as to most people in general) notwithstanding that it may constitute a
small percentage ofthe aggregate taxable gift as found by the majority.2 I know of
no principle of tax law (nor has the majority cited one) that provides that an
adjustment otherwise required by the tax law is inappropriate when it is a small
percentage of a base figure such as aggregate taxable gifts.
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2. Increased Charitable Deduction Is Against Public Policy
Allowing petitioners to deduct as a charitable contribution the increase in value
detennined by the Court is against public policy and is plainly wrong. No one
disputes that CFT will never benefit from the approximately $45,000 that each
petitioner is entitled to deduct as a charitable contribution pursuant to the majority
opinion. Nor does anyone dispute that the only persons benefiting from the
increased value are petitioners and that the only one suffering any detriment from
the increased value is the fisc. I do not believe that Congress intended that
individuals such as petitioners be entitled to deduct charitable contributions for
amounts not actually retained by a charity. See Hamm v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1961-347 (charitable contribution under sec. 2522 requires "a reasonable
probability that the charity actually will receive the use and benefit of the gift, for
which the deduction is claimed"), affd. 325 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1963).

* * *
All of the steps which were taken to effect the transfer of petitioners· partnership
interests to their sons (inclusive of the trusts) were part of a single integrated
transaction. The purpose of that transaction was to transfer the interests with an
avoidance of Federal gift taxes, while, at the same time, discouraging audit ofthe
transfer and manufacturing phantom charitable gift and income tax deductions in
the event that the value of the transfer was later increased. I reach my conclusion
in light ofthe following facts which were found by the trialjudge or are reasonable
inferences therefrom: (1) Petitioners were seeking expert advice on the transfer of
their wealth with minimal tax consequences, (2) the transaction contemplated that
the charities would be out of the picture shortly after the gift was made, (3) the
transfers ofthe partnership interests to the charities were subject to a call provision
that could be exercised at any time, (4) the call provisions were exercised almost
contemporaneously with the transfers to the charities, (5) the call price was
significantly below fair market value, (6) the charities never obtained a separate
and independent appraisal of their interests (including whether the call price was
actually the fair market value of those interests), (7) neither charity ever had any
managerial control over the partnership, (8) the charities agreed to waive their
arbitration rights as to the allocation ofthe partnership interests, and (9) petitioners'
sons were at all times in control of the transaction. I also query as to this case why
a charity would ever want to receive a minority limited partnership interest, but for
an understanding that this interest would be redeemed quickly for cash, and fmd
relevant that the interest was subject to the call provision that could be exercised
at any time.
Judge Swift wrote a concurrence that is most interesting. Essentially he believed that the taxpayers' gift to
charity failed to qualify for the gift tax charitable deduction because it was a partial interest. In particular, Judge Swift
focused on the rights that the charitable donee did not receive because it only received an assignee interest; he discusses
this issue as fo Hows:
Focusing on the gift to the fourth level charitable donee (the gift to CFT),
petitioners themselves allege (in order to beefup the valuation discounts they seek)
and the majority opinion finds, majoritY Ope pp. 19-24, that the gifted MIL
partnership interest transferred to eFT included only certain "economic rights"
with regard to the gifted interest and did not consist of all of the donors· rights as
limited partners in that particular limited partnership interest. Upon petitioners'
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transfer and upon CFTs receipt of the gifted interest in the MIL partnership~
petitioners retained, and eFT never received, the following rights associated with
petitioners' interest in MIL (references are to the MIL amended partnership
agreement):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The right to vote on MIL partnership matters (section 3.10);
The right to redeem the MIL partnership interest (section
9.02(b»;
The right to inspect financial and other pertinent information
relating to MIL (section 3.09(d)(i)-(v));
The right to access any properties or assets owned by MIL
(section 3.09(d)(vi)); and
The right to veto early liquidation of MIL, unless such
liquidation is requ~red by State law (section 10.01).

Under section 7.02 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, a partnership
agreement may, but is not required to~ limit the partnership rights that may be
transferred when a partner transfers or assigns an interest in a partnership. In this
case, petitioners made their retention ofthe above rights (and the nonreceipt thereof
by CFT) explicit by the terms ofthe MIL partnership agreement that they adopted.
Section 8.03 ofthe MIL partnership agreement, discussing the transfer ofa limited
partnership interest to an assignee, is set forth, in part, below:
[A]n Assignee shall be entitled only to allocations of Profits and Losses
* * * and distributions * * * which are attributable to the Assigned
Partnership Interests held by the Assignee and shall not be entitled to
exercise any Powers of Management nor otherwise participate in the
management ofthe Partnership nor the control of its business and affairs.

***
As explained, the above limitations on the charitable gift transferred by petitioners
to CFT are the basis for petitioners' claimed characterization and valuation of the
gift to CFT as an assignee interest in MIL, as distinguished from an MIL
partnership interest~ and (as petitioners themselves contend) they would appear to
constitute substantive and significant limitations.
Such limitations would necessarily make the gifts partial interests, according to Judge Swift, based in part on
Rev. Rul. 81-282, 1981-2 C. B. 78, which disallowed a charitable dedu'ction for corporate stock where the donor
retained the right to vote the stock. Judge Swift's opinion states:
As stated, the retained rights involved in Rev. Rul. 81- 282, 1981-2 C.B. 78, appear
to be analogous to the rights retained by petitioners herein. By providing in the
MIL partnership agreement limitations on transfers of MIL partnership interests
and by transferring to CFT only an assignee interest in MIL, petitioners retained
the voting and the other rights in the MIL limited partnership associated with the
assignee interest transferred to charity. Because the rights retained by petitioners
with regard to their MIL limited partnership interest would be treated as substantial,
under section 170(f)(3)(B)(ii) the portion thereoftransferred to CPT would appear
not to qualify as an undivided portion ofpetitioners' entire MIL limited partnership
interest.
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I would reiterate that it is the perceived substantial significance of petitioners'
retained rights on which petitioners themselves, petitioners' valuation experts, and
the majority opinion rely to justify assignee status and increased valuation
discounts for the gifted interest.
It would appear that for the above analysis not to apply to the gift involved in the
instant case, petitioners' MIL limited partnership interest would have to be
interpreted as consisting oftwo separate and distinct interests (an economic interest
and a noneconomic interest) with petitioners transferring to CFT an undivided
portion of the separate economic interest
I submit that the correct interpretation would be to treat petitioners' MIL limited
partnership interest as one interest consisting of both economic and noneconomic
rights, with petitioners having transferred to CFT only their economic rights
therein. Under this interpretation, it would appear that petitioners should be
regarded as having made a charitable gift to CFT of a partial interest in their MIL
limited partnership interest, which charitable gift would be subject to the gift tax
disallowance provision of section 2522(c)(2).

8.

An Effective Clause?
Consider a transfer to charity had been made in trust pursuant to a clause similar to the following:
Upon receipt of assets by gift in 2003, Trustee will allocate the frrst $
_
to the trust administered by Article _ and will allocate any additional assets to the
WORTHY CHARITY, INC., to be added to the Mr. and Mrs. Donor fund created
thereunder (or, if such organization is not in existence or is not described in
sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a) ofthe Internal Revenue Code,
at such time to another organization which is so described selected by Trustee
within 60 days of such allocation). The allocation will be made as a fractional
share of all assets added to the Trust by gift and Trustee may make a preliminary
allocation with subsequent adjustment ifdesirable. In calculating the amount to be
allocated hereunder, Trustee will determine fair market value in such manner as it
would be determined for federal gift tax purposes whether or not such tax applies.

May Judge Swift's objections above be met by providing the partnership agreement that all partners will be
deemed to consent to any allocation to charity required under the provisions of the trust, as well as to the transfers to
the trust itself? The answer would seem to be yes.

9.

Family Value Versus Charitable Value
An interesting question is the effect of attacks on family limited partnerships on the clause. For

instance, if the law turned out to be that no discounts were allowed for gifts of limited partnership interests holding
marketable securities to family members, but discounts remained in place for gifts to others - charities, for instance what is the effect on the trust discussed at the beginning of this section? Presumably the IRS would take the position
that the units had an undiscounted value for purposes of allocation to the fund for the descendants. Does that
automatically mean that more is allocated to charity? The answer could be no ifthe valuation ofthe units under normal
state law valuation principles is unchanged. Stated differently, if values increase because appraisals are wrong or state
law rights are misunderstood the clause may work, but if values increase simply because the IRS disregards the
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partnership (under a Murphy theory for instance) or because section 2703 or section 2704 alter the valuation in a limited
context - family transfers - the clause may not work.
May the clause be drafted so that it "ties in" to value as finally determined for federal gift tax purposes
including Chapter 14 and Murphy type arguments? Arguably yes but that would seem to increase the ability of the IRS
to argue that in fact the clause was nothing more than a mechanism to avoid gift tax.
May the clause be drafted in reverse? To illustrate, assume $2,100,000 of marketable securities in a limited
partnership with 9900 limited units, representing 99% of the partnership units, given to a trust. The trust provides that
the first $10,000 worth of units will be allocated to charity and the next $1,250,000 to a fund for descendants, and
amounts beyond that to charity again. Is it possible for the IRS to claim that units have one value on the front and back
ends and a different value in the middle?
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2002-2003
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS

SUPPLEMENT

TURNEY P. BERRY
OGDEN NEWELL & WELCH PLLC
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

SUPPLEMENT
2002-2003 Recent Developments of Interest to Estate Planners
A-I. Applicable Date under Section 645 for Decedents Dying Before
December 24,2002. In Notice 2003-33, 2003-23 IRB1, the IRS stated:
The Internal Revenue Service has received several requests
that trusts and estates of decedents dying before December
24, 2002, be permitted to rely on § 1.645-1 (f)(2)(ii) of the
final regulations to determine the applicable date that
terminates the election period. Accordingly, provided that a
Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts,
has not been filed treating the § 645 election period as
terminated, trusts and estates of decedents dying before
December 24, 2002, may rely on § 1.645- 1(f)(2)(ii) of the
final regulations to determine the applicable date.

A-5.

Interest Paid on Specific Bequest. On May 9, 1993, Marvin Schwan

died, leaving a Will which provided that each of his four children would receive
$1,000,000 and set aside $1,500,000 to create a grandchildren's trust. These legacies
were paid on September 21, 19.98. Applicable state law - South Dakota - provided that
legacies not paid within one year of a decedent's death accrued interest at a statutory rate
until paid. At issue in Mark D. Schwan, et.al. v. United States,

_

(S.D. So. Div. 2003) was whether the interest (accrued at 12%) 'was deductible by the
estate for income tax purposes.
The court first looked to section 212. The opinion states:
Here, the Plaintiffs claim that the interest expense incurred
on the legacies was ordinary and necessary to the
administration of the estate. The Plaintiffs argue that the
payment of interest on deferred legacies is a relatively
common occurrence for an estate and thus constitutes an
ordinary expense. The Plaintiffs further contend that the
expense was necessary because the estate was forced to
keep liquid assets and marketable securities in the estate to
cover the unresolved issues regarding estate tax liability
and other litigation involving in estate assets, namely the
children's litigation discussed above. The Plaintiffs claim
that preserving estate assets was necessary for proper
administration of the estate.

The Court finds the Plaintiffs argument unpersuasive.
Under the facts presented, it was unnecessary for the estate
to incur the interest charges at issue. As stated above, the
terms of both the will and the trust directed that the estate
taxes be paid out of trust, not probate, assets. The trust
would have had more than sufficient assets to pay the
liabilities of the estate if the trustees had not transferred all
of the Schwan stock to the Foundation seven months after
Marvin Schwan's death. The Plaintiffs contend that the
transfer to the Foundation was done in accordance with the
redemption agreement which directed that such securities
be transferred to the Foundation "upon the death of
Schwan." See Redemption and Repurchase Agreement,
Article 1, paragraph 5. Again, the Court cannot agree with
the Plaintiffs' argument.
Under both Minnesota and South Dakota law, agreements
that pertain to the same transaction that the [sic] are
executed within the same time frame and involve the same
parties are to be construed together. See Simitar
Entertainment, Inc. v. Silva Entertainment, 44 F.Supp.2d
986,994 (D. Minn. 1999); Anderson v. Kammeier, 262
N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. 1978); Janssen v. Tusha, 287
N.W. 501, 505 (S.D. 1939). Applying this principle to the
will, trust agreement, and redemption agreement leads to
the inescapable conclusion that it was Marvin Schwan's
intent that the Foundation be funded only after the other
obligations of his estate had been satisfied. A general
directive in the redemption agreement stating that the stock
was to be transferred to the Foundation "upon the death of
Schwan" cannot override the specific directives of the trust
agreement and the will which both directed that the trust
pay the estate's liabilities, including estate taxes. The trust
agreement itself stated that trust assets should used to
satisfy legacies under the will in the event that the probate
assets were insufficient, indicating Schwan's intent that the
gifts under the will be satisfied prior to the trust assets
being gifted to the Foundation. The trust agreement also
directed that all of the Schwan stock, except that which was
used to satisfy a legacy, gift, or obligation under the will,
be gifted to the Foundation. This statement clearly
envisions that the obligations under the will would be
satisfied prior to the funding of the Foundation. Therefore,
when reading the three documents together, it is clear that
Marvin Schwan's estate plan was drafted so that the
Foundation would be funded last, and those administering

his estate chose to frustrate that intent and fund the
Foundation first.
Had the executors followed the dictates of Marvin
Schwan's estate plan, they could have satisfied the legacies
on time and would not have incurred the interest expense.
At the time of his death, Marvin Schwan's probate estate
contained assets totaling $19,018,311.47. The legacies that
the estate failed to fully satisfy until 1998 totaled only $5.5
million. As the Defendant pointed out, the executors made
a $5.1 million estimated estate tax payment out of probate
assets although both the trust agreement and will directed
that the estate taxes were to be paid out of trust assets. If
the Schwan stock had not been transferred to the
Foundation in contravention of Marvin Schwan's estate
plan, the estate would have had sufficient assets to pay the
legacies on time without concern for covering the other
liabilities of the estate. Therefore, it was not necessary for
the estate to incur interest expense on the legacies. Cf.
Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741 (1978)
(disallowing an administrative expense deduction for
federal estate tax purposes where the expense was
unnecessary).
The court also rejected the estate's section 163 argument:
Section 163(a) of the tax code provides that "[t]here shall
be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within
the taxable year on indebtedness." I.R.C. 163(a). This
section, however, is limited by the language of Section
163(h)(1) which states that "no deduction shall be allowed
under this chapter for personal interest paid or accrued
during the taxable year." See I.R.C. 163(h)(I). Subsection
(h) ofI.R.C. 163 defines personal interest in all inclusive
terms as "any interest allowable as a deduction under this
chapter other than -- . . ." and goes on to list a few
exceptions. See I.R.C. 163(h)(2). The exception at issue
here deals with the deductibility of investment interest See
I.R.C. 163(h)(2)(B). Subsection(d)(3)(A)ofI.R.C. 163
defines investment interest as "any interest allowable as a
deduction under this chapter . . . which is paid or accrued

on indebtedness properly allocable to property held for
investment." Id.
The Plaintiffs contend that the interest paid on the deferred
legacies is deductible under I.R.C. Section 163 as
investment interest. The Plaintiffs assert that absent
liquidating the investment assets of the estate, the legacies
could not be satisfied. Therefore, the executors chose to
incur the interest expense under South Dakota law on the
deferred legacies rather than liquidate the
income-producing assets of the estate to satisfy the
legacies. The Plaintiffs argue that since the interest expense
was incurred to maintain investment property, it is properly
allocable to property held for investment and qualifies as
deductible investment interest. The Court cannot agree.
As the Court has previously found, during the tax year in
question, 1996, the estate did not own any Schwan stock.
Therefore, maintaining the Schwan stock as an investment
cannot serve as a reason for the estate to incur the interest
expense at issue. Absent the Schwan stock, however, the
estate still had other assets producing significant income.
During the year in question, the probate estate earned
$480,717.59 in interest on municipal bonds, treasury bills
and notes, and a money market account. The probate estate
also earned $.106,391.04 in dividends on American
Municipal Term stock. Therefore, the estate did earn
substantial income on investment, and at least part of that
income was earned because the executors chose not to pay
the $5.5 million in legacies but rather retain those assets in
the estate. It would be absurd, however, to conclude that
such a scenario allowed for an interest expense deduction
on the interest incurred on the deferred legacies.
First, the legacies are not properly characterized as
"indebtedness" in this instance. The legacies do constitute
obligations of the estate, but they were not incurred by the
estate as debts. They were not incurred by the execution in
managing and operating the estate nor were they debts of
the testator. Rather, they were created by the testator to
devise his property upon his death. Furthermore, the job of
the executors of the estate was not to retain the estate assets
so that the assets would produce investment income, but
rather to dispose of the assets in accordance with the
decedent's estate plan. Here, Marvin Schwan will's directed
that $1 million be paid to each of his four children and $1.5

million be placed in to a trust for his grandchildren. Rather
than comply with his wishes, the executors of the estate
held the property in the estate and incurred substantial
interest expense at a rate of 12% to the legatees under
South Dakota law. Under these circumstances. the interest
incurred on the deferred legacies cannot be characterized as
interest paid "on indebtedness properly allocable to
property held for investment."
Second, the Plaintiffs have made no effort to trace the
interest expense at issue to a debt which was created in
connection with maintaining investment property. Section
1.162-8T of the Treasury Regulations establishes the rules
for allocating interest expense among expenditures. The
regulation Provides that" [i]n general, interest expense on a
debt is allocated in the same manner as the debt to which
such interest expense relates is allocated. Debt is allocated
by tracing disbursements of the debt proceeds to specific
expenditures." See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(3). In the
case of investment interest, the interest expense allocated to
an investment expenditure is treated as investment interest.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.163(a)(4)(C). The regulation defines
investment expenditure as "an expenditure (other than
passive activity expenditure) properly chargeable to capital
account with respect to property held for investment ... or
"an expenditure in connection with the holding of such
property." See Treas, Reg. § 1.163(b)(3). Here, there is no
investment expenditure and no debt proceeds to trace.
The legacies, upon which the interest at issue was incurred,
did not arise in connection with the acquisition or
maintenance of property held for investment purposes. This
is not a situation in which the estate incurred a debt such as
a loan to maintain investment property already in the estate.
Here, the purported debt at issue was not incurred as an
expenditure of the estate but rather was created as on
obligation of the estate by the testator in the form of a
legacy. As such it has no connection to property held for
investment and a deduction under I.R.C. § 163 is
inappropriate.
KRS 394.520 provides that specific bequests bear interest if not paid when due, or
if no due date is provided, if not paid within one year after probate of the Will.

With respect to a spouse's elective share that is paid "late", Treas. Reg. §
1.663(c)-5, Example 7 states:
(i) Facts. Testator, who dies in 2000, is survived by a
Spouse and three adult children. Testator's will divides the
residue of the estate equally among the three children. The
surviving spouse files an election under the applicable
state's elective share statute. Under this statute, a surviving
spouse is entitled to one-third of the decedent's estate after
the payment of debts and expenses. The statute also
provides that the surviving spouse is not entitled to any of
the estate's income and does not participate in appreciation
or depreciation of the estate's assets. However, under the
statute, the surviving spouse is entitled to interest on the
elective share from the date of the court order directing the
payment until the executor actually makes payment.
During the estate's 2001 taxable year, the estate distributes
to the surviving spouse $5,000,000 in partial satisfaction of
the elective share and pays $200,000 of interest on the
delayed payment of the elective share. During that year,
the estate receives dividend income of $3,000,000 and pays
expenses of $60,000 that are deductible on the estate's
federal income tax return.
(ii) Conclusion. The estate has four separate shares
consisting of the surviving spouse's elective share and each
of the three children's residuary bequests. Because the
surviving spouse is not entitled to any estate income under
state law, none of the estate's gross income is allocated to
the spouse's separate share for purposes of determining that
share's distributable net income. Therefore, with respect to
the $5,000,000 distribution, the estate is allowed no
deduction under section 661, and no amount is included in
the spouse's gross income under section 662. The
$200,000 of interest paid to the spouse must be included in
the spouse's gross income under section 61. Because no
distributions were made to any other beneficiaries during
the year, there is no need to compute the distributable net
income of the other three separate shares. Thus, the taxable
income of the estate for the 2000 taxable year is $2,939,400
($3,000,000 (dividend income) minus $60,000 (expenses)

and $600 (personal exemption)). The estate's $200,000
interest payment is a nondeductible personal interest
expense described in section 163(h).

Tax-Free Division of Family Farm. In Rev. Rul. 2003-52, 2003-22
IRBI the IRS approved a tax-free division of a farm corporation on the following facts:
Corporation X is a domestic corporation that has been
engaged in the farming business for more than five years.
The stock of X is owned 25 percent each by Father, age 68,
Mother, age 67, Son, and Daughter. Although Father and
Mother participate in some major management decisions,
most of the management and all of the operational activities
are performed by Son, Daughter, and several farmhands.
The farm operation consists of breeding and raising
livestock and growing g~ain.
A-6.

Son and Daughter disagree over the appropriate future
direction of X's farming business. Son wishes to expand the
livestock business, but Daughter is opposed because this
would require substantial borrowing by X. Daughter would
prefer to sell the livestock business and concentrate on the
grain business. Despite the disagreement, the two siblings
have cooperated on the operation of the farm in its
historical manner without disruption. Nevertheless, it has
prevented each sibling from developing, as he or she sees
fit, the business in which he or she is most interested.
Having transferred most of the responsibility for running
the farm to the children, Father and Mother remain neutral
on the disagreement between their children. However,
because of the disagreement, Father and Mother would
prefer to bequeath separate interests in the farm business to
their children.
For reasons unrelated to X's farm business, Son and
Daughter's husband dislike each other. Although this has
not impaired the farm's operation to date, Father and
Mother believe that requiring Son and Daughter to run a
single business together is likely to cause family discord
over the long run.
To enable Son and Daughter each to devote his or her
undivided attention to, and apply a consistent business
strategy to, the farming business in which he or she is most
interested, to further the estate planning goals of Father and

Mother, and to promote family harmony, X transfers the
livestock business to newly formed, wholly owned
domestic corporation Y and distributes 50 percent of the Y
stock to Son in exchange for all of his stock in X. X
distributes the remaining Y stock equally to Father and
Mother in exchange for half of their X stock. Going
forward, Daughter will manage and operate X and have no
stock interest in Y, and Son will manage and operate Y and
have no stock interest in X. Father and Mother will also
amend their wills to provide that Son and Daughter will
inherit stock only in Y and X, respectively. After the
distribution, Father and Mother will still each own 25
percent of the outstanding stock of X and Y and will
continue to participate in some major management
decisions related to the business of each corporation.
Apart from the issue of whether the business purpose
requirement of §1.355-2(b) is satisfied, the distribution
meets all of the requirements of §§ 368(a)(I)(D) and 355 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
The ruling concludes:
The disagreement of Son and Daughter over the farm's
future direction has prevented each sibling from
developing, as he or she sees fit, the business in which he
or she is most interested. The distribution will eliminate
this disagreement and allow each sibling to devote his or
her undivided attention to, and apply a consistent business
strategy to, the farming business in which he or she is most
interested, with the expectation that each business will
benefit. Therefore, although the distribution is intended, in
part, to further the personal estate planning of Father and
Mother and to promote family harmony, it is motivated in
substantial part by a real and substantial non-Federal tax
purpose that is germane to the business of X. Hence, the
business purpose requirement of §1.355-2(b) is satisfied.

A-7. Investment Advice Fees. In J.H. Scott v. United States,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (4th Cir. 2003) the court followed Mellon Bank, N.A., v. United
States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir.2001), and explicitly disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's

holding in O'Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), to subject a trust's
deductions for outside investment advice fees to the 2% limitation of section 67(a). The
opinion states:
In reach our decision today, we find ourselves in agreement
with the Federal Circuit's reasoning in Mellon Bank, and
we thus render a decision at odds with the Sixth Circuit's
holding in O'Neill. In O'Neill, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that "[w]here a trustee lacks experience in investment
matters, professional assistance may be warranted." 994
F.2d at 304. According to the court, without investment
advice, "the co-trustees would have put at risk the assets of
the Trust. Thus, the investment advisory fees were
necessary to the continued growth of the Trust and were
caused by the fiduciary duties of the cotrustees." Id. In our
judgment, this analysis contains a fatal flaw. Of course,
trustees often (and pethaps must) seek outside investment
advice. But the second requirement of § 67(e)(1) does not
ask whether costs are commonly incurred in the
administration of trusts. Instead, it asks whether costs are
commonly incurred outside the administration of trusts. As
the Federal Circuit decided in Mellon Bank,
investment-advice fees are commonly incurred outside the
administration of trusts, and they are therefore subject to
the 2% floor established by § 67(a).

B-5.

Qualified Appreciated Stock. In PLRs 200322005 and 200322018 the

IRS determined that American Depository Shares (ADS) are qualified appreciated stock
under section 170(e)(5)(B). The rulings state:
We further conclude that Company 1 ADSs are stock for
purposes of § 170(e)(5). An ADS is issued by a u.S.
depository bank and represents an interest in the underlying
ordinary shares ofa non-U.S. company. An ADS is
evidenced by an American Depository Receipt (an ADR).
An ADR is a negotiable receipt issued in certificate form
representing an ADS. The holder of an ADR is entitled to
demand delivery of the underlying shares. Each Company 1
ADS represents one ordinary share of Company 1. The
Company 1 ADSs are the equivalent of an ADR pursuant to

the Merger agreement, which states that direct holders of
Company 1 ADSs whose ownership is registered on the
books of the depository are Company 1 ADR holders. The
Service has interpreted ADRs to be treated as shares of
stock for various tax purposes, such as the foreign tax
credit, Rev. Rul. 65- 218, 1965-2 C.B. 566, and the interest
equalization tax, Rev. Rul. 72-271, 1972-1 C.B. 369.
Therefore, for purposes of § 170(e)(5), Company 1 ADSs
are stock for which market quotations are readily available
on an established securities market.
The Taxpayers represent that the Taxpayers have taken
steps to ensure that the Donees will be able to sell the
contributed ADSs in compliance with Rule 145. The
Taxpayers also represent that the aggregate contributions of
the Donees will be limited such that the total number of
Company 1 ADSs contributed by the Taxpayers to the
Donees (including any ADSs already held by the Donees)
will be substantially less than 1% of the shares outstanding
of Company 1 as shown by the most recent report or
statement published by Company 1. The taxpayers also
represent that contributions will be made to the Donees
only at such times when, to the best of their knowledge,
there will not be any proposed recapitalization, tender or
exchange offer, stock repurchase program or similar plan
that would have the effect of substantially reducing the
number of outstanding shares of Company 1 within the
3-month period following the contribution. The Taxpayers
represent that the Taxpayers will, prior to the proposed
contribution, provide a statement to the Donees that the
requirements of Rule 145 are met for all transfers of the
Company 1 ADSs by the Taxpayers and that the Taxpayers
will not take any steps that will prevent the Donees from
making transfers of Company 1 ADSs free of any Rule 145
resale restrictions.
The Taxpayers also represent that, under the Governance
Agreement, the Family Shareholders may contribute
Company 1 ADSs to the Donees without restriction and
that such contributed Company 1 ADSs may be sold by the
Donees without restriction.

Closely-Held Company Stock. At issue in Estate of Helen A. Deputy v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-176, was the value of 99% of a family owned
F-4.

corporation, Godfrey Conveyor Co., Inc., owned by a family partnership. The Tax Court
accepted the opinion of the government expert (Mr. Bums) that the income approach
was the best valuation approach for a "long-established, financially successful, closelyheld operating company that has shown consistent profit and· growth."
With respect to discounts, the opinion states:
Respondent's expert, Mr. Bums, concluded that no minority
discount should be used to compute decedent's interest in
the property. He reached that conclusion on the basis of his
expedient logic that the exclusive use of capitalized
earnings and the income method in the valuation would
result in treating all interests in the entity equally. In other
words, he concluded that minority interests would receive
the same percentage return on their investment as a
majority interest. Mr. Bums did, however, employ a
25-percent marketability discount. To compute the
discounted value, Mr. Burns began with his $30,740,869
income method valuation of Godfrey and calculated that a
19.99-percent interest resulted in an undiscounted value of
$6,145,100. After applying a 25-percent marketability
discount of$1,536,275, he arrived at his discounted fair
market value of $4,608,825.
Mr. Bums relied on two different studies that surveyed
restricted stock transactions of otherwise publicly traded
stock. Based on those studies and his analysis, Mr. Burns
concluded that a 25-percent marketability discount was
appropriate for the 19.99- percent interest in Godfrey. One
study, which was conducted by FAIR MARKET VALDE
Opinions, Inc., surveyed restricted stock transactions from
1979 through 1992·and resulted in a mean discount of23
percent. A second study, conducted by Management
Planning, Inc. (MPI), with respect to restricted stock
transactions occurring from 1980 through 1995,:resulted in
an average discount of 19.4 percent for companies with
revenues ranging from $50 million to $100 million. In the
MPI study, the share prices paid in private placements of
restricted stock were compared with the same company's
freely traded market price. After considering those studies,
Mr. Bums arrived at a 25- percent discount to account for
"the fact that an interest in Godfrey * * * would likely not
be able to be sold immediately."
The estate's expert, Mr. Dorman, reached the conclusion
that the 19.99-percent interest in Godfrey should be
discounted by 44 percent to account for the minority

interest and marketability limitations. He calculated a
discounted value of$I,941,000 by dividing his
$17,341,379 adjusted net asset value by 938 (the number of
Godfrey shares outstanding) to arrive at an
$18,488-per-share value. He then multiplied the per-share
value by 187.5 (the number of shares being valued) to
arrive at an undiscounted value of $3,466,427. By applying
the 44-percent discount ($1,525,228) for lack of
marketability and the minority interest, Mr. Dorman arrived
at a discounted value of$I,941,199, which he rounded to
$1,941,000.
Mr. Dorman's combined 44-percent minority interest and
lack of marketability discount was derived by use of a
matrix table devised by his company. The table is divided
into six rating factors, which Mr. Dorman believes
"replicate an investor's decision process." The table has
values (amounts of percentage discount) assigned to each
of five categories (descending from good to poor) for each
of the six factors. The matrix also has built-in indexing to
place more emphasis on some categories over others. For
purposes of our analysis and clarification, we replicate the
table used by Mr. Dorman with the final column showing
the percentage discount he assigned with respect to the
19.99-percent interest in Godfrey:

***
The first category of the matrix rates the subject's financial
information availability and reliability with a range from
one discount point for the best to five discount points for
the poorest condition. Mr. Dorman selected an
above-average 2-percent rating, noting that Godfrey had
available financial statements that were audited by
independent public accounts. It is enigmatic that Mr.
Dorman would assign a less than favorable rating under
these circumstances. Moreover, there is no reason provided
as to why any discount should be attributable here, where
the subject has ample and quality financial information
available. Accordingly, we do not attribute any discount to
this factor.
The scale provided to rate investment size is an arithmetic
progression by 2, starting with one and proceeding to eight
discount points. Mr. Dorman explains that this adjustment
is made to reflect the premise that the larger the necessary

capital investment, the less likely a buyer would be willing
to place it at risk. Because Mr. Dorman reached a
$3,466,000 undiscounted value for the 187.5 shares in
Godfrey, he considered the investment quite large and
therefore assigned six discount points to this aspect. We
view this aspect as one of the considerations associated
with the risk factor in investing in a minority interest in a
closely held family corporation. It would be reasonable to
assess six discount points for this factor.
The third category concerns Godfrey's financial outlook,
management, and growth potential, and the scale is another
arithmetic progression by 2. However, it starts with 2 and
proceeds to 10 discount points. Here Mr. Dorman indicates
that Godfrey has had some sales fluctuation, but that
operating expenses have shown continuous and steady
decline, and that the short-term financial information
indicates an improving trend. The record here reflects a
much more positive picture of Godfrey's financial record
and prospects. Accordingly, we consider Mr. Dorman's
evaluation to be too conservative.
From another perspective, the financial outlook category
should ostensibly be addressing the potential for return on
invested capital. In that regard, the sixth category of the
matrix more directly addresses that aspect and assigns as
much as 14 discount points for that aspect. The third
category appears, in that respect, to be a·duplication. Mr.
Dorman has given an "above average" rating, assigning 4
discount points to the third category. In any event,
Godfrey's financial picture is such that we would assign no
discount for that aspect.
Ability to control is the fourth category, and Mr. Dorman
assigns a median discount of lOin an arithmetic
progression by 5, ranging from 0 to 20. His reasoning is
that the 187.5 shares "represents 20 percent of the
outstanding common stock, and is therefore the second
largest holding out of approximately .twenty shareholders."
He concludes that the investor would not have control but
"would enjoy swing power, and have a strong voice in the
day-to-day operations and decision making of the
company." We agree with Mr. Dorman's use of 10 discount
points for lack of ability to control.

In the fifth category, which concerns restrictions on transfer
and anticipated holding period, Mr. Dorman selected a
median 8 discount points in an arithmetic progression by 3,
ranging from 2 to 14. His conclusion is based on a holding
period of 5 years or more. Mr. Dorman stated that "To the
best of * * * [his] knowledge at the present time, there is no
likelihood that Godfrey * * * will be sold within the
foreseeable future." We agree that there would be
restrictions and possible delay in a sale of an interest in a
family-owned entity as opposed to a publicly traded stock.
The record before us, however, does not reflect that the
holding period would be extended for 5 years or more, or
that there are any particular difficulties in connection with
the Deputy family. Accordingly, five discount points would
be more appropriate to reflect the restriction situation in
these cases.
Finally, the sixth category, which addresses dividend
payout history, seems to address the return on capital
factor. In this category, Mr. Dorman selected the poorest
rating of 14 discount points from an arithmetic progression
by 3, ranging from 2 to 14. His reason for the rating is that
Godfrey has not paid any dividends and it is unlikely that
any will be paid in the future. However, the actual payment
of dividends is not the sole measure. The potential to pay
dividends must also be considered. A return may also be
expected in the form of increase in the value of the
investment or potential for capital gain. In other words,
prospective earning power is important. See sec.
20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs.; Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1
C.B.237.
Mr. Dorman's analysis completely ignores any potential for
gain due to increase in value. Godfrey's financial
performance and future prospects would likely result in an
increase in the investment value. The lack of dividends,
when factored with the prospect of capital appreciation,
would place Godfrey's return potential more in the middle
range. Accordingly, 8 discount points would seem a better
match than the 14 discount points attributed by Mr.
Dorman to this aspect.
Using the matrix as a guide, we would have arrived at a
sum of 29 percent after considering the six factors.
Factoring in the studies cited in the reports of the experts,

considering the record in these cases, and recognizing the
imprecise nature of the process in which we are engaged,
we hold that a 30-percent discount is appropriate to reflect
the lack of marketability and minority discounts connected
with the 187.5 shares of Godfrey. Accordingly, we hold
that the 187.5 shares of Godfrey had a discounted value of
$3,358,20912 on September 15, 1997, the date of
decedent's death.
Counsel for the taxpayer stated to this writer that, "We were pleased with the
outcome in Deputy. The IRS expert was very good. The FLP discounts agreed to were
35% for the lifetime gifts and 30% for the estate. The estate included a .5% general
partnership interest and a 75% limited partnership interest. The notice of deficiency
included a Section 2036 argument which was abandoned before trial."

K-l.

Additional Split-Dollar Guidance. On May 8, 2003, the IRS issued

supplementary proposed regulations dealing with the valuation of economic benefits
under equity split-dollar arrangements. REG - 164754-01. The Explanation of Provision
and Summary of Comments states:
These proposed regulations provide that in the case of an
equity split-dollar life insurance arrangement, the value of
the economic benefits provided to the non-owner under the
arrangement for a taxable year equals the cost of any
current life insurance protection provided to the
non-owner, the amount of policy cash value to which the
non- owner has current access (to the extent that such
amount was not actually taken into account for a prior
taxable year), and the value of any other economic benefits
provided to the non-owner (to the extent not actually taken
into account for a prior taxable year). The terms owner and
non-owner are defined in Sec. 1.61-22(c)(1) and (2) of the
2002 proposed regulations.
b. Current Access to Policy Cash Value
Generally, under an equity split-dollar life insurance
arrangement governed by the economic benefit regime, the
owner of the life insurance contract pays policy premiums,
thereby establishing a pool of assets with respect to which
the non-owner has certain rights under the arrangement
(for example, rights of withdrawal, borrowing, surrender,
or assignment). Additionally, the pool of assets is held by a

third party, the life insurance company, effectively placing
the cash value beyond the reach of the employer or the
employer's general creditors in many cases. Thus, an
equity split-dollar life insurance arrangement confers on
the non-owner rights to direct or indirect economic
enjoyment of policy cash value, making current taxation of
the non-owner's interest in the cash value appropriate
under the doctrines of constructive receipt, economic
benefit,. and cash equivalence.
These proposed regulations provide that the non-owner has
current access to any portion of the policy cash value that
is directly or indirectly accessible by the non-owner,
inaccessible to the owner, or inaccessible to the owner's
general creditors. For this purpose, "access" is to be
construed broadly and includes any direct or indirect right
under the arrangement of the non-owner to obtain, use, or
realize potential economic value from the policy cash
value. Thus, for example, a non-owner has current access
to policy cash value if the non-owner can directly or
indirectly make a withdrawal from the policy, borrow from
the policy, or effect a total or partial surrender of the
policy. Similarly, for example, the non-owner has current
access if the non-owner can anticipate, assign (either at
law or in equity), alienate, pledge, or encumber the policy
cash value or if the policy cash value is available to the
non-owner's creditors by attachment, garnishment, levy,
execution, or other legal or equitable process. Policy cash
value is inaccessible to the owner if the owner does not
have the full rights to policy cash value normally held by
an owner of a life insurance contract. Policy cash value is
inaccessible to the owner's general creditors if, under the
terms of the split-dollar life insurance arrangement or by
operation of law or any contractual undertaking, the
creditors cannot, for any reason, effectively reach the full
policy cash value in the event of the owner's insolvency.
In a typical equity split-dollar life insurance arrangement,
the non-owner has current access to all portions of the
policy cash value in excess of the amount payable to the
owner. In many arrangements, the non-owner may also
have current access to the portion of the cash value
payable to the owner if, for example, that portion of the
policy cash value is for any reason not accessible to the
owner or the owner's general creditors.

Under these proposed regulations, policy cash value is
determined without regard to surrender charges or other
similar charges or reductions. To provide uniformity,
certainty, and administrative ease, policy cash value
generally is determined on the last day of the non- owner's
taxable year. In addition, solely for purposes of
employment tax (as defined in Sec. 1.61-22(c)(5) of the
2002 proposed regulations) and the penalty for failure to
pay estimated income taxes, the portion of the policy cash
. value that is treated as provided by the owner to the
non-owner during the non-owner's taxable year is treated
as so provided on the last day of that taxable year. The IRS
and the Treasury Department request comments regarding
circumstances in which it might be appropriate to use a
different date for employment tax withholding purposes.

***
c. Current Term Life Insurance Protection
These proposed regulations provide that, in,the case of an
equity split-dollar life insurance arrangement governed by
the economic benefit regime, the value of the economic
benefits provided to a non- owner for a taxable year also
includes the cost of current life insurance protection
provided to the non-owner. The cost of current life
insurance protection provided to the non-owner in any year
equals the amount of the current life insurance protection
provided to the non-owner multiplied by the life insurance
premium factor designated or permitted in guidance
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. The amount of
the current life insurance protection (including paid-up
additions thereto) provided to the non-owner for a taxable
year equals the excess of the average death benefit of the
life insurance contract over the sum of the total amount
payable to the owner (including any outstanding policy
loans that offset amounts otherwise payable to the owner)
under the split-dollar life insurance arrangement and the
portion of the policy cash value actually taken into account
for the current taxable year or for any prior taxable year.

This subtraction of the portion of the policy cash value
actually taken into account by the non-owner prevents the
non-owner from being taxed twice on the same amount,
once as part of the policy cash value to which the
non-owner has current access and again as an amount
provided to the non-owner in the form of death benefit
protection.
These proposed regulations apply to life insurance arrangements entered into after
the date of the final regulations.
The Association for Advanced Life Underwriters (AALU) issued Bulletin 03-51
on May 13, 2003 stating:
In December 2002 and January 2003, AALU and NAIFA
presented a proposal on the valuation of such benefits to
Treasury. Under that proposal, prior to the date on which
cash is accessed by the nonowner or the life insurance
contract is transferred (i.e., "rolled out") to the nonowner,
the value of the economic benefit of the equity portion of
the arrangement would be measured by reference to the
value of the death benefit protection provided by that
equity. (See our Bulletin No. 03-05). AALU and NAIFA
also urged that accessed cash be taxed to the
nonowner/employee in an amount measured by the
difference between the cash received by the nonowner and
the total economic benefit amount previously paid or taken
into account as income by him or her with respect to the
equity and nonequity portions of the arrangement. Finally,
AALU and NAIFA took the position that the nonowner of a
contract should receive basis for all economic benefit
amounts paid or taken into account as income with respect
to the equity and nonequity portions of the arrangement.

Disposition For Section 2519 Purposes is a Net Gift. See also PLR
200319002 (widow's sale and transfer of marital trust interest or net gift).
M-3.

M-5.

Supplemental QTIP Election. In PLR 200323010 the IRS allowed an

estate to file a supplemental estate tax return to correct the amount shown on Schedule M.
The ruling states:
In the instant case, a QTIP election under §
2056(b)(7)(B)(v) was made on Decedent's timely filed
estate tax return. The property for which the election was
made was described as the "Residue of Decedent's interest
in the [Family Trust]." The residue of Decedent's interest in
the Family Trust consisted of the assets remaining in the
Husband's Separate Property Trust after the distribution of
the specific pecuniary bequests plus Decedent's one- half
share of the assets of the Community Property Trust.
However, under Sections 3.03 and 3.04 of the Family Trust
Declaration, these assets were to be distributed to Trust B,
which was to be funded with the "Marital Deduction
Amount," and Trust C, which was to be funded with the
"Exemption Equivalent Amount." Therefore, the QTIP
election was made for both the QTIP trust and the credit
shelter trust. Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2001-38, the QTIP
election with respect to Trust C, the credit shelter trust, will
be treated as a nullity for federal estate, gift, and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. However, since
Trust B meets the requirements for qualified terminable
interest property and the election under § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v)
was made on a timely filed estate tax return, the QTIP
election for the property passing to Trust B, the marital
trust, is valid and irrevocable.
As a result of a miscalculation, the value of the property
which passed to Trust B under the provisions of Section
3.03 of the Family Trust Declaration was reported
incorrectly on Schedule M of Decedent's estate tax return.
As a result of this miscalculation, the marital deduction
claimed for Trust B was less than the amount that should
have been claimed, resulting in an estate tax liability.
Based on the facts submitted and the representations made,
we conclude that the description of the QTIP property on
Schedule M does not invalidate the QTIP election for the
property passing to Trust B pursuant to Section 3.03 of the
Family Trust Declaration. Similarly, we conclude that the
miscalculation of the value of the property passing to Trust
B under the provisions of Section 3.03 does not preclude a
marital deduction for the full value of the property which
will actually fund Trust B under the terms of the governing
instrument.

Accordingly, the personal representative of Decedent's
estate should file a supplemental Form 706 with the
Internal Revenue Service Center, Cincinnati, Ohio 45999,
prior to the time prescribed by § 6511 for claiming a credit
or refund. The supplemental Form 706 should supply the
correct description of the trust for which the QTIP election
was made and report the full value of the property subject
to the QTIP election. A copy of this letter should be
attached to the supplemental return. A copy is enclosed for
that purpose.

R-l.

Use of Single-Member LLCs. In PLR 200321006 the IRS determined

that single member LLCs, or disregarded entities, had no effect on a section 6166
election. The ruling states:
Decedent died on Date 1, a resident of State X. Decedent's
gross estate consisted primarily of a sole proprietorship.
The sole proprietorship was engaged in direct farming
operations of various crops on Y acres of land owned
and/or leased by Decedent. In addition, the sole
proprietorship was engaged in storage and processing
functions with respect to those crops. Up until his death,
Decedent was actively involved in all aspects of the
farming, storage, and processing operations. The interest in
the sole proprietorship included in Decedent's gross estate
qualified as an interest in a closely held business within the
meaning of section 6166(b)(1). As a result, the personal
representative of Decedent's estate elected under section
6166 to pay the portion of estate tax attributable to the
value of Decedent's interest in the sole proprietorship in
installments. Decedent's estate timely filed Form 706,
United States Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer)
Tax Return on Date 2 and included a section 6166 election.
Pursuant to the terms of Decedent's will, the majority of
Decedent's assets were distributable to a residuary trust
with three primary beneficiaries, A, B, and C. A and B are
sons of Decedent. While C was raised by Decedent and
changed his last name to that of Decedent's, C is not a
blood relative of Decedent. Decedent's will expressed the
intent that the beneficiaries continue the farming
operations.

D cedent's will authorized the trust to lease portions or all
o the Y acres of land to the trust beneficiaries, provided
th t the beneficiaries personally operate the farm.
D cedent's will further provided that in the event the trust
b neficiaries, individually or any combination of them, are
th sole owners of a farming entity, a lease to such entity is
a thorized. In accordance with these terms, Decedent's
es ate has entered into cash leases under which it has leased
ce ain of the Y acres of farmland to LLC 1 and LLC 2.
T e leases are based on a fixed cash price per acre. LLC 1
d LLC 2 were formed for the purpose of conducting
D cedent's farming operations.
L C 1 is a limited liability company formed under State X
la with A as its sole owner. It is a disregarded entity for
al federal tax purposes and its activities are treated in the
s e manner as a sole proprietorship of A. See Treas. Reg.
§ OI.7701-2(a). Similarly, LLC 2 is a limited liability
c mpanyformed under State X law with C as its sole
o ere Consequently, LLC 2 is treated as a sole
pr prietorship of C for federal tax purposes.

***

I

I

Tl)e change in this case, from operating the farm operations
asia sole proprietorship to entering into cash leases with
LI!,C 1 and LLC 2, owned and operated by A and C

re~pectively, does not materially alter the business. LLC 1
LLC 2 are disregarded entities for all federal tax
poses and their activities are treated in the same manner
as sole proprietorships of A and C, respectively. LLC 1 and
L C 2 continue the farming operations in the manner
prl viously performed by Decedent. Given LLC 1's status as
a isregarded entity for all federal tax purposes and LLC
1' close relationship to A, leasing the land to LLC 1 should
bel viewed as leasing the land to A. In substance, LLC 1 is
m1rely a trade name by which A conducts the farming
b~siness.

Similarly, LLC 2 is a trade name by which C

copducts the farming business. Therefore, the lease
I
I

I

I

trfsactions will not result in the acceleration of the estate
t1 installments.
I

N-5. S Ie to Grantor Trust· Docketed Case. On February 10, 2003, Sharon
Karmazin v. Co missioner, No. 2127-03, was filed. At issue is the effectiveness ofa
sale of partnershi interests to a grantor trust. The case does not involve the difficult
income tax issue that may arise if a grantor dies before the note is satisfied.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

2.

FORMATION ISSUES
a.

Section 721 1 Investment Company Rules: Partnerships and LLC's taxed as

partnerships (hereafter collectively referred to as partnerships) can be formed without gain
being realized by the persons contributing appreciated - low basis property like stock or real
estate. This gain can be thought ofas built-in gain, that is the gain that is built-in to property
contributed to a partnership. Unlike the rules for corporations, there is no requirement that
the contributing partners control (own 80%) of the partnership.

However both the

partnership rules and the corporate rules will tax a partner or shareholder on the built-in gain
if the partnership or corporation is an investment company and meets certain other rules.
1.

Section 721 (c) provides that the tax deferred treatment shall not apply to gain

realized on a transfer of property to a partnership which would be treated as an
investment company (within the meaning of section 351) if the partnership were
incorporated.
11.

Gain or loss will be recognized, where property is transferred to an

investment company and the transfer results, directly or indirectly, in diversification
of the transferors' interests.

lAll references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise
noted.
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(a)

A transfer of property will be considered to be a transfer to an

investment company if(i)

The transferee is a regulated investment company, a real estate

investment trust, or a corporation more than 80 percent of the value
of whose assets are held for investment and are readily marketable
stocks or securities, or interests in regulated investment companies or
real estate investment trusts.
(ii)

The determination ofwhether a corporation is an investment

company shall ordinarily be made by reference to the circumstances
in existence immediately after the transfer in question. However,
where circumstances change thereafter pursuant to a plan in existence
at the time of the transfer, this determination shall be made by
reference to the later circumstances.
(iii)

Caution: This test applies throughout the life of the

partnership, not just at the initial contribution. Consequently, when
additional securities are subsequently contributed to an investment
company, the contributions must be tested under section 721. If the
contributions are going to fail, then a new partnership may be
necessary to avoid gain.
(iv)

Stocks and securities will be considered readily marketable if

(and only if) they are part of a class of stock or securities which is
traded on a securities exchange or traded or quoted regularly in the
over-the-counter market. The term "readily marketable stocks or
securities" includes convertible debentures, convertible preferred
stock, warrants, and other stock rights ifthe stock for which they may
be converted or exchanged is readily marketable. Stocks and
securities will be considered to be held for investment unless they are
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
James B. Martin, Jr.
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business, or used in the trade or business of banking, insurance,
brokerage, or a similar trade or business.
1)

stock and securities in subsidiary corporations shall be

disregarded and the parent corporation shall be deemed to
own its ratable share of its subsidiaries' assets. A corporation
shall be considered a subsidiary ifthe parent owns 50 percent
or more of (i) the combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote, or (ii) the total value of shares of all
classes of stock outstanding.
(v)

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 significantly expanded the

coverage of these rules to cause many additional partnerships to be
classified as investment companies. For instance, money among
other things, stocks and other equity interests in a corporation,
evidences of indebtedness, options, forward or futures contracts,
notional principal contracts and derivatives, any foreign currency, any
interest in a real estate investment trust, a common trust fund, a
regulated investment company, a publicly-traded partnership (as
defined in section 7704(b))except to the extent provided in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, and any other asset specified
in regulations prescribed by the Secretary are now treated as stock and
securities making the 80% test much easier to meet. The Secretary
mayprescribe regulations that, under appropriate circumstances, treat
any asset otherwise described as not so listed. Further there are look
through rules where entities hold these assets.
1)

The 1997 tax act is intended to change only the types

of assets considered in the definition of an investment
company in the present Treasury regulations (Treas. Reg. sec.
1.351-1(c)(1)(ii)) and not to override the other provisions of
James B. Martin, Jr.
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those regulations. For example, the bill does not override (1)
the requirement that only assets held for investment are
considered for purpos es of the definition (Treas. reg. sec.
1.351-1(c)(3)), (2) the rule treating the assets of a subsidiary
as owned proportionally by a parent owning 50 percent or
more of its stock (Treas. reg. sec. 1.351-1(c)(4)), (3) the
requirement that the investment company detennination
consider any plan with regard to an entity's assets in existence
at the time oftransfer (Treas. reg. sec. 1.351-1(c)(2)), and (4)
the requirement that a contribution of property to an
investment company result in diversification in order for gain
to be recognized (Treas. reg. sec. 1.351-1(c)(I)(i)).
(b)

A transfer ordinarily results in the diversification of the transferors'

interests if two or more persons transfer nonidentical assets to a corporation
in the exchange. For this purpose, if any transaction involves one or more
transfers of nonidentical assets which, taken in the aggregate, constitute an
insignificant portion of the total value of assets transferred, such transfers
shall be disregarded in detennining whether diversification has occurred. The
rulings have recognized 1% as the accepted number for purposes of what is
insignificant. If there is only one transferor (or two or more transferors of
identical assets) to a newly organized corporation, the transfer will generally
be treated as not resulting in diversification. If a transfer is part of a plan to
achieve diversification without recognition of gain, such as a plan which
contemplates a subsequent transfer, however delayed, ofthe corporate assets
(or of the stock or securities received in the. earlier exchange) to an
investment company in a transaction purporting to qualify for nonrecognition
treatment, the original transfer will be treated as resulting in diversification.
(i)

A transfer of stocks and securities will not be treated as

James B. Martin, Jr.
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resulting in a diversification of the transferors' interests if each
transferor transfers a diversified portfolio of stocks and securities. A
portfolio ofstocks and securities is diversified ifit satisfies the 25 and
50-percent tests of section 368(a)(2)(F)(ii), applying the relevant
provisions of section 368(a)(2)(F). However, Government securities
are included in total assets for purposes ofthe denominator ofthe 25
and 50-percent tests (unless the Government securities are acquired
to meet the 25 and 50-percent tests), but are not treated as securities
of an issuer for purposes of the numerator of the 25 and 50-percent
tests.
(c)

The regulations provide two examples of these rules.
(i)

Example (1). Individuals A, B, and C organize a corporation

with 101 shares of common stock. A and B each transfers to it
$10,000 worth of the only class of stock of corporation X, listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, in exchanges for 50 shares of stock.
C transfers $200 worth ofreadily marketable securities in corporation
Y for one share of stock. In determining whether or not
diversification has occurred, C's participation in the transaction will
be disregarded. There is, therefore, no diversification, and gain or loss
will not be recognized.
(ii)

Example (2). A, together with 50 other transferors, organizes

a corporation with 100 shares of stock. A transfers $10,000 worth of
stock in corporation X, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, in
exchange for 50 shares of stock. Each of the other 50 transferors
transfers $200 worth ofreadily marketable securities in corporations
other than X in exchange for one share of stock. In determining
whether or not diversification has occurred, all transfers will be taken
into account. Therefore, diversification is present, and gain or loss
James B. Martin, Jr.
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will be recognized.
iii.

Practice Examples.
(1)

Husband and Wife. Transfers of spouses frequently raise this issue.

Fortunately, unlimited marital gifts can be used to avoid the diversification
rule.
(2)

Partnerships with Securities and Real Estate. Frequently it is possible

to add real estate to a partnership to avoid the 80% test for an investment
company. However this can have serious complications under section 731 (c),
discussed below.
b.

704(c) Built in Gain Rules.
1.

Section 704(c). For the partner contributing property with a value of $100

and basis of zero, section 704(c) presents some significant complexities to
partnership treatment. Section 704(c) requires that built-in gain to be attributed to
the contributing partner. So for example if the partnership immediately sold the
property for $ 100, section 7 04(c) would require the gain to b e allocated tot he
contributing partner even though the partnership agreement called for equal sharing
of gain. Likewise if the property was depreciable, section 704(c) would require the
depreciation to be allocated to the other partners.
11.

The regulations under section 704(c) allow for the use ofa reasonable method

to cure the difference between the tax basis (zero in the example) and the book value
of the contributed property (100). To figure out this allocation in the case of
depreciable property, you start with book depreciation, ie, depreciation based on fair
market value as opposed to tax basis. In general, the rule for depreciation is tax
follows the book, which means the noncontributing partner is at least entitled to tax
depreciation in an amount equal to the book depreciation. Each asset is supposed to
be separately accounted for and as you can see, this process can become exceedingly
complicated.
(1)

The traditional method is the default method for eliminating the

James B. Martin, Jr.
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tax/book difference and is restricted by a rule that the maximum amount of
gain, deduction, or loss that can be taken into account by the partnership is
the tax computation of that amount. This is the ceiling rule.. Suppose one
partner contributes property with tax basis of 50 (fair market value of 100)
depreciable over 5 years; the maximum depreciation under the ceiling rule is
10. If the other partner puts up 100 for a 50% interest, he or she would be
entitled to 50% of the economic depreciation of 20 times 50% or 10. The
contributing partner would receive no allocation of depreciation because of
the ceiling rule.
(2)

The curative method looks to any other tax items of the partnership

that differ from the allocation of corresponding book items to close the gap
between the book value and tax basis of the contributed property. In the
above example, suppose that the tax basis ofthe contributed property was 30
not 50 so that the tax depreciation was 6 not 10. The noncontributing partner
would still be entitled to economic depreciation of 10 but for the ceiling rule.
Thus the noncontributing partner would need to be allocated other deductions
or the contributing partner would need to b e allocated 0 ther partnership
income to eliminate the tax-book difference.
(3)

The remedial method uses fictional tax items to offset the ceiling rule

problem. The noncontributing partner's basis for depreciation is bifurcated
between a portion that relates to the carryover basis to the extent of the
ceiling rule, and the portion that represents the excess over the ceiling rule.
The remedial method is used when there are not enough tax items under the
curative method. In the curative example, ifthere were no other deductions,
the partnership would use the remedial method. The noncontributing partner
would take the 10 deduction he or she was entitled to and it would be
allocated 6 to carryover basis and 4 to purchased amount, causing the
contributing partner to pay tax on a portion of the built-in gain.
James B. Martin, Jr.
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3.

INCOME TAX ISSUES DURING THE LIFE OF THE PARTNERSHIP.
Generally the family limited partnership will allocate any income pro rata according to the

percentage interests ofthe partners. There is not much risk that the Service would contest such an
allocation.
a.

Family Partnership Rules. With respect to partnerships in which capital is a material

income-producing factor, section 704(e)(1) provides that a person shall be recognized as a
partner for income tax purposes if he owns a capital interest in such a partnership whether
or not such interest is derived by purchase or gift from any other person. If a capital interest
in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor is created by gift,
section 704(e)(2) provides that the distributive share of the donee under the partnership
agreement shall be includible in his gross income, except to the extent that such distributive
share is determined without allowance ofreasonable compensation for services rendered to
the partnership by the donor, and except to the extent that the portion of such distributive
share attributable to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the donor
attributable to the donor's capital.
1.

A donee or purchaser of a capital interest in a partnership is not recognized

as a partner under the principles of section 704(e)(1) unless such interest is acquired
in a bona fide transaction, not a mere sham for tax avoidance or evasion purposes,
and the donee or purchaser is the real owner of such interest. To be recognized, a
transfer must vest dominion and control ofthe partnership interest in the transferee.
The existence ofsuch dominion and control in the donee is to be determined from all
the facts and circumstances. A transfer is not recognized ifthe transferor retains such
incidents of ownership that the transferee has not acquired full and complete
ownership ofthe partnership interest. Transactions between members ofa family will
be closely scrutinized, and the circumstances, not only at the time of the purported
transfer but also during the periods preceding and following it, will be taken into
consideration in determining the bona fides or lack ofbona fides ofthe purported gift
or sale. A partnership may be recognized for income purposes as to some partners but
James B. Martin, Jr.
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not as to others.
b.

Distributions Issues.
1.

General Rules. A Partner recognizes no gain on Partnership distributions,

except to the extent that any money distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of such
Partner's interest in the Partnership immediately before the distribution. A Partner
recognizes no loss on Partnership distributions, except that upon a distribution of
cash in liquidation ofa Partner's interest in a Partnership, loss shall be recognized to
the extent of the excess of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the
partnership over the sum of--any money distributed.
(1)

Any gain or loss recognized is considered as gain or loss from the sale

or exchange of the partnership interest of the distributee partner.
(2)

No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership on a distribution

to a partner of property, including money. One of the supposed advantages
of partnership taxation is the fact that the partnership is generally pennitted
to make tax deferred distributions of property. The distributions are tax
deferred because the partner receiving the property takes the partnership's
low basis in the property as his or her own. If and when the partner sells the
property, absent some other exemption, the partner will report the gain.
11.

Basis. The basis ofproperty (other than money) distributed by a Partnership

to a Partner other than in liquidation of the Partner's interest shall be its adjusted
basis to the Partnership immediately before such distribution. However, the basis to
the distributee Partner of property is applicable shall not exceed the adjusted basis
ofsuch partner's interest in the partnership reduced by any money distributed in the
same transaction.
(1)

The basis ofproperty (other than money) distributed by a Partnership

to a Partner in liquidation of the Partner's interest shall be an amount equal
to the adjusted basis of such Partner's interest in the Partnership reduced by
any money distributed in the same transaction.
James B. Martin, Jr.
Income Tax Issues for Family Limited Partnerships

B-9

111.

Exceptions to General Rule.
(1)

Section 704(c). Ifpropertycontributed with built-in gain (also known

as pre-contribution gain under section 737) is distributed to a Partner other
than the contributing Partner within 7 years ofcontribution, the built-in gain
or loss will be recognized by the contributing Partner equal to the difference
between the fair market value of the property distributed less its adjusted
basis.
(a)

The transferee 0 fa partner's interest must report the transferor's

section 704(c) gain. However, the transferee is treated as the transferor with
respect to property the transferor contributed.
(b)

Several exception apply to section 704(c). Ifa partnership distributes

to a partner the same property contributed by that partner, then there is no
gain under section 704(c). In a termination under section 708(b)(1)(B) (50%
or more transfer in 12 months), section 704(c) does not apply to the
distribution of interests in the new partnership. In limited circumstances,
distributions pursuant to mergers are also excepted. Partnership divisions are
not excepted.
(2)

Section 737. If the contributing Partner receives other property (ie,

property contributed by another partner) within 7 years ofthe contribution of
the built-in gain property, the Partner will recognize gain equal to the lesser
of the net realized gain (the fair market value of the property over the
distributee's basis in his or her interest less the cash distributed in the
transaction) or the net built-in gain of the Partner.
(a)

The partner's transferee must report the transferor's section 737 gain.

Unlike with section 704(c), the transferee is not treated as the transferor with
respect to property the transferor contributed.
(b)

Several exceptions apply to section 737.

If the partner receives a

distribution of property said partner contributed, then section 737 does not
James B. Martin, Jr.
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apply. In a termination under section 708(b)(1)(B), section 737 does not
apply to the distribution of interests in the new partnership.

Distributions

pursuant to mergers are also excepted. Additionally in very limited cases, the
regulations provide an exception for distributions in partnership divisions.
To meet this exception, section 737 does not apply to a transfer by a
partnership (transferor partnership) of all of the section 704(c) property
contributed by a partner to a second partnership (transferee partnership) in an
exchange described in section 721, followed by a distribution as part of the
same plan or arrangement ofan interest in the transferee partnership (and no
other property) in complete liquidation of the interest of the partner that
originally contributed the section 704(c) property to the transferor
partnership.
(3)

Disguised Sales. When a Partner provides services or contributes

property to a Company, and within two years another property is distributed
because of the services rendered or the contribution, the IRS can view the
contribution and the distribution transactions together and recast those
transactions for tax purposes. The regulations presume that any distribution
within two years of a contribution is a disguised sale. Distributions beyond
two years are presumed to not be a disguised sale.
(a)

Guaranteed payments for capital, preferred returns, operating cash

flow distributions, and reimbursement of pre-formation expenditures are
excepted from the disguised sale rules.
(b)

IRS considers certain facts as indicative of the existence of a

disguised sale:
(i)

Whether the distribution was guaranteed; and

(ii)

The duration of the recipient's association with the

Partnership and the timing ofthe payment in relation to services and
property transferred.
James B. Martin, Jr.
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(4)

Section 731 (c).

Prior to 1994, marketable securities could be

distributed without tax to the recipient Partner. Now, section 731(c) treats
marketable securities the same as cash, thus to the extent that the fair market
value of the marketable securities exceeds the basis of the recipient's
Partnership interest.
(a)

The rules provide several exceptions to the treatment.
(i)

Distributions of a security that was contributed to the

partnership by such partner (but not his successor) are not treated as
cash, except to the extent that the value of the distributed security is
attributable to marketable securities or money contributed (directly or
indirectly) to the entity to which the distributed security relates.
(ii)

The most important exception allows distributions without tax

from investment partnerships (compare section 721 investment
companies).
1)

An investment partnership means any partnership

which h as n ever been engaged in a trade or business and
substantially all ofthe assets (by value) ofwhich have always
consisted of money, stock in a corporation and other similar
assets. Additionally the distributee (but not his successor)
must not be an ineligible partner which means any partner
who, before the date ofthe distribution, did not contribute to
the partnership any property other than permitted assets ofthe
investment partnership.
(b)

Limitation.

In the case ofa distribution ofmarketable securities to

a partner, the amount treated as cash is reduced (but not below zero) by the
excess (if any) of -- such partner's distributive share of the net gain which
would be recognized if all ofthe marketable securities ofthe same class and
issuer as the distributed securities held by the partnership were sold
James B. Martin, Jr.
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(immediately before the transaction to which the distribution relates) by the
partnership for fair market value, over such partner's distributive share ofthe
net gain which is

at~butable to

the marketable securities of the same class

and issuer as the distributed securities held by the partnership immediately
after the transaction, determined by using the same fair market value.
(5)

Preferred Returns. Routinely, the Partners putting up the cash for a

Partnership will desire a preferred return. Such a return raises numerous
issues. From a mechanical point ofview, the Partners need to decide how the
return will be computed, whether the distributions need to be cumulative,
whether there needs to be income before there will be a distribution, and
many more. From a economic standpoint, the Partners must decide whether
the return will be permanent or merely timing in nature.
c.

Partnership Interest Transfer issues. A particularly unusual problem comes up in real

estate partnerships where the underlying property is encumbered. When the parent partner
makes gifts ofpartnership interests, there is some question about how the debt is treated. For
example, the parent contributes real property valued at $1 million, with basis of $500,000
and subject to debt of$750,000 for all general (1 % of all units) and limited units (99% ofall
units). The parent then gives the limited units to her kids. The partnership pays ofthe loan
out of rent. This essentially sh ifts 9 9% 0 f the debt repayment to the children. If the
transaction was bifurcated between a sale to the extent of the debt ($250,000 in gain in this
example) and a gift for the value in excess of the debt ($250,000).
1.

In a sale or exchange ofproperty (including partnership interests), liabilities

assumed or taken subject to are included as part of the purchaser's basis and the
seller's amount realized. While IRS takes the position that these rules apply to gifts
(ie, a gratuitous conveyance ofproperty subject to a liability is a sale to the extent of
the liability), the courts have been slower to follow. See McKee, Nelson, Whitmire,
Federal Taxation ofPartnerships and Partners, , 15.05[1]. Section 752(d) provides
that in the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, liabilities shall
James B. Martin, Jr.
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be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange
of property not associated with partnerships. Thus when a partner buys in to a
partnership, his basis includes a share of partnership liabilities. When the partner
sells out, his share of the partnership liabilities is treated as amounts realized.
11.

The McKee Treatise identifies three alternative views:
(1)

Treat section 752(d) as applying to gifts of units making the transfer

part sale, part gift.
(2)

Use section 752(b) which treats reductions of partner's share of

partnership liabilities as a distribution. In the above example the debt in
excess of basis would generate gain for the donor.
(3)

Recognize that section 752(d) is limited to sales or exchanges, that

section 752(b) does not apply to partner to partner transfers, and that
partnership liabilities should not be realized upon a transfer that is not a sale
or exchange. While the McKee Treatise rejects this view, it cites Weiss v.
Commissioner, 956 F2d 242 (11 th Cir. 1992) which held that a partner can
transfer his entire interest in a partnership without simultaneously realizing
his share of partnership liabilities. This view appears to depend 0 n the
donor's continued liability for the debt in question.

4.

SECTION 754 ELECTIONS.
Ifthe partnership makes this election, the basis ofpartnership property shall be adjusted, in

the case of a distribution of property, in the manner provided in section 734 and, in the case of a
transfer ofa partnership interest, in the manner provided in section 743. Such an election shall apply
with respect to all distributions ofproperty by the partnership and to all transfers of interests in the
partnership during the taxable year with respect to which such election was filed and all subsequent
taxable years. Such election may be revoked by the partnership, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by regulations prescribed by the Secretary. The election is made in a written statement
filed with the partnership return for the taxable year during which the distribution or transfer occurs.
For the election to be valid, the return must be filed not later than the time prescribed by paragraph
James B. Martin, Jr.
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(e) of §§ 1.6031-1 (including extensions thereof) for filing the return for such taxable year. We will
limit our review to section 743.
a.

Section 743(b) provides in the case ofa transfer ofan interest in a partnership by sale

or exchange or upon the death of a partner, a partnership with respect to which the election
provided in section 754 -is in effect shall increase the adjusted basis of the partnership
property by the excess of the basis to the transferee partner ofhis interest in the partnership
over his proportionate share ofthe adjusted basis ofthe partnership property, or decrease the
adjusted basis of the partnership property by the excess of the transferee partner's
proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership property over the basis of his
interest in the partnership.
1.

Basis to the transferee partner of his interest. In the case of the transfer of a

partnership interest by sale or exchange or as a result of the death of a partner, the
transferee's basis in the transferred partnership interest is determined under section
742 and Treas. Reg. §1.742-1. See also section 752 and Treas. Reg. §1.752-1 through
1.752-5.
(1)

Regulation 1.742-1 provides that the basis of a partnership interest

acquired from a decedent is the fair market value ofthe interest at the date of
his death or at the alternate valuation date, increased by his estate's or other
successor's share of partnership liabilities, if any, on that date, and reduced
to the extent that such value is attributable to items constituting income in
respect of a decedent.
11.

A partner's proportionate share of the adjusted basis of the partnership

property is equal to the sum ofthe decedent's interest as a partner in the partnership's
previously taxed capital, plus the transferee's share of partnership liabilities.
(1)

Generally, a transferee's interest as a partner in the partnership's

previously taxed capital is equal to(a)

The amount ofcash that the transferee would receive on a liquidation

of the partnership following the hypothetical transaction (to the extent
James B. Martin, Jr.
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attributable to the acquired partnership interest); increased by
(b)

The amount of tax loss (including any remedial allocations under

§§ 1.704-3(d)), that would be allocated to the transferee from the hypothetical
transaction (to the extent attributable to the acquired partnership interest); and
decreased by
(c)

The amount of tax gain (including any remedial allocations under

§§ 1.704-3(d)), that would be allocated to the transferee from the hypothetical
transaction (to the extent attributable to the acquired partnership interest).
(2)

Hypothetical transaction means the disposition by the partnership of

all ofthe partnership's assets, immediately after the transfer ofthe partnership
interest, in a fully taxable transaction for cash equal to the fair market value
of the assets.
b.

Section 755 allocations. Any increase or decrease in basis because ofthe section 754

election and section 743 must be allocated according to the complicated section 755
regulations. The regulations requires that the basis change be allocated between capital gain
and ordinary gain properties based on the gain or loss on such properties in hypothetical sales
of such properties.
1.

The regulations provide the following example: A purchases a partnership

interest in LTP at a time when an election under section 754 is not in effect. The
three partners in LTP have equal interests in capital and profits. During a later year
for which LTP has an election under section 754 in effect, and in a transaction that
is unrelated to A's purchase ofthe LTP interest, A dies and his interest in LTP passes
to his estate. At the time of the transfer, A's adjusted basis in his interest in LTP is
$20,433. A recognizes no gain or loss as a result of his death. The Estate's basis in
its partnership interest in LTP will be stepped up under section 743. The balance
sheet of LTP on the date of death shows the following:

James B. Martin, Jr.
Income Tax Issues for Family Limited Partnerships

B - 16

Assets
Fair
Cash
Accounts receivable
Inventory
Nondepreciable capital asset
Total

.
.
.
.

Adjusted
Basis
$ 5,000
10,000
20,000
20,000

Market
Value
$5,000
10,000
21,000
40,000

.

$55,000

$76,000

Liabilities and Capital
Fair

Liabilities

Adjusted

Market

Per Books

Value

$10,000

$10,000

Capital:
A.............................

15,000

22,000

B.............................

15,000

22,000

C

-.....................

15,000

22,000

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

$55, 000

$76,000

The amount of the basis adjustment under section 743(b) is the difference between
the basis of the estate's interest in LTP and its share of the adjusted basis to LTP
of partnership property. The estate's interest in the previously taxed capital of
LTP is $15,000 ($22,000, the amount of cash the estate would receive ifLTP
liquidated immediately after the hypothetical transaction, decreased by $7,000, the
amount of tax gain allocated to the estate from the hypothetical transaction). The
estate's share of the adjusted basis to LTP of partnership property is $18,333
($15,000 share of previously taxed capital, plus $3,333 share ofLTP's liabilities).
The amount of the basis adjustment under section 743(b) to partnership property
therefore, is $2,100 ($20,433 minus $18,333).
The total amount of gain that would be allocated to the estate from the
hypothetical sale of capital gain property is $6,666.67 (one-third of the excess of
the fair market value ofLTP's nondepreciable capital asset, $40,000, over its
basis, $20,000). The total amount of gain that would be allocated to the estate
James B. Martin, Jr.
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from the hypothetical sale of ordinary income property is $333.33 (one-third of
the excess of the fair market value ofLTP's inventory, $21,000, over its basis,
$20,000). Under the regulations, LTP must allocate $2,000 ($6,666.67 divided by
$7,000 times $2,100) of the estate's basis adjustment to the nondepreciable capital
asset. LTP must allocate $100 ($333.33 divided by $7,000 times $2,100) of the
estate's basis adjustment to the inventory.

5.

SELECTED INCOME TAX ISSUES ON WINDING UP.
Inevitably the heirs desire to unwind the family limited partnership and go their separate

ways after the death of the parent. If this can be delayed until 7 years after the contribution of the
assets, then neither Section 704(c) nor Section 737 present a problem. If the heirs can't wait the
7 year period, then there is a distinct likelihood that they will be taxed, notwithstanding the
stepped up basis upon the death of the parent. As the partnerships usually have mostly
marketable securities, section 731 becomes a major concern.
a.

Section 704(c). We have seen how this provision taxes the partner who

contributed built-in gain property or such partner's successor upon the distribution of the
contributed built-in gain property to another partner. It is clear that this provision does
not apply when a partner receives back property which the partner contributed. A
successor can step into the partner's shoes with respect to this rule. For example, the
parents contribute securities with built-in gain. The parents die and the partnership
interests pass equally to the 2 children. Children cause the securities to be distributed.
Section 704(c) will not apply.
b.

Section 737. To compliment section 704(c), 737 taxes the partner who

contributes built-in gain property when he or she receives a distribution of other property
from the partnership. If the partner receives a distribution of property that they
contributed there is no gain. The transferee of the contributing partner's interest must
report his transferor's section 737 gain. Importantly, the successor is not treated as the
contributing partner with respect to the section737 exception for contributed property.
James B. Martin, Jr.
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c.

Section 731 (c). This section treats marketable securities as cash for purposes of

distributions. Investment partnerships are excluded from this rule. If a partner receives a
distribution of the securities he or she contributed, then section 731(c) does not apply. A
transferee of a partnership interest does not qualify for this exception. There is also a
limitation on the amount of the securities discussed above. However, the limit is treated
as a distribution of property other than money for purposes of section 737.
d.

In Paul Carman, Unwinding the Family Limited Partnership: Income tax Impact

of Scratching the Pre-Seven Year Itch, Journal of Taxation, March 2002, Mr. Carman
works through these intricacies with an excellent example. We modify it slightly here as
follows: Parents each contribute $100,000 in securities to a family limited partnership in
exchange for a 50% interest in the partnership. They have a combined basis of $50,000
in their partnership interests. They each give their son and daughter a 1/12 interest in the
partnership (in which the children will have a basis of$16,666 (2(1/6 times 50,000)).
Assume the parents die simultaneously on December 3!0 for estate tax purposes. Their
two children inherit the partnership units equally and they dissolve the partnership the
next day. The parents partnership units were valued at $40,000 each on December 30.
The securities have not appreciated.
1.

No section 754 election. Sell off the securities. Distribute proceeds.

There is $100,000 in gain shared equally by the children ($200,000 in value less
$100,000 in basis.) $200,000 in value is distributed to the children as compared to
their aggregate basis of$213,332 (16,666 plus 40,000 basis from parents plus
$100,000 gain from the sell of securities) resulting in a $13,333 loss on
liquidation. Net the income and loss and the children show a net gain of $86,666
or $43,333 of gain for each child..
11.

No section 754 election. Distribute the assets (assuming they are not

securities). No section 731(c) issues. Each child receives $100,000 in assets.
Under section 737, as transferees, the children do not create the return of
James B. Martin, Jr.
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contributed property exception; consequently each will report the lesser of built-in
gain or excess of the value of the property over the distributee's basis in his or her
interest. The built-in gain was $100,000. The excess of fair market value over
basis in interest (after step-up) was $86,666. Thus each child reports $43,333 in
gain on liquidation under section 737.
Ill.

Same as ii, except assume that 80% of the assets are securities and the

remaining 20% is land. Section 731 (c) will apply to the securities. The children
do not qualify for the return of contribution exception. But the limitation will
apply. The children's share of gain before the distribution ($160,000 less $80,000
in basis) is compared to their share after liquidation (zero) to detennine the
limitation equal to $40,000 each. Thus the securities treated as cash distribution
of $80,000 each are reduced to $40,000. The children had a $56,666 basis in
their interests, thus the distribution of the securities was not in excess of basis.
However, the 731(c) limit is treated as section 737 property and is added to the
land to be distributed (20,000 each) making the amount of737 amount distributed
equal $60,000 each. That number is compared to the partner's basis in their
interest after the 731 (c) deemed cash distribution of $40,000 each (or $16,666).
As a result each partner ends up with the same $43,333 in gain under section 737.
IV.

Section 754 election is made. Sell off the securities. Distribute proceeds.

Under section 754 and section 743, the children are entitled to increase the basis
of the partnership assets by the difference between their basis in their interests
after the step up and their share of the basis of the partnership assets. Recall that
discounts will limit the step up. Also recall that the fair market value of the
inherited partnership interests was $40,000 each. The proportionate share of the
parents' estates of the tax basis of the assets (67%) of the partnership is $33,333.
This makes the 743 adjustment $6,666 for each child, which will be allocated
among the assets under section 755. On sale of the assets the partnership would
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realize $86,666 in gain ($200,000 less $100,000 plus $13,333 (gross step up)) or
$43,333 each. Surprisingly, this is consistent with the example where no section
754 election was made. On distribution of $200,000, the partners realized no gain
because they have basis of$100,000 each ($16,666 plus $40,000 plus $43,333).
v.

Section 754 election is made.

Distribut~

assets (which consist of land).

There is no exception to section 737. The built-in gain is the gain realized on the
deemed sale of the assets after the section 743 adjustment ($200,000 less
$100,000 plus $13,333). The built-in gain will be $43,333 each. Section 737
taxes the partner on the lesser of the built-in gain or the excess of the fair market
value of the distribution less the distributee's basis in his or her interest. The
latter number is $43,333 ($100,000 less $56,666). Thus in this scenario the gain
per partner under 737 is $43,333.
VI.

Same as v. except 80% of the assets are securities. The children do not

qualify for an exception to Section 731 (c) but can avail themselves of the
limitation, which is computed by comparing their gain before the distribution
($160,000 less $80,000 (basis) less $13,333 (743 adjustment) with their share of
the gain after the distribution (zero). Thus the amount of securities treated as cash
is reduced by $34,666 each, for a deemed cash distribution of$45,333. This
amount is less than the children's basis in their interest resulting in no gain. The
reduction of $34,666 is treated as section 737 property and is added to the fair
market value of the remaining asset ($20,000). The excess of the sum of the two
($54,666) over the partner's remaining adjusted basis of$ll, 333 results in
section 737 gain of$43,333.
e.

This example leaves the advisor with very few alternatives to avoid tax, typically

under section 737, if the partnership liquidates before 7 years. Because the partnership
division exception is very narrow, that likely will not be an option. Even if you can wait
the 7 years, section 731 (c) may cause tax in any event.
James B. Martin, Jr.
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I.

A QUICK OVERVIEW: TELL ME THE PERIODS OVER WHICH
DISTRIBUTIONS MAY BE MADE FROM A QUALIFIED PLAN, IRA, 403(B)
ARRANGEMENT OR ELIGIBLE §457 DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN
CHART FOR DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE DISTRIBUTION PERIOD

Identity of the
Designated Beneficiary

Distribution Period
During Owner's
Lifetime

Non-Spouse Beneficiary

Use the Uniform
Lifetime Table in the
Q&A-2 of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9.

Spouse is sole
beneficiary and is not
more than 10 years
younger than Owner

Use the Uniform
Lifetime Table in the
Q&A-2 of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9.

Distribution Period After
Owner's Death If Owner
Dies Before Required
Beginning Date

Distribution Period After
Owner's Death If Owner
Dies After Required
Beginning Date

Designated
beneficiary's life
expectancy, determined
under Single Life Table
in Q&A-l of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9 in the
year following year of
Owner's death; reduce
by 1 for each
subsequent year.
During spouse's life:
Use spouse's life
expectancy, determined
in the year Owner
would have reached age
70-1/2, redetennined
each year based on
attained age. Use Single
Life Table in Q&A-l of
2002 Reg. §1.40 1(a)(9)9. On Spouse's death:
Spouse's life
expectancy as of year of
Spouse's death (use
Single Life Table in
Q&A-l of2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9); reduce
by 1 for each
subsequent year.

Designated
beneficiary's life
expectancy, determined
under Single Life Table
in Q&A-l of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9 in the
year following year of
Owner's death; reduce
by 1 for each
subsequent year.
During spouse's life:
Use spouse's life
expectancy, determined
in the year following
year of Owner's death,
redetermined each year
based on attained age.
Use Single Life Table in
Q&A-l of2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9. On
Spouse's death:
Spouse's life
expectancy as of year of
Spouse's death (use
Single Life Table in
Q&A-l of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9); reduce
by 1 for each
subsequent year.
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CHART FOR DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE DISTRIBUTION PERIOD

Distribution Period
During Owner's
Lifetime

Distribution Period After
Owner's Death If Owner
Dies Before Required
Be2innin2 Date

Distribution Period After
Owner's Death If Owner
Dies After Required
Be2innin2 Date

Spouse is sole
beneficiary and is more
than 10 years younger
than Owner.

Use the joint and
survivor life expectancy
of Owner & Spouse,
redetermined each year
based on their attained
ages. Use the Joint and
Last Survivor Life
Table in Q&A-3 of
2002 Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)9.

During spouse's life: Use
spouse's life expectancy,
detennined in the year
Owner would have
reached age 70-1/2;
redetennine each
subsequent year based on
attained age. Use Single
Life Table in Q&A-l of
2002 Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)9. On Spouse's death: use
Spouse's life expectancy
as of year of Spouse's
death (use Single Life
Table in Q&A-l of2002
Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-9);
reduce by 1 for each
subsequent year.

No designated
beneficiary

Use the Uniform
Lifetime Table in the
Q&A-2 of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9.

Complete distribution
by the end of the fifth
calendar year following
Owner's death.

During spouse's life:
Use spouse's life
expectancy, determined
in the year following
year of Owner's death,
redetermined each year
based on attained age.
Use Single Life Table in
Q&A-l of 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-9. On
Spouse's death:
Spouse's life
expectancy as of year of
Spouse's death (use
Single Life Table in
Q&A-l of 2002 Reg.
§1.40 1(a)(9)-9); reduce
by 1 for each
subsequent year.
Use Owner's life
expectancy, determined
in the year of the
Owner's death (use
Single Life Table in
Q&A-l of2002 Reg.
§1.40 1(a)(9)-9; reduce
by 1 for each
subsequent year.

Identity of the
Designated Beneficiary

II.

LIFETIME DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER THE 2002 REGULATIONS
A.

Required Beginning Date
1.

The general rule: distributions begin on April 1 of the year following the
year in which client attains age 70Yl.
(a)

Once the client reaches his or her "required beginning date" (i.e.,
the April 1st following the calendar year of attainment of age
70Yl), the client must thereafter receive a minimum required
distribution from his or her retirement plans/IRAs each year.

C-2

2.

An exception for qualified plan participants who are not five percent
owners.

(a)

B.

Qualified plan participants who are not five percent owners are
exempted from this requirement: distributions need not begin until
the calendar year that includes actual retirement. NB: No such
similar relief applies to IRA owners.

Calculating Each Year's Required Distribution During the Life of the Plan
Participant or IRA Owner
1.

Determine each year's required distributions by dividing the owner's
account balance (generally, the account balance as of the last valuation
date in the preceding calendar year) by the "applicable distribution period"
(2002 Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-5, Q&A-l). The "applicable distribution period"
serves as the divisor by which the account balance is divided.

2.

General rule: the divisor is determined each year by reference to the
"Uniform Lifetime Table" prescribed at Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-9, Q&A-2. It
began its life as the MDffi table in the 1987/1997 Proposed Regulations:
the table represents the joint life expectancy of a IRA owner and a
beneficiary who is ten years younger than the IRA owner.

3.

(a)

The Uniform Lifetime Table in the 2002 Regulations (as well as
the tables for single life expectancies and joint and survivor life
expectancies) were "derived by starting with the basic 2000
individual annuity mortality table and projecting mortality
improvement for the period 2000 through 2003 using the assumed
mortality improvement factors that were adopted in developing the
Annuity 2000 mortality table. The resulting mortality rates were
blended using a fixed 50% male 50% female blend. The uniform
lifetime table provided in these final regulations has also been
adjusted to reflect these new mortality tables."

(b)

Result: the initial divisor under the new Unifonn Lifetime Table
(i.e., a IRA owner age 70) is 27.4 years (the joint life expectancy
of someone age 70 and someone age 60). The same table in the
2001 Proposed Regulations for a person age 70 contained a 26 year
life expectancy.

The Uniform Lifetime Table for Determining the "Applicable Distribution
Period" for an IRA Owner.
(a)

The Uniform Lifetime Table appears in Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-9, A-2.

(b)

It also is reproduced at the end of this outline.
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4.

To use the table, determine IRA Owner's age on IRA Owner's birthday
for the distribution year in question. Then, divide the prior year-end
account balance by the divisor in the table that corresponds to that age.
(a)

5.

c.

Example: IRA Owner reaches age 73 on IRA Owner's birthday in
2003. The applicable distribution period - the divisor - from the
table for age 73 is 24.7. On the last account valuation date for
2002, the value of IRA Owner's IRA was $500,000. Divide
$500,000 by 24.7; the result - $20,243- is the minimum
required distribution for 2003, and will be the required distribution
if IRA Owner has no designated beneficiary or if IRA Owner has a
designated beneficiary or if IRA Owner changes IRA Owner's
designated beneficiary at any time. There is only one exception:
that exception will apply if IRA Owner's sole designated
beneficiary is IRA Owner's spouse and spouse is more than ten
years younger than IRA Owner.

Result: no matter how long IRA Owner or plan participant lives, the
plan/IRA account will never go to zero (if we assume the IRA owner
limits annual distributions to the amount of the required distribution and
does not have a negative investment retum)~

Distributions During Lifetime for IRA Owners and Plan Participants With Much
Younger Spouses
1.

A IRA owner or plan participant with a spouse who is (i) the sole
beneficiary and (ii) more than ten years younger than the IRA owner, must
recalculate their joint life expectancies each year.
(a)

A spouse is the "sole" designated beneficiary "if the spouse is the
sole beneficiary of the employee's entire interest at all times during
the distribution calendar year." 2002 Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-4(b).

2.

Result: each year, IRA Owner and Spouse compare the divisor produced
by the Joint & Last Survivor Table in Q&A-3 of §1.401(a)(9)-9 of the
2002 Final Regulations to the divisor in the Uniform Lifetime Table. Use
the larger divisor (i.e., generate a smaller required distribution).

3.

What happens if there is a change in marital status during the year?
(a)

Under the 2002 Final Regulations, if the IRA owner and the IRA
owner's spouse are married on January 1 of a distribution calendar
year, but do not remain married throughout that year (i.e., the IRA
owner or the IRA owner's spouse die or they become divorced
during that year), the IRA owner will not fail to have a spouse as
the IRA owner's sole beneficiary for that year merely because they
are not married throughout that year.
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(b)

Watch out: Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-5, A-4(b)(2) provides:
"If an employee's spouse predeceases the employee, the spouse
will not fail to be the employee's sole beneficiary for the
distribution calendar year that includes the date of the spouse's
death solely because, for the period remaining in that year after the
spouse's death, someone other than the spouse is named as
beneficiary. However, the change in beneficiary due to the death
or divorce ofthe spouse will be effective for purposes of
determining the applicable distribution period under section
401(a)(9) in the distribution calendar year following the
distribution calendar year that includes the date ofthe spouse's
death or divorce. (Emphasis added.)

III.

DISTRIBUTIONS UPON DEATH
A.

Requirements Imposed by Code §401(a)(9)
1.

Death Prior to Required Beginning Date §401(a)(9).

General Rule Under Code

(a)

Upon the client's death prior to his or her required beginning date,
distributions must be completed no later than five years after the
client's death.

(b)

However, two exceptions apply:
(i)

(c)

Spousal Beneficiary. If the client's spouse is the
beneficiary of any portion of the client's plan benefit, then
distributions must:
A)

Commence at the time the client would have
attained his or her required beginning date; and

B)

May be distributed over the life expectancy of the
client's spouse, with the life expectancy determined
at the time distributions first commence to the
beneficiary from the plan.

Non-Spouse Designated Beneficiary. If the client has a non-spouse
designated beneficiary (and the client's spouse is not a
\ beneficiary), then distributions must:
(i)

Commence within one year following the date of the
client's death; and

(ii)

May be distributed over the life expectancy of the client's
designated beneficiary, with the life expectancy determined
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at the time distributions first commence to the beneficiary
from the plan.
2.

Death After Required Beginning Date §401(a)(9)
(a)

B.

General Rule Under Code

Upon the client's death on or after the client's required beginning
date, distributions must continue to be made as rapidly as in effect
before the client's death.

Calculating Distributions After a IRA Owner/Owner's Death Under the 2002
Regulations: Who is a "Designated Beneficiary" for Purposes of Calculating the
Divisor?
1.

With one exception, only an individual may be a designated beneficiary
for purposes of determining the distribution period for required
distributions.

2.

The exception: a trust may qualify as a "designated beneficiary" - with the
result that the beneficiaries of the trust will be treated as the "designated
beneficiaries" - if these requirements are satisfied:

3.

(a)

The trust is valid under state law.

(b)

The trust is irrevocable or will, by its terms, become irrevocable
upon the death of the client.

(c)

The beneficiaries of the trust must be identifiable.

(d)

A documentation requirement is satisfied.

The documentation requirement.
(a)

Prior to the IRA Owner's death, required minimum distributions
are based on the Uniform Lifetime Table in all cases save one. The
exception is for a spouse who is the sole beneficiary and who is
more than ten years younger than the IRA owner.
(i)

If a IRA owner is not using the exception, and if the IRA
owner has designated a trust as beneficiary, then the 2002
Regulations do not require the delivery of any
documentation to the plan.

(ii)

If a IRA owner wants to use the exception - the IRA owner
wishes to designate a trust for which the spouse is the sole
beneficiary and the spouse is more than ten years younger
than the IRA owner - , then the IRA owner use either:

C-6

(iii)

A)

Choice #1: provide a copy of the trust agreement to
the plan administrator and agree that if the trust is
amended at any time in the future, the IRA owner
will, "within a reasonable time," provide to the plan
administrator a copy of each amendment. 0

B)

Choice #2: provide the plan administrator with a list
of all of the beneficiaries of the trust (including
contingent and remainder beneficiaries with a
description of the conditions on their entitlement
sufficient to establish that the spouse is the sole
beneficiary); certify that, to the best of the
knowledge of the IRA owner, this list is correct and
complete and that the first three requirements listed
above are satisfied; agree that, if the trust is
amended in the future, to provide corrected
certifications to the extent that the amendment
changes any information previously certified; and
agree to provide a copy of the trust instrument to the
plan administrator upon demand.

Upon the death of IRA Owner (regardless of when IRA
Owner dies), by October 31 of the year following the
calendar year in which the IRA owner died (the 1987/1997
Proposed Regulations mandated that the deadline was the
end of the ninth month beginning after the death of client
and the 2001 Proposed Regulations allowed the trustee to
wait until December 31 rather than October 31), the trustee
of the trust must either:
A)

provide the plan administrator with a final list of all
of the beneficiaries of the trust (including
contingent and remainder beneficiaries with a
description of the conditions on their entitlement) as
of September 30 of the calendar year following the
calendar year that includes the date of death; certify
that, to the best of the trustee's knowledge, this list
is correct and complete and that the first three
requirements listed above are satisfied; and agree to
provide a copy of the trust instrument to the plan
administrator upon demand; OR

B)

provide the plan administrator with a copy of the
actual trust document for the trust that is named as a
beneficiary of the client under the plan as of the
client's date of death.
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C.

Calculating Distributions After a IRA Owner/Owner's Death Under the 2002
Regulations: When Do We Detennine the Identity of the "Designated
Beneficiary" for Purposes of Calculating the Divisor?
1.

Under the 2002 Regulations, the identity of the designated beneficiarywhose life expectancy will be used to determine the required distribution
to the designated beneficiary- is postponed until September 30 of the
year following the calendar year of the IRA owner's death.

2.

Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-4, A-4(a):
(a)

"In order to be a designated beneficiary, an individual'must be a

beneficiary as of the date of death. Except as provided in paragraph
(b) and §1.401(a)(9)-6T, the employee's designated beneficiary
will be determined based on the beneficiaries designated as of the
date of death who remain beneficiaries as of September 30 of the
calendar year following the calendar year of the employee's death.
Consequently, except as provided in §1.401(a)(9)-6T, any person
who was a beneficiary as of the date of the employee's death, but
is not a beneficiary as of that September 30 (e.g., because the
person receives the entire benefi~ to which the person is entitled
before that September 30), is not taken into account in determining
the employee's designated beneficiary for purposes of determining
the distribution period for required minimum distributions after the
employee's death."
3.

Can the family of the deceased IRA owner or plan participant get together
after the death of the IRA owner or plan participant and designate anyone
they desire as the beneficiary of the account as long as they do it by
September 30 of the calendar year following the calendar year of the IRA
owner's death?
(a)

4.

No, they cannot. The maximum size of the universe of possible
beneficiaries is frozen on the date of death of the IRA owner. Postmortem planning options do not include creating a new set of
beneficiaries.

Eliminating the undesirable beneficiary.
(a)

If the IRA owner or plan participant designated desirable
beneficiaries (i.e., young beneficiaries with long life expectancies)
as contingent beneficiaries, or if those individuals are included
among a group of multiple beneficiaries, for example, it is possible
to "eliminate" less desirable beneficiaries whom the IRA owner or
plan participant may also have named (i.e., older beneficiaries or
entities which cannot qualify as "designated beneficiaries") so that,
by December 31 of the calendar year following the calendar year
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of that includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan
participant, the only remaining "designated beneficiaries" are the
desirable beneficiaries.

D.

(i)

Tactic #1: Older beneficiaries disclaim.

(ii)

Tactic #2: totally distribute the benefits of the older or nonindividual beneficiaries to them before September 30 of the
calendar year following the calen~ar year that includes the
IRA owner's death.

Calculating Distributions After a IRA Owner/Plan Participant's Death Under the
2002 Regulations: The· IRA Owner or Plan Participant Who Dies Prior to the
Required Beginning Date of the IRA Owner or Plan Participant
1.

2.

The general rule.
(a)

If there is a designated beneficiary, and if the beneficiary is the
spouse of the IRA owner or plan participant, and if the spouse is
the sole beneficiary, then the general rule is that the spouse will
receive required distributions over the surviving spouse's life
expectancy, beginning no later than the later of (i) December 31 of
the calendar year the deceased IRA owner or plan participant
would have reached age 70 Y;, or (ii) December 31 of the calendar
year following the calendar year that includes the date of death of
the IRA owner or plan participant.

(b)

If there are one or more designated beneficiaries, and if at least one
of the beneficiaries is not the spouse, then the general rule is that
beneficiaries will receive required distributions over the life
expectancy of the oldest beneficiary, beginning no later than
December 31 of the calendar year following the calendar year that
includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant.

(c)

If there is no designated beneficiary, then the general rule is that
distributions must be made in accordance with the five-year rule.

(d)

This general rule appears in the 2002 Regulations at Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-3, A-4(a).

The exception to the general rule that applies in particular to qualified .
plans.
(a)

A plan may adopt a provision specifying either that the five-year
rule will apply to certain distributions after the death of an
employee even if the employee has a designated beneficiary or that
distribution in every case will be made in accordance with the five-
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year rule. A plan need not have the same method of distribution for
the benefits of all employees.
(b)

3.

A plan may adopt a provision that permits employees (or
beneficiaries) to elect on an individual basis whether the five-year
rule or the life expectancy rule apply to distributions after the death
of the participant who has a designated beneficiary.
(i)

"Such an election must be made no later than the earlier of
the end of the calendar year in which distribution would be
required to commence in order to satisfy the requirements
for the life expectancy rule or the end of the calendar year
which contains the fifth anniversary of the date of death of
the employee.

(ii)

"As of the last date the election may be made, the election
must be irrevocable with respect to the beneficiary (and all
subsequent beneficiaries) and must apply to all subsequent
calendar years.

(iii)

"If a plan provides for the election, the plan may also
specify the method of distribution that applies if neither the
employee nor the beneficiary makes the election.

(iv)

"If neither the employee nor the beneficiary elects a
method and the plan does not specify which method
applies, distribution must be made" under the life
expectancy rule." 2002 Regulation § 1.401(a)(9)-3, A-4(c).

If the surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary and the life expectancy rule
applies, then the surviving spouse must (i) start receiving distributions by
later of December 31 of the calendar year following the year that includes
the date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant or the end of the
calendar year in which the IRA owner or plan participant would have
attained age 70~, and (ii) receive distributions over the "applicable
distribution period," which is the surviving spouse's life expectancy.
(a)

During the surviving spouse's lifetime, the surviving spouse must
take required distributions over the surviving spouse's life
expectancy, recalculated annually, beginning in the year the IRA
owner or plan participant would have reached age 70~. or, if later,
by December 31 of the calendar year following the calendar year
that includes the IRA Owner's death. Use the "Single Life Table"
in 2002 Reg. §I.401(a)(9)-9, A-I to determine the divisor by
reference to the spouse's age during the year in question.
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(b)

(c)

4.

Once the surviving spouse dies, any benefits remaining in the plan
or IRA must be paid out over the remaining (fixed term) life
expectancy of the surviving spouse:
(i)

Step One: determine the spouse's life expectancy using the
Single Life Table, using spouse's age on spouse's birthday
in the year of spouse's death.

(ii)

For the calendar year following the calendar year of the
surviving spouse's death, use the life expectancy you just
calculated as the divisor to determine the required
distribution.

(iii)

For each subsequent calendar year, subtract one from the
previous year's divisor.

This rule works to the benefit of the surviving spouse and the heirs
of the surviving spouse: it gives them the advantage of
recalculation without the drawback customarily associated with
recalculation: life expectancy dropping to zero and requiring full
distribution of the account.

If there is one individual beneficiary, and that beneficiary is not the spouse
of the IRA owner or plan participant, then. the beneficiary must take
required distributions over the beneficiary's life expectancy (determined
based on the beneficiary's age on the beneficiary's birthday in the year
after the year in which the IRA owner or plan participant died, and
reduced by one for each subsequent year), beginning no later than
December 31 of the year after the year in which the IRA owner died. 2002
Reg. §§1.401(a)(9)-3, A-3(a) and 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(c)(I). Watch out for
the exception to general rule: a plan may, but is not required, to adopt an
optional provision that would require the use of the five-year rule or
require an irrevocable election not to use the five-year rule.
(a)

If the beneficiary wishes to use the extended distribution period,
here are the steps:
(i)

Step One: determine the beneficiary's life expectancy using
the Single Life Table in 2002 Regulations §1.401 (a)(9)-9
A-I, using the beneficiary's age as of the beneficiary's
birthday in the calendar year immediately following the
calendar year that includes the date of death of the IRA
owner or plan participant.

(ii)

For the calendar year following the calendar year that
includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan
participant, use the life expectancy you just calculated as
the divisor to determine the required distribution.
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(iii)
5.

If there are multiple beneficiaries (and they do not establish "separate
accounts" for each of them by December 31 of the year following the year
that includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant), and if
all of the beneficiaries are individuals, then (even if one of the
beneficiaries is the spouse of the IRA owner or plan participant), they
must take distributions over the oldest beneficiary's life expectancy
(determined based on his or her age on his or her birthday in the year after
the year in which the IRA owner or plan participant died), beginning no
later than December 31 of the year following the year that includes the
date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant. 2002 Reg.
§1.401(a)(9)-3, A-3(a) and 2002 Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7.
(a)

6.

Watch out for the exception to general rule that applies to qualified
plans: a plan may, but is not required, to adopt an optional
provision that would require the use of the five-year rule or require
an irrevocable election not to use the five-year rule.

If there is one beneficiary, and that beneficiary is not an individual; or, if
there are multiple beneficiaries (and they do not establish "separate
accounts" for each of them by December 31 of the year following the year
that includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant), and
any of the beneficiaries is not an individual (even if one of them is the
spouse of the IRA owner or plan participant); then the IRA owner or plan
participant is treated as having "no designated beneficiary."
(a)

7.

For each subsequent calendar year, subtract one from the
previous year's divisor.

Result: all benefits must be distributed under the five year rule: all
benefits must be distributed by December 31 of the year that
contains the fifth anniversary of the date of death. '2002 Reg.
§§1.401(a)(9)-3, A-2, 1.401(a)(9)-3, A-4(a)(2) and 1.401(a)(9)-5,
A-5(b).

If there are multiple beneficiaries and they do establish "separate
accounts" payable to each of them by December 31 of the year after the
year that includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant,
these rules are applied separately to each such "separate account." 2002
Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-8, A-3.
(a)

Warning: the 2002 Regulations provide that if a trust is the
designated beneficiary, and if the spouse is not the sole
beneficiary, then you cannot use the "separate accounts" rule to
determine the applicable distribution period separately for each
beneficiary. You must use the age of the oldest beneficiary for
ALL distributions. 2002 Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-4, A-5(c).
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E.

F.

The Magic of the Fresh Start Rule for the Surviving Spouse Who is the Sole
Beneficiary of the Deceased Owner's IRA
1.

If the surviving spouse is a beneficiary, the surviving spouse has the
option to rollover the benefits payable to the spouse and treat the resulting
IRA as if it always belonged to the surviving spouse.

2.

Result: the deceased owner magically vanishes - and the surviving spouse
can(a)

Designate a new beneficiary or beneficiaries.

(b)

Use the Uniform Lifetime Table to determine the minimum
required distribution during the surviving spouse's lifetime.

(c)

Permit the designated beneficiaries to divide the IRA into separate
accounts upon the death of the surviving spouse and permit each
designated beneficiary to use his or her own life expectancy (use
the Single Life Table, Reg. §I.401(a)(9)-9, A-I) to determine
minimum required distributions.

Calculating Distributions After a IRA Owner/Plan Participant's Death Under the
2002 Regulations: The IRA Owner or Plan Participant Who Dies On or After His
or Her Required Beginning Date
1.

Determine the iden~ity of the "designated beneficiaries as of September 30
of the calendar year following the calendar year that includes the date of
death of the IRA owner or plan participant.

2.

The minimum distribution for the year in which the IRA owner or plan
participant died is calculated based upon the required distribution schedule
of the deceased IRA owner or plan participant (normally, the Uniform
Lifetime Table). 2002 Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-4(a).
(a)

Result: if the deceased IRA owner or plan participant has not
received the required distribution for the year of death, the
beneficiary(ies) must calculate and distribute an amount equal to
the distribution which would otherwise have been required, and do
so before the end of the year in which death occurred.

3.

Required distributions beginning in the year after the year that includes the
date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant will be based on an
"applicable distribution period."

4.

If the surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary, and if the surviving spouse
does not implement the "fresh start" strategy, then the "applicable
distribution period" is the longer of (i) the remaining life expectancy of the
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IRA owner or plan participant, or (ii) the surviving spouse's life
expectancy.
(a)

During the surviving spouse's lifetime, the surviving spouse must
take required distributions over the longer of the remaining life
expectancy of the deceased IRA owner or plan participant (use the
Single Life Table to determine the life expectancy of the deceased
IRA owner or plan participant in the year of death and subtract one
for each subsequent year) or the spouse's life expectancy,
recalculated annually through the use of the Single Life Table,
beginning in the year after the year in which the IRA owner or plan
participant died. 2002. Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(a) and A-5(c)(2).
(i)

Once the surviving spouse dies, any benefits remaining in
the original plan/IRA must be paid out over the remaining
(fixed term) life expectancy of the surviving spouse:
A)

Step One: determine the spouse's life expectancy
using Single Life Table, using spouse's age on
spouse's birthday in the year of spouse's death.

B)

For the calendar year following the calendar year of
the surviving spouse's death, use the life expectancy
you just calculated as the divisor to determine the
required distribution.

C)

For each subsequent calendar year, subtract one
from the previous year's divisor.

(b)

This is the same rule that applies if the IRA owner or plan
participant dies before reaching his or her required beginning date.

(c)

Example. Husband dies at age 75 leaving his IRA to Wife. Wife
chooses not to effect a "fresh start" to treat Husband's IRA as
Spouse's IRA. As long as the IRA remains in Husband's name,
Wife's required distributions for each year are computed based on
Wife's life expectancy as of her birthday in that year (i.e., a
recalculation method) or, if longer, the remaining life expectancy
of Husband (use the Single Life Table to determine the deceased
IRA owner's life expectancy in the year of death and subtract one
for each subsequent year). Wife dies several years later at age 77.
The minimum required distribution for the year of Wife's death is
based on the single life expectancy of an individual age 77 (12.1
years). Subsequent calculations of required distributions now
switch to the "minus one" methodology. For the year after Wife's
death, the divisor is 11.1 (12.1 minus 1). For the next year, the
divisor is 10.1. And so on.
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(i)

5.

6.

If Wife had rolled over the inherited IRA to Wife's own
IRA (or if Wife fails to take what would otherwise have
been the required distribution), Wife could have named
Wife's own "designated beneficiaries" and their life
expectancies would then be used to determine the required
distribution, instead of being limited to exhausting Wife's
remaining life expectancy.

If there is one individual beneficiary, and that beneficiary is not the
surviving spouse, then the "applicable distribution period" is the longer of
the remaining life expectancy of the deceased IRA owner or plan
participant, or the individual beneficiary's life expectancy. The beneficiary
must take required distributions over the longer of the remaining life
expectancy of the deceased IRA owner or plan participant (use the Single
Life Table to determine the life expectancy of the deceased IRA owner or
plan participant in the year of death and subtract one for each subsequent
year) or the beneficiary's life expectancy (use the Single Life Table to
determine the beneficiary's life expectancy in the year of death and
subtract one for each subsequent year), determined based on the individual
beneficiary's age on his or her birthday in the year after the year in which
the IRA owner or plan participant died. Distributions begin in the year
after the year in which the IRA owner or plan participant died. 2002 Reg.
§1.40I(a)(9)-5, A-5(a)(1) and A-5(c)(l). Here are the steps:
(a)

Step One: determine (i) the beneficiary's life expectancy using the
Single Life Table in 2002 Reg. §I.401(a)(9)-9, A-I, using the
beneficiary's age as of the beneficiary's birthday in the calendar
year immediately following the calendar year that includes the date
of death of the IRA owner or plan participant, and (ii) the
remaining life expectancy of the deceased IRA owner or plan
participant using the Single Life Table and the age of the deceased
IRA owner or plan participant as of his or her birthday in the year
of his or her death.

(b)

Step Two: use the larger of the two numbers you just calculated as
the divisor to determine the required distribution for the year
following the year that includes the date of death of the IRA owner
or plan participant.

(c)

Step Three: for each subsequent calendar year, subtract one from
the previous year's divisor.

If there are multiple beneficiaries, and they are all individuals, then, unless
the "separate accounts" rules are invoked, required distributions will be
calculated based upon the life expectancy of the oldest beneficiary
(determined based on his or her age on his or her birthday in the year after
the year in which the IRA owner or plan participant died) or the life
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expectancy of the deceased IRA owner or plan participant, whichever is
larger, beginning by December 31 of the calendar year after the calendar
year that includes the date of death of the IRA owner or plan participant.
7.

If there is one beneficiary, and that beneficiary is not an individual or, if
there are multiple beneficiaries and anyone of them is not an individual
(even if the spouse of the deceased IRA owner or plan participant is one of
the beneficiaries), then, unless the "separate accounts" rule is invoked, the
IRA owner or plan participant is treated as having "no designated
beneficiary."
(a)

IV.

Result: the "applicable distribution period" is the remaining life
expectancy of the IRA owner or plan participant, determined
using the Single Life Table, determined as of the age of the
deceased IRA owner or plan participant on his or her birthday in
the year of his or her death, and reduced by one for each year
thereafter. 2002 Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-5(a)(2) and §1.40I(a)(9)5, A-5(c)(3).

REQUIRED DISTRIBUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL WHO PARTICIPATES
IN MORE THAN ONE ARRANGEMENT
A.

Qualified Plans Must be Treated Separately
Qualified plan participants may not aggregate their balances in multiple qualified
plans, calculate a "combined" required distribution and then allocate the required
distribution among plans.

B.

IRAs May Be Aggregated and the Resulting Required Distribution Allocated
Among the IRAs
1.

The required distribution from each IRAs must be calculated separately.
The resulting required distributions may then be totaled and the total
distribution may be taken from any one or more of the individual IRAs.
2002 Reg. §1.408-8, A-9. This same rule is applied separately to §403(b)
arrangements. 2002 Reg. §1.403(b)-3, A-I(b).

2.

IRAs cannot be aggregated with §403(b) arrangements; distributions from
a Roth IRA cannot be used to satisfy the minimum required distribution
obligations for a traditional IRA or a §403(b) arrangement; and
distributions from a traditional IRA or a §403(b) arrangement cannot be
used to satisfy the minimum required distribution obligations for a Roth
IRA. 2002 Reg. §1.408-8, A-9.

3.

An individual's IRAs held as owner may not be aggregated with IRAs
held as a beneficiary of another person (2002 Reg. § 1.408-8, A-9); an
individual's 403(b) arrangements held as employee may not be aggregated
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with that person's §403(b) arrangements held as beneficiary of another
person (2002 Reg. §1.403(b)-2, A-4).

V.

TO ROLL OVER OR STAY IN A QUALIFIED PLAN
A.

Typical Fact Pattern
Executive (or Physician) has died. Executive/Physician designated Spouse as
beneficiary of Executive/Physician's interest in a qualified plan. Should Spouse
leave the account balance in the qualified retirement plan? Or should Spouse roll
over the distribution to his own IRA?

B.

What Should Be Done If Spouse Is Not The Sole Beneficiary - Or If There Is No
Spouse For Whom The Executive/Physician Could Have Designated As A
Beneficiary?
1.

If Executive/Physician designated multiple beneficiaries only one of
whom is Spouse, then a rollover w_ill not be permitted without further
planning.

2.

Solution #1.
(a)

Cause distributions to be made to the non-spouse beneficiaries
prior to September 30 of the year following the date of death of
Executive/Physician. Spouse will be the sole remaining beneficiary
- and Spouse can rollover the Spouse's share to an IRA.

(b)

Drawback: accelerated distributions to the non-spouse
beneficiaries, none of which can be rolled over.
(i)

3.

If the qualified plan's only payment option is a lump sum
distribution, then the only question is how long the plan is
willing to wait before making that distribution.

Solution #2.
(a)

Cause the qualified plan to use the "separate account" rule to
establish separate accounts for each beneficiary.

(b)

If the qualified plan offers an annuity or installment distribution,
the non-spouse beneficiaries can select that option. The spouse can
elect a lump sum distribution and rollover the distribution to an
IRA.
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c.

Considerations: Claims of Creditors
1.

ERISA Covers Qualified Plans (a)

2.

But Not IRAs

Individual Retirement Accounts, simplified employee pension
plans, SIMPLE IRAs, government plans and most church plans are
not covered under the non-alienation provisions of either ERISA or
the IRC and, therefore, a IRA owner's benefits under such plans
are subject to creditors' claims unless protected under state law.
See ERISA §§4(b) and 201; IRC §401(a); 29 CFR §2510.3-2(d).

Effect of State Law
(a)

Let's use Ohio as an example.

(b)

Effective March, 1999, Ohio H.B. No. 108 amended Ohio Revised
Code ("ORC") Section 2329.66(A)(10)(c) to exempt individual
retirement accounts, Roth IRAs, and Education IRAs from
execution, garnishment, attachment or sale to satisfy a judgment or
order. Although SEPs and SIMPLE IRAs are types of IRAs, the
are not protected under these provisions of Ohio law. amounts
rolled over from a SEP or SIMPLE to a rollover IRA are, however,
protected from creditor claims.

(c)

Will state laws such as Ohio's be honored? Don't count on it. D.
Lampkins v. R.H. Golden, 2002-1 USTC 50,216 (6th Cir. 2002):

(d)

(i)

A Michigan statute exempted IRAs described in Code §408
from garnishment.

(ii)

The district court determined that a law firm's simplified
employee pension plan (a collection ofIRAs described in
§408) was not exempt from garnishment by a fonner
employee to satisfy payment of accrued benefits.

(iii)

The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed: since the antialienation provisions in Code §401 do not apply to IRAs,
ERISA affinnatively authorizes garnishments ofIRAs and
the preemption provisions of ERISA therefore preempt any
state law to the contrary.

Lampkins involved a non-bankruptcy judgment creditor seeking to
garnish a SEP-IRA. By contr~st, In re Mitchell, Christine (2002
BC OH) 2002 WL 31443051, involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding. The court held that the Ohio statute was not
preempted.
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3.

D.

Moral of the story: determine the contingent - or actual-liabilities of
ExecutivelPhysician before deciding whether to advise surviving spouse to
effect a rollover.

Considerations: Effect of State Estate Taxes
1.

2.

Let's use Ohio as an example of a state that(a)

imposes an estate tax,

(b)

which is NOT a "sponge tax."

ORC §5731.09(A) provides:
"Except as provided in division (B) of this section, the value of the gross
estate includes the value of an annuity or other payment receivable by a
beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any [onn of contract
or agreement under which an annuity or similar payment was payable to
the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity
or payment, either alone or in conjunction with another, for the decedent's
life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to the decedent's
death, or for any period which does not in fact end before the decedent's
death.
"However, the value of the gross estate includes only such part of the
value of the annuity or other payment receivable under the contract or
agreement as is proportionate to that part of the purchase price of the
contract or agreement contributed by the decedent. The value of the gross
estate does not include the part of the value of the annuity or other
payment as is proportionate to the part of the purchase price of the
contract or agreement contributed by the employer or fonner employer of
the decedent, whether to an employee's trust or fund fanning part of a
pension, annuity, retirement, bonus, or profit-sharing plan or otherwise, if
the contributions were made by reason of the decedent's employment."

3.

E.

In re Estate of Roberts (2002), 94 Ohio St. 3d 311, the Ohio Supreme
Court has ruled that the second sentence ofORC §5731.09(A) will not
insulate a rollover IRA from taxation: a rollover IRA is included in a
decedent's gross estate for Ohio estate tax purposes. If the decedent had
left her account balance in the qualified plan, then the balance would have
been eligible for the exemption described in ORC §5731.09(A).

Distributions If the Participant Dies Before Attaining the Participant's Required
Beginning Date
1.

This issue arises for a client who is not married or who does not wish to
designate her spouse as beneficiary of her retirement plan interest.
(Remember that, if client is married, she must obtain the consent of her
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spouse to designate someone other than the spouse in many qualified
retirement plans).
2.

3.

F.

If Client dies prior to attaining her required beginning date and Client has
already rolled over her retirement plan distribution to her own IRA, then:
(a)

Distributions need not begin until the year following the year of
Client's death; and

(b)

Minimum required distributions are calculated based on the life
expectancy of the designated beneficiaries.

(c)

Result: Client preserves the beneficiary's ability to defer receipt of
the proceeds and defer imposition of tax.

If Client dies prior to attaining her required beginning date but has not
effected a distribution from the qualified plan, then:
(a)

Distribution options will be controlled by the terms of the plan.
Many defined contribution plans offer only one fonn of benefit
distribution: a lump sum distribution.

(b)

Only spouses can effect a tax-free rollover.

(c)

Result: the lump sum distribution must occur within five years of
death - and there will be no deferral.

Traps for the Unwary in Estate Planning for Retirement Plan Distributions
1.

2.

The Client Who Dies While Still Employed
(a)

The world doesn't come to an end, especially if Spouse is the
designated beneficiary. Spouse can receive a lump sum distribution
(assuming the plan permits one) and rollover the distribution to
the Spouse's own IRA.

(b)

But what if the Client is no longer married and the client
designates children or a trust?
(i)

Only spouses possess the right to rollover distributions
from qualified plans.

(ii)

Result: accelerated distributions to children or trust.

The Client Who Elected an Annuity Form of Distribution
(a)

Client retires. Client receives a qualified joint and survivor annuity
- an annuity for the life of Client and a survivor annuity for the life
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of Client's spouse equal to at least 50% (but not more than 100%)
of the amount of the annuity paid to Client.
(b)

Problem #1: Spouse predeceases Client.
(i)

(c)

VI.

Plan has no obligation to adjust Client's annuity amount.

Problem #2: Client and Spouse divorce.
(i)

Spouse remains the recipient of the survivor annuity.

(ii)

Plan has no obligation to substitute another beneficiary (a
new spouse) for the fonner spouse.

DESIGNATE THE SPOUSE AS BENEFICIARY - OR DESIGNATE A TRUST AS
BENEFICIARY? PRACTICAL POST-EGTRRA PLANNING ISSUES
What should we do for that client the vast bulk of whose estate resides in her
retirement plan or rollover IRA and who does not possess sufficient assets to fund her
credit shelter marital deduction trust. Assume that client is married. should client
designate spouse as beneficiary of the plan/IRA? Or should client designate her credit
shelter marital deduction trust as the beneficiary?
A.

Spouse As Plan Beneficiary
1.

Distribution Upon Death
(a)

2.

The client can designate the client's spouse as the client's IRA
beneficiary. At death, the IRA benefits will be paid to the client's
spouse in the form either provided by the IRA and/or elected by
the client's spouse.

Advantages
(a)

If the client designates the client's spouse as beneficiary, the client
maximizes the period of time over which minimum required
distributions must be made, thus deferring as much income tax
liability as possible.
(i)

If Client dies before attaining age 70-Y2, and if surviving
spouse is about the same age as Client, then surviving
spouse need not begin receiving distributions until Client
would have attained age 70-~.

(ii)

In addition, surviving spouses - and only surviving spouses
- may rollover IRA/plan benefits to their own IRAs and
then designate new beneficiaries.
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(iii)
(b)

3.

B.

Remember: this has no' effect on distributions during
Client's lifetime.

This is the best income tax result, assuming that surviving spouse
and surviving spouse's beneficiaries can and will postpone
distributions from the planlIRA" and live on the minimum required
distributions.

Disadvantages
(a)

Spousal Management. The client may wish to assure professional
management of assets: a trust provides this opportunity; the
surviving spouse mayor may not possess the skill to do so.

(b)

Children From a Previous Marriage. If client has children· from a
previous marriage, client must rely upon surviving spouse to
bequeath client's any remaining retirement plan/IRA benefits to
those children.

(c)

Potential Loss of the Estate Tax Exemption Amount
(i)

If the client's spouse is the outright beneficiary, the client
may lose the use the Federal estate tax exemption amount if
the client does not have other assets equal to the in the
client's own name to be sheltered by the exemption
amount.

(ii)

Accordingly, the client's spouse will possess the entire
IRAJretirement plan interest at the client's spouse's death
and the client never will have used the client's exemption
amount.

AlB Trust As Plan Beneficiary: The Advantages.
1.

Professional Management
(a)

Client is more assured of professional management of assets
through the trust.

(b)

Guarantee Maximization of the Exemption Amount
(i)

If the client's AlB Trust is the beneficiary, the client will
maximize the use the federal estate tax exemption amount,
particularly if the client does not have other assets equal to
exemption amount in the client's own name to be sheltered
by the exemption amount.
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2.

Assure Distribution of Assets to Children/Other Remainder Beneficiaries
(a)

C.

Particularly in the case of clients with children from fonner
marriages, clients can more carefully calibrate which remainder
beneficiaries will receive any remaining assets.

AlB Trust As Plan Beneficiary: The Disadvantages
1.

Accelerated Minimum Required Distributions
(a)

Let's assume that the NB trust qualifies as a designated
beneficiary.
(i)

(ii)

During surviving spouse's lifetime:
A)

If Surviving Spouse is the sole beneficiary of the
AlB Trust, then the minimum required distributions
during surviving spouse's lifetime are the same,
regardless of whether the surviving spouse is the
primary, direct beneficiary of Client's plan/IRA or
the AlB Trust is the primary, direct beneficiary of
Client's AlB trust.

B)

That's the best case. If Surviving Spouse is not the
sole beneficiary (and Surviving Spouse may not be
the sole beneficiary of any portion of the plan/IRA
allocated to the "family trust" - what we
traditionally have called the credit shelter trust - ),
then (i) we may face a situation in which we have
non-spouse beneficiaries, and (ii) instead of being
able to wait until the participant would have
attained age 70~, distributions must commence by
the conclusion of the calendar year following the
year in which the Participant died.

After Surviving Spouse's Death
A)

2.

We have lost the ability for surviving spouse to
rollover the distribution to surviving spouse's own
IRA and designate new beneficiaries.

Income Tax Imposed on the Trust
(a)

The purpose for designating the AlB Trust as beneficiary of the
plan/IRA is to assure the use of the "exemption amount." At the
same time, we wish to avoid the acceleration of income tax when
compared to the result we obtain if Surviving Spouse is the
beneficiary.
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(b)

(c)

D.

Issue #1: For trust accounting purposes, how will distributions
from a planIIRA be treated? This is an important issue: if, for
example, the credit shelter trust provides that all income will be
distributed to the Spouse and/or lineal descendants, then the
characterization of the plan/IRA distribution as "income" for trust
accounting purposes will flush the distribution out of the credit
shelter trust.
(i)

Result: the credit shelter trust will never accumulate any
assets.

(ii)

State "principal and income acts." Let's use Ohio's
Principal and Income Act as an example. It can be read to
characterize plan/IRA distributions as principal, not
Income.

(iii)

Ohio's Principal and Income Act can also be read to
characterize those distributions as income.

(iv)

One solution: draft the credit shelter trust language so that
income distributions are not mandatory.

Issue #2: For income tax purposes, how will the distribution be
taxed? It is income. If the distributions occur too quickly, then not
only will the credit shelter trust be depleted, but a real loss of
wealth will occur: by accelerating the time at which income taxes
are paid, the growth on the tax paid is also lost.

Can We Really Get The Estate Tax Marital Deduction If We Designate The AJB
Trust As Beneficiary?
1.

Objectives
(a)

Assume that Client wishes to designate AJB Trust rather than
Spouse as beneficiary of Client's IRAs/retirement plans so as to (i)
assure that the credit shelter fund ("Fund B") is funded, (ii) avoid
burdening Spouse with the need to manage such a large sum of
money, and (iii) assure that as much as possible ends up with
Client's lineal descendants.

(b)

To maximize that possibility, Client learns that the marital
deduction fund ("Fund A") may be drafted in either of two ways:
(i)

Spouse possesses control over all of the income and the
principal of Fund A. Although this is the simpler of the two
choices (and will be the easiest to explain to Spouse and
continue to live happily with Spouse), it means that Spouse
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may at any time cause the trustee to accelerate distributions
from the plans/IRAs.
(ii)

2

QTIP Principles
(a)

3.

To satisfy the QTIP rules, the surviving spouse must have the
unqualified right to receive all of the income from the property
payable at least annually. Code §§2056(b)(5) and
2056(b)(7)(B)(ii). This requirement will conflict with the desire to
minimize distributions from the IRAlretirement plan to the AlB
Trust.

Rev. Rul. 2000-2
(a)

4.

Use the "qualified terminal interest property" ("QTIP")
rules and make Fund A a QTIP trust. That limits Spouse's
access to principal, and therefore reduces Spouse's .
plan/IRA interests to that required to satisfy the QTIP rules.

Rev. Rul. 2000-2, 2000-3 I.R.B. 305 (January 18, 2000):
distributions from an IRA to a trust qualify for the marital
deduction as qualified terminable interest property if all of these
requirements are met:
(i)

The trustee must elect to treat the IRA and the QTIP trust
as QTIP property.

(ii)

Each year, an amount sufficient to satisfy the required
minimum distribution, and an amount at least equal to all of
the income on the undistributed portion of the IRA, must be
distributed.

(iii)

The QTIP trust, at least annually for the lifetime of the
Spouse, must pay the Spouse both the income earned on the
undistributed portion of the IRA to which the QTIP trust is
beneficiary plus the income the QTIP trust earns on IRA
distributions.

Waming: Watch Out for Plan/IRA Language
(a)

IRAlretirement plan language must permit distributions in amounts
sufficient to satisfy these rules.

(b)

IRAs are usually not a problem: they allow beneficiaries to
withdraw as much as they like, whenever they so desire.

(c)

But qualified plans rarely do so.
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5.

Can We Satisfy Our Objective? Yes, If We are Careful
(a)

(b)

E.

The objective in this exercise is to accumulate the exemption
amount in the credit shelter trust. If this is not accomplished, then
the ability to shelter the exemption amount from tax in both
Client's and Spouse's estate will be lost.
(i)

Rev. Rul. 2000-2 already poses a hazard that militates
against accumulation of plan/IRA amounts in the marital
deduction/QTIP trust.

(ii)

State principal and income acts pose a similar hazard.
Ohio's principal and income act can be interpreted to
characterize distributions to the trust from the plan/IRA as
income, not principal.

Solution: make sure that the credit shelter trust does not require
distributions of all income.

If We Designate the AlB Trust, Do We Care How Trust Assets Are Divided
Between the "Marital Trust" and the "Family Trust"? Watch Out: The Rules
Governing "Income in Respect of a Decedent" Can Lay Waste to The Estate Plan
1.

2.

What is "Income in Respect of a Decedent"?
(a)

A decedent's estate often includes assets which, if the decedent
had not died, would have been taxable income ifhe or she
remained alive.

(b)

IRD includes the untaxed contributions and earnings in a
retirement plan or traditional IRA.

(c)

These arrangements have been funded with pre-tax dollars and, if
the decedent had remained alive, distributions from the retirement
plans would have been included in the decedent's taxable income.

IRD, Retirement Plan/IRA Assets, and the Tax Effect of the IRD Rules
(a)

The fair market value of plan/IRA assets are included in the
decedent's gross estate for purposes of determining estate tax
liability. IRC §§2001, 2003.

(b)

In addition, the person who receives an IRD asset must pay income
tax upon the receipt of the IRD income. IRC §691.

(c)

In essence, the value of the IRD asset is taxed twice: as income to

the ultimate recipient of the asset; and as part of the decedent's
gross estate.

(d)

3.

(i)

The deduction is a miscellaneous itemized deduction.
Unlike the other miscellaneous itemized deductions, it is
not subject to the 2% "floor" on this category of deduction.

(ii)

Under Code §68, the amount of itemized deductions
othelWise allowable for a year is reduced by the lesser of (i)
3 percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the
"applicable amount," or (ii) 80 percent of the amount of
certain itemized deductions otherwise allowable for the tax
year. Near the end of each year, the IRS issues a revenue
procedure containing inflation-adjusted "applicable
amounts" used to calculate the limitation for the following
tax year.

(iii)

NB: EGTRRA softens the blow inflicted by the phase-out
of itemized deductions.

IRD and Marital Deduction/Credit Shelter Allocation Fonnulas
(a)

Normally, periodic distributions that constitute IRD are not
recognized as income for income tax purposes until they are
actually received. But~ if IRD is "transferred," recognition is
accelerated. Code §691(a)(2); PLR 9324024.

(b)

Assume that the AlB Trust uses a pecuniary share marital
deduction fonnula to allocate trust assets between Fund A and
Fund B, including the asset that consists of the right to future
distributions from a retirement plan or IRA. Result: the current fair
market value of the future payments from the retirement plan/IRA
is immediately recognized and included in income for income tax
purposes.

. (c)

VII.

IRC §691 (c) allows the person who receives the IRD income and
pays the respective income tax a deduction equal to the amount of
estate taxes which were paid with respect to the IRD asset.

Solution: use a fractional share marital deduction formula instead
of a pecuniary share marital deduction formula.

TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY IN ESTATE PLANNING FOR A TRUST THAT IS
THE BENEFICIARY OF AN IRA
A.

- Multiple Beneficiaries
1.

First, if a trust is a beneficiary, and if there is more than one beneficiary of
the trust, the applicable distribution period that must be used to determine
the period over which distributions to the trust must be made from the IRA
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will be based on the age of the oldest beneficiary. 2002 Reg. §1.401(a)(9)4, A-5(c).
2.

If one (or the only) "designated beneficiary" is other than an individual,
then the IRA owner will be treated as having no beneficiary.
(a)

Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, Q&A-3.
Q-3. Maya person other than an individual be considered to be a
designated beneficiary for purposes of section 40 1(a)(9)?
A-3. No, only individuals may be designated beneficiaries for
purposes of section 40 1(a)(9). A person that is not an individual,
such as the employee's estate, may not be a designated beneficiary.
If a person other than an individual is designated as a beneficiary
of an employee's benefit, the employee will be treated as having
no designated beneficiary for purposes of section 40 I (a)(9), even if
there are also individuals designated as beneficiaries.

(b)

(c)

If the IRA owner dies before reaching his or her required
beginning date:
(i)

If the IRA owner is treated as having no designated
beneficiary, the entire IRA must be distributed within five
years.

(ii)

This is far worse than the result we could achieve if the
IRA owner's IRA beneficiary qualifies as a designated
beneficiary.
A)

If there is only one beneficiary of the trust and it's
the spouse, we could wait until surviving spouse
attained age 70-1/2 and then use the life expectancy
of the surviving spouse (recalculated each year
using the Single Life Table based on the surviving
spouse's attained age in the year in question).

B)

If there is more than one individual beneficiary and
no non-individual trust beneficiaries, we could use
the Single Life Table to determine the life
expectancy of the oldest individual and subtract "1"
for each subsequent year.

If the IRA owner dies on or after attaining age 70-1/2:
(i)

If the IRA owner is treated as having no designated
beneficiary, then we use the Single Life Table to detennine
the IRA owner's life expectancy as of the owner's birthday
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in the year of following the year of death and subtract" 1"
for each subsequent year.
(ii)

3.

B.

It: on the other hand, there are no non-individual trust
beneficiaries, then we could we could use the Single Life
Table to determine the life expectancy of the oldest
individual and subtract "1" for each subsequent year.

That means that we care about the universe of "designated beneficiaries."
We want to avoid two types of beneficiaries of the trust:
(a)

Non-individual beneficiaries, especially if the IRA owner has not
attained his or her required beginning date.

(b)

Very old beneficiaries - when compared to the vast majority of the
remaining beneficiaries.

The Case of the Contingent Beneficiary: The Applicable Portions of the
Regulations
1.

Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7(b):
(b) Contingent beneficiary. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(I) of this
A-7, if a beneficiary's entitlement to an employee's benefit after the
employee's death is a contingent right, such contingent beneficiary is
nevertheless considered to be a beneficiary for purposes of determining
whether a person other than an individual is designated as a beneficiary
(resulting in the employee being treated as having no designated
beneficiary under the rules of A-3 of §1.401 (a)(9)-4) and which
designated beneficiary has the shortest life expectancy under paragraph (a)
of this A-7.

2.

Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-5, A-7(c)(I):
"A person will not be considered a beneficiary for purposes of
determining who is the beneficiary with the shortest life expectancy under
paragraph (a) of this A-7, or whether a person who is not an individual is a
beneficiary, merely because the person could become the successor to the
interest of one of the employee's beneficiaries after that beneficiary's
death. However, the preceding sentence does not apply to a person who
has any right (including a contingent right) to an employee's benefit
beyond being a mere potential successor to the interest of one of the
employee's beneficiaries upon that beneficiary's death. Thus, for example,
if the first beneficiary has a right to all income with respect to an
employee's individual account during that beneficiary's life and a second
beneficiary has a right to the principal but only after the death of the first
income beneficiary (any portion of the principal distributed during the life
of the first income beneficiary to be held in trust until that first
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beneficiary's death), both beneficiaries must be taken into account in
determining the beneficiary with the shortest life expectancy and whether
only individuals are beneficiaries."
C.

The Case of the Contingent Beneficiary: The Risk of the Older Beneficiary
1.

PLR 200228025 illustrates the risks of including, among the universe of
contingent beneficiaries, individuals who are much older than the primary
beneficiaries.

2.

Before her death in 1999, Grantor established four IRA accounts and
named a trust as beneficiary of the four IRAs. The trust became
irrevocable upon Grantor's death and the trustee satisfied the
documentation requirements so that the applicable distribution period
could be based on the age of the oldest beneficiary.

3.

(a)

The primary beneficiaries of the trust were the grantor's two minor
grandchildren.

(b)

The trust provided that distributions would be made to support the
grandchildren until age 30, when each beneficiary could withdraw
his or her entire share. If either beneficiary died before attaining
age 30, the trust provided that the beneficiary's entire share would
be distributed to the other beneficiary. If both beneficiaries died
before attaining age 30, the trust provided that it would be
distributed in its entirety to contingent beneficiaries who were
much older than the primary beneficiaries. (According to the
ruling, the oldest contingent beneficiary named in the trust was 67
- the same age as the grantor.

The IRS concluded that the old, contingent beneficiaries could not be
disregarded:
(a)

Beneficiaries whose entitlement to the IRA owner's benefit is
contingent on any event other than the death of a "prior"
beneficiary must be considered for purposes of detennining which
beneficiary has the shortest life expectancy and, as such, who is the
designated beneficiary for purposes of §401(a)(9).

(b)

In the trust described in the ruling, the IRS noted that the discretion
the trustee possessed with respect to the payment of trust amounts
to the grandchildren, who were the primary beneficiaries,,is a
contingency over and above the death of a prior beneficiary:

"The Trust X language does not require that the payments from the
IRA Accounts be paid to the Grandchildren on an annual basis and
therefore Trust X language does not preclude there being an
accumulation of distributions from the IRA Accounts. Under such
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circumstances, the Contingent Beneficiaries must be considered in
determining the beneficiary with the shortest life expectancy."
4.

5.

D.

E.

Solutions that should work
(a)

Solution #1: Draft the trust instrument so that payments from IRAs
must be distributed in their entirety in the year of receipt to the
primary beneficiary.

(b)

Solution #2: Make sure that the contingent beneficiaries are all
younger than the primary beneficiaries - or at least not much older.

A solution that probably won't work
(a)

The suggested solution: instead of simply relying on the trust
instrument to divide an IRA into separate IRAs, one for each
beneficiary, use the IRA beneficiary designation to create separate
IRAs and, in addition, in the IRA beneficiary designation fonn,
designate separate sub-trusts within the trust as the designated
beneficiary of each of the separate IRA.

(b)

PLR 200317043: the taxpayer requesting this private letter ruling
was the oldest beneficiary of a trust in which the IRA owner had
completed just such an IRA beneficiary designation fonn. The
taxpayer asked the IRS to rule that each beneficiary of each subtrust could use his or her own life expectancy. The IRS rejected
that request: the life expectancy of the oldest beneficiary must be
used by all beneficiaries.

The Case of the Contingent Beneficiary: The Risk of Allowing the Trust to Pay
Estate Taxes or Expenses of Administration
1.

If the trust has been drafted to obligate the trustee to pay estate taxes or
expenses of administration, then the estate becomes a beneficiary - and is
not a contingent beneficiary. Since it is not an individual, we have
accidentally accelerated the period of time over which IRA distributions
must be made.

2.

Solution: pay all such expenses prior to September 30 of the year
following the year of death of the IRA owner.

A True Trap For The Unwary: If A Trust Is The Designated Beneficiary, Who
Should Be Shown As The Owner Of The Decedent's IRA?
1.

Typical fact pattern.
(a)

Decedent owns IRA and has designated Trust as the beneficiary.
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2.

3.

4.

(b)

Decedent is a widow. Decedent's trust directs the trustee to divide
the trust assets into separate shares, one for each of Decedent's
then living adult children and one share collectively for the then
living lineal descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes. The
trust instrument provides that the trustee will immediately
distribute the assets of any trust established for the benefit of a
child.

(c)

Decedent has four children, all of whom are alive, ranging in age
from 40 to 48.

The issue
(a)

Each of the children is entitled to an immediate distribution of all
of the assets held. in the child's trust. Those assets include a 1/4
interest in the IRA.

(b)

Each child would like to defer receipt of the IRA as long as
possible.

(c)

The trustee would like to wash hislher/its hands of the trust.

The mechanics
(a)

Divide the IRA into four separate, equal IRAs.

(b)

Allow each child to directly receive amounts from the IRA, thus
bypassing the need to involve the trustee.

(c)

Avoid having to include the entire IRA balance in the year of the
"distribution" of the right to receive the IRA.

The solution
(a)

Be very careful who is listed as the owner of each of the newly
created IRAs.

(b)

In Private Letter Ruling 200228023, IRA owner named his son as
the beneficiary. Shortly after his father's death, the IRA
beneficiary transferred some of the IRA assets to a new IRA
account, titled "Beneficiary IRA rollover to be maintained for the
benefit of [the Beneficiary]" (instead of "IRA of Owner, deceased,
for benefit of beneficiary").
(i)

Revenue Ruling 78-406, 1978-2 C.B. 157, provides that the
direct transfer of funds from one IRA trustee to another
IRA trustee does not result in the funds being treated as
paid or distributed to an IRA owner and the transfer does
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not constitute a rollover. Furthennore, the revenue ruling
states that its conclusion will apply whether the transfer is
initiated by the bank trustee or the IRA holder.

(c)

F.

(ii)

The necessity of the first point is clear: if division of the
decedent's IRA into separate IRAs for the benefit of each
of the children constitutes a distribution, the children lose
the benefits of deferral. Since surviving spouses are the
only beneficiaries who may effect a tax-free rollover of a
decedent's IRA, the children wish to avoid characterizing
the process of dividing the decedent's IRA as a rollover.

(iii)

The IRS ruled that the transfer could not be deemed a taxfree trustee-to-trustee transfer~ Therefore, the IRS ruled
that the attempted trustee-to-trustee transfer in fact resulted
in a full taxable distribution of the IRA to the son.

On the other hand, in Private Letter Ruling 200228025, the owner
of the new IRA was established in the name of the deceased IRA
owner for the benefit of the beneficiary. The IRS held that this
qualified as a tax-free transfer.

What If The Spouse Is The Beneficiary Of The Trust - Can The Spouse Effect A
Rollover of an IRA for Which the Trust is the Designated Beneficiary in Order to
Gain The Benefits Of The Fresh Start?
1.

There are numerous private letter rulings in which a trust was named a
beneficiary of an IRA, but the surviving spouse was allowed to treat the
IRA as having been received by the surviving spouse directly, thereby
allowing for a spousal rollover. These private letter rulings provide a
variety of factors which, when satisfied, allow for this treatment.

2.

In Private Letter Ruling 9811008, the IRS ruled that a trust in which the
spouse had the power to revoke the trust could be ignored and the spouse
could be treated as having received the IRA directly from the decedent.

3.

In Private·Letter Ruling 20011062, the IRS ruled that where the surviving

spouse was the sole trustee of the trust, as well as the income beneficiary
with the power to demand payment of a portion or all of the trust
principal, and the spouse did request payment of the remaining IRA assets,
the surviving spouse could be treated as having received the IRA proceeds
from the decedent and not from the trust, and therefore allowed a spousal
rollover.
4.

In Private Letter Ruling 199943055, when the spouse was the sole trustee,
and had discretion to allocate the IRA assets in a trust to a subtrust of
which she was the only beneficiary, the IRS ruled that the surviving
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spouse received the IRA proceeds directly from the decedent rather than
through the trust.
.
5.

In each of these private letter rulings, in order to be able to disregard the
trust and allow the spouse to be treated as the direct beneficiary of the
IRA, the spouse either:

(i) had the power to revoke the trust, or
(ii) was the sole trustee of the trust.

VIII. HOW ABOUT A VALUATION DISCOUNT FOR ESTATE TAX PURPOSES FOR
AN IRA?
A.

The Issue
Can an estate claim a valuation discount for Federal estate tax purposes for an
IRA, arguing that the present value of the IRA should be diminished by the
present value of the Federal income tax that the IRA beneficiaries must pay on
distributions from the IRA?

B.

IRS Says, No.
1.

In TAM 200247001, the IRS concluded that the value ofa decedent's IRA
should not be discounted for estate tax purposes to reflect income taxes
that will be payable by the beneficiaries upon receipt of distributions from
the IRA, or to reflect the effect of prohibitions on the transfer or the
assignment of the IRA prior to distribution to the beneficiary.

2.

In Estate of Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 222 (1977), during her
lifetime, the decedent sold stock in exchange for a promissory note. The
decedent properly elected to report the gain on. this sale ratably as each
payment was received, under the installment method pursuant to §453.
The decedent died before the note was satisfied. In determining the value
of the note includible in the gross estate, decedent's executor discounted
the note to reflect the potential income taxes that would be payable on
receipt of subsequent installment payments. The court concluded that
under the "willing buyer-willing seller" standard of the regulations,
property is to be valued at the price a hypothetical willing buyer would
pay a willing seller and not the intrinsic value of the property in the hands
of the individual decedent or his beneficiaries. In this case, on purchase of
the note, a willing buyer's basis in the note would be increased to the
purchase price, and thus, the buyer would not incur any income tax on
receipt of the installments.

(i)

According to the court in Robinson, the fact that the willing seller
might incur income tax on the sale of the note does not affect the
sales price. Accordingly, a willing buyer would not take potential
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income tax into account in determining what he would be willing
to pay for the note, and a willing seller would not accept any
discount for potential income tax in determining the price of sale.
The court also noted that taking potential income tax into account
would require consideration of many factors that are peculiar to the
individual decedent, the decedent's estate and the beneficiaries.
Consideration of these subjective factors would not be consistent
with the "willing buyer-willing seller" standard that looks to
hypothetical parties.
(ii)

3.

4.

Finally, the court in Robinson stated that Congress focused on the
problem of income tax inherent in certain assets included in the
gross estate by allowing an income tax deduction under section
691(c). As discussed above, section 691(c) provides an income tax
deduction determined by reference to the estate tax attributable to
the assets. The court reasoned that Congress recognized that an
installment obligation which includes income in respect of a
decedent is subject to both income tax and estate tax. Congress
chose to ameliorate the impact of the income taxation of the
property by allowing an income tax deduction under section
691 (c). The court found that there was no basis for supplementing
this income tax relief with additional estate tax relief.

The IRS concluded that the Robinson court's rationale is equally
applicable in the case involving the valuation of an IRA.
(i)

As was the case in Robinson, the IRS concluded that fact that these
assets are subject to income tax on distribution, should not impact
on the application of the "willing buyer- willing seller" standard.
The situation is analogous to that presented where a donor transfers
low basis property by gift. The value of the gift for gift tax
purposes is the undiscounted value of the property because that is
the amount a willing buyer would be willing to pay for the
property, and it is also the minimum amount for which the willing
seller would sell the property. The fact that the donee might incur
income tax upon a later sale of the property does not decrease the
value of the gift, which is determined under the "willing buyerwilling seller" standard.

(ii)

Just as in Robinson, the adverse impact of the potential income tax
inherent in the IRAs is alleviated by the §691(c) deduction.

The IRS rejected the arguments for a lack of marketability discount.
Although §408(e) imposes penalties on the transfer or assignment of the
IRA, there are no restrictions preventing the distribution of assets to the
beneficiaries after decedent's death. The beneficiaries can request that the
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.custodian distribute the assets of the IRAs and the beneficiaries can then
sell the assets to any willing buyer. Furthermore, short administrative
delays in processing the beneficiaries' request for distribution should not
warrant a discount. The underlying assets are marketable, so no valuation
discount should apply.
5.

The IRS refused to apply the principles in Eisenberg v. Commissioner,
155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998).
(i)

In Eisenberg, the taxpayer transferred shares of her closely held

corporation to her son and grandchildren. On her gift tax return,
the taxpayer discounted the value of the gifts to reflect potential
capital gains tax liabilities that may be incurred if the corporation
liquidated, or distributed or sold its appreciated assets, even though
no liquidation or distribution was planned at the time of the gift.
The court held that with the repeal of the doctrine of General
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, neither the corporation, if it sold the
assets, nor a shareholder, ifhe liquidated the corporation, could
avoid imposition of capital gains tax on the appreciated assets. The
court applied the "willing buyer-willing seller" standard and
determined that a hypothetical buyer would take the corporation's
built-in capital gains tax liability into account in determining the
value of the stock. The Service acquiesced in Eisenberg to the
extent that it holds that a discount for potential capital gain tax is
not precluded as a matter of law. A.O.D. 1999-01.
(ii)

The IRS took the position that the situation in Eisenberg is
distinguishable from the facts involving an IRA. Upon sale of the
stock of the corporation, a hypothetical buyer of the stock in
Eisenberg will obtain a cost basis for the stock that he purchases,
but the corporation's basis in its assets will not change. When the
corporation liquidates or distributes the assets, a capital gains tax
will be imposed. This potential liability reduces the inherent value
of the corporation to the buyer. However, in the case of the IRA,
"if we assume arguendo that the IRAs could be sold, the
hypothetical buyer, as in Estate of Robinson, would receive a cost
basis in the assets and would not incur any income tax on the
resale of those assets, unless the assets appreciate in value.
Therefore, the hypothetical buyer will be willing to pay the full
value of the underlying assets for the IRA. Although the seller
might incur income tax on the sale (see §408(e)(2)), this income
tax liability cannot be the basis for an estate tax valuation
discount."

(iii)

The IRS also rejected the notion that IRA assets should be viewed
as assets separate and apart from the IRA itself. "Rather, an IRA is
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a custodial arrangement and the stocks, bonds, and mutual funds
held in the IRA are properly viewed as individual assets no
different than stocks and bonds held in a brokerage account.
(iv)
6.

The IRS noted that §691 (c) did not provide any relief to the
taxpayer in Eisenberg, whereas it does in the case of the IRA.

The IRS also refused to apply Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d
515 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'g 108 T.C. 412 (1997), nonacq. 2000-19 IRB 1
(May 8, 2000).
(i)

"In Estate of Smith, prior to his death, the decedent had been paid

oil and gas royalties and had reported the payments as incoJ}le.
Subsequently, the corporate payor of the royalties sued the
decedent for $2.48 million dollars, claiming the payments had been
excessive by that amount. The proceeding was still pending at the
time of decedent's death. Fifteen months after decedents' death,
the estate settled the suit for $681,840. The estate claimed a
deduction under section 2053, as a claim against the estate, for
$2.48 million, the amount the decedent was being sued for at the
date of death. The Fifth Circuit held that the amount deductible
was the value of the claim as of the date of death determined
without consideration of the post-death settlement. Further, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the inco~e tax benefit inuring to the
estate under §1341 (providing relief in the form of an income tax
deduction or credit to taxpayers who are forced to repay an amount
previously taken into income) was one of the factors to be
considered in valuing the claim, and was not to be included as a
separate asset, as the Tax Court had concluded."
(ii)

"Similarly, in the instant case, it could be argued that tax benefit
available under §691(c) is merely a factor to be taken into account
in determining the appropriate discount."

(iii)

"However, as discussed above, §691(c) specifically addresses
income tax inherent in assets that are also subject to estate tax and
provides a statutory remedy, a reduction in income tax, to alleviate
the situation. This income tax reduction operates in lieu of an
estate tax reduction in the fonn of a valuation discount. In view of
§691(c), the Fifth Circuit's approach in Estate of Smith would not
apply in the instant case."
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IX.

PLANNING FOR CHARITABLE BENEFICIARIES OF QUALIFIED PLANS
ANDIRAs
A.

Consider Designating A Charity As The Outright Beneficiary Of Retirement
Plan/IRA Benefits for Clients With Substantial Estates Plus IRAs or Retirement
Plan Assets
1.

B.

Instead of designating the children of the IRA owner or plan participant as
beneficiaries of the IRA or plan, consider designating a charity as the
beneficiary or retirement plan.
(a)

The justification: heirs will be sufficiently provided for with the
estate's non-IRA assets.

(b)

The IRNplan assets not only will be subject to estate tax but also
will be subject to income taxation in the hands of the children -for
whom the deduction for estate taxes imposed on the IRNplan asset
may not offset the cost of the estate tax. This may subject the IRA
or plan asset to a high aggregate rate of tax.

2.

The IRD income would be recognized by the charitable organization, and
because the charity is exempt from paying income tax, the IRD tax
liability disappears.

3.

The value of the IRA benefits are included in Client's gross estate.
However, the estate-is entitled to a deduction under Code §2055(a) for the
value of the assets transferred to the charity. As a result, there will be no
estate tax liability with respect to the IRA assets.

4.

The children give up the net after-tax proceeds - but the charity receives
the entire IRA or plan tax-free.

Consider The Use Of A Charitable Remainder Trust As The Beneficiary Of The
Retirement Plan/IRA
1.

The family preserves an income stream.

2.

Clients generate an estate tax charitable contribution and shelter the
income to charity from reduction by income taxes.

3.

This helps the family: they can satisfy charitable obligations via the
charitable remainder trust's tax savings - money that would have
otherwise been paid in taxes - and free up other income for investment.
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C.

Interesting Tax Issues Created When Charitable Remainder Trusts are Designated
as Beneficiaries of IRAs or Qualified Plans
1.

Tax Consequences To The Income Beneficiary Of A Charitable
Remainder Trust
(a)

Amounts distributed by a charitable remainder trust to a noncharitable recipient are taxable to the recipient.

(b)

The Code establishes a four-tiered system to determine the
character of the income received by the income beneficiary. IRC
§664(b).

(c)

(i)

Payments are first treated as ordinary income to the extent
of the sum of the trust's ordinary income for the taxable
/ year of the trust and its undistributed ordinary income for
prior years. IRC §664(b)(1).

(ii)

Payments are then treated as capital gain to the extent of
the trust's undistributed capital gains. IRC §664(b)(2).

(iii)

Payments are next treated as other income to the extent of
the sum of the trust's other income for the taxable year and
its undistributed other income for prior years. IRe
§664(b)(3).

(iv)

Finally, any additional payments are treated as a
distribution of trust corpus. IRC §664(b)(4}.

In the typical example of a donor/income beneficiary contributing
a highly appreciated, low basis asset to a charitable remainder
trust, and the trust subsequently selling the asset, the trust will
generate large amounts of capital gain initially. Therefore, trust
distributions may often be comprised of both ordinary income and
capital gain income. This classification benefits high tax bracket
income beneficiaries, since the capital gains portion will be taxed
at a federal tax rates far lower than the Federal tax rate on ordinary
Income.

(i)

Example. Suppose Client and Client's Spouse have created
a charitable remainder unitrust, and they are to receive an
annual payment equal to 10% of the trust value,
redetermined annually. If the initial value of the trust is
$1,023,058, the required first annual payment would be
$102,306. However, suppose in year 1 the trust assets only
earned $80,000. the $102,306 distribution would be
characterized first as $80,000 of ordinary income, and then
$22,306 of capital gain income.
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2.

3.

How Should Distributions From A Qualified Retirement Plan/IRA To A
Charitable Remainder Trust Be Treated For Code §664(b) Purposes?
(a)

Choice #1: Since a charitable remainder trust is exempt from
Federal income tax, distributions from a plan/IRA lose their
character as income for Code §664(b) when received by the
charitable remainder trust.

(b)

Choice #2: The tax exempt status of the charitable remainder trust
is irrelevant. So is the characterization of these distributions as
principal for trust accounting purposes under the applicable
Principal and Income statute. Therefore, all distributions from the
IRA to the charitable remainder trust are treated as ordinary
income and all subsequent distributions from the charitable
remainder trust to the beneficiaries are also treated as ordinary
income under Code §664(b)(1) until distributions from the
charitable remainder trust exceed the value of the distributions
from the Plan/IRA to the charitable remainder trust.

(c)

Guess which position the IRS has taken? Yes, a taxpayer asked the
IRS which one was correct - and suggested that Choice #2 was
correct. PLR 9634019.

(d)

Result: we can have our cake (deferral) but we can't eat it, too
(escape Federal income tax).

Can Client Claim An Estate Tax Charitable Contribution Deduction For
The Value Of A Charity's Remainder Interest In A Charitable Remainder
Trust?
(a)

Since the CRT qualifies as a charitable remainder unitrust under
§664 of the Code, the value of the remainder interest passing to
charity will qualify for the federal estate tax charitable deduction
under §2055(a).

(b)

Upon Client's death, the proceeds of Client's IRA will constitute
IRD. However, since the CRT will be a qualified charitable
remainder trust, it will not be taxable on its income.

(c)

Distributions from the CRT to the income beneficiary will
constitute ordinary income.
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4.

Can Client Claim An Estate Tax Marital Deduction For A Surviving
Spouse's Income Interest In a Charitable Remainder Trust That Is A
Beneficiary Of A Qualified Plan or IRA?
(a)

In PLR 9253038, the IRS ruled that Client's estate would be
entitled to claim the estate tax marital deduction for the value of
the CRT income interest to which Wife was entitled.

(b)

Since the CRT is a qualified charitable remainder trust for
purposes of §2056(b)(8) of the Code and, after the death of Client,
Spouse (assuming Spouse survives Client) will be the only
noncharitable beneficiary of the charitable remainder trust, the
present value of the Wife's interest in property passing from the
Plan to the CRT as a result of the Donor's death will qualify for the
estate tax marital deduction under §2056(a).
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SECTIOND

Split Dollar Plans in General
Split dollar life insurance plans are a technique for an employer to provide an employee
with life insurance protection for the employee's family as part of the company's employee
benefit plan.
There are two basic types of split-dollar arrangements: (1) the "endorsement method"
typically is structured with the policy being owned by the employer, who endorses the contract
so that a portion of the death benefit is payable to the employee's beneficiary; the employer
pays the

premium~

thereby providing the employee with an economic benefit, but reserves the

right to be repaid its premiums out of the death benefit or the cash value of the policy; and (2)
the "collateral assignment method" where the employee (or an ILIT) owns the policy and the
employer loans the funds with which the premium i spaid; t he employee (or ILIT) uses the
policy as collateral to repay the employer.
The tax treatment of these split-dollar plans has never been explained in the Internal
Revenue Code or, at least until now, its Regulations. Rather, the Service has expressed its
views in a number of Revenue Rulings, most significantly Rev. Rul. 64-328. 1 The Service has
ruled that these transactions are not interest free loans; rather, the employer is providing an
economic benefit. The employee must pay income tax on this benefit; however, the employer
does not receive a deduction for its payment/loan. 2 This is an unusual situation where the
employee must report as taxable income dollars which the employer cannot deduct.
Rev. Rut. 64-328 provided that the amount of this economic benefit to the employee
was either (a) the term insurance cost of providing the death benefit, as determined under the
1

1964 C.B. 11

2

Field Advisory 98-252 reconfmned this taxable benefit analysis under the present law after adoption of Section 7872 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended

(hereafter the "Code").
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PS 58.rates3 or (b) the insurer's lower, generally available, published one year term rate. 4 The
alternative rate must be one published by the issuer of the policy (not a parent or subsidiary),
has to be for the same amount of coverage and has to be for yearly renewable term insurance. 5
Rev. Rut. 67-1546 limited the optional term rates to those quoted for original issue insurance
(excluding any form of insurance purchased with policy dividends).
The employee is subject to income tax based on these calculations, regardless of the
actual premium paid on the policy.
Rev. Rut. 66-110 also provided that the employee must report as taxable income any
"other benefit" which the insured receives as a result of the arrangement. This "other benefit"
could presumably include the amount by which the policy's cash surrender value exceeds the
cumulative employer paid premiums (where the employer may only recover the amount of its
premium payments). That is, the employer in any other transaction would be entitled to the
earnings on its loan; in the case of a split-dollar transaction, on the other hand, those earnings
are being used to provide a benefit to the employee (life insurance protection), which
represents an income taxable benefit to the employee.
Finally, Rev. Rut. 64-328 provided that the death proceeds are not taxable income to
either the employer or the employee, based on the assumption that there had been no "transfer
for value" for purposes of Code Section 101(a).
These income tax consequences were extended to the gift and estate tax laws by Rev.
Ruls. 78-4207 and 81-198. 8 The Service ruled that the amount of gift made by the employee

3

Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228 provided a table of then current tenn insurance rates, which were then multiplied by the death benefit under the policy net after return of

the employer's cumulative contributions.
4

Rev. RuI66-110, 1966-1 C.B. 13.

5

PLR 9452004 and TAM 9918060

6

1967-1 C.B. 11

7

1978-2 C.B. 67.

8

1981-2 C.B. 188.
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each year to the policy owner (typically an irrevocable trust) was equal to the amount of the
employee's income each year.

Notice 2001-10

Notice 2001-10 9 discusses split-dollar arrangements in general terms and adopts interim
rules to be used until "final guidance" is provided by the Service. While the Notice is written
in terms of employer provided split-dollar plans, its principles would apply to third party
owned employment arrangements and private split-dollar plans. The Notice revokes Rev. Rul.
55-747 and modifies Rev. Ruls. 64-328 and 66-110.
The traditional equity split-dollar arrangement involves an insurance policy which
builds up value ("equity") within the policy during the lifetime of the insured. The insured has
access to this equity build up to the extent it exceeds the cumulative dollar contributions made
by the employer.
The Notice stated that "it is necessary to account for the employees rights in the cash
surrender value under an equity split-dollar arrangement in a manner consistent with the
substance of the parties' contractual positions." The Service concluded that the tax treatment
could bee ither a transfer 0 f property s ubj ect to Code Section 8 3 0 r a loan subject to Code
Section 7872.

Transfer of property subject to Code Section 83.

If the parties agree that the

incremental build up of equity represents a transfer of a property interest from the employer to
the employee which is subject to Code Section 83, the transfer can either be subject to income
9

I.R.S. Notice 2001-10, 2001
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tax each year on a current basis or can be subject to income tax at the termination of the
agreement (by providing that the employee's interest is substantially vested or unvested, as
defined in the Regulations to Code Section 83).
Although the employer would be entitled to a deduction for the equity under Code
Section 83(h), if reasonable compensation, that deduction would be offset by the gain it would
recognize on transferring property in which it had no basis as compensation under Regulations
Section 1.83-6(b).

A loan subject to Code Section 7872. As an alternative to taxation under Code Section
83, Notice 2001-10 states that an equity split-dollar arrangement can be treated as the
acquisition by the employee of a life insurance policy through a series of loans from the
employer, if there is a "reasonable and bona fide expectation" that the employer will be repaid
for the premium loans "at a fixed or determinable future date" (presumably including the death
of the employee).
If the arrangement is treated as a series of loans under Code Section 7872, the Notice
provided that the unstated interest on the loan to the employee would be taxed to the employee
as compensation; the deductible interest expense by the employer would be wiped out by the
employer's receipt of the unstated interest income.

Interim guidelines.

Notice 2001-10 noted that "updated guidance" on all split-dollar

arrangements was needed, adopted interim guidelines and asked for comments on the interim
guidance.
Pending the issuance of this further guidance, the Service agreed to accept the parties'
characterization of the income tax treatment of split-dollar arrangements so long as:
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1.

the "characterization

IS

not clearly inconsistent with the substance of the

arrangement;"
2.

the parties have consistently followed this characterization from the inception of

the split-dollar arrangement; and
3.

"the parties fully account for all economic benefits conferred on the employee in

a manner consistent with that characterization."
The Notice pennitted parties to existing split-dollar arrangements to continue to treat an
employer's premium payments as loans to the employee, if they had been doing so previously.
The loan under those circumstances would be governed by Code Section 7872, providing an
income tax deduction for the deemed interest subject to tax by the employee (if reasonable),
offset by the employer's receipt of deemed interest income. There would ben 0 "e conomic
benefit" compensation to the employee and the cash value of the policy will not be treated as
property transferred to the employee for purposes of Code Section 83. The Notice modifies
Rev. Ruls. 64-328 and 66-110 to the extent the held that split-dollar arrangements are not to be
treated as loans.
If the parties to an existing split-dollar arrangement had not been treating the
employer's premium payments as loans, on the other hand, the Notice states that "the parties
must fully account for all of the economic benefits that the employee derives from the
arrangement in a manner consistent with that characterization," so that: (a) "the employer will
be treated ash aving a cquired beneficial ownership of the life insurance contract through its
share of the premium payments;" (b) the employee will receive taxable compensation in an
amount equal to the insurance protection provided under the agreement, reduced by any
contributions made by the employee; (c) dividend or other policy distributions to the employee
will be taxed as income to the employee under Rev. Rul. 66-110; (d) "the employee will have
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compensation income under section 83(a) to the extent the employee acquires a substantially
vested interest in the cash surrender value of the life insurance contract, reduced under section
83(a)(2) by any consideration paid by the employee for such interest in the cash surrender
value."
If parties to a split-dollar arrangement had not been treating it as a loan from the
beginning, but wished to do so after issuance of Notice 2001-10, t hey could tenninate the
existing split-dollar plan and repay the employer for its premium payments out of the cash
surrender value of the insurance policy. If this were done, however, it is possible that the
Notice's interim guidelines would require the employee to recognize as income the equity build
up within the policy.
Nevertheless, some comfort for existing split-dollar arrangements was provided by this
provision in Notice 2001-10:
"Pending the publication of further guidance, the IRS will not treat an employer as
having made a transfer of a portion of the cash surrender value of a life insurance
contract to an employee for purposes of section 83 solely because the interest or other
earnings credited to the cash surrender value of the contract cause the cash surrender
value to exceed the portion thereof payable to the employer on tennination of the splitdollar arrangement. If future guidance provides that such earnings increments are to be
treated as transfers of property for purposes of section 83, it will apply prospectively."
This provisions appears to "grandfather" existing collateral assignment equity splitdollar arrangements, at least until further guidance is issued by the Service or at least until the
equity is actually transferred to the employee.
The Service summarized its position on the income tax

tre~tment

of split-dollar plans

by providing that "...any payment made by an employer under a split-dollar arrangement must
be accounted for as a loan...., as in investment in the policy for the employer's own account...,
or as a payment of compensation...."
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Notice 2001-10 revoked Rev. Rul. 55-747, so that the P.S. 58 rates will not longer be
accepted "as a proper measure of the value of current life insurance protection for Federal tax
purposes." The Service issued a new Table 2001, which "taxpayers may rely upon" to measure
the value of current life insurance protection on a single life policy provided under a s plitdollar arrangement or qualified retirement plan. These new rates are substantially lower than
the old P.S. 58 rates, but are higher than most alternative term rates.
Nevertheless, employees can still use an insurer's lower published term rate at least
until December 31,2003, so long as they comply with the provisions of Rev. Rul. 66-110 to
measure the value of current life insurance protection under the split-dollar arrangement (the
insurance be available for all standard risks for initial issue one-year term insurance and that
the rates are published).
After December 31, 2003, employees who still wish to use an insurer's lower published
term rate must not only comply with Rev. Rul. 66-110, but they must also meet three new tests:
(a) the insurer must generally make the rates known to persons who apply for term coverage
from the insurer; (b) the insurer must regularly sell term insurance at those rates to persons who
apply for term coverage through normal channels; and (c) the insurer must not more commonly
sell term insurance at higher rates to individuals classified as standard risks.

Notice 2002-8

Notice 2002-8,10 issued on January 3, 2002, is the "further guidance" 0 n split-dollar
arrangements called for in Notice 2001-10.

The Service revoked Notice 2001-10, but

republished Table 2001; further, the revocation of Rev. Rul. 55-747 and the modification of
10 I.R.S. Notice 2002-8, 2002-1 C.B. 398
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Rev. Ruls. 64-328 and 66-110 remain effective. Finally, until final Regulations are published,
taxpayers can rely on either Notice 2001-10 (which is unusual because it has been revoked) or
Notice 2002-8 for the income and gift tax treatment of split-dollar arrangements.
Notice 2002-8 provides interim guidance on the value of current life Insurance
protection under existing split-dollar plans.
If the plan was entered into before January 28, 2002 and if the plan "provides that the
P.S. 58 rates will be used to determine the value of the current lie insurance protection
provided to the employee (or to the employee and one or more additional persons)," the parties
can continue to use the old P.S. 58 rates to determine the value of the current life insurance
protection provided to the employee.
Most pre-January 28, 2002 split-dollar arrangements would have mandated the use of
the old P.S. 58 rates only ifno alternative term rates were available. Other grandfathered plans
may continue to use "the insurer's lower published premium rates that are available to all
standard risks for initial issue one-year term insurance" to measure the value of the insurance
protection, assuming these rates meet the requirements of Rev. Ruls. 66-110 and 67-154. This
is a more generous interpretation than that provided in Notice 2001-10, which imposed stricter
requirements for old split-dollar plans after December 31, 2003.
Parties to a pre-January 2 8, 2002 split-dollar plan may also use the new Table 2001
rates to value the current life insurance protection.
The use of the old P.S. 58 rates is not available to parties to a split-dollar plan entered
into after January 28, 2002. Those plans may use the insurer's lower alternative term rates, so
long as the requirements of Rev. Ruls. 66-110 and 67-154 are met. It is presumed that, after
December 31,2003, those requirements cannot be met unless "(i) the insurer generally makes
the availability of such rates known to persons who apply for term insurance coverage from the
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insurer, and (ii) the insurer regularly sells term insurance at such rates to individuals who apply
for term coverage through the insurer's normal distributions channels." Notice 2002-8 dropped
the earlier requirement that the insurer must not more commonly sell term insurance at higher
rates to individuals classified as standard risks.
It is important, therefore, to determine carefully the date upon which the plan is
"entered into" for these purposes. If the split-dollar plan was entered into before January 28,
2002, be careful that any changes to the arrangement or even to the policy subject to the
arrangement do not create a new post-January 28, 2002 arrangement.

Interim Guidance Under Notice 2002-8

1.

Pre-January 28, 2002 split-dollar arrangements.

How to measure the current life insurance protection. There are three options:
(a)

The historic P .S. 5 8 rates c an continue to be used, so long as the split-dollar

arrangement required that those rates "will be used" by the parties to measure the value of the
current life insurance protection provided to the employee. The requirement that the benefit to
be measured is the protection provided to the employee seems to indicate that the P.S. 58 rates
cannot be used in reverse split-dollar plans;
(b)

The Table 2001 rates; or

(c)

The insurer's alternate published term rates available to all standard risks for

initial issue one. year term insurance, without regard to the stricter requirements for a postJanuary 28, 2003 split-dollar arrangement.
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Income tax treatment (traditional).

The parties may continue to treat the split-dollar

arrangement as one in which the employer is providing an economic benefit to the employee of
an amount equal to the current value of the life insurance protection, regardless of the way in
which the transaction is documented.
So long as the employee continues to report the current value of the protection as
income and so long as the employer retains some economic interest in the policy, there is no
"rollout" or deemed transfer of the policy to the employee; however, if the employer ever
ceases to have any economic interest in the policy prior to the employee's death, there will be a
deemed transfer of the policy equity

Income tax treatment (loan).

The parties may continue to treat the split-dollar

arrangement as 0 ne in which a series 0 f loans ism ade from the employer to the employee,
regardless of the way in which the transaction is documented. Interest will be subject to Code
Section 7872. If the parties wished to switch from the traditional income tax treatment to the
loan treatment, they could treat all prior payments as loans entered into on the first day in
which the loan treatment is elected.

Safe Harbor "Grandfathering."

Notice 2002-8 provides complete protection from the

taxation of the policy equity if
(a)

Prior to January 1, 2004 the split-dollar plan is terminated; or

(b)

All payments made after January 1, 2004 are treated as loans to the employee

and all prior payments are treated as loans having been made on that date.
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2.

Post-January 28, 2002 split-dollar arrangements.

How to measure the current life insurance protection. There are these options:
(a)

The Table 2001 rates.

(b)

Until December 31, 2003, the insurer's alternate published term rates available

to all standard risks for initial one year term insurance.
(c)

After December 31,2003, the insurer's alternate published rates available to all

standard risks for initial one year term insurance, so long as "(i) the insurer generally makes the
availability of such rates known to persons who apply for term coverage from the insurer, and
(ii) the insurer regularly sells term insurance at such rates to individuals who apply for term
insurance coverage through the insurer's normal distribution channels."

Income tax treatment for post-January 28, 2002 split-dollar arrangements is the same as
that for pre-January 28, 2002 arrangements, except that the safe harbor is"not available.

3.

Conclusions prior to final Regulations.

New split-dollar arrangements entered into prior to the effective date of final
Regulations can be treated as:
(a)

non-equity arrangements, with the income to the employee measured by the

economic benefit provided;
(b)

equity arrangements, with the income to the employee measured by both the

economic benefit provided each year and the policy equity on termination of the arrangement
during the employee's lifetime;
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(c)

a non-interest-bearing demand loan, with the income to the employee measured

by the foregone interest, at the short-term APR, changing monthly, taxed each year, and no
taxation of equity;
(d)

a non-interest-bearing term loan, with the income to the employee measured by

the foregone interest, at the applicable APR, determined at the outset, taxed in the year of the
loan, and no taxation of policy equity; or
(e)

a bonus arrangement, with the full premium taxable to the employee each year.

In lieu of a traditional split-dollar arrangement, an employer who wished to provide an

economic benefit to the employee (the premium payments) could do so in one of three ways:
(a)

interest-bearing demand loans, with a bonus by the employer equal to the

interest due on the loan each year, with the rate changing each year;
(b)

interest-bearing term loans, with a similar bonus to the employee, with the rate

for the loan fixed at the outset; or
(c)

interest-bearing loans, with the interest accrued at the applicable APR, until

termination of the loan.

Proposed Regulations

Two sets of Proposed Regulations were issued by the Internal Revenue Service, on July
9,2002 11 and on May 8, 2003. 12

The Proposed Regulations will only apply to split-dollar

arrangements entered into after the date on which the Regulations become final. Notice 2002-8

11 67 FR 45414 (July 9,2002); 2002 WL 1455202
12 68 FR 24898 (May 9,2003); 2003 WL 21032197
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will continue to provide guidance until the Regulations become final. Because the second set
of Proposed Regulations is treated as part of the first 'set, both sets will be discussed in this
material together.
The Service has provided that parties can rely on the Proposed Regulations for the
treatment of any split-dollar arrangement entered into prior to the effective date of the final
Regulations, so long as all parties treat the arrangement consistently; for example, parties to an
equity split-dollar plan can rely on the Proposed Regulations only if the value of "all benefits"
taken into account by the parties exceeds the value of the economic benefits based on the life
insurance protection provided

u~der

the arrangement "reflecting the fact that ... [an equity]

arrangement provides the [insured/owner] with economic benefits that are more valuable than
current life insurance protection."
The Service bases its position on this fundamental belief: equity split-dollar
arrangements are intrinsically more valuable to the employee than are non-equity
arrangements. The preamble to the Proposed Regulations, therefore, requires the employee in
an equity split-dollar plan to include in gross income the value of any interest in the policy's
cash value provided to the employee each year. As the equity value increases each year, the
employee must report this increased benefit in the employee's taxable income.
The Proposed Regulations move away from the taxation of policy equity under
Code Section 83 towards taxing the equity under Code Section 61.

The Mutually Exclusive Tax Regimes

The Proposed Regulations provide two mutually exclusive regImes for taxing split-dollar
arrangements entered into after the adoption of final Regulations or those old plans which are
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materially modified after the Regulations become final: (1) the "economic benefit regime,"
based on Code Section 61; and (2) the "loan regime," based on Code Section 7872. The
preamble to the Proposed Regulations requires all parties "to fully and consistently account for
all amounts under the arrangement" under either the economic benefit or the loan regime.
Which regime applies to a particular split-dollar arrangement is based solely on which
party owns the insurance policy. This concept moves away from the notion, expressed in the
prior Notices, that the documentation of the plan is not important.

The economIC benefit regIme applies to the traditional endorsement split-dollar
arrangement, under which the employer is the owner of the policy. The employer/owner of
the policy is treated as having provided an annual benefit to the employee equal to the "value
of the economic benefits" provided under the split-dollar arrangement. Although the Proposed
Regulations have postponed, pending public comments, the manner under which these
economic benefits will be valued, the Regulations provide that any right in the policy,
including any interest in the cash surrender value, is an "economic benefit" and will be subject
to income tax "when provided," presumably on an annual basis.
An increase in the policy's equity is treated as having been paid by the insurance

company to the employer and then by the employer to the employee. The employer is taxed on
the amount of the distribution under Code Section 72 and the employee accounts for the
distribution from the employer as compensation. No premium payment nor any economic
benefit included in the employee's gross income is deductible by the employer. Surprisingly,
the Proposed Regulations require an employer to include in its gross income any amount paid
by the employee.
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The loan regime applies to a collateral assignment split-dollar arrangement in which the
employee is the owner of the policy.

The employee/owner is the borrower and the

employer/non-owner is the lender under a split-dollar loan. A loan is created whenever the
employer (non-owner) makes a payment which a reasonable person would expect to be repaid,
when the repayment is to be made from or is secured by either the policy's death benefit or its
cash surrender value.

This concept applies even to the early years of a policy, when the

cumulative payments made by the employer exceed the policy's cash surrender value, so long
as a reasonable person would expect all the payments to be repaid in full.

Guidance on the Valuation of Economic Benefits Under the Economic Benefit Regime

Guidance is provided by the Proposed Regulations on the valuation of economic
benefits (including interests in the policy's cash surrender values) under an equity split-dollar
arrangement governed by the economic benefit regime. This is the employer owned policy in
an endorsement split-dollar arrangement.
The value of all the economic benefits provided during a tax year to the employee in the
case of a non-equity situation should be the same as under the current law; that is, the
employee's portion of the death benefit multiplied by a term factor (presumably Table 2001).
The value of all economic benefits provided during a tax year to the employee in the
case of an equity situation is the sum of (a) the cost of the current life insurance protection; (b)
the amount of cash surrender value "to which the owner [employee] has current access," to the
extent not taken into account in a prior taxable year; and (c) the value of"any other" economic
benefit provided to the employee under the arrangement.
reserved the issue of how these benefits are to be valued.
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The Proposed Regulations have

An equity split-dollar arrangement confers on the employee (non-owner) rights to either

direct or indirect economic enjoyment of policy cash values, making current income taxation of
the employee's interest in the cash values "appropriate under the doctrines of constructive
receipt, economic benefit and cash equivalence."
The employee is treated as having current access to policy cash values that are directly
or indirectly accessible by the employee, inaccessible by the employer or inaccessible to the
employer's general creditors.

"Access" is to be defined broadly to include the employee's

power to make withdrawals from the policy, to borrow against the policy, to totally or partially
surrender the policy, to assign, pledge or encumber the policy and to make the cash value
available to the employee's creditors.
Cash value is not available to the employer under the Proposed Regulations if the
employer does not have the full rights to policy cash value normally held by an owner of a
policy; that cash value i s not available tot he employer's general creditors i f those creditors
cannot, for any reason, effectively reach the full policy value in the event of the employer's
insolvency.
Policy cash values are to be determined under the Proposed Regulations without regard
to surrender charges and any "artifice or device" which might be used to understate the amount
of policy cash values to which the employee has access.
The Proposed Regulations provide that any amount received under the life insurance
contract during t he lifetime 0 f the insured, which i s provided directly or non-directly to the
employee, is treated as though it was paid by the insurer to the employer and then by the
employer to the employee. The employer would be taxed on the distribution from the insurer
under Code Section 72 and the employee would be taxed on the distribution from the employer
as compensation.
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A transfer of the life insurance policy (or an undivided interest in it) from the employer
to the employee occurs only when the employee becomes

th~

owner of the policy or that

undivided interest. When and if that transfer occurs, the employee must take into account for
all tax purposes the excess of the fair market value of the life insurance policy (determined by
its cash surrender value plus the value of all other rights in the policy, other than current
protection, with are "not reflected in the cash value") over the employee's basis in the policy.

An Illustration from the Proposed Regulations

These concepts are illustrated by the following example in the Proposed Regulations:
"Example 1.
(i)
Facts. In year 1, Rand E enter into the equity split-dollar life insurance
arrangement. Under the arrangement R pays all of the premiums on the life insurance contract
until the termination of the arrangement or E's death. The arrangement also provides that upon
termination of the arrangement or E's death, R is entitled to receive the lesser of the aggregate
premiums paid or the policy cash value of the contract and E is entitled to receive any
remaining amounts. Under the terms of the arrangement and applicable state law, the policy
cash value is fully accessible by R and R's·creditors but E has the right to borrow or withdraw
the portion of the policy cash value exceeding the amount payable to R upon termination of the
arrangement or E's death. To fund the arrangement, R purchases a life insurance contract with
constant death benefit protection equal to $1,500,000. As of December 31 of year 1, the policy
cash value equals $55,000 and R has paid $60,000 of premiums on the life insurance contract.
As of December 31 of year 2, the policy cash value equals $140,000 and R has paid aggregate
premiums of $120,000 on the life insurance contract. As of December 31 of year 3, the policy
cash value equals $240,000 and R has paid $180,000 of premiums on the life insurance
contract.
(ii)
Analysis. Under the terms of the equity split-dollar life insurance arrangement,
E has the right for year 1 and all subsequent years to borrow or withdraw the portion of the
policy cash value exceeding the amount payable to R. Thus, ... E has current access to such
portion of the policy cash value for each year that the arrangement is in effect. In addition,
because R pays all of the premiums on the life insurance contract, R provides to E all of the
economic benefits that E receives under the arrangement. Therefore, under paragraph (d)(I) of
this Section, E includes in gross income the value of all economic benefits ... provided to E
under the arrangement.
(iii)
Results for year 1. For year 1, E is provided ... $0 of policy cash value (excess
of $55,000 policy cash value determined as of December 31 of year 1 over $55,000 payable to
R). For year 1, E is also provided ... current life insurance protection of $1,445,000
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($1,500,000 minus $55,000 payable to R). Thus, E includes in gross income for year 1 the cost
of $1 ,445,000 of current life insurance protection.
(iv)
Results for year 2. For year 2, E is provided ... $20,000 of policy cash value
($140,000 policy cash value as determined on December 31 of year 2 minus $120,000 payable
to R). For year 2, E is also provided ... current life insurance protection of $1,360,000
($1,500,000 minus the sum of $120,000 payable to R and the aggregate of $20,000 of policy
cash value that E actually includes in income on E's year 1 and year 2 income tax returns).
Thus E includes in gross income for year 2 the sum of $20,000 of policy cash value and the
cost of $1 ,360,000 of current life insurance protection.
(v)
Results for year 3. For year 3, E is provided ... $40,000 of policy cash value
($240,000 policy cash value determined as of December 31 of year 3 minus the sum of
$180,000 payable to Rand $20,000 of aggregate policy cash value that E actually included in
gross income on E's year 1 and year 2 federal income tax returns). For year 3, E is also
provided ... current life insurance protection of $1,260,000 ($1,500,000 minus the sum of
$180,000 payable to Rand $60,000 of aggregate policy cash value that E actually includes in
gross income on E's year 1, year 2, and year 3 federal income tax returns). Thus, E includes in
gross income for year 3 the sum of $40,000 of policy cash value and the cost of $1,260,000 of
current life insurance protection."

Gift Tax Considerations

An employee who assigns to a third party (such as an ILIT) a policy subject to a split-

dollar arrangement has made a gift for gift tax purposes. The initial gift of the policy to the
ILIT will equal its "normal gift tax value" under Regulations Section 25.2512-6(a),13 reduced
by the employer's interest.
Rev. Rul. 78-420 provides that there are ongoing indirect gifts from the employee to the
ILIT resulting from the economic benefit provided by the employer. Leverage can be obtained
as a result; t he a mount 0 f t he employee's gift is not the amount of the employer's premium
payment, but is, instead, the economic benefit to the employee.
As will be seen below, there is some flexibility when structuring a new arrangement by
delaying the employee's access to the policy's equity, thereby delaying the date on which a
further gift to the ILIT of the equity is made.
13 Rev. Rul. 81-198, 1981-2 C.B. 188
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If the transaction is structured as a loan under Code Section 7872, on the other hand,
and the policy is owned by an ILIT, the foregone interest on the premiums paid by the
employer will still be treated as a transfer from the employer to the employee and a gift by the
employee to the ILIT. The amount of the gift in that instance is not the economic benefit, but
is of the foregone interest.

Estate Tax Considerations

If the employee dies the 0 wner 0 fa policy subject to a split-dollar arrangement, the
death proceeds are included in the employee's gross estate under Code Section 2042, reduced
under Code Section 2053(a)(4) by the amount which is owed to the employer. 14
In the case of an employer which is controlled by the employee/shareholder, the amount
of the proceeds which is payable to the employer may have an impact on the value of the
employee's ownership in the corporation.
Because of the uncertainties surrounding the incidents of ownership in a variety of
split-dollar arrangements, great care must be exercised when drafting the tax charging clause of
the employee's will. I suggest that the tax liability be imposed solely upon those parties who
receive some or all of the insurance proceeds, rather than merely charging taxes against the
"residue" of the employee's estate.
To avoid inclusion of the employee's portion of the insurance proceeds, many splitdollar arrangements include an irrevocable life insurance trust component. If the employee
owns the policy for any period of time and then transfers ownership to the ILIT, the three year
rule of Code Section 2035 must be considered.
14

PLR 9026041 seems to suggest this logical result
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Concerns that the ongoing indirect gifts to the ILIT will necessarily cause inclusion
under Code Section 2035 were eliminated by Leder v. Commissioner. 15 The Internal Revenue
Service issued AOD 91-12, in which it took the position that it no longer would argue for
inclusion of the policy proceeds under the indirect transfer concept.
If the trustee of the ILIT initially acquires ownership of the policy in collateral
assignment arrangements, there will be no transfer by the employee and there would be no
Code Section 2035 concerns.

Observations and Recommendations

The Proposed Regulations are based on the assumptions that an employer who provides
an employee with an interest in a life insurance policy's cash values does give something of
value to the employee and that value ought to result in taxable income. Rather than relying on
a "transfer" of the equity value to produce taxable income under Code Section 83, the Proposed
Regulations rely on the general tax principles of constructive receipt, economic benefit and
cash equivalence to produce taxable income under Code Section 61. The employee's "access"
to these cash values triggers income taxation under the Proposed Regulations (even if the cash
values are still subject to claims of the employer's creditors).
Assuming that the Proposed Regulations become final, here are some planning
strategies for your consideration:

1.

Delay the employee's access to the policy cash values in new plans.

An

employer could create an equity endorsement split-dollar arrangement and delay taxation of the
15 89 T.e. 235 (1987), affd. 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989)
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policy equity tot he employee by delaying the employee's access to policy cash values until
retirement. The cash value remains available to the employer (and to the employer's creditors),
but not to the employee; therefore, constructive receipt, economic benefit and cash equivalent
doctrines should not lead to taxation at the employee level. Recall, however, that the employee
must still report as taxable income the value of the current life insurance protection.
The policy could be transferred to the employee upon retirement, along with its cash
value (less basis created by taxation or contribution of the term element), all reported as taxable
income only at that time. This could be viewed as another form of deferred compensation.

2.

Split -dollar insurance and irrevocable life insurance trusts will continue to be

useful estate planning strategies even after the Proposed Regulations become final. Ownership
of the insurance policy is held by the trustee of an irrevocable life insurance trust in an effort to
remove the life insurance proceeds from the gross estate of the insured/employee. Rev. Rul.
78-420, as supplemented by the Proposed Regulations, make is clear that the economic benefit
is treated as having been received by (and taxable to) the employee and then as having been
given by the employee to the ILIT.
It does not appear to make as much sense to have the employee taxed annually on the
increase in the policy's cash values unless the policy were owned by an irrevocable life
insurance t rust and the increased policy value i s treated a san additional gift by the insured
employee as it is taxed to the employee. By spreading the increase in cash values over many
years, the employee could minimize the gift and generation-skipping tax consequences of these
constructive gifts to the irrevocable life insurance trust.
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Exercise care, however, to be certain that the employee is not unpleasantly surprised by
the increasing equity in the policy, leading to ever greater imputed gifts to the ILIT. An escape
plan should be built into the arrangement.
For example, the employer could distribute the policy to the employee, which would
represent taxable income to the employee; the employee, in tum, could give ownership of the
policy to the trustee of the ILIT. A transfer to the employee (an exempt transferee) and then by
the employee to the ILIT will avoid any transfer for value problem.

If the employee is

concerned with the three year rule of Code Section 2035, he or she could sell the policy to the
ILIT (if it is a grantor trust). If it is not a grantor trust and ownership of the existing policy is
given to the trustee, the trustee of the ILIT might purchase a three year term policy on the life
of the employee, designed to pay any estate tax if the employee were to die within three years
of the transfer.
Another option is for the employee to make a cash gift to the ILIT, which can be used
by the trustee to purchase the existing policy from the employer for its cash value.

3.

S Corporation split -dollar. If the employer in the split-dollar arrangement is an

S corporation, the fact that the premiums are not deductible by the corporation means that all
the shareholders (and not just the insured/employee/shareholder) must report as taxable income
their pro rata share of the dollars used to pay the premium. The insured/employee/shareholder
must also report as taxable income the employee's economic benefit of the arrangement;
therefore, there necessarily is some double income taxation for the employee/shareholder.
In spite of this element of double taxation, however, split-dollar plans in S corporations

will continue to be a viable strategy as a method to transfer the insurance proceeds free 0 f
estate tax by having the policy owned by an ILIT.
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4.

Existing collateral assignment arrangements. The typical collateral assignment

split-dollar arrangement includes an employer purchased policy on the life of the employee,
funded with a premium (illustrated, but not guaranteed) to enable the employee to repay the
employer from the policy's cash value at retirement. The employee may also anticipate being
able to take income from the policy upon retirement, all without having to pay more premiums.
Pre-January 28, 2002 collateral assignment plans will be pennitted to use the insurer's
qualifying one-year tenn rates after 2003. S

0

long as the employee continues to report the

annual economic benefit, the increasing equity within the policy will not be subject to income
tax. If the policy remains in force until the employee dies and if no cash is taken from the
policy during the employee's lifetime, the equity will never be subject to income tax.
The option of leaving everything in place until the employee dies may not be consistent
with the purpose of the split-dollar arrangement, however. The employer may not be willing to
wait until the employee's death to recover its premium dollars; the employee may wish to take
withdrawals from the policy after retirement.
Many collateral assignment plans contemplate the policy's rollout as the employee .
reaches the age when the tenn rates become prohibitive. The employee will not have to report
the equity as taxable income under Code Section 83 if the plan is tenninated or if the parties
restructure the arrangement as a loan under Code Section 7872 before January 1,2004. If the
equity is not subject to income tax, it presumably is not a gift for gift or generation-skipping
tax purposes.
The parties should detennine whether the policy is perfonning at a level where it can
finance its own rollout from the cash value; that is, sufficient cash value exists to repay the
employer's premium payments and to fund an acceptable residual death benefit. Many older
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plans may well be able to do so and, in those instances, termination of the plan in 2003 may be
a viable strategy.
Newer plans may not have sufficient cash value to pay back the premiums paid by the
employer and fund continued death benefits. The parties may elect under those circumstances
to continue the plan through 2003 under its existing terms (in order to take advantage of the
one-year term rates) and then convert the arrangement to a loan for what hopefully may be only
a few years before the cash value is sufficient to fund the rollout.
If the plan is converted to a loan at the end of this year, all of the employer's premium
payments to that point will be treated as a loan to the employee, as would subsequent premium
payments by the employer. There would be no reportable annual economic benefit for the
insurance protection and, when the employee repays the loan, the equity in the policy is still
not subject to income taxation.
The employee need not impute interest for the years prior to conversion to a loan status.
He or she must report imputed interest income on the policy loans after conversion, of course.
If it is projected that the cash value of the existing policy will grow large enough in only a few
years to fund a rollout, this strategy may make the most sense.

5.

Reverse

split-dollar arrangements.

In a typical reverse split-dollar

arrangement, the employer "buys" the policy death benefit for a limited period of time; the
employee owns the policy and endorses the employer's interest in the death benefit to the
employer.

The employer pays a portion of each policy premium equal to the "economic

benefit" of the death benefit it is purchasing; the employee pays the balance of the premium.
If the arrangement terminates due to the death of the employee, the employee's
beneficiary would b e repaid for the employee's premium payments and the employer would
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receive the balance of the death benefit. If the arrangement terminates during the lifetime of
the employee, on the other hand, the employer would receive nothing
The employer's cost of the death benefit it purchases has typically been measured by the
P.S. 58 rates. Notice 2001-10 concluded, however, that use of the outdated P.S. 58 rates to
measure the cost of the death benefit payable to the employer "overstates" the employer's
investment. Notice 2002-8 is silent on the concept of reverse split dollar.
Notice 2002-59 16 takes the position that there is no authority for using either a table rate
or an alternative term rate to measure the cost of the benefit purchased by the employer.
Therefore, guidance on the income tax consequence of reverse split-dollar is scant. If
the amount paid by the employer is "overpaid" by use of the outdated P.S. 58 rates, it seems
clear that there should be some income tax consequence to the employee, perhaps under Code
Section 83.
Nevertheless, reverse split-dollar arrangements will continue to be a viable strategy
when there is a legitimate employer need for the death benefit.
To avoid any possible argument that the employee's interest in the policy will cause it
to be included in the employee's gross estate at death under Code Section 2042 (the insured's
access to the policy cash values is an incident of ownership), the employee might consider
giving ownership of the cash values to an ILIT. Any income taxable to the employee under the
reverse split-dollar arrangement will presumably bet reated as a gift by the employee to the
ILIT and care should be exercised until the measure of the benefit provided the employee is
determined.

16 IRS Notice 2002-59, 2002-36 I.R.B.
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Conclusions

Split-dollar arrangements are clearly under attack by the Internal Revenue Service,
which is using its authority to issue Regulations and Revenue Rulings to establish, perhaps for
the first time, the rules which it believes govern the income, gift, estate and generationskipping tax consequences of these plans. Whether the views expressed by the Service will be
upheld in the long run is open to question. Nevertheless, it is the challenge of all planners to
work within the framework of these new rules, however imperfect, to advise our clients.
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Agricultural Trends and Farm Management

•

•

•

•

•

•

Farm Numbers in the U.S.
Nearly 7,000,000 in 1930's
Just over 2,000,000 in 2000

Kentucky Farm Numbers
Nearly 275,000 in 1930's
89,000 in 2000

Percent Change in Total and Rural Population 1990-2000

u.s.: 13% increase in total population, and 23% decrease in farm population
Kentucky: 9% increase in total population, and 4% decrease in farm population

•

•

•

•

•

•

Agricultural Trends in Kentucky
Average age of farmers is 59
Average size of farms is 164 acres
Average value per acre is $1,850.00
55% of farmers made less that $10,000.00 in 2001

Investment Returns from Kentucky Managed Farms
4% annual return off the land
9% annual return from the land value increases since 1990

Largest Farm Management Firms
Bank of America
Bank One
Wells Fargo Bank
Farmers National Company
Texas Pacific Land Trust
u.s. Bank

E -1

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Farm Management Services Provided
Research farm history and outlook for the future
Select right tenant and farm lease
Plan production and marketing
Submit all government documentation
Provide accounting and inventories
Review and pay all expenses

Types of Clients Served
Farms held in Trust
Absentee landowners
Customers and individuals interested in buying farmland

Role of Farm Manager with Trust Administrator
Trust administrator is leader of the relationship
Farm manager reports to trust administrator

Helpful Specifics Within a Trust Document
Guidelines for retaining land
20% concentration issue
Retain farm or sell if funds are needed
Family Members Leasing or Purchasing Farm
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FEDERAL FIDUCIARY ISSUES

I.

Income Shifting Techniques
A. Income Tax Brackets
1. Due to extremely quick bracket creep, income in discretionary trusts or estates should
seldom be accumulated.
2. For 2003 calendar year trusts and estate, the top bracket of 35% commences at $9,350.
3. At $4,500 of taxable income, there is a top bracket of 28%. Contrast with a single
individual at $68,800 and a married couple filing a joint return at $114,650.
4. Children over 14 are taxed at their own rate;
Example: Trustee has the right to accumulate income in an educational trust with two
potential beneficiaries, both ofwhom are in the ten percent bracket. The trust has $10,000
of taxable income. The beneficiaries are both over age 13, but neither is of college age
and normally the funds would be accumulated. If the money is accumulated, federal tax
to the trust would be approximately $2,650 as opposed to $1,000 if distributed to the
beneficiaries. Parents may simply set up mutual funds or savings accounts for benefit of
individual children to receive the trust distributions. Although an administrative hassle,
savings are normally worth it to most people.
5. Always find out the tax brackets of potential beneficiaries.
6. Don't forget the availability of the 65 day rule to "bail you out of trouble" on complex
trusts and estates.
7. The ten percent bracket does not apply to estates and trusts.
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B. TrappingDistributions
1. Some benefits still exist with trapping distributions;

Example: An estate has $28,000 of taxable income. It will eventually split into marital
and residuary trusts, each ofwhich would ultimately be entitled to more than one third of
the current year's income. The estate would pay a federal tax ofapproximately $8,950 if
income is retained vs. approximately $7,200 in total if approximately $9,300 were
distributed to each of the two trusts from the principal of the estate to the principal ofthe
trust. This may be accomplished through the distribution of either principal cash or
principal as~ets.
2. Basis in an asset distributed by an estate or trust to a beneficiary is determined as shown
in Part II of this outline.

II.

Property Distributions in Kind
A. Basis for Property Distribution
1. Code Section 643(d) states that the basis of any property received by a beneficiary in an
estate or trust shall be the adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the estate or trust
immediately before the distribution, adjusted for any gain or loss recognized to the estate
or trust on the distribution.
2. In the case ofany distribution ofproperty (other than cash) the amount taken into account
for distribution deduction purposes under Sections 661 (a)(2) and 662(a)(2) is the lesser of
the basis in the hands of the beneficiary or the fair market value of the property.
B. Capital Gain Election
1. An election may be made by the estate or trust to recognize the gain on an asset
distributed on its return for the taxable year the distribution is made. Once made, it may be
revoked by the taxpayer only with the consent of the Secretary;
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Example: An estate has $20,000 interest income. It has $30,000 in deductible expenses
of administration. It is not the final year of the estate. The executor has distributed
$20,000 in IBM stock to the estate's sole beneficiary. It has a basis of $10,000 on the
death tax return. Without the election, the estate has ($10,000) of taxable income. By
making the election to have the capital gain taxed to the estate, the executor is able to
utilize what would otherwise be wasted deductions. Thus, the executor has essentially
achieved a stepped-up basis for this estate asset to $20,000 in the hands ofthe beneficiary
without incurring tax.
2. Points out the need for estimating taxable income prior to the estate or trust's year end. If
the executor or trustee is aware before the year end, they can take action to prevent wasted
deductions which might have otherwise occurred in the prior example.

c.

Rationale for Making the Capital Gain Election Under Section 643(e)(3)
I. In the majority of cases, if you are able to conceive of a reason to make the capital gain
election, you would accomplish the same result by making a sale of the security and
distributing the principal cash;

Example: The executor wishes to make a $10,000 distribution to a beneficiary and the
estate has $10,000 ofordinary income. The estate also has a $5,000 long-term capital loss
and the executor has a security with a basis of $5,000 and a fair market value of$IO,OOO
that the beneficiary has indicated a desire to sell ifdistributed to him on the termination of
the estate. The executor distributes the security to the beneficiary and elects to have the
capital gain taxed in the estate which will be offset by the long-term loss. This same
result would have been accomplished by an outright sale ofthe stock and a distribution of
the principal cash.
2. Some possible reasons for taking the gain in the estate or trust as opposed to an outright
sale of the security might be:
a)

To save the brokerage commission on the sale.
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b)

To meet the beneficiary's desire ofreceiving a particular asset while saving him the
time and expense of a repurchase.

c)

To eliminate the necessity of sale for a normally non-marketable type asset (e.g.
personal property, real estate, etc.)

3. Some possible reasons why an executor or trustee might want to recognize gain in cases
where no tax on the distribution would have been the alternative:
a)

To offset expiring loss carryforwards, investment tax credit carryforwards,

b)

To utilize a lower estate income tax bracket on a sale the beneficiary would likely
make upon receipt of the security.

c)

To avoid the loss of deductions in excess of income that would not qualify for net
operating loss carryforward.

d)

To make use ofthe separate alternative minimum tax exemption ofan estate or trust.

e)

To prevent an undesirable capital gain (loss) situation, e.g., the netting ofshort-term
losses against long-term gains.

III.

Estimated Tax Payments for Trusts and Estates
A. Income from estates and grantor "pour-over" trusts receiving the residual ofthe probate estate
under the grantor's will, for which a Section 645 election has been made, are subject to
estimated tax payments only after they have completed two years.
1. Allows for "use of the money" versus other taxable entities;

Example: An estate has $40,000 oftaxable income in its initial year which clearly places
it in the 35% bracket. The estate passes to one beneficiary who is also in the 35% bracket.
If the executor remits the $40,000 of taxable income to the beneficiary, however, most
likely the beneficiary will have additional estimated tax payments to pay in order to have a
"safe" estimate. This would result in the payment ofapproximately $14,000 in estimated
tax payments over the course ofthe year that the estate would not have to pay ifthe income
were accumulated.
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B. Estimated payments for trusts and estates follow the same rules as with individuals.
1. May file "safe" or "annualize" and pay in ninety percent of the current period's tax;

Example: A simple trust incurred a capital gains tax of $20,000 for its recently filed
calendar 2002 return. Regarding the filing of2003 estimates, the trustee has two choices
to avoid penalties. The trustee may either pay in $5,000 on each quarterly payment (e.g.
file "safe") or compute actual taxable income for the annualized period and pay in ninety
percent ofthe required quarterly annualized tax. Assume there are no capital gains in 2003
so that no payment is required if the annualized method is used. If a safe estimate was
filed, the government would have had an interest fee loan from the trust for the entire year.

c.

Estates and trusts are allowed to annualize one month earlier than individuals;

Example: With the same facts as the previous example, assume that the trust incurs a
capital gain of$1 0,000 in May 2003 which represents the only taxable income for the trust
for its calendar year. An individual, using the annualized method, would be required to
base estimated tax payments for the second quarter including the $10,000 gain as May 31
is the cutoffdate. However, a trust would not be subject to estimated tax on this gain until
the third quarter as the second quarter cutoff for determining annualized income for trusts
is April 30, which would be prior to the gain being realized.
D. As with individuals, trusts and estate with adjusted gross income in excess of$150,000 may
only qualify for the prior year safe harbor if they pay in 110% of their prior year tax.
E. A trust may not use the prior year's tax safe harbor if the prior year was not a twelve month
period;

Example: A trust was funded by an estate in February 2002 and had a $2,000 tax liability
on its 2002 return. The trustee will not have a "safe" estimate if $500 quarterly payments
are made in 2003 as the trust was not in existence for twelve months in 2002.
F. Zero is a safe estimate if a trust has been in existence for twelve months;
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Example: A simple trust was required to payout its entire income in 2002 and was in
existence the entire year. It had no capital gain or other principal income and, therefore,
had no tax. It has no obligation to make 2003 estimated tax payments no matter what tax
liability it incurs in 2003.
G. Executor may elect to distribute estimated tax payments to the beneficiaries during the tax
year that is expected to be the final one for the estate.
1. Makes more sense not to make estimated payments at all ifyou think it will be the estate's
final year.
2. Election to distribute excess estimated payments to beneficiary must be made on Form

I041-T.
H. A trustee may also elect to treat excess estimate payments over the trust's current year tax
liability to be credited toward the beneficiary's current year tax liability.
1. Might come in handy ifbeneficiary has an estimated tax penalty which may be lessened or
eliminated by allocation of estimated tax payments from the trust.
2. The trustee's election must be made on Form 1041-T.
3. The election must be filed on or before the 65 th day after the close of the tax year.

IV.

Administration Expense Election
A. Estate Tax vs. Income Tax
1. In situations where the estate tax bracket is greater than the income tax bracket of the
estate or its potential beneficiaries, it would nonnally make sense to deduct administration
expenses on the estate tax return;

Example: The decedent has a taxable estate of $1,800,000 (45% bracket) which will
incur $100,000 in administration expense. The estate and its sole beneficiary are both in
the 35% bracket. By taking the administration expenses on the estate tax return, there will
be a tax savings of $10,000.
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a)

The estate tax bracket, in excess of the unified credit, e.g. at $1,000,000 (41%)
exceeds the top income tax bracket (35%).

b)

The unlimited marital deduction has created many zero estate tax situations where it
would appear to be a "no-brainer" to deduct such expenses on the income tax return
(but see B, Funding Issues, below);
Example: Due to the unlimited marital deduction and use of the unified credit,
the decedent has a zero taxable estate. Administration expenses total $50,000 and
the estate and its income beneficiary are in the top bracket of 35%. By taking the
administration expense on the income tax return, there is an income tax savings of
approximately $17,500.

2. One must allocate between taxable and tax-free income to determine the deductible
percentage for administration expenses, which might make distribution or selling of
municipal bonds before the final tax year beneficial;
Example: The decedent has a taxable estate of $500,000 which does not require a filing
of a federal death tax return. Administration expenses total $20,000. The estate has
$40,000 of gross income, $20,000 from taxable bonds and $20,000 from tax-free
municipal bonds. The estate is expected to last two tax years. Ifadministration expenses
are deducted in year 1, only 50% or $10,000 would be deductible (e.g. $20,000 -:- $40,000
x $20,000). If, instead, the municipal bonds are distributed to the beneficiary in year one
and administration expenses are taken in Year 2, a full deduction of $20,000 will be
available in the second tax year. Ofcourse, the distribution ofthe municipal bonds in Year
1 will cause taxable income from the estate to be taxed to the beneficiary, which may not
be the best shifting technique the executor would otherwise employ. However, this
negative, if any, will most likely be offset by the increased deductibility of the
administration expense.
3. Unused deductions on the termination of an estate are subject to the 2% rule;
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Example: The executor has decided to take administration expenses on the estate's
income tax return where the beneficiary, in the final year of the estate, is in the 35%
bracket. The deductions, which total $100,000 are in excess ofthe final year's income of
$90,000 thereby creating a $10,000 unused deduction on termination of the estate. The
beneficiary has $500,000 of gross income and has no other miscellaneous deductions.
Since miscellaneous deductions must exceed 2% of an individual's gross income, there
would be no benefit to this beneficiary from the unused deduction (e.g.2% x $500,000 =
$10,000). With proper long-term planning, administration expenses may be timed to avoid
such a result. If $10,000 or more in administration expenses had been paid in a previous
year of the estate, full deductibility ofthese expenses could have possibly been achieved.
B. Funding Issues
1. In marital deduction situations, it may make sense to deduct administration expenses on
the death tax return regardless of the brackets;
Example: Assume the decedent, age 88, has died leaving an estate of $2,000,000.
Administration expenses are $100,000. The will calls for a credit shelter trust, which is to
pay all taxes, debts and administration expenses and an outright marital deduction for the
remainder of the estate to the decedent's spouse, age 87, who has an estate of
approximately $4,000,000. If the administration expenses are taken on the estate tax
return, the marital deduction will be $900,000 ($2,000,000 - $100,000 - $1,000,000). If
the administration expenses are taken on the income tax return, the marital deduction will
be $1,000,000 ($2,000,000 - $1,000,000). In order to get the marital deduction on the
estate tax return, the amount of the deduction must be fully funded. Therefore, by
deducting the expenses on the income tax return, we have added another $100,000 to the
estate of the decedent's spouse which, at the 50% bracket and based on the age of the
spouse, might very well cost the heirs overall despite the use ofthe money on any income
taxes saved.
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2. Any appreciation on additional funding caused by an income tax administration expense
election will also be included in the spouse's estate and might well exceed the "use ofthe
money" on income tax savings.

Some attorneys feel the removal of this potential

appreciation from the estate will always mandate taking administrati~n expenses on the
death tax return in unlimited marital deduction situations.
3. As with so many issues involving fiduciary tax decisions, all factors should at least be·
considered and calculations added to your workpapers to document your election
decisions.

V.

Selection of Fiscal Years
A. Estates
1. Estates may still .select.

Although many find fiscal years to be confusing to the

beneficiaries and administratively inconvenient due to inability to match 1099s, misplaced
K-ls that beneficiaries receive early in the year, etc., there are opportunities for benefits
that should be considered.
2. Deferrance occurs on the payment of tax;

Example: An estate was created on November 16. Between the date of death and
December 31, it accumulated $20,000 oftaxable income placing it in the 35% bracket and
creating approximately $6,100 in tax which would be paid in April. Ifthe executor elects a
fiscal year ending October 31 of the subsequent year, the tax payment would not be due
until February 15 of the following year or a deferral of tax for ten months. Although
additional income might be accumulated during this period of deferral, the overall tax
bracket remains the same and the estate would have the use of $6,100 for ten additional
months.
3. The effect on estimated taxes could offer additional deferral potential;

Example: An estate in its third taxable year must make estimated tax payments. By
selecting a fiscal year you increase the time frame before the third tax year begins and,
subsequently, defer the payment of estimate taxes.
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4. Deferral matures upon tennination ofthe estate and might cause a "bunching" ofincome
in the final year, which might be partially or totally offset by proper utilization of
administration expenses.
Example: An estate has $50,000 of taxable income which it distributes to its sole
beneficiary during its January 31 fiscal year end. The estate generates another $50,000 of
income in the final year from February 1 until its closing in December which is taxable to
the beneficiary in the same year. Having $100,000 bunched into the same year could cause
adverse income tax bracket effects. Ifadministration expenses were taken in the fmal year,
some of this adverse effect might be eliminated.

5. Deferral could backfire if income rates rise for the estate or its beneficiaries.
6. With low interest rates, as we have today, potential confusion to beneficiaries could
override income earned on use of the tax savings for small amounts.
B. Trusts
1. Except for wholly-exempt charitable trusts, all trusts must be on a calendar year end (see
Section 645 election).
2. Charitable remainder trusts are not wholly exempt and, therefore, must be on a calendar
yearend.
3. Trusts that are private foundations may be on fiscal year ends as well.

VI.

Pecuniary Bequests
A. Funding Pecuniary Trusts
1. The funding ofpecuniary trusts with appreciated securities from an estate creates capital
gaIn;
Example: Assume that a marital pecuniary bequest to a trust is funded with assets having
a date of death value of $800,000 and a date of distribution value of $1,000,000. The
result will be a $200,000 capital gain realized by the estate.
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B. Allocation of Capital Gain in Final Year
1. Since pecuniary funding of trusts often occurs in the final year of an estate, the result is
that gain from a pecuniary bequest is allocated to all the beneficiaries receiving principal
deductions.

Example: Assume in the previous example that the distribution to the marital trust is
50% ofthe total principal distributions made during the estate's fiscal year and the estate is
filing its final return. Only $100,000 of the $200,000 capital gain is taxable to the
pecuniary marital trust with the other $100,000 taxable to the other principal distributees
based on their percentage ofoverall principal received and assuming separate share rules
do not apply.
2. Consider Early Funding of Pecuniary Bequests to reduce capital gain exposure;

Example: Ifthe estate, in the prior examples, had immediately funded the pecuniary trust
when values were still at $800,000, the $200,000 gain would not be taxed unless the assets
were actually sold for $1,000,000.
C. Timing of Funding Could Bring Inequitable Results
1. Although early funding of pecuniary bequests cuts capital gain exposure, non pro-rata
funding could bring inequitable results;

Example: During an estate's initial fiscal year, it generates $100,000 oftaxable income.
A preliminary partial funding ofa pecuniary marital trust is made from the principal ofthe
estate for $600,000. The decedent's will creates an additional residuary trust for $600,000.
No additional distributions were made during the estate's fiscal year. The result is that the
entire $100,000 will be taxed to the pecuniary trust even though no actual income was
distributed. Unless the trust instrument permits an equitable adjustment for this result
(unlikely), this early disproportionate funding might bring unwanted results in income
taxability. The separate share rules mitigate this concern for direct distributions to
individual beneficiaries.
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VII~

The Below-Market Interest Rate Loan
A. Code Section 7872 Applies To:
1. Gift loans.
2. Compensation-related loans (employer-employee or independent contractor and
customer).
3. Corporation-shareholder loans.
4. Tax avoidance loans - principal purpose of interest arrangement is to avoid tax.
5. Other below-market loans - if interest arrangements have significant tax effect on the
federal tax liability of lender or borrower.
B. Foregone Interest:
1. The excess of the amount of interest that would have been payable on the loan for such
taxable period if the applicable federal rate was used over interest payable on the loan
properly allocable to such period.
2. Applicable rates:
a)

Less than three years - federal short-term rate.

b)

3 but less than 9 years - federal mid-term rate.

c)

Over 9 years - federal long-term rate.

C. What About Trusts?
1. Loans between trusts and individuals would, it appears, have to fall under gift loans, tax
avoidance loans, or other below-market loans, if covered at all.
2. Loans from simple trusts to current income beneficiaries:
a)

Would not appear to be a gift loan since beneficial interest would remain the same,
nor would tax avoidance or significant tax effects be present.

F- 12

b)

Would seem to only have "tax effect" if calendar year of trus~ as opposed to fiscal
year of beneficiary, were involved (extremely rare!).

c)

Would imputed interest income to the trust constitute an item of distributable net
income, e.g. not accounting income, to be distributed to the beneficiary or simply
taxed to the trust?

d)

If taxed to the beneficiary, it would appear to be a wash (assuming a distribution
deduction is allowed under Sections 651 and 661) with the fiscal year-calendar year
question the only thing that matters.

It would seem, to avoid unnecessary

administrative compliance, that this type situation should be exempted.
e)

Iftaxed to the trust, you are in a situation where income shifting could thrive again if
the beneficiary were in a higher tax bracket than the trust. Certainly, the intent of
this legislation was not to create such an opportunity.

Example: A sole beneficiary ofa simple trust borrows $100,000 from the trust
with no interest due and payment due on demand. The applicable federal shortterm rate is two percent. The beneficiary might receive a $2,000 interest expense
deduction and the trust would receive imputed interest income of $2,000. If the
imputed interest is deemed to be distributed to the beneficiary, there is a "wash"
with respect to the tax return of the beneficiary and zero taxable income to the
trust.

If, instead, the $2,000 is taxed to the trust, the trust would pay

approximately $300 in tax versus $700 in tax savings for the interest expense
deduction allowable to the beneficiary ifthe proceeds are traceable to investment
or business purposes.
f)

The intent of Congress being to eliminate the results as shown in the preceding
example, simple trusts with one beneficiary should be exempted from the belowmarket interest rate loan rules. -

g)

If more than one beneficiary is present and a loan is made to only one, a different
problem presents itself:
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Example: The terms ofthe governing instrument require all income ofa trust to
be distributed fifty percent to Beneficiary A, (a 25% bracket taxpayer) and fifty
percent to Beneficiary B (a 35% bracket taxpayer). Beneficiary B, with the signed
blessings of Beneficiary A, borrows $200,000 from the trust on demand with no
interest due. The applicable short-tenn rate is ten percent. Beneficiary B, ifCode
Section 7872 applies, e.g. a gift loan, has an interest expense deduction of$20,000
and $7,000 in tax savings. Beneficiary A and B, ifthe imputed interest income is
distributable net income, would each realized $10,000 ofinterest income ifnormal
simple trust distribution rules under IRC 652(a) were followed. Beneficiary A
would realize taxable income, but have no benefit from the loan nor an interest
expense deduction.
h)

In the above example, it would appear likely that a gift has been made from
Beneficiary A to Beneficiary B, e.g. treated as ifA received the $10,000, paid tax on
it, but gave the $10,000 to B.

i)

Another possible viewpoint, as mentioned earlier, might be that the trust pays the tax
on the entire $20,000 (net accounting income rules make this the most likely
treatment). Yet another potential argument is that the borrower, if a beneficiary of
the trust, pays tax on all the imputed interest income since he is benefiting from the
deduction. Of course, this approach would violate the current distribution rules,
although certainly more logicaL

3. Loans From Complex Trusts to Potential Income Beneficiaries
a)

Since it's in the discretion of the trustee as to whom to distribute income, it appears
a "wash" would occur similar to the simple trust with one beneficiary.
Example: A trustee of a complex trust makes a loan to one of its potential
beneficiaries for $200,000 with no interest payable on demand. The beneficiary
would receive a $20,000 interest expense deduction and would, presumably, be
taxed on the imputed interest to the trust, e.g. $20,000 (assumes ten percent rate).

F- 14

b)

As with the case of the simple trust, an argument could be made for taxing the
$20,000 to the trust.

4. Loans From Trusts to Remaindermen
a)

In many instances, current income beneficiaries agree to allow a potential
remainderman to have an advancement on his future inheritance, e.g. to go into
business, buy a horse, buy a summer home, etc.

b)

When the borrower, in such an instance, is not a current beneficiary of the trust,
normal distribution rules of the tax code would tax income to the current
beneficiaries or to the trust. In any event, such distribution rules by themselves
would not create taxable income to the remainderman.
Example: A simple trust has one beneficiary who agrees to allow a potential

remainderman an advancement of $100,000 to enter a new business. The
applicable short-term federal rate on this interest free demand loan is ten percent.
The borrower, e.g., the principal remainderman, will be able to deduct $10,000 as
interest expense. The interest income of $10,000 under normal simple trust
beneficiary rules, will be taxed to the income beneficiary. The income beneficiary
would have presumably made a gift of $10,000 to the remainderman.
D. Other Provisions and Considerations
1. Certain de minimis exceptions apply:
a)

In the case of a gift loan between individuals, no interest will be imputed to either

the borrower or lender for any day on which the aggregate outstanding amount of
loans between such individuals is not in excess of$10,000 unless the loan proceeds
are directly attributed to the purchase or carrying of income-producing assets.
b)

For gift loans directly between individuals that are not in excess of $100,000, the
imputed interest amount is limited to the borrower's net investment income for the
taxable year. Iftax avoidance is one ofthe principal purposes ofthe loan, however,
this special rule does not apply.
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c)

Notice that the $100,000 de minimis provision is addressing itselfto the borrower's
total net investment income as determined under Section 163(d)(3), not just the
investment income from the borrowing. This is commonly misunderstood.

d)

Notice further that the word individual is used in both de minimis exceptions.
Nowhere can the word trust be seen. One would have to assume that these de
minimis exceptions are not currently applicable to trusts.

e)

On the death of an individual, to whom interest is being imputed, it is possible that
the

acc~ed

imputed interest income might be deemed to have both income tax

application and estate tax application.
E. Will Logic Intervene?
I. Ifrational thinking prevails, most ofthese problems could be alleviated by simply saying
that the borrower, in all instances, would have the interest income imputed. Whether a
simple trust, complex trust, current income beneficiary or remainderman, this would result
in a "wash" to the borrower. Further, in such a line of reasoning, there would be no need
to apply the code section to trusts, as no income tax benefit could be derived. To have this
result, in some instances, would be to create beneficiaries not currently in the governing
instrument (e.g., the borrower).
2. Another consideration for non-application ofthis section for most trusts is that the result
of the logical thinking above is taxable income to the borrower and an interest expense
deduction to the borrower. Contrast this treatment to the normal gift loan situation
between individuals where the lender has interest income and the borrower has the interest
expense deduction. The only way this same result is derived in a trust is if the trust pays
the tax on the imputed interest income, the problems of which have been discussed
throughout this presentation.
3. Section 7872 allows for regulations to be issued to assure that the positions of the
borrower and lender are consistent as to the application or non-applic~tionofthe section.
Regulations have not been promulgated which address these issues.
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VIII.

Charitable Trusts and Private Foundations
A. Remember that charitable trusts, both exempt and non-exempt, unless grandfathered due to
their having come into existence before 1969, are private foundations until non-private
foundation status is obtained.
B. Although the Internal Revenue Service in some instances has made exempt status retroactive
to the beginning of a trust, it is not an automatic and non-exempt trusts face needless capital
gains taXes, as well as taxes on accumulated income, simply because they have not made
application for exemption.
C. Private foundation returns are due 4

~

months after year end, which may be fiscal, and

estimated taxes are due and payable by coupon.
D. Schedule B disclosing the name and address of the contributors in a current year must be
disclosed on the attorney general's copy ofa private foundation return. They do not have to
be disclosed on the attorney general's copy of an exempt organization return (Form 990).
IX.

The Defective Grantor Trust and Installment Sales
A. Commonly used as estate tax savings device
1. Income taxes paid by grantor are reducing estate tax
2. Obviously must have sufficient assets on outside in order to pay tax on income that goes
to someone else.

Example: Taxpayer creates an irrevocable trust for benefit ofhis children. He retains the
right to substitute his assets for assets in the trust.

This is a sufficient retained

administrator power to create taxability ofthe income in the trust to the grantor under the
grantor trust rules (IRe Section 675(4».
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B. Installment Sales
1. The death of the grantor would seem to end the defective grantor tax treatment.
2. If an installment note to the grantor is involved, does the death of the grantor cause the
remaining balance on the note to be subject to taxation as future principal payments are
made or does it have no tax effect.

Example: The trustee purchases limited partnership units from the taxpayer that has a
basis of $ 100,000 and a fair market value of$I,OOO,OOO. The trust is a defective grantor
trust and the grantor is the taxpayer. The payment on sale is a $1,000,000 promissory note.
At the time ofthe sale, no gain is realized as the buyer and seller for tax purposes are the
same. The taxpayer dies and no payments have been made. What is the effect of future
payments?
3. Since taxation is determined at the time ofsale, one school ofthought would be it's not an
installment sale then, so it never is. The other is it remains an installment sale until paid
off.
4. Perhaps you could pay off the note to avoid the potential of taxability until we get case
law.

x.

Principal vs. Income Issues
A. Allocation
1. Principal consists of the original corpus plus appreciation, less depreciation, plus any
additional gifts made to the trust.
2. Income consists of investment income generated by corpus such as interest and dividends
reduced by ordinary and necessary expenses in connection with generating such income.
B. Types of Interests
I. Income beneficiary or beneficiaries
2. Remainderman or remaindermen
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c.

Net Accounting Income
1. Defined by terms of trust instrument and applicable local law.
2. Applicable local law refers to the applicable state's Uniform Principal and Income Act.
Effective January 1, 1993, Kentucky adopted the Revised Income and Principal Act
(UPIA).
a)

Act provides income and expenses are to be allocated between income and principal
in accordance with terms ofthe trust instrument notwithstanding contrary provisions
of the Act.

b)

In the absence of any contrary terms ofthe trust instrument, in accordance with the
provisions of the Act; or

c)

If neither ofthe preceding rules of administration is applicable, in accordance with
what is reasonable and equitable in view ofthe interests ofthose entitled to income
as well as those entitled to principal, in view ofthe manner in which (individuals) of
ordinary prudence, discretion, and judgment would act in the management of their
own affairs.

D. Normal Allocations as Defined Under UPIA Adopted by Kentucky
1. Income includes dividends, interest, rental income and recurring rental expenses and
investments fees on income.
2. Principal includes capital gains and investment fees on principal.
E. Alternative Items Not Clearly Defmed by UPIA Adopted by Kentucky
1. Limited partnership and LLC interests.
2. Annuities, IRA's and other retirement vehicles.
3. Stock options.
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XI.

Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies
A. Principal vs. Income Issues
1. Partnership or LLC distributions.

Example: ABC Partnership is created in 2003 and consists of marketable securities.
During 2003, it has income of$50,000 from dividends and $50,000 from capital gains. It
has two partners, a general partner with a 1% general interest and a trust with a 99%
limited partnership interest. The trust has sufficient additional assets to meet its tax
obligations. The trust receives a K-l reporting $49,500 of dividends and $49,500 of
capital gains. The partnership makes a distribution on December 31, 2003 of $50,000
($49,500 to the trust and $500 to the general partner).
2. Proper Treatment
a)

Absent guidance from the trust document as to how to treat partnership distributions
or a statement from the partnership as to what its distribution consists of: one might:

b)

1.

prorate $24,500 to income and $24,500 to principal.

11.

put $49,500 to income and nothing to principal.

Ill.

put $49,500 to principal and nothing to income.

Could have major effect on what is received by income beneficiary and
remainderman.

c)

Should unreceived capital gaIn and income be accounted for by trustee as
distributions are received in future years?

Example: In 2004, the partnership in the above example, has $50,000 in dividend
income again and makes a $50,000 distribution to its partners as ofDecember 31,
2004, of which $49,500 goes to the trust.
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d)

Should the $49,500 pick up the prior year's undistributed income and principal
(depending upon which method you use) or should the current year be considered
first?

e)

The K-1 seems to be the only document the trustee would normally have to make a
determination - is this the tax tail wagging the accounting dog? You should actually
use book accounting but how does one obtain this information?

3. Payment of Taxes by Trust
a)

ABC partnership is created in 2003 and consists of marketable securities. During
2003, it has $50,000 of income and $50,000 ofcapital gains. A simple trust owns a
99% interest and receives a $50,000 distribution from the partnership.
1.

Ifone subscribes to the theory that you put distributions in income first to the
extent you have income on a K-l, then the whole $50,000 would go to the
income beneficiary and there would be no money to pay trust taxes.

11.

If you keep $10,000 in principal to pay trust taxes (which, logically, you
should), then net accounting income (e.g., what is ultimately taxed to the
income beneficiary) should be reduced to $40,000 which would be the
distribution to the income beneficiary.

4. Potential Solutions
specifi~ally.

a)

A UPIA which addresses these issues

b)

Guidance in the trust document itself

c)

A written determination by the general partner, e.g. this is a distribution of all
income first and then capital gains.

d)

When all else fails, a consistent method of allocation is worth a lot.
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B. Planning for Losses to Maximize Tax Effect on Partners
1. If losses are likely, consider drafting to give potentially active partners the losses.
a)

With farm, rental or other losses, consider what partner will be active, real estate
professional, etc.

b)

Most trusts and estates are passive, but consider the Mattie Carter Trust, DC Texas
(April 11, 2003).

2. Partners not receiving the loss allocation will benefit when the property is sold due to their
higher capital account.
C. Other Tax Issues Which May Affect Trusts and Estates
1. Put a notation in your permanent files as to the 704(b) allocation. Ifimmaterial, note it as
such. If you actually track it, make sure you update it each year.
2. Gift taxes paid affect the outside partnership basis if paid on the transfer of partnership
interests.
3. The Section 754 election is an "offthe balance sheet" adjustment pertaining to a partner's
interest obtained by sale or death.
4. If you filed the return with a discount that you might expect to settle at a lesser amount
later with the Internal Revenue Service, you might consider a Section 754 election even if
the effect is to currently step-down the inside basis of your assets.
Example: An estate owns a 99% limited partnership interest in a partnership which
contains marketable securities having a fair market value of$4,000,000 and a cost basis of
$2,500,000 inside the partnership. An appraisal is obtained which allows a forty percent
discount on the limited partnership units which allows it to value its outside partnership
interest at $2,376,000 (e.g., $4,000,000 x .99 x .60). On paper, it appears ludicrous to
make a Section 754 election since it results in a step-down in basis of$99,000 ($2,500,000
x .99 = $2,475,000 - $2,376,000). However, ifthe executor thinks there is likely to be an
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audit and that he would accept a thirty percent discount, the Section 754 election should be
made as the result would he a basis step-up. The value of the partnership interest would
rise to $2,772,000 ($4,000,000 x .99 x .70) vs. $2,475,000 ($2,500,000 x .99) or a basis
step-up of$297,000, which saves approximately $45,000 in federal capital gains tax ifan
audit occurs (at a 15% capital gain rate) vs. a cost of approximately $15,000 in tax if it
doesn't.
5. Run the numbers and document your decision as electing a step-down with 754 doesn't
appear on the surface to be a wise thing to do.
6. Brace yourselffor numerous amended returns where you are dealing with the 754 election
and discounts are involved. It is a fact of life, but refunds are the norm, so clients should
be happy.
7. What is the effect of the 754 election on assets where alternate values are involved?
Example: XYZ Partnership owns one piece ofreal estate at taxpayer's date ofdeath with
a cost basis of $1,200,000 and a fair market value of $2,000,000. For simplicity, assume
no discount was taken on the value ofthe partnership interest on the estate tax return. The
decedent owned 99% ofthe partnership interests, so there is a potential inside basis step-up
of$792,000 (99% of $800,000) relating to the taxpayer's estate if Section 754 is elected.
Shortly after the taxpayer's death, the real estate is actually sold for a net of $2,000,000
creating an $800,000 capital gain inside the partnership if Section 754 is not elected. The
partnership then purchases another piece of real estate for $2,000,000. Six months after
date ofdeath it is worth $1,500,000. Alternate valuation is elected and $1,485,000 (99% x
$1,500,000) is reported on the estate tax return. Section 754 is elected and the estate is
entitled to a basis step-up of$297,000 (99% x $300,000). The issue is how to allocate the
basis step-up.
a)

Do you put the total step-up to the real estate held at date of death?

b)

Do you put the total step-up to the most recently purchased asset that actually
dropped in value?
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c)

Do you do some type of pro-ration based on some manufactured theory?

d)

At least one prominent tax service (PPC) agrees that there is no actual answer in the
code or regulations, but thinks the increased basis should go to assets held at date of
death. This appears to be the most logical approach, since ifalternate values had not
been elected, there would have been zero gain to the estate, and with alternates, there
is a substantial gain. So whatever step-up there is, logically should reduce that gain.
Also, ifassets are owned individually, only those owned at date ofdeath are adjusted
for alternates, and not newly acquired assets.

8. Practical Advice
a)

If your taxpayer is both a general and limited partner, combine the information on
one K-l.

b)

However, ifan individual partner is also a grantor ofa GRAT or another trust which
is defective, file separately although the same social security number is shown on
both. This is not mandated by the Internal Revenue Code, but it helps with tracking
amongst various entities.

XII.

Estates and The Section 645 Election
A. Benefits
1. For persons dying after August 5, 1997, the IRS released proposed regulations under Code
Section 645. Section 645 allows a trustee of a qualified revocable trust (QRT) and the
executor of the decedent's estate to elect to have the trust treated as part of the estate
instead of as a separate taxable trust. The election is also available if there is no probate
estate. The election gives the trustee the opportunity to take advantage ofcertain benefits
that are available to estates that are not available to trusts. These benefits include fiscal
year elections, higher exemption ($600), no estimates in the first two tax years, charitable
deductions, and the waiver of active participation requirements for deducting passive
activity losses.
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B. Qualification Requirements
1. To qualify for this election, a trust (QRT) must have been treated as owned by a decedent
under IRe Section 676 (power to revoke retained by decedent with the consent or approval
of a nonadverse party, including the decedent's spouse). Rev. Proc. 98-13 sets forth the
procedures for making the election. The election is made beginning with the decedent's
date ofdeath and terminates the date before the applicable date. The applicable date Wlder
the proposed regulations was two years after the decedent's death if no estate tax return,
Form 706, is filed.

Otherwise, the applicable date was six months after the final

determination of the federal estate tax liability, i.e. six months after date of federal estate
tax closing letter.

c.

Final Regulations
1. The IRS has now issued final regulations effective for decedent's dying on or after
December 24,' 2002. Procedures and requirements for making the election are set forth, as
well as rules regarding the tax treatment ofthe trust and the estate while the election is in
effect and guidelines regarding the termination ofthe election. The fmal regs provide that,
if an executor is appointed, the executor and the trustee make the election by filing Form
8855, Election to Treat a Qualified Revocable Trust as Part of an Estate, with the IRS.
This form should be available this summer. Until then, the election is made by filing a
statement with the returns as provided under Rev. Proc. 98.12.
2. The fmal regulations have changed the "applicable date" for those situations in which a
federal estate tax return was required to be filed. Under the Proposed Regulations, if a
federal estate tax return was required to be filed, the applicable date was the date that was
six months after the date of final determination of liability for estate tax. Under final Reg
1.645-1(b)(2)(ii), however, the applicable date is the later ofthe date that is two years after
the date of the decedent's death or the date that is six months after the date of final
determination of liability for estate tax. Further, under the final Regulations, if the
issuance ofthe closing letter triggers the date offinal determination ofliability, the date of
final determination is the date that is six months after the date the closing letter is issued.
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3. Estates and trusts ofdecedents dying before December 24, 2002, may follow the election
procedures set forth in the earlier proposed regulations or in Rev. Proc 98-13. Also those
estates and trusts may follow the procedures in the final regs when obtaining a TIN for a

QRT and filing a Foem 1041 for the short tax year beginning with the decedent's death and
ending December 31 of that year.

XIII.

Total Return Trusts
A. Change in Thinking About Reasonable Returns
1. Some trust investment managers are veering away from the idea of generating current
"income" for the income beneficiary and principal appreciation for the remainderman. As
mentioned earlier, trustees have been using a wide range ofinvestment vehicles to increase
the total return oftheir trusts. In response to this new approach, many states are adopting
the Prudent Investors Act and the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act. These new
state laws are now in place to do exactly what the trustees have been doing by investing in
these varied investment options. They are managing the investments to increase the total
return to benefit both the income beneficiary and the remainderman. The trustee is then
required to allocate the total return between the income beneficiary and the remaindennan.
The UPIA allows the trustee to make an "equitable adjustment" shifting income to
principal or vice versa.
B. Tax Law Conformity
1. To adapt to the new management philosophy, the IRS has issued proposed regulations for
Section 643, introduced in February 2001.
2. Section 1.643 (a)-3(b) redefines DNI to include capital gains "to the extent they are,
pursuant to the terms of governing instrument and applicable local law; or pursuant to a
reasonable and consistent exercise of discretion by the fiduciary (in accordance with a
power granted to the fiduciary by local law or by the governing instrument, if not
inconsistent with local law)
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a)

allocated to income;

b)

allocated to corpus but treated by the fiduciary on the trust's books, records, and tax
returns as part of a distribution to a beneficiary; or

c)

allocated to corpus but utilized by the fiduciary in determining the amount which is
distributed or required to be distributed to a beneficiary."

c.

State Law
1. Although Kentucky has not adopted the 1997 act, trust instruments are being created and
existing instruments being reformed to adapt to these proposed regulations. It appears
from the proposed regs that as long as the new or reformed trust instrument specifically
gives the trustee the discretion to allocate capital gains to income, the gains should be
included in DNI for purposes of calculating the distribution deduction.

D. Not As Hot a Topic Today
1. With the falling stock market in recent years, income yields have gone back up and you
don't hear as much talk about these trusts. HOPefully, the market will rise to the level that
they become popular again. The attractiveness is they guarantee a certain percentage yield
irrespective of the existing market conditions.
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KENTUCKY FIDUCIARY ISSUES

I.

Intangibles Tax
A. Assets Subject to Intangibles Tax
1. Despite the laudable, in my opinion, efforts of our court system, there is still an
intangibles tax.
2. Corporate bonds, non-Kentucky municipal bonds and money market funds are still
taxable. Notably, all mutual funds (even if 100% in corporate bonds) are exempt.
3. Notices are currently being mailed on small amounts where brokers have notified the state
of Kentucky.
B. Taxation of Trusts
1. With simple trusts, taxation is determined based on the residency of the income
beneficiary;

Example: A simple trust has two beneficiaries, one a Kentucky beneficiary who receives
50% of the income, the other a non-resident who receives the other 50%. The trust has
$200,000 of corporate and non-Kentucky municipal bonds.

The trust would owe

intangibles tax on 50% of the assets.
2. With complex trusts, taxation is based on who actually receives distributions based on
their residency;

Example: A complex trust has terms which allow for income to be accumulated or to be
sprayed among various beneficiaries. 30% of the income is actually distributed to a
Kentucky resident and 70% to a non-resident. Only 30% of the trust is subject to
intangibles tax.
3. With complex trusts that have not made any distributions for the tax year, everything is
taxable to Kentucky if there is a potential Kentucky income distributee. If not, there is
nothing taxable.
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4. With estates, Kentucky takes the position that they are always subject to intangibles tax
(see Boske v. Security Trust & Safety Vault Company, 56 S.W. 524 (1900);

Example: An estate, at termination, will pour into two trusts both of which have one
beneficiary, a non-resident of Kentucky. You must ignore where the estate assets will
ultimately be disbursed and pay intangibles tax on those assets that are subject.
5. Revenue policy 62P130 should be read for further clarification.

II.

Income Tax
A. Taxation of Trusts
1. KAR 19:010 states that a resident estate or trust shall report and pay tax on all taxable
income except that portion of net income distributable or distributed during the taxable
year, and that portion ofthe net income from intangible personal property attributable to a
non-resident beneficiary.
2. KRS 141.020(4) states in part: ...a nonresident individual shall be taxable only upon the
amount of income received by him from labor performed, business done or from other
activities in this state, and from intangible property which has acquired a business situs in
this state; provided, however, that the situs of intangible personal property shall be the
residence of the real or beneficial owner, and not at the residence of the trustee having
custody or possession thereof...
B. Ordinary Income Taxation
1. With respect to ordinary income and simple trust taxation, the application of these
taxation rules should not be in doubt;

Example: 100% of the beneficiaries of a simple trust are non-residents of the state of
Kentucky. They have no taxable income to the state of Kentucky unless the income is
derived from real or tangible personal property located in Kentucky.

Example: A simple trust has $10,000 ofdividend income and $10,000 ofincome derived
from rental property located in Kentucky. The only beneficiary lives in Arizona. The
Arizona beneficiary is subject to tax in Kentucky only on the renal income of $10,000.
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2. With respect to ordinary income and complex trusts, the logical result would be the same
as with intangibles taxation.
a)

To the extent income from intangible personal property is actually distributed to
non-residents of Kentucky, they would pay no income tax.

b)

To the extent income is accumulated and distribution is totally discretionary as to
Kentucky and non-Kentucky beneficiaries, all income is taxed to the trust;

Example:' A complex trust has $10,000 of dividend income and the trustee may
distribute among a class ofthree non-Kentucky and two Kentucky beneficiaries in
any proportion. All of the income should be taxed to the trust since 100% of the
income could be accumulated for later payment to Kentucky beneficiaries.
Another way taxation could be determined in this case would be to wait until the
year actual distribution of this income was made. This, obviously, could be a
tracing and administrative nightmare. The opinion ofthe author is that the former
would hold true.
c)

Contrasted with the fonner example, assume that income may be accumulated but
must be accounted for in even 20% separate shares. In this case, logic would say
that only 40% of the accumulated income for the benefit of the two Kentucky
beneficiaries would be taxable and 60% non-taxable.

d)

Estate income which is being accumulated that will actually go in required
percentages to non-resident beneficiaries should likewise be exempt.

If the

accumulation will ultimately be made to trusts which have non-resident
beneficiaries, but Kentucky trustees, the income would be taxable at the estate level.
This is consistent with the intangibles tax treatment previously discussed.
C. Capital Gains Taxation of Trusts
1. Referring back to KAR 19:010, Kentucky taxation oftrust income appears to be based on
the residency of· the trust life income beneficiaries. The residency of the potential
remaindermen of the trust appears to have no application. Presumably, this is due to the
fact that the remaindermen could constantly move without the knowledge of the trustees
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and, ofcourse, the possibility ofunborn remaindermen. Also, remaindermen are not used
in determining intangibles taxation of trusts, for presumably the same reasons.
2. Since remaindermen are not addressed specifically, it would appear that the same rules
governing taxability ofordinary income from intangible personal property for trusts should
apply to capital gains;
Example: A simple trust incurs $10,000 of capital gains during the tax year and has one
beneficiary who lives in Wisconsin. Although the income beneficiary will not normally
receive the proceeds ofthe capital gain (unless encroachments are involved or an unlikely
provision exists in the governing instrument to mandate distribution ofsuch proceeds), it
would at least be arguable that the combined reading of KAR 19:010 and KRS 141.020
would lead to no capital gains tax to be paid.
3. Ifthe result is not as shown above, then what should be used to determine the taxability of
the gain? It would appear that the domicile of the remainderman would be the next best
choice, which should be ruled out based on the impracticalities discussed previously.
4. Of course, one might also argue that all capital gains are taxable to Kentucky trusts.
However, to come to this conclusion would seem to totally ignore both KAR 19:010 and
KRS 141.020 and the interplay between them.
5. You should read these sections and form your own conclusion.

III.

Administration Expenses
A. Due to the tax bracket differential, it might be wise to take administration expenses on a
federal estate tax return but not on a Kentucky death tax return;
Example: An estate is in a 50% estate tax bracket and the executor elects to take
administration expense on the federal death tax return. The Kentucky estate tax applies as
it is greater than the inheritance tax. In this case, all administration expenses should be
deducted on the Kentucky fiduciary income tax return.
B. Due to the tax bracket differential, it might be wise to take administration expenses on a
Kentucky inheritance tax return but not on a federal estate tax return;
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Example: A decedent has an estate of$950,000 and leaves 100% to one niece. There is
no federal estate tax return required and, therefore, administration expenses should be
taken on a federal fiduciary income tax return. However, the top Kentucky inheritance tax
return bracket of the niece is 16% which exceeds the top Kentucky income tax bracket of
6%.

Therefore, the administration expenses should be deducted on the Kentucky

inheritance tax return.
C. With the Kentucky inheritance tax completely phased out for decedent's dying after July 1,
1998 who leave their estate to Class A beneficiaries, it would appear that, when this occurs,
administration expenses should always be taken on the Kentucky fiduciary income tax return.
D. Class A beneficiaries include the following:
1. Parents
2. Children (natural, adopted and step)
3. Grandchildren
4. Brothers
5. Sisters
6. Half-brothers and half-sisters

IV.

Situs Issues - Resident Versus Non-Resident Trusts
A. KRS 141.190(1) provides that every fiduciary must file a return for a trust with income over
$100.

KRS 141.190(2) states that fiduciaries shall be subject to all of the provisions

applicable to individuals.
B. A resident individual is one who lives in Kentucky in the aggregate more than 183 days (KRS
141.010(17).
C. A non-resident is an individual who is not a resident of Kentucky.

F-32

D. It would appear, therefore, that a resident trust for Kentucky purposes would be one that has a
Kentucky fiduciary and that a non-resident trust would be one with a fiduciary that is
domiciled outside of Kentucky.
E. There is no actual definition of resident and non-resident trusts in the statute; however, the
above appears to be a logical conclusion;

Example: A Kentucky decedent establishes a testamentary trust for the benefit of two
children. A Kentucky fiduciary is named. During the tax year the trust is moved to a
fiduciary who lives outside the state of Kentucky. It would appear, in this instance, that a
final return would be filed with Kentucky for that year.
F. This is a "hot issue" with respect to state income tax planning. Contrast this treatment with
states which treat resident trusts as those created by a resident decedent at date of death or a
resident settlor if created during lifetime.

Example: The state of New York has a testamentary trust created by a decedent with a
New York trustee. The trustee is changed to a Kentucky fiduciary. New York would
claim a return was still necessary with the state of New York. Kentucky, under the logic
mentioned above, would similarly claim a return is due with Kentucky.

Example: A Kentucky trust has its Kentucky fiduciary switched to one domiciled in New
York. Since New York does not require returns for non-resident trusts regardless ofwhere
assets are located, nor does Kentucky appear to base filing requirements on the settlor's or
decedent's domicile when trusts are created but rather the domicile of the fiduciary, no
state return will be filed.
G. Opportunities would seem to abound in cases where trusts in Kentucky are accumulating large
sums of income or incur large capital gains. As long as there is a logical reason for switching
the situs of the fiduciary, capital gains taxes might be avoided.

Example: A Kentucky trust holds a business interest in a successful closely-held
business which it will probably sell in a few years. The trustee is domiciled in Kentucky
and is a bank with an affiliate that is domiciled in a state with no capital gains tax or with
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laws similar to the state ofNew York. The trust has Kentucky beneficiaries. The capital
gain is expected to be $5,000,000 when the business is sold. If the trustee is switched to
one outside ofKentucky with the parameters described above, $300,000 in inco~e tax will
be saved.
H. The state of Florida does not have a fiduciary income tax return. Many corporate bank
trustees have Florida affiliates. Is this a "no-brainer"?
I.

This would appear not to have any tax sham elements as long as the situs isn't moved
immediately before the sale or ifthere are other reasons to move the trustee, e.g. the residency
of an income beneficiary or· remainderman, or a move out of the state by the income
beneficiary or remainderman.

J. This loses some appeal, where non-resident beneficiaries are involved, ifyou agree with our
previous discussion that no capital gains taxes should be paid to the state of Kentucky
regardless.
K. There have been several articles presented on this subject in recent years but one case (1997
W.L. 50545 (D.C. App.» is an excellent summary ofthe points mentioned above (District of
Columbia vs. The Chase Manhattan Bank).

V.

Miscellaneous Items Federal vs. Kentucky
A. Different Schools of Thought
1. Since Kentucky statutes and regulations are silent on so many fiduciary taxation issues,
there are various other areas where practitioners are making their own interpretations.
2. Some practitioners feel that the basis ofassets for Kentucky purposes should be different
than for federal purposes since the Kentucky inheritance tax does not allow for alternate
valuation.
a)

The Kentucky statutes define taxable income to be the same as federal except for
exceptions noted. The.author sees no exception for capital gains and losses nor is
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there an override section as there is with non-resident beneficiaries receiving income
from intangible personal property.
b)

With the advent of the state death tax credit being available for more and more
estates in Kentucky, this argument will rarely be available as the state death credit
certainly keys off the federal amount of tax.

3. Some practitioners also feel the net income in respect of a decedent deduction should be
calculated differently when out of state municipal bonds and government bonds are
involved or deductions for state income taxes.
a)

Although logical, the Kentucky statutes, as mentioned above, defme taxable income
to be the same as federal except for exceptions noted. The income is respect of a
decedent deduction is not an exception and, therefore, should always be the same as
the federal amount.

B. Other Differences
1. The foreign income tax paid is not allowed as a credit for Kentucky purposes and the
Kentucky legislature recently took away a deduction for foreign tax for tax years beginning
after pecember 31, 2002, and ending June 30, 2004.
2. There are no estimated tax payments due to the state of Kentucky for either estates or
trusts.
3. Because the state income tax deduction is not allowed for Kentucky purposes,
distributable net income is not the same for federal and Kentucky purposes when this item
is involved. However, with the Internal Revenue Service now blessing the concept of
limiting taxation to an income beneficiary to "net accounting income", there is no longer a
problem of inequity.
Example: A simple trust has $10,000 of income from dividends and paid a $2,000 state
income tax on capital gains incurred in a prior year. Distributable net income is $8,000 for
federal purposes and $10,000 for Kentucky purposes. Net accounting income is $10,000
and for federal and Kentucky purposes, the income beneficiary may not be taxed on more
than what was the actual income available to be distributed. The concept works perfectly
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with $8,000 taxable on the federal and $10,000 on Kentucky which is the correct result. It:
however, there is $5,000 of income in respect of a decedent, the federal distributable net
income rises to $13,000 but due to the net accounting income limitation, only $10,000 is
taxed to the income beneficiary and $3,000 to the trust. Kentucky income rises to $15,000
with $10,000 taxable to the income beneficiary and $5,000 to the trust. Before the net
accounting income theory was accepted by the Internal Revenue Service, simple trust rules
would have taxed $13,000 for federal purposes and $15,000 for Kentucky purposes even
though the beneficiary received only $10,000. Most practitioners were following the net
accounting income theory long before it was accepted by the taxing authorities. It is the
only equitable result.

c.

Non-Resident Real Estate
1. As mentioned earlier in this discussion, non-resident income beneficiaries must pay tax to
Kentucky on net income derived from real estate or tangible personal property.

F- 36

·USE OF OUT OF STATE TRUSTS

Jeffrey T. Getty
National City Trust Company ofDelaware
Wilmington, Delaware

Copyright 2003. Jeffrey T. Getty. All rights reserved.

SECTIONG

USE OF OUT OF STATE TRUSTS

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION

G-l

A.

Why Clients Should Use Out Of State Trusts?

G-l

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

G-l
G-l
G-l
G-l
G-l

Tax Advantages
No Residency Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Generational Wealth Accumulation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Creditor Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Privacy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

ADVANTAGEOUS TRUSTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-2
A.

B.

DynastyTrusts

G-2

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

G-2
G-2
G-2
G-2
G-3

Asset Protection Trusts
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

C.

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Summary of Technique
Income Tax Implications Of Dynasty Trusts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
~ . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Types of Dynasty Trusts
Delaware - An Ideal Jurisdiction for a Dynasty Trust .... . . . . . . . ..

G-3

Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-3
Summary of Technique
G-3
Historical Prohibitions to Asset Protection Trusts. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G-3
Legislation
G-4
Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-4
Federal Income Tax Issues
G-IO
Gift/Estate Tax Issues - Creditor Protection
G-II
Characteristics of Asset Protection Trusts
G-12
Example of State with Favorable Asset Protection Laws G-I2
Delaware Asset Protection Trust Law

Gift Trusts
1.

G-16

Gift APTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-16

D.

CRUTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-17

E.

Total Return Trusts

G-17

SECTIONG

III.

MOVING TRUSTS TO DELAWARE ............•.................... G-17
A.

IV.

Moving Trusts to Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. G-17

OTHER ADVANTAGEOUS TECHNIQUES
A.

Investment Holding Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.

G-18
. . . . .. G-18.

Delaware Investing Holding Companies.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... G-18

SECTIONG

USE OF OUT OF STATE TRUSTS
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Why clients should use out of state trusts?
1.

Tax Advantages - The plain and simple truth is that establishing a trust out of state
can avoid state taxes. In such states as Delaware, assets held in irrevocable trusts
established by out-of-state donors and administered in Delaware are not subject to
income tax in Delaware. Although federal tax rates are declining, many states, due to
budget crises, are considering raising various taxes. Therefore, it is beneficial for a
client domiciled in a state that has high income tax rates to establish a trust in a state
that has no or low tax rates in order to allow investments to grow free from state taxes.

2.

No residency requirement - It is not necessary for a donor or a beneficiary of a trust
established in some states to be a resident of the state in order to benefit from
favorable tax laws. Although most states with favorable tax laws require trusts to be
administered in the state in order to reap the tax benefits, they do not require the
donor or the beneficiaries of the trust to be a resident of the state. In fact, in some
instances, it is more advantageous for out-of-state residents to establish a trust in
Delaware.

3.

Generational Wealth Accumulation - Historically, the trust law of most states prohibited
establishment of a perpetual trust. This rule, which is termed the "Rule Against
Perpetuities," states that an irrevocable trust can exist only as long as the life of,
typically, the youngest beneficiary of the trust plus 21 years. However, several states
have removed this restriction. These states, including Delaware, permit irrevocable
trusts to exist indefinitely. With this advantage, clients can accumulate wealth within a
trust for the benefit of generations ,to come.

4.

Creditor protection - Although many states allow creditor protection for beneficiaries of
a trust, they do no afford such protection to·creators of a trust. In some states,
however, creators of a trust are protected from certain creditors. It may be wise for a
client with a high risk of liability domiciled in a jurisdiction that does not provide creditor
protection to donors of a trust to investigate whether an out of state trust can provide
such protection.

5.

Privacy - Some states provide more privacy to clients with regard to assets held in
trust. For example, in many instances, trusts established in Delaware are not required
to be supervised by the courts. Furthermore,. trust documents are not required to be
filed with the courts. Thus, clients with privacy concerns may want to consider
Delaware or a state with similar practices to establish their trusts.
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II.

ADVANTAGEOUS TRUSTS·
A.

Dynasty Trusts
1.

Definition - A dynasty trust is one that is designed to last for several generations, if not
perpetually.

2.

Summary of Technique - Dynasty trusts usually are designed to accumulate trust
income and principal during a donor's lifetime. A dynasty trust typically is structured
as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes, which increases the value of the
gift to the trust. At the donor's death or, depending on the terms of the instrument, the
death of the surviving spo~se, the trust is divided into shares for each of the donor's
issue. The trust assets are available to be spent by the trust ben~ficiaries at all times,
either through the trustee's discretionary power to distribute income and principal or
various limited powers of appointment held by trust beneficiaries. However, if the trust
beneficiaries have sufficient assets of their own, the assets in.the dynasty trust will
continue to grow for the benefit of successive generations or for the ultimate benefit of
charity.

3.

Income Tax Implications of Dynasty Trusts -

4.

a.

Grantor Trust - A dynasty trust typically is structured as a grantor trust for
federal income tax purposes. The donor might want grantor trust treatment
because the trust will not be depleted to pay taxes on accumulated income
and capital gains, or because the trust income may be taxed at a lower rate if
it is taxed to the grantor. There are several ways to structure a dynasty trust
as a grantor trust without including the trust in a donor's estate. The donor
can retain the power, exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity, to reacquire trust
assets by substituting property of an equivalent value and to give an
independent trustee the power to add charitable beneficiaries.

b.

Non-Grantor Trust - In some instances, a donor might not want a dynasty trust
structured as a grantor trust, either because the donor is not willing or able to
pay the income tax on the income that the donor does not actually receive, or
because creating the trust as a grantor trust might subject it to state tax that
could be avoided if it were structured as a separate taxpayer.

Types of Dynasty Trusts a.

Exempt Dynasty Trusts - An exempt dynasty trust is a trust that uses an
individual's GST tax exemption.

b.'

Grandfathered Dynasty Trusts - A grandfathered dynasty trust is a trust that is
not subject to the GST tax because it was irrevocable on September 25,

1985.
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c.

5.

Nonexempt Dynasty Trusts - A trust that is not exempt or grandfathered for
GST tax purposes.

Delaware - An Ideal Jurisdiction for a Dynasty Trusta.

Delaware is an ideal location for a dynasty trust. Under Delaware law a trust
can be perpetual, ie, never terminating. Additionally, Delaware is a favorable
jurisdiction for dynasty trusts because:
i.

ii.

iii.
iv.

B.

No tax imposed on accumulated income or capital gains for nonDelaware residents.
Follows the prudent investor rule that permits a trustee to acquire
almost any type of investment and that assesses investment
performance as a whole.
Recognizes direction trusts permitting someone other than the trustee
to make investment decisions for particular assets.
Protects self-settled trusts from most creditors.

Asset Protection Trusts
1.

Definition - An asset protection trust is a trust that provides protection from most
creditors and, if established in a state like Delaware, grows free of state income tax for
non-Delaware residents.

2.

Summary of Technique - The donor creates an irrevocable trust with situs in a
jurisdiction with favorable asset protection laws. The donor is allowed to retain the
potential to receive distributions of income, principal or both in the discretion of a
trustee who is neither the transferor nor a related or subordinate party as defined by
the Internal Revenue Code (IRe). The benefit of the creation of such a trust is that no
action of any kind may be brought against the trust assets unless brought under an
exception to the state's asset protection statute (if an exception exists) or under the
fraudulent conveyance law of the state. The results of the creation of these trusts are
protection of assets from creditors and the ability to place assets in trust that are
considered completed gifts for estate tax purposes (removing the assets from the
estate of the donor). Yet, the donor is able to retain an interest in the trust funds if
ever needed (serving as a safety net for the donor if ever assets are required).

3.

Historical Prohibitions to Asset Protection Trusts - The assets in most U.S. trusts may
be attached by .creditors of the grantor to the extent that the grantor is entitled or
eligible to receive assets from the trust even if the transfer to the trust was irrevocable
and not made to defraud creditors.
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a.

4.

i.

The grantor retained too much control over the trust (Le. power to
revoke or appoint property).

ii.

The grantor retained a beneficial interest in the trust.

iii.

The trust was funded as a result of a fraudulent conveyance or the
trust is a sham.

b.

Spendthrift trusts - Most states recognized the validity of spendthrift clauses in
trusts, which protect a beneficiary's interest from creditors' claims. Generally,
however, spendthrift clauses are not enforceable against the claims of a
grantors' creditors to the extent of the grantor retained beneficial interest in
the trust. Most states have statutes prohibiting grantQrs from establishing
self-settled trusts to protect against claims of creditors.

c.

However, there are certain traditional trusts with asset protection qualities:

i.

Discretionary trusts.

ii.

Support trusts - distribution limited to health, education, support and
maintenance.

iii.

Credit shelter discretionary trusts.

iv.

Marital trusts limiting principal invasions.

v.

Split interest trusts (Le. CRTs, GRATs, QPRTs).

vi.

Trusts where grantor retains income interest only- thereby protecting
principal from creditors.

Legislation - In recent years, several states have lead the charge on providing asset
protection for donors of trusts established in their state. The following is a list of states
that provide such protection:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

5.

Under most state laws, a grantor's creditors can recover against trust assets if
a grantor retains benefit from the trust if:

Missouri (1989)
Alaska (1997)
Delaware (1997)
Rhode Island (1999)
Nevada (1999)

Challenges - Several challenges exists to effectiveness of asset protection trusts.
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a.

Full Faith and Credit Clause

i.

Must obtain jurisdiction over trustee, assets or settlor.

ii.

Advance a legal theory:
• offensive to public policy;
• "sham" trust; or
• fraudulent conveyance

iii.

Based upon jurisdiction obtained may have enforcement issues.

b.

Due Process - Forum state must have sufficient interest in the matter that the
application of its laws would not be arbitrary or unfair.

c.

Contract Clause

d.

i.

Law must substantially impair the obligations of the parties to·existing
contracts or unreasonably difficult to enforce.

ii.

Subject to "strict scrutiny" review - law must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling. government interest.

The Fraudulent Conveyance Doctrine -If a transfer is considered a fraudulent
conveyance under applicable or state law, it will be voidable at the instance
of a creditor or bankruptcy trustee, subject to the applicable statute of
limitations. Most states have adopted some version of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) or the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA). If the state has not adopted the UFTA or UFCA, the state has
adopted either a statutory or common law variant of the Statute of Elizabeth.
The Bankruptcy Code also has fraudulent transfer provisions.

i.

Statute of Limitations - Law varies state to state. The Bankruptcy
Code provides that a fraudulent conveyance is voidable if ,it takes
place within a year of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Section 9 of
the UFTA provides that a cause of action relating to a fraudulent
transfer is extinguished unless an action is brought:
•

To void a transfer made with actual intent to delay, hinder of
defraud creditors, within four years after the transfer was
made, or if later, within one year after the transfer was or
could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.

•

To void a transfer of property made with constructive fraud,
within four years after the transfer was made, and
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•

ii.

Actual Fraud - A transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors may be voidable by a present or future creditor or
bankruptcy trustee. Since an admission is difficult to obtain courts
often look to circumstantial evidence or "b~dges of fraud."
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

iii.

To void a transfer made to an insider.. for an antecedent debt,
within one year after the transfer is made.

Transfer to an insider.
Transfer with retention of possession or control of property.
Transfer after the transferor has been sued or threatened
with suit.
Transfer of substantially all of the transferor's assets.
Removal of assets from the jurisdiction of the court.
Omission of assets from a financial s~atement given to a
creditor or bankruptcy trustee.
.
Transfer for inadequate consideration.
Transfer made when transferor is insolvent.
Transfer shortly before or after substanti.al debt·is incurred.

Constructive Fraud - Transfers that are voidable regardless of intent.
•
•
•
•

e.

Transfers while insolvent (sum of a person's debts
exceed the fair value of their assets).
Transfer by person intending to.incur debt.
Transfer has not be acknowledged, or proved and filed
for record as required by law.
Transferor is left with unreasonably small capital in their
business.

Bankruptcy
L

ii.

Supremacy Clause
•

Sect. 541 (c)(2) exemption - based on state law however, this was written prior to DAPT legislation.

•

If argue exception independent of Sect. 541 then Sec.
522(b)(2) applies exemptions of debtor's domicile state.

Federal Bankruptcy Generally ~
•

Bankruptcy concepts relevant to asset protection:
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--Property of the bankruptcy estate.
--The fraudulent conveyance rules under Bankruptcy
Code Section 548.
--The rule that permits the debtor to choose between
federal exemptions or state law exemptions.
-Definition of the term "insolvency" under the
Bankruptcy Code.
-The circumstances under which a bankruptcy
discharge will be denied.
•

Property of the bankruptcy estate - Property of the
bankruptcy estate is broadly defined under Section 541
of the Bankruptcy Code. Generally, Section 541 provides
that the bankruptcy estate shall include:
--All interests in property except assets in valid
spendthrift trust.
"
--Debtor's interest in controlled community property.
--Property recovered by trustee in bankruptcy that was
subject of a prior fraudulent conveyance.
--Certain property acquired by debtor 180 days after filing
of bankruptcy.petition, including, but not limited· to,
property acquired by bequest, devise, divorce or life
insurance policy.
--Income and revenue from property.

•

iii.

Definition of Transfer - Section 548(d)(1) provides that a
transfer of property to a transferee will be deemed to
have occurred when a bona fide purchaser of the same
property from the debtor cannot acquire an interest in the
property that is superior to that of the transferee.

Insolvency under Bankruptcy Code •

Definition of insolvency - Section 101 (32) of the
Bankruptcy Code generally defines "insolvent" as a
"financial condition such that the sum of an entity's debts
is greater than all of that entity's property, at fair
valuation, exclusive of:
-Property transferred, concealed, or removed to hinder,
delay or defraud such entity's creditors.
--Property that may be exempted from property of the
bankruptcy estate.
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iv.

•

Test of insolvency - A balance sheet test is used under
the Bankruptcy Code to determine whether a debtor is
insolvent. Under the definition of insolvency, if the debts
of a debtor outweigh the fair valuation of the property of a
debtor, the debtor will be deemed insolvent.

•

Fair valuation - The Bankruptcy Code provides that the
test of insolvency is based on a "fair valuation" of a
debtor's property. Fair valuation is defined as an
estimate of what can be realized out of the assets within
a reasonable time, either through collection or sale at the
regular market value. Thus, a forced sale valuation of
assets is inappropriate in determining insolvency.

•

Contingent liabilities - A debt is defined as a liability on a
claim under the Bankruptcy Cod~.Under the Section
101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, "claim includes those
that are contingent, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. Accordingly,
contingent liabilities are included in the computation of
insolvency or solvency, with an adjustment for possible
rights of subrogation or reimbursement.

Fraudulent Transf~rs - Section 548 of Bankruptcy Code is the federal
equivalent to state fraudulent conveyance statutes and provides for
two (2) classes of fraudulent transfers.
•

Actual fraud and badges of fraud- Section 548(a)(1)(A)
provides that a transfer within one year of the bankruptcy
filing is voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy if it can be
shown to have been made with an actual intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors. A presumption of fraudulent
intent exists if the trustee in bankruptcy can prove the
existence of several badges of fraud.

•

Constructive fraud - A transfer may be constructively
fraudulent under Section 548(a)(1)(8) of the Bankruptcy
Code if the debtor:
--Received less than reasonably equivalent value for the
property4
-Either was:
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1) Insolvent on the date of the transfer (or became
insolvent because of the transfer;
2)

was engaged in a business (or was about to
engage in a business) and had unreasonably
small capital; or

3)

intended to incur debts beyond his ability to
repay.

-Protection of good faith purchasers - Generally, Section
548 protects good faith purchasers for value. If a
purchaser buys an asset from the debtor and pays fair
and adequate consideration AND has no actual or
constructive notice of the debtor's fraudulent intent, then
the purchaser may retain the property.
--Charitable Gift Exception - Section 548(a)(2) excepts
certain qualified charitable gifts from the constructive
fraud provisions of Section 548(a)(1)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Under that provision, an individual
debtor's gift to a qualified religious or charitable
organization (as defined by Internal Revenue Code
Section 170) is not a constructively fraudulent transfer
provided the gift does not exceed 150/0 of the debtor's
gross income for the year within which the transfer was
made. Further, even if the gift does exceed 15°k, the
contribution will not be considered constructive fraud if
the transfer was consistent with the debtor's prior
practice of charitable giving. This charitable gift
exception DOES NOT apply to charitable transfers
where actual fraud exists.
--Trustees Power to Void Transfers Under State LawSection 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee
in bankruptcy the rights of an unsecured creditor of the
bankrupt-debtor to void transfers that could have been
voided by a creditor under state law. This provision is
particularly important since, as to alleged fraudulent
transfers under state law, the trustee may rely on these
statutes and the accompanying statute of limitations
(which would have been available to a creditor under
state law) rather than the one year statute proscribed in
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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--Denial of Discharge- Section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code sets forth the circumstances when a discharge
from debts will be denied. The section provides that a
court shall grant a debtor discharge from debts unless
the debtor (or someone else with debtor's permission)
has transferred, destroyed, concealed property, within
one year before the date of filing a bankruptcy petition,
with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. Four
(4) specific elements must be proven before the
debtor's discharge will be denied:
1) That a transfer of property has occurred by
the debtor or has been made at the debtor's
direction.
2) That the transfer involved property of the
debtor.
3) That the transfer was made within one year of
the filing of bankruptcy petition.
4) That the debtor intended to hinder, delay or
defraud a creditor by transferring the property.
6.

Federal Income Tax Issues a.

Grantor trust treatment - If the donor of an asset protection trust retains the
right to income and principal in the discretion of the trustee of the trust, the
trust will be treated as a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes. An
advantage of such treatment is that the trust will not be diminished by federal
income tax because the donor may be taxed on income that the donor does
not actually receive. However, one must be careful not to jeopardize the
asset protection goals of the trust by including provisions in the trust directing
the trustee to reimburse the donor for income tax payments. Furthermore, the
trustee must be careful not to use its discretionary powers to reimburse the
donor for such taxes too frequently, which may cause the IRS and/or creditors
to contend that the donor and trustee informally agreed to reimburse the
donor.

b.

Non-Grantor trust treatment - In cases where the donor of an asset protection
trust retains the right to income and principal in the discretion of the trustee,
but does not wish to be taxed on the income the donor does not receive, the
donor can establish a deliberately defective non-grantor trust. In this case,
the trust instrument requires consent of a beneficiary with a substantial
adverse interest in the payment of the income.

G -10

74

Gift/Estate Tax Issues - Creditor protection:
a.

b.

Background
i.

Gift tax - If a trust is established in state where the grantor's creditors
cannot reach the trust assets, then the gift is complete for federal gift
tax purposes. - PLR 9837007.

H.

Estate tax - General rule is transfers that represent a completed gift
are then excluded from the transferor's gross estate. ProblemSmith V4 Shaughnessy, 318U.S. 176 (1943).

Section 2036(a) Transfers with a Retained Life Estate
i.

ii.

Implied agreement - Tax Court has found when:
•

All trust income is paid back to settlor during his/her lifetime Estate of Skinnerv. U.S., 197 F.Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1961)

•

All the settlor's assets are placed in the trust - Estate of
Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785 (1986)

•

Settlor continues to use the property placed into the trust Estate of Lindermen v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305 (1969)

•

But see - Estate of Wells v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1981574 (1981); PLR 8037116

Creditor's rights - If transferred assets are not subject to creditor
claims the transfer will be considered complete and not included for
estate tax purposes - PLR 9332006; Rev. Rul. 76-103
•

Caselaw mixed

•

Look for public policy exception

iii.

Bankruptcy law (see above) -Inclusion could be argued by mere fact
that a bankruptcy court could ignore the state law.

iv.

Section 2038 - Revocable Transfers
•

Applies where the settlor has retained the power to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate any other person's beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
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•

8.

Characteristics of Asset Protection Trusts a.

9.

Most likely would occur if the retained rights in the trust were
considered a retained power to "terminate the trust by
relegating the grantor's creditors to the entire property of the
trust." Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 153 (1981).

Major provision necessary for asset protection trusts:

i.

Irrevocability - The trust must be irrevocable.

ii.

Identity of trustee - The trust must have a qualified trustee. For example, in
Delaware, a qualified trustee is defined as a natural person who resides in the
state or a corporation subject to supervision by certain regulatory agencies in
the state.

iii.

Situs requirement - The qualified trustee must materially particip~te in the
administration of the trust (e.g. maintain trust records). At least a portion of
the trust assets must be located within the state.

iv.

Choice of law - The trust instrument should state the law of the situs
jurisdiction governs the validity, construction and administration of the trust.

v.

Spendthrift clause - The trust must have a spendthrift clause.

vi.

Distributions to donor - Most states with asset protection trust laws allow a
trustee of an asset protection trust the power to make discretionary
distributions to the donor.

Example of State with Favorable Asset Protection Laws - Delaware Asset Protection Trust
Lawa.

The summary of the Delaware Act establishing asset protection trust law notes the
purpose of the legislation is to allow grantors to reduce estate tax by excluding
creditors' claims againstself-settled trusts. The Act is intended to maintain
Delaware's status as the most favorable jurisdiction for establishing trusts.

b.

Rule against perp~tuitjes - Delaware has abolished the rule against perpetuities for
personal property and adopted a 110 year rule against perpetuities for real property.
However, any interest in a corporation, limited liability company. partnership. business
trust or other entity which holds real property is expressly exempt .from the scope of
the 110 year rule against perpetuities for real property.
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c.

Qualified trustee - A qualified trustee is defined in Delaware as a natural person who
resides in the state or a corporation subject to supervision by certain regulatory
agencies in the state. Any qualified trustee that ceases to be a Delaware resident or a
Delaware bank or trust company will be deemed to have resigned at the time of such
cessation, and any successor qualified trustee designated in the trust instrument will
take its place.

d.

Qualified dispositions - Delaware law (12 Del. C. Sec. 3570 et seq.) applies to
"qualified dispositions" made on or after July 1, 1997.

i.

A "qualified disposition" is a disposition by or from a transferor to a trustee
who is:
•
•
•
•

e.

f.

A Delaware resident, bank or institution authorized by Delaware law
to act as a trustee.
Maintaining or arranging for custody of some or all of the trust corpus
in Delaware.
Maintaining records of the trust on an exclusive or nonexclusive
basis.
Preparing or arranging for the preparation of fiduciary tax returns or
otherwise materially participating in the trust's administration.

Under Section 3572(b), a creditor existing at the time a transfer to a trust is made
must commence an action to enforce a judgment within the later of four (4) years or
one (1) year after the transfer was or could reasonably have been discovered by the
creditor.

i.

A trustee may make a qualified disposition. If a trustee.of an irrevocable .
spendthrift trust makes a qualified disposition after June 30, 1997, the time
that the trust was in existence before it was moved to Delaware will count
toward the four (4) year period for pursuing claims that arise after a qualified
disposition is made.

ii.

Example: Michael created an offshore self-settled spendthrift trust in 1992. If
the trustee or trust protector amends the trust in 2000 to become a Delaware
asset protection trust and if no creditor's claims existed when the trust was
.created, the trust will not be vulnerable to claims that arose in 1998 because
the four (4) year claim period expired in 1996.

Irrevocability - An asset protection trust in Delaware must be irrevocable, but can
include one or more of the following provisions:

i.

Grantor may retain power to veto distributions.

ii.

Grantor may retain a special power of appointment.

G - 13

g.

iii.

Grantor may receive income, principal or both in the sole discretion of a
trustee who is neither the grantor nor a related or subordinated party of the
grantor (I.R.C. Section 672(c)).

iv.

No action to enforce a judgment shall be brought for attachment against a
qualified disposition, provided the transfer of property to the trust was not
intended to hinder, delay or defraud creditors (Le. no fraudulent conveyance).

Exceptions to the Delaware Asset Protection Trust Act (DAPTA)
i.

The following persons are not subject to th,e DAPTA and may recover against
an asset protection trust:
•

Alimony/Child Support - A person whose claim results from an
agreement or court order providing for alimony, child support or
property division may recover from an asset protect trust. This
exception would almost certainly exist, even if it were not in the
statute, because it is highly unlikely that any court in any U.S. state
would permit a child to go without support while a donor/parent was
living on funds received from a retained interest in a trust. However,
a spouse who marries a donor of an asset protection trust after the
trust is created has no greater rights against the trust than any other
general creditor.

•

Tort Claims - A person who suffers death, personal injury or property
damage before the date of the qualified disposition for which the
donor is liable may recover. Realistically, a plaintiff asserting the tort
claim exception probably will be recover any way under the exception
for claims that existed before the trust was created because a tort
claim that predates the making of a qualified disposition almost
certainly will be pursued within four (4) years after the qualified
disposition is made or, if later, within one year after discovery of the
qualified disposition.

ii.

Although these exceptions exist, a creditor may not seek disqualification of
the entire disposition. If one of the exceptions above applies, the qualified
disposition is defeated ONLY to the extent necessary to pay the creditor's
claim and related costs, including attorneys' fees. If multiple creditors under
these exceptions confront the donor, each creditor must bring a separate
action for avoidance.

iii.

Acts of Independent Significance: The establishment of a DEAPT as a
completed gift, thereby barring inclusion in the estate of a donor, turns on the
ability of a donor's creditors to reach the trusts assets. Although the
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exceptions to DEAPT Act may allow a creditor utilizing an exception to reach
a portion of the trusts assets,' the exceptions may not defeat the completed
gift status of the DEAPT. Relevant federal and state cases and rulings
provide that a donor will make a completed gift and obtain estate tax
exclusion unless the donor retains the affirmative powers to incur debt and to
relegate creditors to the assets of a trust. These cases and rulings also hold
that "acts of independent significance," such as divorce, failure to support a
spouse, the ability to have or adopt children and the ability to terminate
employment, will not prevent a transfer from being a completed gift or from
resulting in estate tax exclusion. In light of the fact that, similar to an event
such as divorce, a donor usually does not incur a tort claim affirmatively, the
institution of a tort claim against a donor may be deemed an act of
independent significance that will not prevent a transfer from being a
completed gift or from resulting in estate tax exclusion. See Estate of Tully v.
U.S., 528 F.2d 1401 (CA6 1976)(stating acts of independent significance
include divorce); see also Outwin v. Comm., 76 Te 153 (1981); TAM
8819001; Ellis v. Comm., 51 TC 182 (1968), affd 431 F.2d 442 (GA91971)
(stating acts of independent significance; Rev. Rul. 80-255, 1980-2 GB 272)
(stating acts of independent significance include the ability to have or adopt
children); Landorf v. U.S., 408 F.2d 461 (Gt. CI1969); Estate of Smead v.
Gomm., 78 TC 43 (1982); Estate of Beauregard v. Comm., 74 Te 603 (1980);
Rev. Rut. 72-307, 1972-1 CB 307.
h.

Additional Advantages of a Delaware Asset Protection Trust

L

Partial avoidance of transfer - In Delaware, the transfer may be held void only
to the extent necessary to satisfy the judgment debt.

ii.

Non-residents of Delaware may act as trust advisors, with the authority to
remove and appoint qualified trustees and/or direct, consent, or disapprove
distributions from the trust.

iii.

Delaware asset protection trust may have multiple trustees located in different
jurisdictions so long as at least one of the co-trustees is an individual resident
of Delaware or a bank or trust company authorized to act as a trustee in
Delaware.

iv.

Extensive Liability - The trustee, trust advisor and any person involved in the
counseling, drafting, preparation, execution or funding of an asset protection
trust is protected. On July 20, 1999, the Delaware Qualified Dispositions in
Trust Act, 72 Del. Laws c. 195, was amended to provide that no creditor nor
any other person shall have any claim against the trustee or any advisor of an
asset protection trust nor against any person involved in the counseling,
drafting, preparation, execution, or funding of such trust other than the right to
avoid fraudulent transfers. In effect, the amendment absolves trustees,
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advisors and persons involved in the creation of asset protection trusts from
any personal liability to a donor's creditors and third persons.

C.

v.

The donor of a Delaware asset protection trust may retain a right to receive
income and principal from a charitable remainder unitrust or a charitable
remainder annuity trust within the meaning of Section 664 of the Internal
Revenue Code or to retain the right to receive a specified percentage of the
value of the trust property each year provided that the specified percentage
does not exceed five (5) percent.

vi.

Avoidance of other state income tax - A Delaware asset protection trust might
be used to avoid the income tax imposed by a state that has not adopted the
federal grantor trust rules or the tax imposed on intangible property by a state.
•

Example: In 2000, Ms. Mitchell, an Alabama resident, sold her zerobasis stock in her computer business for $10~OOO,000 through a
Delaware asset protection trust. In selling her business this way, Ms.,
Mitchell avoided the 5°k Alabama income tax on the gain.

•

Example: Mr. Anderson lives in New Yorl< City. If he puts
$10,000,000 in a Delaware asset protection trust, he will have to pay
New York City and New York State income tax on the trust's capital
gains and accumulated income if the trustee is given sole discretion
to use income and principal for his benefit. However, if distributions
are subject to approval of an adverse party (e.g. a remainder
beneficiary who will receive principal if it is not distributed to Mr.
Anderson), the trust will not be a grantor trust. Thus, it should not be
subject to either New York City or New York State income tax.

Gift Trusts
1. Gift APTs - (DE) "The purpose of the Act is to facilitate the establishment in Delaware
of the irrevocable trust that will allow trust settlors to transfer assets from their estates,
in order to reduce the federal'estate taxes the would otherwise be due upon their
death. In order to remove effectively such assets from their estates, the settlors
cannot retain any enforceable right to the income or principal of the trust, but may
receive wholly discretionary distributions of income or principal if the trustee is not a
related or subordinate party. In addition, these trusts cannot be subject to the claims
of settlor's creditors if they are excluded from the setttlor's estates."
a.

Interaction between creditor rights and transfer tax - A transfer is complete for
federal gift and estate tax purposes only when it is no longer subject to the
claims of the creditors of the donor.

b.

Interaction of property law and federal estate and gift taxes.
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III.

i.

Federal law determines tax consequences of any retained property
rights.

ii.

The extent of property rights are determined under applicable state
law which sets the parameters of property interests.

D.

CRUTs

E.

Total Return Trusts

MOVING TRUSTS TO DELAWARE
A.

Moving Trusts to Delaware1.

Moving a trust to Delaware requires an analysis of the tax and personal implications of
such a move. In most cases, if the circumstances are favora~leJ moving a trust,
including a dynasty trust, to Delaware may be in the best interests of the current and
future beneficiaries.
a.

Review of governing instrument - In most cases, where the governing
instrument provides for removal and replacement of the trustee without court
proceedings, appointment of a Delaware trustee is sufficient to move the situs
of the trust to Delaware. However, if the instrument is silent as to the removal
or replacement of the trustee, the current trustee's resignation or court
approval is required to facilitate the transfer.

b.

Creating a perpetual trust - In many cases, a trust is moved to Delaware to
take advantage of Delaware's abolishment of the rule against perpetuities. If
the governing instrument has sufficient flexibility and confers a limited power
of appointment on a beneficiary, a beneficiary may exercise the power to
make it possible for the trust to last forever.

c.

Avoiding state income, intangible and capital gains tax-It is necessary to
determine if moving the trust from a state that imposes an income or
intangible tax will make it possible for the trust to cease paying the tax. If a
state assesses a tax if the trustee is located or resides in that state, moving
the trust should terminate liability for the tax. However, constitutional issues
arise where the original state imposes its tax if the donor lived in the state
when the donor created the trust.
i.

Example: Avoid Home State Tax: Client intends to sell a $10,000,000
business. Client creates a trust with Delaware trustee. Trust
beneficiaries are client's spouse and children. Client's children may
direct trustee to give assets to client. Client may direct disposition'of
assets remaining in trust at client's death. Business is sold, resulting
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in federal capital gains tax and NO home state capital gains tax.
Assets may remain in trust or be returned to client (after a "decent"
interval).
d.

Avoiding federal transfer tax consequences-It is necessary to ensure that
moving a trust will not produce adverse federal transfer tax consequences.
An exempt dynasty trust or a nonexempt dynasty trust most likely can be
moved without changing the federal transfer tax status of the trust. However,
more considerations are necessary for grandfathered dynasty trusts.

IV. OTHER ADVANTAGEOUS TECHNIQUES
A.

Investme~t

1.

Holding Companies

Delaware Investment Holding Companies - A Delaware investment holding company
("DIHC") is a special-purpose legal entity incorporated in DeJa,ware and widely
recognized as a vehicle for minimizing state income taxes. Many national and
international companies establish DIHCs as subsidiaries and reap the benefits of
these tax savings.
a.

Statute - Under Section 1902(b)(8)of the Delaware Code, a DIHC qualifies for
exemption from both Delaware corporate income tax and Delaware gross
receipts tax where the activities of the entity are limited to certain prescribed
activities within the State of Delaware. Additionally, by virtue of its status as a
DIHC, an entity may be exempt from taxation in other stat~s. In order to
qualify for exemption from Delaware tax and minimize the possibility of
taxation in other states, a DIHC must confine its activities to the "maintenance
and management" of intangible investments and the collection and distribution
of the income from such investments or from tangible property located
physically outside of the State of Delaware.

b.

Function - In order to reap the benefits of a DIHC, a parent company must
establish a DIHC that must own and manage the intangible investments.
However, the parent company may utilize the intangible investments of the
DIHC through leasing agreements or the like.

c.

Requirements: Establishing a DIHC is relatively simple and cost efficient.
Delaware law permits a parent company to establish a wholly-owned
subsidiary to own and manage its intangible assets regardless of whether the
parent company is incorporated in Delaware. Intangible investments include
investments in stocks, bonds, notes, other debt obligations, patents,
trademarks and trade names. However, in order for an entity to benefit from
the tax advantages of a' DIHC, it must be structured and managed properly.
Primarily, a DIHC must have:
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A stated business purpose on file.

ii.

Been created for valid non-tax reasons, including protecting the value
of trademarks and protecting transferred intangibles against the
claims of creditors.

iii.

A substantial presence in and a real nexus to the State of Delaware in
order to avoid taxation in a parent company's state of origin". Some of
the factors evidencing a sufficient nexus include, but are not limited
to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

maintaining a permanent corporate office and bank account in
Delaware;
maintaining a telephone number for the Delaware office;
maintaining and utilizing a Delaware address for all
correspondence, legal documents and financial statements;
executing all Delaware corporation documents in Delaware;
custody of the intangible assets of the OIHC within Delaware;
holding a meeting of the directors of the DIHC in Delaware at
least once a year;
performing record keeping "and accounting functions in
Delaware;
holding original accounting and corporate records in Delaware;
and
retaining a Delaware employee (or independent contractor) with
the experience and authority to manage a DIHC
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I

The Changing Landscape of Taxation

The recent passage of several income and gift and estate tax reductions has altered
the landscape of planning. Still, opinions regarding the ultimate outcome of this political
drama are many and varied. Uncertainty has tested the skills of the advisor and made
flexibility the hallmark of most planning strategies.
A.

Estate Tax Reform or Repeal

The ultimate repeal of gift and estate taxes is uncertain and, should it actually
occur, its viability long term is arguably questionable. An additional variable is the
response of state legislatures that are facing budget shortfalls and falling federal revenue
enhancements such as the elimination of the state death tax credit.
Most advisors would agree that our clients still need to consider the effect that gift
and estate taxes will have on their estates should they die in the next few years. For our
wealthier clients, those with estates greater than $10 million today, tax and estate tax
planning will always be an important part of their planning.
B.

Leaving a Legacy that is not a Hindrance

A larger applicable credit amount means greater opportunity to shelter and freeze
estate values. It also tends to foster greater wealth concentrated in fewer hands. The
concerns many clients have regarding the financial and managerial discipline of the
younger generation- increase geometrically in relation to the additional wealth that will
soon be placed in those hands. Some members of the first generation who have struggled
to amass wealth would rather their progeny not just passively inherit it.
Today's wealthy are more likely to embrace the growing emphasis on supporting
an entrepreneurial ambition rather than simply funding the wastefulness of future
generations. _ In short, they want their children to earn their inheritance. An increasing
number of wealthy families are holding their wealth in business entities and trusts to
maximize control, pool resources and train the younger generation in financial

management. The creation of perpetual trusts in states with no durational limits on trusts
is one way to protect family assets and control waste.
A welcome component to the perpetual trust is the unitrust concept. Rather than
bind current income beneficiaries and remaindermen to traditional income and principal
ascertainable standards, which tend to set the interests of these parties against one
another, the unitrust concept places them both on the same side of the equation. This
presentation will discuss the Dynasty Trust, as well as its use of unitrust terms to equalize
the treatment of current and future beneficiaries of the trust, and Charitable Remainder
Trusts. We will primarily discuss the use of a Delaware trustee and Delaware law as this
state provides arguably the best opportunities for multi-generational trusts to grow
unfettered.
II

Dynasty Trusts

A Dynasty Trust, more appropriately called a "perpetual trust", is an irrevocable
trust established in a state with no durational limit on trust longevity. Most states allow
an irrevocable trust to last up 110 years or so, depending on the interplay between the
state's Rule Against Perpetuities and the ages of the beneficiaries when the trust is
executed. A true perpetual trust is unhampered by this rule.
Many states have modified or repealed their statute codifying the Rule Against
Perpetuities to allow a trust to run for many generations, even perpetually. The trust is
usually drafted to limit a beneficiary's access to trust assets to "use" and "enjoyment"
rather than distribution of trust assets. Often, the terms of the trust are flexible regarding
distribution of income and principal and by nature will generally grant broad discretion to
the trustee. Because the grantor cannot know what circumstances may arise 80, 100 or
200 years from now, any specific terms may become inefficient, even onerous, over time.
Therefore, great care must be taken to draft provisions that can stand the test of time and
provide mechanisms for flexibility, amendment or termination.
A.

The Rule Against Perpetuities

For most attorneys, the Rule Against Perpetuities is a distant memory, tucked
away with the Rule in Shelley's Case. In the typical estate plan, the drafter includes
boilerplate language signifying the trust's termination in the remote chance that the
grantor's descendants fail to die in the proper order and the trust overstays its welcome.
Kentucky falls into the category of the "wait-and-see" states that follow the
common law Rule Against Perpetuities" (KRS 381.215) but modify its harshness by
viewing an interest in property through the actual events affecting a violation of the rule
rather than by the mere possibility that an event will violate the rule. Any interest that
does violate the Rule is then reformed to approximate the creator's intent within the
confines of the Rule (KRS 381.216). This treatment serves to limit the length of time a
testator can control interests in property after death while maintaining the testator's
intent, as closely as possible, where the Rule is violated.
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The fact is that the average client isn't usually interested in a trust that will last for
more than one generation. However, the many benefits of an irrevocable trust are
coupled with tremendous tax savings when a perpetual trust is properly drafted and
funded in the right jurisdiction. In states without durational limits, trusts can benefit one
generation after another without ever paying estate or .generation skipping tax, and
sometimes without paying any state income tax. Independent trustees with professional
standards and state-of-the-art investment and financial services bring experience, control,
continuity and a multi-disciplinary approach to asset management. Once funded, a
properly drafted perpetual trust can serve on the basis of its own terms for many
generations. It can serve as a foundation for each generation to build from, without
waste, without dependence and without allegiance to one generation over the next.
I have found sources that list fifteen states that have altered the Rule or provided
other means of increasing the duration of a trust in their jurisdiction. These include
Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.!
Delaware is almost alone in its approach to the Rule. This state abolishes the
Rule as to personal property but imposes a separate durational requirement on real
property held in trust. In Delaware, real property must be distributed when the property
has been held in the trust for 110 years. This restriction is tied only to real property and
does not affect the trust's other assets. Furthermore, the real property limitation does not
apply to real property owned by the trust through membership in an LLC, FLP or similar
entity. (25 Del. C. 503) Every other state that imposes a separate restriction on real
property requires that the trustee have a power to alienate the property but does not
require distribution.
With a few exceptions for real property, the approach to the Rule taken by the
remaining 14 states falls into just a few general categories. The most common approach
is to abolish the Rule, or allow settlors to include language in the trust opting out of the
Rule, but provide a requirement that the power of alienation not be suspended for a
period similar to the terms of the Rule. However, the settlor need only give the trustee
the power to alienate trust property and the trust can last forever. These 10 states are
Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota and
Wisconsin. Idaho applies this rule on alienation only to real property and sets no limits
on personal property.
The remaining states approach the Rule more simply. Florida and Washington
abolish the Rule and replace it with a term of years, 150 for Florida and 360 for
Washington. Rhode Island simply abolishes the Rule. Virginia allows settlors to opt out
of the Rule. Neither of these states imposes any other limitation and do not distinguish
between personal and real property. 2
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B.

Funding the Perpetual Trust

Many perpetual trusts are funded with estate tax and generation skipping tax
exempt funds. Many serve also as life insurance trusts insuring the lives of the settlor
first then chosen beneficiaries of succeeding generations for added leverage. They are
generally drafted to address broadly defined needs and with no intention to benefit the
current generation over the next one. Many start out as grandchildren's trusts, skipping
the first generation altogether. Care must be taken to properly apply the generation
skipping transfer tax exemption as a part of a comprehensive estate plan. The trust
should also contain language allowing the trustee to refuse to accept property whose
addition to the trust would cause the trust to lose its zero inclusion ratio for generation
skipping transfer tax purposes.
Another consideration in drafting a perpetual trust is whether the trust should be a
grantor trust or a non-grantor trust for income tax purposes. Considerations of state and
federal tax liability and the ability of the grantor to bear the trust's tax burden with no
correlated income stream will bear on this decision. Under the new Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JAGTRRA) the top federal income tax rate on
dividends and capital gains is generally reduced to 15%. However, an AMT taxpayer
subject to the exemption phase-out may find his rate to be closer to 22% on dividends and
capital gains. This taxpayer may prefer to leave the tax liability within the trust to avoid
the AMT exemption phase-out rate.
The use and protection of the GSTT exemption allocation is another important
aspect of perpetual trusts. GSTT considerations are too involved for this discussion, but
Delaware has passed an interesting law in this area. Effective in July 2000, the Delaware
legislature passe'd the Delaware "Tax Trap" legislation. The Delaware Tax Trap is not
limited to Delaware as it concerns a taxable event that occurs when a power of
appointment is used to create another power of appointment causing the period when an
interest in the property will vest to be unascertainable in relation to the original power of
appointment. Delaware's law protects a beneficiary holding a limited power of
appointment over a trust from inadvertently exercising the power in a fashion that would
trigger the trap and cause the trust property to be includable in the powerholder's gross
estate. However, the powerholder would still be able to exercise a power of appointment
to intentionally cause estate inclusion when the power relates to property that is subject to
generation-skipping tax. (25 Del. C. 504)
One method for leveraging the GSTT exemption is to sell discounted assets to an
intentionally defective grantor Dynasty trust. Assets that have been discounted for lack
of control and lack of marketability through independent appraisal, such as interests in a
family limited partnership or limited liability company, are purchased by the funded trust
on an installment basis. Because the trust is defective for income tax purposes, the
grantor recognizes no gain or loss on the sale. However, the grantor is treated as the
owner of the trust assets for income tax purposes. If the grantor dies during the
installment sale term, the trust will lose its grantor trust status and recognition of the gain
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from the sale of the assets could be accelerated creating an income tax liability for the
grantor.
If the assets purchased by the trust are secured by a properly drafted promissory
note in an arms-length transaction, and interest is paid at the applicable federal rate, the
sale portion of the transaction is completed up front. Payments on the note may be
ballooned at the end of the term with interest only payments required in the interim. Care
should be taken to ensure that the trust contains assets other than the purchased assets to
help pay the interest and that the payment schedule does not mirror the trust's income
stream.
Assuming that the purchased assets appreciate faster than the rate of interest on
the note, which discounted assets have a high probability of achieving, a tremendous
value can be transferred to the trust without transfer tax. Many advisors believe that the
grantor's estate will only be taxed on the unpaid balance of the note if the indebtedness is
not paid before his or her death.
Some practitioners will employ a self-canceling installment note to avoid estate
tax inclusion, but care must be taken to calculate the payments against the seller's life
expectancy plus a premium of some kind in exchange for the possibility of early
termination.
I must note that the foregoing strategy, and variations on the theme, has been
subject to challenge by the IRS. Most recently on grounds that the settlor retained an
interest and therefore, under IRC 2702, the sale was not for fair market value and should
be treated as a gift. An in-depth discussion on ways to fund a perpetual trust or the
application of generation skipping transfer tax strategies is beyond the purview of this
presentation. However, the foregoing illustrates that opportunities to leverage gifts to a
perpetual trust are available but require experienced counsel.
C.

Choice of State Law Considerations

A strong consideration in choosing among state laws that allow a perpetual trust is
whether the state imposes state income tax on fiduciary accounts. By recent count, Idaho
and Wisconsin have levied fairly high income taxes on trust income. Delaware and
Illinois only tax income and capital gains paid to or accumulated for the benefit of
resident beneficiaries and South Dakota has no state income tax. I encourage you to
consult with an attorney practicing in this area in the foreign state before embarking on a
strategy that juggles different state income tax laws. Considerations of that state's
practice of law rules and your own malpractice coverage should compel you to include
out-of-state co-counsel in advising your clients.
The interplay between state income tax laws of the grantor's and beneficiaries'
domiciles and that of the trust situs can play an important part in the client's decision to
use an out-of-state trustee for some specific purposes. Here is a transaction that may be
worth looking into:
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Smith, the owner of a closely-held business structured as a Kentucky LLC is
personally domiciled in Kentucky. Smith owns all of the LLC's governing and
non-governing interests. He transfers his non-governing interests, 99% of the
LLC, to an irrevocable trust he established under the laws of Delaware with an
independent Delaware trust company as trustee. How he accomplishes the
transfer is not material to this example. Neither Smith's wife nor any of his
children, the beneficiaries of the trust, are domiciled in Delaware. They all live in
Kentucky.
A few months later, in a separate arms-length transaction that was not formalized
at the time the trust was funded, the LLC sells substantially all of its assets to an
unrelated buyer and winds down the LLC distributing the proceeds from the sale
pro rata among its members. For federal income tax purposes, the members,
Smith and the trust, must recognize the capital gains and pay the applicable
federal capital gains tax.
Under Delaware law, it appears that Delaware provides a tax deduction to trusts
with non-resident beneficiaries for accumulated income and capital gains that are
recognized for federal income tax purposes. In other words, the trust incurs no
Delaware capital gains tax for the sale of the closely-held business assets. (30 Del.
C. 1636)
Under Kentucky law, it appears that the beneficiaries of that trust are also not
liable for any Kentucky capital gains tax on the capital gains incurred, but not
distributed, during the taxable year of sale by this nonresident trust. (See KRS
141.010-190 and 103 KAR 19.010) Therefore, Smith avoids all state capital gain
taxes on the sale of his business.
Obviously, I haven't addressed all of the key components of this strategy or the
provisions needed in the trust. Any Kentucky resident interested in reducing the state
income tax liability on the sale of assets would need the advice of a counsel in both states
to properly structure a Delaware trust to meet his or her own particular circumstances.
Another consideration is the virtual representation rule. Delaware's Trust Act
2000, effective January 1, 2001, provides that, for all purposes, a minor, unborn, or
incapacitated trust beneficiary may be represented and bound by any other trust
beneficiary who has a substantially identical interest with respect to a question or dispute
provided there is no material conflict of interest between the two. This codification· of the
virtual representation common law doctrine will provide additional flexibility to
perpetual trusts controlled by Delaware law.
Interestingly, Delaware law states that a beneficiary may not hold a trustee liable
for a breach of trust if the beneficiary consents to the conduct causing the breach, releases
the trustee from liability for the breach, or ratifies the transaction constituting the breach,
unless, the beneficiary lacks capacity, was not informed of material facts, did not know
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his or her rights or was induced to provide consent, release or ratification improperly.
(12 Del. C. 3588) A breach of trust is defined simply as "a violation by a trustee of a
duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary". (12 Del. C. 3581)
This statute, combined with Delaware's statutory virtual representation doctrine,
may add a degree of flexibility to a perpetual trust that is both positive and negative.
However, when dealing with a trust whose terms will affect beneficiaries for generations,
this kind of legislation may increase the number of alternatives when trust terms outlive
their usefulness.
Care should be taken to research the state law of the chosen state and ascertain
whether other factors may militate against forming a trust in that state. Sometimes, the
choice of which state will hinge on the choice of independent trustee and in which states
that trustee can serve as a fiduciary.
D.

The Independent Trustee

Unless the settlor lives in one of the states that support perpetual trusts, the settlor
must ensure that a trust he or she intends to qualify under one of those states' laws
comports with certain choice of law requirements. The settlor's intended state law is
more likely to be upheld by a reviewing court if the settlor expresses his or her intent to
apply that state's law in a governing law clause in the trust agreement and the trust has a
substantial connection to that state. If the settlor and the beneficiaries are not residents of
that state, then naming a trustee doing business in that state and the trustee's continued
performance of meaningful fiduciary services in that state should suffice to evidence a
substantial connection.
Historically, the Rule Against Perpetuities has been an issue of a trust's validity,
rather than an issue of administration, by most courts' characterization. 3 Courts generally
honor a settlor's designation of law where there is a substantial connection and the law
does not violate an important public policy interest of a relevant state. 4 The recent
proliferation of states amending their laws to allow perpetual trusts may increase the
likelihood that a court will honor a trust settlor's expressed intent regarding the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
It is inadvisable to establish a multi-generational trust using a non-professional or
non-corporate trustee. Because the trust is designed to continue through many
generations, it makes little sense to name a natural person as the trustee. Many settlors of
perpetual trusts name a corporate trustee and include one or more self-perpetuating trust
advisory boards or committees to manage the investments, make discretionary principal
distributions, or grant or exercise powers of appointment.
The corporate trustee of a perpetual trust should be a trust company or bank with
sufficient capital assets to protect the trust. Common trust terms require that a corporate
trustee have somewhere between $10 and $25 million in capital assets to serve as trustee
for a family trust. Because of the compounding effect of investments held over
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generations the capital asset requirement in a trust might be $50 million in capital assets
for some heavily funded trusts.
Obviously, the investment of the trust assets is a major concern to settlors.
Settlors should give the trustee broad investment powers and not restrict its ability to
diversify trust assets or to hold assets, at least temporarily, which may be unsuitable
investments. If certain interests, such as interests in closely held companies, limited
partnerships or a family business, will be transferred to the trust, the trustee should be
exculpated for holding such interests and against liability for decisions made by a family
trustee or advisory board in relation to the activities of these entities. The trust should
place the burden of managing such interests with an advisory board.
The use of advisory boards is prevalent in perpetual trusts. Typically, they are
empowered to advise the trustee regarding investments and distributions. The trustee
should be exculpated for the determinations of the advisory board followed in good faith.
The advisory board may be empowered to replace the trustee, name additional trustees,
and change the trust situs. Some states, South Dakota for example, have a statute that
allows a disinterested trust protector to amend the trust to conform to present law or take
advantage of changes in the tax law. 5 In Delaware, many Dynasty trusts contain similar
powers for trustees.
III

The Total Return Trust

The Dynasty Trust can provide a reliable source of income to a settlor's
descendants. However, beneficiaries frequently criticize the typical income and principal
trust for favoring either the income beneficiaries or the remaindermen. The term
"income" has been generally defined in trust agreements to include interest and
dividends, but not capital gains. Although the Uniform Principal and Income Act allows
the grantor to give the trustee the power to adjust returns between principal and income,
this power does not entirely alleviate the problem.
A.

Income v. Growth

Interest and bond rates have significantly decreased over the years so that many
stocks pay higher dividends than can be obtained through fixed income products.
Although stock dividends 'are not yet as generous as they have be~n at times in the past,
the new dividend tax rate may change that in the short run. However, with the current
sunset provisions in the JAGTRRA, it is advisable that trusts be drafted to allow more
flexibility in their investment strategy. Historically, income and principal trusts that are
heavily invested in the equities market have grown in value without significantly
increasing the distributions to the current income beneficiaries. One of the alternative
investments for trusts that require current income production is fixed-income products,
such as bonds. A trust portfolio heavy in the fixed income market allows the trust to
meet the current income beneficiary's needs but typically produces little or no growth in
asset value.
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The income and principal trust places the trustee in the unenviable position of
trying to please two trust beneficiary groups with competing interests. The "income
beneficiaries" are best served by investments that generate significant income, even at the
expense of growth. The "remaindermen" are worried about declining trust balances and
want the trustee to invest for growth, regardless of the poor income production.
The total return unitrust places all of the beneficiaries in the same boat. It simply
pays a selected rate of return to the "income beneficiaries" regardless of the actual
income earned by the trust. The unitrust rate is typically set between three and five
percent. The trust requires that the trustee determine, on an annual basis, the value of the
trust's assets and distribute a percentage of this value among the income beneficiaries in
equal quarterly or monthly amounts.
Therefore, if the trust is valued on the first day of each year and pays 4% to the
beneficiaries, a trust value of $1,000,000 would allow a total distribution of $40,000 that
year. This distribution is unaffected by the amount of income produced by the trust
assets or how the trust's investments performed that year. If the trust grows at 8% that
year, the next year's annual distribution to the beneficiaries would come to about
$41,500. If the trust's investments perform poorly, the next year's unitrust amount might
be smaller than the current year's amount.
In a total return trust, both the income beneficiary and the remainderman want the
same thing, for the trust assets to grow in value. The trustee is placed in a position to
accommodate both groups because the trustee can invest for total return while providing
a reasonable payout to current income beneficiaries.
B.

Investment Performance and Distributions

What happens if there is a sustained period of poor investment performance?
First, the total return unitrust will still perform better for the income beneficiary than an
income only trust, because a lack of dividends will not affect the unitrust amount. The
total return unitrust rate will ensure that a relatively substantial payment is always made
to the current beneficiaries.
Second, a smoothing rule can be included in the trust agreement to reduce
volatility. This rule simply requires that the trustee use the average value of the trust for
the current and last two years in setting the unitrust annual payment. Therefore, applying
the smoothing rule, a drop in the current year's total trust value will be ameliorated by the
previous two years' higher returns. Likewise, a year of higher returns will not result in a
spike in distributions to the income beneficiaries. However, the unitrust amount will
fluctuate from year to year.
Finally, as a hedge against a prolonged economic downturn, the trustee can be
given the power to lower or raise the unitrust rate to ensure that the interests of the
income beneficiaries or the remaindermen are protected. The grantor could indicate
which group takes precedence, his children or grandchildren, or he or she could leave that
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to the trustee's discretion, too. Many trusts allow a similar level of discretion by
instructing the trustee that it may consider all other assets and sources of income
available to the beneficiary before making distributions.
An added benefit of the total return unitrust may be lower income taxes to the
distributees of the trust. Rather than investing for income, which is taxed at ordinary
income rates to the beneficiary, the trustee can make distributions mostly from the sale of
investments that may be taxed at a lower rate. Long-term gains are taxed at capital gains
rate, which have historically been lower than the beneficiary's marginal income tax rate
and today are set at 5% and 15%, depending on the taxpayer's tax bracket. In addition,
dividends now receive a more favorable rate than ordinary income and may encourage
greater allocations in dividend paying stocks.

C.

Reformation and Conversion

Some existing trusts can be reformed to include total return unitrust terms, even
though they are irrevocable, under the applicable state law. If the trust requires that all
income be paid to current beneficiaries but gives the Trustee discretion to distribute from
principal, a court may allow such a reformation if all of the beneficiaries agree and it
would not alter the grantor's intent. Effective in July 21, 2001, without court approval, a
trustee under Delaware law is authorized to convert income trusts, inter-vivos or
testamentary trusts, into total return trusts. (12 Del. C. 3527)
Beneficiaries of an income trust may want to consider moving that trust to a
Delaware trustee to take advantage of Delaware's rules on converting to a total return
trust. All that is required to convert a Delaware trust from an income trust to a total
return trust, or vice versa, or to alter the unitrust payment percentage, is a written n<?tice
to the current beneficiaries and first tier remaindermen. The notice must disclose very
specific information regarding how the trust will operate. If they do not object within 60
days, the trustee has the authority to change between total return and income-only
distributions or to increase or decrease the unitrust rate without court approval.
The Delaware total return unitrust must pay a rate between 3% and 5%. If the
trust is a marital deduction trust under IRe Section 2056 or 2523, the spouse is entitled
under Delaware law to compel the trustee in writing to convert or reconvert the trust to an
income trust.
IV

Advisory Boards

A perpetual trust maybe structured to include an advisory board. The trustee will
almost always be a corporate fiduciary and the advisory board provides a strong and
formalized avenue for communication and relationship strengthening. A professional
trustee's relationship with the family served by a trust is as much about people and
personality as it is about professional services.
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Typically, a settlor chooses to use a particular trustee because he or she has a
close and trusting professional relationship, with an advisor at that institution, probably
through financial and wealth management services. A corporate trustee will only retain a
perpetual trust if the professionals providing the trust services maintain the family
relationship. The advisory board provides the family with input into the trust
administration and fosters relationship building over the generations.
The advisory board creates the same kind of institutional memory from the
family's perspective as the corporate trustee enjoys because of its dynamic structure. As
advisory board members are replaced, the financial, investment, interpersonal and social
benefits derived from serving on such a board are passed to each succeeding generation.
The importance of this information exchange becomes crucial to the success of a
perpetual trust.
A.

Choosing the Board Members

It is a natural inclination to name family members, including beneficiaries, to the
advisory board of a trust. Strong family representation is important. However, settlors
should consider the board's purpose and its powers in deciding who should be appointed
to the board. Rather than think just of particular people, they should consider what skills
that person will need. Because of the longevity of a perpetual trust, and the fact that any
board member will eventually need a successor who is unknown to the settlor, it is
important that the settlor determine what types of people should make up the board and
set up a successorship strategy that will maintain that mix of representation.
Naturally, a board should include some representation of the beneficiaries. This is
especially true for boards that can divide into separate committees with separate
functions. However, care should be taken not to grant a board that consists of only
beneficiaries such broad discretion over distributions or qualifications that the trust
Naming an independent
unwittingly creates unwanted powers of appointment.
"disinterested" party to the board can avoid unexpected tax consequences and give the
board a sense of fairness and impartiality.
Because the settlor's trusted advisors also will not outlive the trust, naming an
advisor as a representative of a well-established accounting or law firm is one solution.
The successor member provisions can calion the firm to provide a replacement in the
event of death or resignation. The successor provisions can include a ratio requirement
for beneficiary representation and unrelated members with a cap on the total number of
members. Remaining members can nominate replacements and a majority vote can
appoint them.
The key is to include provisions that ensure a mix of advisors and beneficiaries
that follows the settlor's initial desires and set guidelines for qualifying candidates. The
replacement of members should be simple and straightforward. Non-family members
should be compensated for their time and costs in serving the trust at their prevailing
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rates. A well-drafted trust will require regularly scheduled meetings and a process for
decision making where necessary.
B.

Discretion and Exculpation

Some common provisions regarding the advisory board include the exculpation of
the advisory board for decisions made in good faith. The board is usually not liable for
any failure to act and its determinations must be timely or the trustee may act in its own
discretion. Typically, instructions to the trustee must be in writing and the trustee is
exculpated for following them. The trust agreement can require unanimity or a majority
agreement on determinations communicated to the trustee.
The trustee and the advisory board should be protected from a requirement that
they investigate findings of fact or make personal inquiries. The terms of the trust should
place the burden of presentment on the beneficiaries. For instance, if the trust contains
language limiting distributions to a beneficiary who is abusing drugs, the trustee should
be required to act only on information presented to it and not be required to investigate
the beneficiaries. The trustee should have broad powers of discretion to weigh evidence
and make decisions. If the advisory board does not direct the trustee regarding some
action, the trustee should be empowered to use its own discretion. Policing the
beneficiaries is generally beyond the scope of a corporate trustee's capabilities, reserving
that duty to the advisory board is more effective.

v

Charitable Remainder Unitrusts

Charitable Remainder Unitrusts (CRUT) have long been an attractive vehicle for
those wishing to make a significant gift to charity but desiring to retain the use of the
money and take advantage of the trust's favorable tax treatment. While CRUTs must pay
in one way or another a minimum of 5% of the trust's fair market, valued annually, IRS
regulations offer several types of charitable trusts that meet this requirement. One
particularly favorable version is called a net income with makeup CRUT or a NIMCRUT.
NIMCRUTs provide that a non-charitable beneficiary such as the settlor will receive the
lesser of net income or a minimum of 5% of the trust's value annually. During those
years when the net income is less than stated unitrust amount, the difference is tracked in
a reserve account. In any future year that income exceeds the unitrust amount, the excess
is paid from that account.
Delaware permits trustees to treat as income for trust accounting purposes the
increased value of certain assets such as zero coupon bonds, annuity contracts before
annuitization, life insurance contracts before the death of the insured, and any other
obligations to pay money when it is distributed to the trust. (12 Del. C. 6112) Thus,
individuals who want to defer income from a charitable remainder trust for retirement
may allow the assets of the trust to grow over an extended time period by· creating a
NIMCRUT in Delaware. This strategy would be especially attractive to someone with
strong donative intent and a concentration in a single stock with low basis if they are
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ready to diversify this holding, want to defer the capital gain recognition and do not
currently need the income.
Of course, in 2003, a time of record-breaking low interest rates, the relatively
smaller charitable deductions available from gifts to a CRUT are less attractive to donors.
However, where the charitable deduction is not a strong consideration, a Delaware
NIMCRUT may provide a strong solution to a concentrated wealth problem.
VI

Conclusion

Kentucky residents need not be hampered by Kentucky's trust limitations. Outof-state trusts may provide alternative solutions that will help individuals meet their
financial goals and leave a greater legacy for their descendants and their community. As
evidenced by the following illustration, a perpetual trust that is funded and structured to
reduce estate and GSTT tax exposure has great potential for growth.
Settlors must decide what their priorities are and have documents prepared
accordingly. The many advantages given to perpetual trusts under Delaware law that
increase a trust's flexibility make that state's law more desirable than other states. The
additional benefits of total return unitrust provisions increase the opportunity for truly
effective investment strategies. Even charitable trusts get an added boost under some
out-of-state principal and income laws. There can be tremendous advantages to using
out-of-state trustees under proper circumstances.
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Ie INTRODUCTION:
People are living longer. The aging of America has had and will continue to have a
significant impact in Kentucky and across the nation on government, politics, communities, families,
and business. The number ofpersons 65 years ofage and over is expected to double by the year 2030
and the fastest growing segment of the population consists of people who are 85 years of age and
older. Many experts are concerned that issues relating to aging will reach a critical point as early as
the year 2010 when the "baby boom" generation first starts to reach the age of 65. By 2030 one in
every three Kentucky and Louisvillle residents will be fifty-five years of age or older. 1
In response to the so-called "graying of the population", the law has responded to the legal
needs of the segment of the population considered "old." Elder law is now recognized as a finnly
established practice area. The ABA has the Commission on Legal Problems ofthe Elderly, and the
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys now has over 3,500 members. 2
Elder law is defined largely by its substantive breadth and the interdisciplinary relationships
among the client, the lawyer, health professionals and financial advisors. It is a specialty recognized
by the American Bar Association and certified by the National Elder Law Foundation, which defines
Elder Law as "the legal practice of counseling and representing older persons or their
representatives". Five "core" and eight "extended" topics comprise the thirteen substantive practice
areas of legal services itemized by the Board of Certification of the NELF. The five "core" topics
are:

Urban Studies Institute, University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky as reported in
"Kentucky's Population on Way to Getting Grayer", Courier Journal, Friday, June 6th, 2003.
1

Morgan, Rebecca C., "Who is the Client? Ethical Issues in an Elder Law Practice.",
Journal ofthe American Academy ofMatrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 16, 2000, pp. 463-479.
2
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Health and Personal Care Planning (Advance Directives, Financial POA's)
Pre-mortem Legal Planning (Wills, Trusts, etc.)
Fiduciary Representation
Legal Capacity Counseling
Public Benefits Advice3

Among the eight "extended topics" of legal services is "Income, Estate and Gift Tax
Advice"4and as a result, those of us providing services to "mature" estate planning clients are
included within the specialty of Elder Law.
The issues addressed in this outline are those concerning Legal Capacity as it relates to estate
planning.

II. TYPES OF CAPACITY:
Proper execution ofa legal instrument requires that the person signing have sufficient mental
"capacity" to understand the implications of the document. When discussing the concept of
"capacity" it is important to remember that as attorneys we are concerned with capacity in a legal
sense rather than a medical sense. From the standpoint of legal capacity, clients can have "good
days" and "bad days" even when their overall mental capacity is diminishing over time. One side
ofthe capacity equation involves the client's abilities, which may change from day to day depending
on the course of the illness, fatigue and the effects of medication. On the other side, greater
understanding is required for some legal activities than for others. For example, the law typically
distinguishes between the level of capacity necessary to execute contracts (including such things a
life insurance or long-term care insurance) and testamentary capacity. Kentucky, like many states,
requires a higher degree of capacity to enter into a contract or transact business than it does t,o
execute a Will. ("A person to make a will, need not have the degree of capcity required to make a
contract", Moorev. Moore, 162 S.W.2d547, 290Ky. 715(1942». A third type of capacity
suggested by the literature is "decisional capacity", which generally falls somewhere between the
level required ro contractual capacity and testamentary capacity.

National Elder Law Foundation, Board ofCertification, §2.2 ofthe Rules and Regulations
Regarding Certification of Elder Law Attorneys.
3

4 The eight extended topics include Advice on Insurance Matters, Resident's Rights
Advocacy, Housing Counseling, Employment and Retirement Advice, Income, Estate and Gift Tax .
Advice, Counseling Regarding Tort Claims Against Nursing Homes, Counseling With Regard to
Age or Disability Discrimination, and Litigation and Administrative Advocacy in connection with
any of the thirteen topics.
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A. Testamentary Capacity.
Testamentary capacity requires ability on the part ofthe testator to know and understand, in
a general way, the nature and situation ofhis property, and his relations to those persons who would
naturally have some claim to his remembrance, and the ability to act according to a fixed purpose.
It requires freedom from delusion which is the effect of disease or weakness and which might
influence the disposition of his property. And it requires ability at the time of execution of the
alleged will to comprehend the nature of the act of making a will. 5
In most states, including Kentucky, the necessary legal capacity to execute testamentary
documents is a relatively low. For example, Kentucky case law provides us with the following
helpful tidbits:
"Any person of sufficient mind to know his property, the objects of
his bounty and his duty to them, and to act according to a fixed
purpose, may make a Will." Bickel v. Louisville Trust Company, 197
S. W2d 444, 303 Ky. 356 (Ky. 1946).
"All rational people have the right to dispose of their worldly goods
according to their own personal desires and such right has been
extended to the aged, the infirm, the forgetful and the queer." Sloan
v. Sloan, 197 S. W2d 77, 303 Ky, 180 (Ky. 1946).
"The mere weakness of mental power or the failure of memory,
momentary forgetfulness or lack of strict coherence in conversation,
and even proofofinsanity without evidence ofits continuity down to
the date of the will, does not render one incapable of executing his
will or destroy the validity thereof." Sloan v. Sloan, 197 S. W2d 77,
303 Ky, 180 (Ky. 1946).
"Perfect intelligence is not a prerequisite to the ability to make a will
and peculiarities common to many elderly persons fall short of
furnishing a basis for conclusion of testamentary incapacity, even
though indicating a failing mentality." Slusherv. Blanton, 177S. W2d
378, 296 Ky. 422 (Ky. 1944).
The fact that the next day the client does not remember the will signing and is not sufficiently
"with it" to execute a will then does not invalidate the will ifhe understood it when he signed it.

5 Kirtland, Michael A., "Dealing with Mental Capacity Issues in Estate Planning", Estate
Planning, April 2002, Vol. 30, No.4, pp. 192-197.
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Furthermore, Kentucky, like most other jurisdictions, presumes that a testator possesses the
requisite capacity to execute his or her will and the burden ofproofis on the contestants to overcome
the presumption of capacity. 6
The standard ofcapacity with respect to durable powers of attorney varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Some courts and practitioners argue that this threshold can be quite low. The client
need only know that he trusts the attorney-in-fact to manage his financial affairs. Others argue that
since the attorney-in-fact generally has the right to enter into contracts on behalfofthe principal, the
principal should have capacity to enter into contracts as well. There are no recent Kentucky cases
on the issue of capacity as it relates specifically to the execution ofPowers of Attorney. However,
a 1978 Court of Appeals case holds that the lack' of mental capacity at the time of execution ofa
Power of Attorney does not necessarily void the power, but merely makes it "voidable".7

2.

Contractual Capacity.

In contrast to the level ofcapacity required to execute testamentary documents, the threshold
for entering into contracts is fairly high. The standards for entering into a contract are more stringent
because the individual must know not only the nature ofher property and the person with whom she
is dealing, but also the broader context of the consequences of the transaction. In a Massachusetts
case, the Court ofAppeals contrasted competency to sell property with the capacity to make a will,
the latter requiring only understanding at the time of executing the will:
Competency to enter into a contract presupposes something more
than a transient surge oflucidity. It requires the ability to comprehend
the nature and quality of the transaction, together with an
understanding ofwhat is "going on," but an ability to comprehend the
nature and quality of the transaction, together with an understanding
of its significance and consequences. Farnum v. Silvano
Similarly, Kentucky courts have held that the mental capacity necessary to enter into a
contract is that capacity sufficient to know the nature, character and effect ofthe transaction in which
the party is engaged at the time. 8 "There is no contract where one party was mentally incapable of
understanding and appreciating or knowing the effect of what he was doing at the time of
contracting.." Johnson v. Sands, 53 S. W.2d 929 (Ky. 1932). In Everly's Adm'r v. Everly's Adm'r, .
the Kentucky Supreme Court articulated the well established principal that it requires a higher degree

See Cruse v. Leary, 727 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. App. 1987); and Fischer v. Heckerman, 772
S.W.2d 642 (Ky. App. 1989).
6

7 Parton v. Robinson, 574 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App. 1978).
8

See Everly's Adm'r v. Everly's Adm'r, 175 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1943).
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ofmental capacity to enter into contract at arm's length than it does to enter into a gift transaction. 9

The question of contractual capacity is relevant to estate planners because many of the
ancillary documents related to comprehensive estate planning are contractual in nature. For example,
decisions regarding life insurance policies, long-term care policies, transfers ofreal property and prepaid funeral arrangements are contractual in nature and any change ofbeneficiary or ownership may
be subject to a more stringent evaluation ofcapacity than changes in a Will done contemporaneously.

3.

Decisional Capacity.

Decisional Capacity can be thought of as the ability to understand issues presented and the
consequences of decisions made regarding those issues. 1o The question of whether a client has
decisional capacity may arise in situations where neither contractual nor testamentary capacity is
required. For example, the decision to appoint a healthcare surrogate or execute a living will or
decisions regarding lifetime gifts and transfers of non-real estate assets. Generally, decisional
capacity has a lower threshold than contractual capacity and a higher requirement than testamentary
capacity.

4.

Summary.

In practical terms, in assessing a client's capacity to execute a legal document, attorneys
generally ask the question, "Is anyone going to challenge this transaction?" Ifa client ofquestionable
capacity executes a will giving her estate to her husband, and then to her children ifher husband does
not survive her, it's unlikely to be challenged. If, on the other hand, she executes a will giving her
estate entirely to one daughter with nothing passing to her other children, the attorney must be more
certain of being able to prove the client's capacity.

III. CAPACITY ISSUES IN ESTATE PLANNING.
Capacity issues in estate planning range from the practical to the legal and ethical. Each of
these areas present difficulties for estate planners providing services to clients ofquestionable mental
capacity. A review ofthe caselaw, literature and model rules fails to provide many concrete answers
for the estate planner.

9

10

Id.
Kirtland, Supra note 5, at 193.
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Issues regarding the capacity of a testator typically arise in one (or more) of three
circumstances:

D

In the initial meeting with a prospective client;

D

Following the execution ofa new Will changing beneficiaries, or the appointment of
a new Power of Attorney; or

D

In the context of a challenge to the Will after the testator's death.

A.

Practical Issues.

Regardless of your ethical duties and the legal implications of a lack ofcapacity on the part
of a potential testator, there are serious practical problems in representing a client of questionable
capacity. For example, is the client able to participate in the planning process? Is he or she able to
adequately communicate his or her intentions? As attorneys we are not mind readers and
consequently there must be some minimum level of communication with the client in order to
accurately draft the client's documents. One point.of caution in this regard is that there may be
reasons other than mental incapacity for the client's inability to effectively communicate. For
example, the client may suffer from some type of physical disability or may be taking medication
which interferes with his or her ability to communicate.

B

Leeal Issues.

The legal issues concerning a testator's mental capacity largely involve whether or not the
documents executed by the testator will be void or voidable. Ifa will introduced for probate is found
to be invalid, then the testator's last valid will is probated instead, even if the last will does not
represent the testator's intentions at the time ofdeath or it has negative tax or financial consequences
for the heirs.
Alternatively, if there is no valid will available for probate, the assets will be distributed
according to the laws ofdescent and distribution for intestacy - and this is almost certain to have bad
tax consequences for large estates.
Also, attorneys must consider whether a prospective client has the requisite capacity to enter
into an attorney client relationship in the first place.
As noted above, if the grantor is found to lack capacity at the time of execution of a Power
of Attorney, the power is voidable rather than necessarily void.
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c.

Ethical Issues.

The ethical issues involved in representing a client ofquestionable mental capacity in estate
planning are the true "sticky wicket" of capacity issues. There are client capacity issues, conflict
issues, third-party payor issues and privilege issues, all or some of which may arise in the context
of representing an existing or potential client. In reviewing the ethical issues, this outline makes
reference to the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct and the American College ofTrust and Estate
Counsel commentaries where appropriate. Kentucky has adopted the Model Rules ofProfessional
Conduct in Supreme Court Rule 3.130 which includes corresponding Rule numbers.

.L

Identification of Client: Confidentiality.

The nature ofthe elder law practice lends itselfto thorny ethical issues. Many times an estate
planning attorney is contacted by one or more family members after a crisis in the family such as the
death of a parent or spouse or the admittance of a parent into a nursing home.
Lucy Lawyer receives a call from Debbie Daughter who explains that her father
is in the hospital due to a stroke. Her mother, Mary Mom, is distraught and
having difficulty coping. Debby Daughter lives out of town, as does Sammy
Son. Mary Mom is giving the children some information which at times is
conflicting and confusing about their father's prognosis. Debbie Daughter
advises you that she wants to schedule an appointment with you for her mother
to discuss their options. She also informs you that she is planning to attend and
that Sammy Son will join in by conference call ifhe is available.
As noted in the above example, because of the nature of the practice, many times there is
more thanjust one person involved in the client-attorney relationship, requiring the attorney to make
clear "who is the client." It is not unusual for the family to be involved in the parent's life, trying to
resolve problems encountered by the senior family member. However, the attorney must be
absolutely clear about who is the client.
The Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct assume that there must be one and only one client.
For example, MRPC 1.1 states in part "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to ~
client...", MRPC 1.6 provides that "a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
ofa client.... and MRPC 1.7 provides "a lawyer will not represent a client ifthe representation ofthat
client would be directly adverse to another client.."
It seems clear from the MRPC that at some point there can only be one client. However, is
it possible that for purposes ofan informational meeting there is "no client"? Several authors in the
Elder Law area seem to think that a "communitarian approach" is permissible in the context of an
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initial, information meeting where the focus is on counseling rather than on "representation". 11 They
believe that functioning as a counselor or consultant to the family without identifying a specific
individual as "the client" is permissible under the Model Rules. However, the authors caution that
the communitarian approach should only extend to the initial meeting and is not permissible where
the attorney has previously represented one of the members of the family. Where there is a prior
existing client relationship, the rules regarding disclosure and waiver of conflicts of interest apply.
Also note that there is no client-attorney privilege with the third party who is present in the meeting.
The ACTEC commentaries to MRPC1.6 seem to require identification "a client" even in an
initial meeting. The commentary states that:
"a lawyer owes some duties to prospective clients including a general
obligation to protect the confidentiality of information obtained
during an initial interview. Ifthe initial conference does not result in
the lawyer being retained as counsel, the lawyer's receipt of
information imparted at an initial conference mayor may not
disqualify the lawyer from representing a party whose interests are
adverse to the prospective client."
The MRPC do not present an absolute bar to representing more than one member of the
family or from having a third-party present during the client meeting. However, they do require the
attorney to adhere to the rules regarding confidentiality ofclient information, disclosure and conflict
of interest.
Even if the appropriate consents and waivers are given, whenever a third person (family
member or friend) attends a meeting with the client, the estate planner must still be alert to whether
the client is expressing his or her wishes and is acting under his or her own free will. This may be
difficult to ascertain ifthe attorney is never able to speak with the client alone. Without knowing the
details of the relationship between the client and the third party, it could very well be that the third
party is there to ensure that the client does things the way the third party wants. Worse, the third
party may be participating in the conversation. If the attorney cannot verify to her satisfaction that
the client's directions and decisions are actually those of the client, then the attorney may have to
simply terminate the conversation and decline the representation ofthe client. Absent the ability to
make the necessary determination about the client, the attorney would be well advised to proceed
no further.

See Zimring, Stuart D., "Ethical Issues for Estate Planners in Representing Seniors and
Counseling Their Families", 2003 National CLE Conference, Law Education Institute, Trusts and
Estates, pp. 465-491, ©2002. See also, Johns, A. Frank, CELA, RG "The Communitarian Approach
in Elder Law Construct: Multiple Member Family Engagements Forecast an Embrace of Family
Entity Representation", NABLA Symposium 2000.
11
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In a situation such as the one faced by Mary Mom,
Debbie Daughter and Sammy Son, it is not uncommon for
"the client" (presumably Mary Mom) to want other family
members to be informed from time to time ofwhat is going
on. So long as Mary Mom authorizes Lucy Lawyer to make
such disclosure it is perfectly acceptable for Lucy Lawyer to
provide copies ofdocuments and correspondence to Debbie
and Sam.

Caveat: If Lucy Lawyer and Mary Mom had an
existing relationship, the communitarian approach could not
be used, even in a "consulting" meeting witthout prior
consent to disclosure given by Mary Mom.

Also, it is important to note that
the duty of confidentiality and
loyalty to the client continues
after the death of the client. In
general, confidential
information cannot be disclosed
after the client's death unless it
becomes relevant to an issue
between heirs, the rationale
being that such disclosure

Note: In a proposed comment to Rule 1.14, The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission recognized
that circumstances exist when a family member might be providing assistance to an elderly person,
not be the client, and yet be privy to confidential information. The Ethics 2000 Commission
proposed comment to Model Rule 1.14 reads as follows:
[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons
participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist
in the representation, the presence ofsuch persons generally does not
affect the applicability of the client-attorney evidentiary privilege.
Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost
and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must
to look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on
the client's behalf. 12
2.

Joint and Multiple Representation of Clients: Conflicts of Interest.

a.
Conflict of Interest Rule. The representation of conflicting interests
is not itself prohibited by the rules. However, MRPC 1.7 sets forth the requirements of accepting
such representation.
The rule states that a lawyer may not represent a client ifsuch representation will be directly
adverse to another client unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client and each client consents after consultation.
In addition, a lawyer maynot represent a client ifthe representation maybe materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to other clients, a third person, or the lawyer's own interest unless

MRPC Rule 1.14 Comment 3. The full text· of the proposed changes to Rule 1.14 is
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ruleI14draft.html.
12
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the lawyer reasonably believes that it will not be adversely affected and the client consents after
consultation.
Ifthe representation ofmultiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation must
include the an explanation ofthe implications ofthe common representation and the advantages and
risks involved.
b.
Spouses. In many cases estate planners are asked to represent both a
husband and wife in conventional estate planning. There is no rule preventing such representation
and the ACTEC commentary specifically recognizes the appropriateness and benefits of such
representation. The commentary to MRPC 1.7 states that "it is often appropriate for a lawyer to
represent more than one member of the same family in connection with their estate plans...."
The comment goes on to say that,
In some instances the clients may actually be better served by such
representation, which can result in more economical and better
coordinated estate plans prepared by counsel who has a better overall
understanding of all the relevant family and property considerations.
The fact that the estate planning goals of the clients are not entirely
consistent does not necessarily preclude the lawyer from representing
them..
In the traditional joint representation scenario, the attorney is retained to represent a husband
and wife to achieve essentially the common estate planning goals. However, the representation of
both spouses results in a conflict of interest situation which can only be avoided if at the beginning
ofthe representation, the attorney disclosed to each spouse the potential for a conflict ofinterest, and
required the execution of a joint representation agreement that clearly prohibited any privileged
communication between the parties with regard to the transaction for which the attorney is retained,
as well as a written waiver of any conflict of interest. Without the agreement, the attorney is not,
allowed to share information between spouses.
So long as both spouses have contractual capacity and are appropriately advised of their
rights and potential conflicts, there is no reason an attorney cannot represent a married couple. The
problem arises when one of the spouses is incapacitated and the well spouse wishes to retain the
attorney. In this case, there is no real confusion regarding the issue of who the client is. However
there may be fiduciary obligations imposed on the well spouse by state law which would limit the
well spouse's ability to complete his or her desired estate plan. For example, married persons
generally have a community property interest or downer or curtsey right in the other's spouse which
would impose certain fiduciary obligations on the well spouse. 13 In certain circumstances, the well
spouse's concerns and needs may be inapposite to the incapacitated spouse's needs and concerns.

13

See Ca. Family Code §1001; KRS 404.
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In such a case, the attorney must be mindful that the obligations to the well spouse are in addition
to those ethical and legal obligations ofthe attorney toward the incapacitated spouse as a third-party
beneficiary of the representation.

c.
Representation ofChild/Parent: At times a child and parent may seek
the representation ofan attorney. This by itselfdoes not violate the MRPC. However, when a child
or other relative is involved in the estate planning process for his or her parent, assessing the risk of
undue influence and duress becomes paramount. This is especially true in parent-child relationships
where the child is likely to be more alert and have sharper faculties. It may be difficult to obtain a
truly knowing waiver ofpotential conflicts ofinterest in this case and impossible to do ifthe parent
has already begun to show signs of incapacity.
In cases such as this it may be wise to inquire as to why joint representation is necessary.
There may very well be other means ofaccomplishing the parties' goals without creating an attorneyclient relationship with the child. For example, ifthe parent is the party seeking services and desires
his child to be informed of the status of his planning this can be accomplished with a consent to
disclose. Furthermore, if the true issue is whether or not the client has the capacity to retain the
attorney in the first place, having joint representation will not solve the problem.

Even if joint representation can be avoided, the attorney must exercise caution when
preparing a Will or trust for another person.
Cassie Client calls Lucy Lawyer and asks Lucy to prepare a Will for her father
who wants to leave everything to his four children in equal shares. Cassie has
been a client of Lucy's for a number of years and would rather have Lucy
prepare the Will than to go find another attorney for her father. Her father has
no objection to using Lucy and is in agreement that he wants everything split
four ways.
Under the model rules Lucy Lawyer is not prohibited from preparing a Will for Cassie Client's
father. However, the attorney should exercise particular care where the person requesting the
preparation ofthe Will or Trust is also a beneficiary under the instrument. According to the ACTEC
commentaries to MRPC 1.7, such representation may be appropriate where the client and the
requesting person are closelyrelated, the requesting party is competent and adequately informed, and
the terms ofthe will or trust do not unduly benefit the requesting party. Of course, as with the case
of an adult child accompanying the client to a meeting, the attorney must satisfy himself or herself
that the wishes expressed are truly those of the client. If the requesting party is also paying for the
attorney's services the attorney must comply with MRPC 1.8(f) and should consider cautioning the
client and the requesting party of "the possibility that the client may be presumed to have exerted
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undue influence on the other person because the requesting party was involved in the procurement
of the document."14
Caveat: Even in cases where the requesting party is not an existing client ofthe attorney, an
attorney-client relationship may be established at the time the requesting party asks the attorney to
prepare a new Will for the requesting party's parent. A San Diego Ethics Opinion concluded that
where a son or daughter contacts an attorney to prepare a new Will for the child's parent, the person
who is to sign the document is the "client" of the attorney. However, it also concluded that unless
it is otherwise agreed upon in advance, the son or daughter may also be considered a "client" of the
attorney and all provisions regarding conflicts of interest and disclosure will apply. 15
~
Payment by a Third-Party. In many cases, children may be financially better
offthan their elderly parents. As a result, the issue ofthird-party payments arises in the area ofElder
Law more frequently than almost any other area of law.

Suppose in the case of Cassie Client, dad worked for and recently retired from Enron. To
help out, Cassie Client has agreed to pay for the preparation ofdad's new Will. Does this change the
attorney's responsibilities or the client's rights? Under the MRPC third-party payments are
permissible. However the Rules require that the third-party payor understand that:

D

The Payor may not interfere with the attorney's independence or professional
judgment.

D

The Payor cannot interfere with the attorney-client relationship;

D

The attorney-client privilege applies and the Payor is not privy to any confidential
client information; and

D

The client must give informed, written consent to the arrangement. 16

Prior to undertaking the representation of Cassie's dad, the attQrney must inform Cassie of
the requirements of Rule 1.8(f), and in particular, that the attorney must be free to exercise her
independent judgment in advising Cassie's father regarding his Will. The attorney must also obtain
the father's informed consent to having Cassie pay for the services rendered on his behalf: Finally,
since Cassie is also a client the attorney must be satisfied that representing both Cassie and her father
is permissible under the Rules dealing with conflicts of interest, or she must decline representation

14 ACTEC Commentaries to Rule 1.7.
15 San Deigo Op., 1990-3 (1990).
16 MRPC 1.8(f); See also, Zimring, Stuart A., supra Note 11 at 475.
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of Cassie's father. Under no circumstances should the attorney prepare the Will without meeting
with Cassie's father personally, and preferable alone.
The ACTEC Commentaries to Rule 1.5 note that even though someone else is paying the fee,
the person "for whom the services are performed" is considered the client, the client's confidences
are safeguarded and protected, and the client's instructions are followed. Therefore, even though
Cassie is paying for the services and may feel entitled to information on the status of dad's estate
planning, the attorney is prohibited from disclosing any information to Cassie in the absence of a
consent to disclose from her father.
4.

Fiduciary Representation Issues.

In cases where the elder parent has executed a durable power of attorney which authorizes
the holder to employ counsel, the holder may retain counsel on behalf of the principal. In such an
arrangement, the principal is the client irrespective ofthe fact that the holder actually "retained" the
attorney. Further, in undertaking the representation, the concurrent fiduciary duties must be clearly
set forth. Both the attorney and the agent owe a fiduciary duty solely to the principal. Where the
agent is a child or spouse ofthe principal there may be inherent conflicts because the agent's interest
may be at odds with the principal's interest in estate planning. Ifa potential conflict arises, the agent
should be advised to seek independent counsel.

Note: In some jurisdictions, including Kentucky, the power to make gifts and/or engage in
estate planning on behalfofthe principal must be specifically set forth in the document granting the
power.

2:.

Conservatorship Issues.

At times attorneys are contacted by family members to initiate guardianship or
conservatorship proceedings for a parent. There are a number of ethical issues involved depending
upon whether the allegedly incapacitated person is an existing client of the attorney.
a.
No pre-existing client relationship. In the case where the attorney is
approached by a family member to commence guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and there
is no prior attorney-client relationship with any of the parties, the attorney is free to pursue the
representation. However, the attorney must be mindful ofwho the client is. Again, the Rules do not
recognize the representation of the family unit as a client. Therefore, if one family member is
seeking to be appointed with the support of the others, it is that person who is the client. If more
than one family member is seeking appointment as ')oint" guardians, the rules regarding multiple
representation should apply. Finally, if more than one family member is seeking to be appointed
independently of the other, each should retain his or her own counsel.
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b.
Existing client relationship. Ifthe attorney is approached by the family
of an existing client, the ethical considerations are far more difficult.

Clarence Client is in his early 80s and recently lost his wife. He seems to be suffering
from some sort of dementia. Lucy Lawyer has been Clarence's attorney for years. In
the past, Clarence had been a meticulous dresser and neat to a fault. One day he comes
into Lucy's office, looking disheveled and distracted, and demands that his children
be terminated as beneficiaries ofhis estate. He demands that his entire estate, (roughly
$5.0 million) except enough money to live on, be bequeathed to a local TV evangelist.
He believes that the Reverend Jim has been speaking directly to him through the
television and has asked for his help. In his prior Will, Clarence made some small
amount of charitable bequests (10% of his estate) and left the remainder to his four
children in equal shares. Clarence has stated that he has no problem with any of his
children, all of whom he can identify, and he is aware of his personal financial
situation. Clarence insists that Lucy,draw a new Will leaving everything to the Rev.
Jim.

Clarence has told his children of his plan to change his Will and they are concerned that he is
slipping into dementia. They have now contacted Lucy to begin conservator proceedings. May
Lucy, as Clarence's attorney, commence guardianship or conservatorship proceedings for Clarence?
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer under the Model Rules appears to be a qualified "yes".
Under paragraph (b) ofRule 1.14, "a lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client
cannot adequately act in the client's own interest."
A problem arises, however, under some state codes of professional conduct which do not
alter the standard ofclient-attorneyprivilege for clients with marginal or total incapacity At least one
state's Rules ofProfessional Conduct have been interpreted as specifically prohibiting the filing of
guardianship by the client's own attorney. The prohibition is based upon the adversarial position
toward the client and the presumed "absolute" duty ofconfidentiality the attorney owes the client. 17
Kentucky has not specifically prohibited such an action. However KBA E-314 (Nov. 1986),
states that "An attorney should be permitted to help a disabled client who has discharged him
without warning to understand the consequences ofthe discharge, but should not initiateproceedings
for a conservatorship or similar protection ora client except in extreme cases. (emphasis added).

Formal Opinion 1989-112 Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and
Conduct of the State Bar of California.
17
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6.

Duties to Client.

What if instead of the children do not ask Lucy to commence guardianship proceeding?
Should she comply with Clarence's wish to leave is estate to the Reverend Jim?
In general, the duties to the client do not change merely because of the client's diminished
capacity. MRPC 1.14 states that:

(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions
in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of
minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client.
The commentary to the correlating Kentucky Rule, SCR 3.130(1.114), recognizes that when
a client is suffering from diminished mental capacity maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer
relationship may not be possible in all respects.
However, the commentary also states that while
a client under disability may not be capable ofmaking legally binding decisions, the client often has
the ability to understand, deliberate upon and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's
own well-being..... So also, it is recognized that some persons ofadvanced age can be quite capable
of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major
transactions.
As with the representation of any client, an attorney has a duty to advocate zealously on
behalf of his or her client. In the estate planning arena, this means that the attorney may proceed
with estate planning and the drafting and execution of estate planning documents so long as the
attorney reasonably believes that the client has at least marginal capacity to understand the
documents and the context in which the plan is being developed. 18
While the line maybe vague, the attorney need not turn down the client's request to prepare
an estate plan simply because the level of the client's mental capacity is diminished. "
Diminished capacity is not the same as lack capacity."19

18 Kirkland, supra Note 5 at 196.
19

Id.
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7.

Privilege Issues.

Generally speaking, communications between a client and attorney are privileged in nature. 20
Privileged communications typically defined by statute. For example, KRE 503 defines a
communication as "confidential" ifit is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those
to whom disclosure is made in furtherance ofthe rendition ofprofessional legal services to the client
or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of communication.
The holder of the privilege is:

D

the client when no guardian or conservator has
been appointed;

D

the client's guardian or conservator if one has
been appointed;

D

the client's personal representative if the client
is deceased

Generally the privilege
survives the death of the
client. However, note that
there is an exception to
privilege in cases where the
communication is relevant to
an issue between parties who
claim through the same
deceased client (e.g. Will
contests).

Privilege issues may arise in the context ofrepresenting a client with diminished capacity in
a number of estate planning situations. For example in our scenario above involving Mary Mom,
Debbie Daughter and Sammy Son, the attendance of Debbie or Sam at the client meeting between
Mary Mom and Lucy Lawyer would destroy the privileged nature ofany confidential communication
made by Mary Mom.
Another situation in which privilege issues may arise is when a third party, such as a financial
advisor, friend, social worker or geriatric care manager attends a client meeting. Since the privilege
only covers disclosure to third persons if"made in furtherance ofthe rendition ofprofessional legal
services" or to those "reasonably necessary for the transmission ofcommunication", generally third
parties are not going to be covered within the definition of privilege.
If an affiliated professional is a member of the attorney's staff it appears that the privilege
will apply. On the other hand where the affiliated professional is not a member of the attorney's
staft: a different issue presents itself. Ifthe attorney hires the affiliated professional, he or she would
presumably be considered the attorney's "employee" and privilege would apply. However, if the
client, or another family member has retained an affiliated professional, generally speaking the
privilege would not apply.
Even where the ,affiliated professional is an employee of the attorney, ethical issues may
arise. Although the attorney has a duty not to disclose confidential infonnation related to the client's

20

See MRPC 1.6 and SCR 3.130(1.7).
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mental capacity, an affiliated professional may be under a mandatory duty to report certain
circumstances involving a client with or without diminished capacity.
Chelsea Client is represented by Lucy Lawyer, who also employs Greta
Geriatric-Care-Manager. During a meeting, Chelsea confides to Lucy and
Greta that her nephew has stolen some checks and valuable silver pieces and
has threatened to harm Pookie, her beloved Pekingese. Before she leaves
Lucy's office, Chelsea specifically instructs Lucy and Greta not to say anything
to anyone.
Based upon the facts presented21 it appears that a conservatorship may be appropriate for
Chelsea since she is susceptible to undue influence and duress. However based upon KBA E-314
(Nov. 1986), without a client's consent, a lawyer should not initiate proceedings for a
conservatorship or similar protection ofa client except in extreme cases. Furthermore, Chelsea has
specifically prohibited the disclosure of the very information that would be required to obtain a
conservatorship.
Greta, however, is in a different position as a Geriatric Care Manger. In most states a GMC
is a mandated reporter and would be required to report the elder abuse. In addition, the GMC has
its own Code of Ethics and Standards and Procedures. which may compel Greta to disclose
information to other members of the client system.22

D.

Competency and How to Determine Competency?

Given the growing population of seniors over the age of 80 in the United States, the
occurrence ofdementia among the population is bound to continue to increase. Many senior citizens
already suffer from some type of dementia which is not a singular disease but a collection of
diseases. Defined as "chronic degenerative diseases involving progressive deterioration of all
intellectual functions, forms ofdementia affect as many as 20 percent ofthe over 80 population and
70% of nursing home residents".23

21 Example adapted from Zimring, supra Note 11 at 482.
22 See www.caremanager.org/gmc/standardsofpractice.htm.
23 Duska, Ronald F., Ph.D., "Ethics in Estate Planning for the Elderly", Journal ofFinancial
Service Professionals, January 2002, pp. 22-24.
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The two most common fonns of dementia are multi-infarct dementia which involves the
death of brain tissue as a result of stroke, and Alzheimer's disease which is a general deterioration
of the brain. 24
Detennining whether a client is "legally competent" is not an exact science and many times
(ifnot at all times) it will be impossible for the attorney to make a definitive detennination. In spite
of this fact, attorneys will often be called upon to make competency detenninations in deciding
whether representation can be initiated, whether documents can be executed and in evaluating the
potential need for a conservator or legal guardianship. Nevertheless, an attorney is not a licensed
mental health professional and the attorney need only use his or her best judgment and observation
skills in assessing mental capacity. Such an assessment is as much of an "art" as a "science".
Often times the attorney's perceptions ofthe client's appearance and mannerisms will suggest
the path to follow. However, the attorney should not be lulled into accepting his initial perception
as conclusive as to the competency of the client. Many times an elderly person is able to "muddle
through" appearing competent for short periods oftime when necessary, even in the case ofoverall
diminishing mental capacity. Attorneys practicing in estate planning or the broader area of elder
law should be watchful for signs ofchanging behavior, lapses in memory and odd courses ofaction
which may indicate an existing or increasing problem with mental capacity.
In assessing mental capacity, there are a variety of factors and tests which may be used by
attorneys to help guide their detennination. When deciding whether or not to employ any of these
methods, or simply rely on observation, the attorney should keep in mind than some elderly clients
may take offense at even the suggestion that they are suffering from some sort ofmental disability.
In cases where a client has made minor revisions to documents, or is preparing an initial estate plan
leaving his estate "all to his spouse, and then equally among his children", it may not be necessary
to perfonn any "tests" because the likelihood of a Will contest is relatively low. On the other hand,
where a client decides to disinherit his children and leave his entire estate to the "Reverend Jim"
more cautionary methods might be called for. In such a case, to diminish any offense taken by the
client, the attorney might just explain to the client that this is a radical change and to reduce the risk
of a successful challenge some "routine" tests are recommended. ("Better safe than sorry, right?").

If a "test" is not warranted under the circumstances, the attorney should consider the
following factors in assessing a client's questionable mental capacity:

D

Whether the client is able to articulate reasoning behind decisions consistent with the
client's identified goals.

D

The degree ofalertness ofthe client's state ofmind and ability to understand relevant
infonnation.

24

Id. At 22.
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D

Whether the client is able to understand the nature ofhis or her own situation and the
consequences of his or her decisions.

D

Whether the client's decisions are consistent with his or her lifetime commitments
and basic values. 25

Alternatively, Frolik and Kaplan26 suggest the following three factors in assessing a client's
competency to execute legally binding documents such as Wills, trusts, durable powers ofattorneys
and living wills:

D

The client must understand the essence of the discussion.

D

The client must understand the need for a particular document, and

D

The client must understand the document's general operation.

Ofcourse, the application ofthese factors requires the attorney to make judgments regarding
what the client's level of comprehension is. To do that, the attorney may rely on his or her own
observations and perceptions or may ask the client a series of questions aimed at assessing mental
capacity.
The following set of questions are adopted from the Folstein Mini-Mental Status Exam. The
maximum score on the test is 30 points. Scores of 26 to 30 indicate that the patient is normal. 22
to 25, mildly impaired. Less than 22, significantly impaired.

Figure A

Shuster, Michael, "Representing Older Persons with Diminished Capacity-Ethical
Considerations" 263 Prac. L. mst./Est. Plan & Admin. 339 (May 1998).
25

Frolik, Lawrence A. and Kaplan, Richard L., Elder Law in a Nutshell, West Group, 2d ed,
St. Paul, MN, 1999 pp.12-17.
26
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ORIENTATION TO TIME (1 pt each)
1. What year is this?
2. What season is this?
3. What month is this?
4. What is today's date?
5. What day of the week is it?
ORIENTATION TO PLACE (1 pt each)
1. Which state are we in?
2. Which county are we in?
3. Which city are we in?
4. Which hospital are we in?
5. Which floor are we on?
IMMEDIATE RECALL (3 pts)
Name three objects and ask the patient to repeat all three objects. Repeat the three objects
until the patient learns them all. Count the number of times it take the patient to learn the
objects.
ATTENTION (either test) (5 pts)
1. Serial 7's: subtract 7 from 100, then su btract 7 from the answer you get and keep
subtracting 7 until I tell you to stop.
2. Spell the word "world" backwards.
DELAYED RECALL (3 pts)
What are the three words I asked you to remember earlier?
NAMING (2 pts)
Show patient common objects (ie. wrist watch and pen) and ask the patient to name them.
REPETITION (1 pt)
Have the patient repeat the following sentence exactly: "No ifs, ands, or buts."
STAGE COMMAND (3 pts)
Have the patient listen first and then follow these directions when you are finished: "Take
it in your right hand, use both hands to fold it in half, and then put it on the floor."
READING (1) Tell the patient to read and follow these commands: "Close your eyes."
COPYING (1) Give the patient a clean sheet of paper and ask him/her to copy the design
shown in figure A above.
WRITING (1) On same sheet of paper, ask the patient to write a complete sentence.
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In cases where a less comprehensive test is necessary, the attorney may use the following
screening techniques from the Family Practice Notebook website. 27 In some cases using one or two
of the following will be sufficient for quick screening:

Techniques:
(pick 1-2 tests to use for quick screening)
1. Clock Drawing
Example: Draw the time 4:45
2. Make Change
Here is 67 cents (and tester gives patient
change) Please give me 32 cents (patient gives
back coins)
3. WORLD Testing
Spell WORLD
Spell WORLD backwards
Alphabetize letters in WORLD
4. Orientation
Day of week and Date
Current address
Current president

E.

Helpful Hints.

Capacity is not an all-or-nothing matter. With an understanding ofcapacity issues and some
simple accommodations, some clients with diminishing capacity can respond much better than in
an environment that is not sensitive to their condition. The following general guidelines may be
helpful to practitioners28 :
1.
Do continue to evaluate the client's condition. As noted above, some clients with
diminishing capacity are very adept at "keeping up appearances" despite declining abilities. If the
client is an existing client, compare the client's current behavior and mannerisms with his or her past

27

http://www.:fpnotebook.com/NEU68.htm

28

See Kirtland, supra Note 5 at 194.
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practices. Uncertainty about his orientation or who people are may be a sign that further investigation
may be warranted. In order to avoid potential litigation, make notations in the client file concerning
the client's mental state during meetings to create a contemporaneous record of your impressions
regarding the client's mental status.
2.
Do ask the client about his or her health in general. This simple question may elicit
information regarding medical conditions or medication that the client may have started since your
last encounter. Some medications have side effects that can cause slight mental confusion or
disorientation.
3.
Do watch for signs of confusion. Difficulty remembering simple details such as the
names 0 f family members my mean the client is suffering from a more serious problem with
capacity. While simple confusion does not necessarily indicate a case of mental incompetency, it
should tip you off that there may be a problem warranting further investigation.
4.

Make your practice environment conducive to serving older clients:

D

Consider that many older people experience "sun downing" meaning that they are
most alert early in the morning, and less alert as the day goes on.

D

Vision problems are common among older people, so make sure your office is
adequately lit and print your documents in adequately large type, with enough
contrast between the text and the page. Keep in mind visual limitations when
preparing handouts or power point presentations.

D

Make sure that the address and phone number on your stationary and business cards
are large and distinctive enough to be read clearly.

D

Face older clients when you speak, and concentrate on speaking distinctly. Don't play
background music during appointments with older clients.

D

Make sure clients receive copies of documents and explanations that they can take
home and review. Design the documents to be easy to read and understand. 29 •

5.
Do use independent witnesses in the execution of any estate planning documents to
avoid or reduce the risk of accusations of undue influence or coercion.
6.
Do consider videotaping the execution ofdocuments ifthere is reason to believe that
the validity of the documents will be challenged based on a lack of mental capacity. Make sure to

29 Adapted from the Senior Market Advisor, Shilling, Dana, "The Question of Capacity
When Seniors Aren't Able to Keep Their Best Interests in Mind, Estate Planners Can Pick up the
Slack", SMA Premier 2000:
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clearly identify all parties who are present and the purpose oftheir presence. Also identify the date,
time and location, as well as the actions being taken during the execution. One author suggests
asking the following questions to verify the authenticity ofthe video along with the mental capacity
of the testatoro:

D
D
D
D
D

Name, age, marital status and residency of the client;
The names of children and grandchildren of the client;
Whether the client has read the estate planning document being executed;
Whether the attorney has fully explained the documents to the satisfaction of the
client;
If possible, a brief explanation of the reasons for any unusual provisions.

FINAL EXAM

In this case, the Martha Mother was elderly and suffered from Alzheimer's disease.
With the help ofher attorney, she changed her will to disinherit three ofher children
and leave her entire estate to a caregiver child, Claudia Caregiver. After Martha's
death, the three children who were disinherited challenged Martha's revised will
based on their claims that their Martha lacked testamentary capacity and that Martha
was subject to the undue influence of the Claudia. To prove Martha's lack of
capacity, the three children submitted the testimony of an expert in geriatric
psychiatric medicine who had reviewed their mother's voluminous medical records,
and who determined that it was highly unlikely that Martha had testamentary capacity
when she executed her revised will. The three disinherited daughters were able to
prove that their sister, Claudia, was Martha's caregiver. The sisters claimed that
Claudia exerted undue influence over Martha. They claimed that Claudia isolated
their mother from the other three sisters and abused their mother. The court found
only one incident of abuse about five years prior to the mother's execution of her

What happened? The Circuit of Fairfax County, Virginia, decided that a mother had the
capacity to execute a will and was not under undue influence by a caregiver The court found that
Claudia Caregiver's close relationship with Martha coupled with her caregiver role, was sufficient
to give rise to a fiduciary relationship, however, the court ruled that the "suspicious circumstances"
cited by the three sisters did not rise to the level of undue influence. The court found that there was
some element oftruth in these claims, but the court also found that the three disinherited sisters had
an unrelenting tendency to find evil intent in all of the beneficiary, caregiver child's actions. The
court also found only one incident of abuse about five years prior to the mother's execution of her.

30

Kirtland, supra Note 5 at 197.
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The beneficiary child admitted the abuse and checked herself into a mental health facility
immediately after the incident. The court decided that this incident was too remote in time to form
the basis of undue influence.
The decision is in the case ofBeek v. Speakman, 2000 Va. Cir. Lexis 522 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax
County, Nov. 21, 2000). The opinion gives valuable guidance to attorneys concerning what steps
they should take when revising a client's will to disinherit a child.
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SECTION I

CHARITABLE LEAD TRUSTS 1
by
Edward Jay Beckwith2

I.

Period Of Profound Uncertainty
A.

One Perspective
During the rest of this decade, individuals will be considering what changes may
be advisable in their private wealth plans in the context of a confusing and
uncertain atmosphere. Taxpayers and planners alike will try to determine which
traditional devices might be less useful (or even unsafe) after the enactment of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the "2001 Tax
Act") and which new perspectives merit consideration or reconsideration. There
are no magical

answers or instant solutions.

As always, practitioners will

examine each client's situation based upon the client's particular circumstances as
well as his or her tax and non-tax objectives.

The following are some

considerations to keep in mind while we are uncertain about the prevailing
legislative framework and the financial markets:
1.

Not much has changed, for now.

This material was originally presented at the 37th Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning, University of Miami, January, 2003.
Edward Jay Beckwith, Esq.: Edward Jay Beckwith is a partner in the national law firm of Baker & Hostetler LLP residing in the
firm's Washington office. He received a B.S. in Science from the Pennsylvania State University and a J.D. and LLM in Taxation from the
Georgetown University Law Center. Mr. Beckwith is active in the American and the District of Columbia Bar Associations, as well as the
American Law Institute. He is a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. He also is a Fellow and a Regent of the American College of Trust and
Estate· Counsel where he has served as the State Chair in the District of Columbia as well as the Chair of the College's Philanthropy Study
Committee and its Committee on Charitable Planning and Exempt Organizations. He .lectures throughout the United States and has written
extensively, including articles and speeches for the American Law Institute/American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional
Education, the Council on Foundations and Tax Management. He is the Founder and Chair of the Advanced Estate Planning Institute sponsored
annually by The Georgetown University Law Center. In addition, Mr. Beckwith is an adjunct tax professor at the Georgetown University Law
Center where he teaches graduate seminars in Advanced Estate Planning and Charitable Organizations and Planned Giving.
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2.

With an increasing unified credit amount, the estate and generation
skipping transfer ("GST") taxes soon may cease to be a factor for many
clients, even if repeal is delayed.

3.

The estate and GST taxes may never be repealed completely.

4.

The gift tax has not been repealed.

5.

Carryover basis, if ever applicable, will present a new set of planning
challenges.

B.

Renewed Interest in Charitable Lead Trusts
.Many planners are familiar with the Charitable Lead Trust ("CLT") as a device
for avoiding or reducing transfer taxes on large transfers.. Currently, the device is
useful to reduce or eliminate gift tax exposure for inter vivos gifting and to reduce
estate tax exposure for death time gifting. Similar advantages apply to the GST
tax for both inter vivos and death time transfers. Since the 2001 Tax Act, the
ability to reduce gift taxes has become a greater focal point for many clients and,
as a result, the utility of the CLT may well enjoy a renaissance. In addition,
historically low rates under section 7520 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19863
coupled with a precipitous decline in the securities markets, can provide even
greater benefits than were available just one year ago.

c.

Immediate Opportunities for Charities

Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code").
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With all the attention that has been focused upon the potential problems, every
charity runs the risk of missing a rare opportunity to present the non-tax "case" to
its constituency at a time when virtually every person of means will be reviewing
his or her estate plan and considering revisions to their existing plans. In the long
run, this may serve to refocus a charity's planned giving outreach on its mission
rather than exclusively on its ability to provide tax benefits to the donor. If ever
there is no estate tax, a person whose estate otherwise would have been taxable
will have more to dispose of as he or she wishes - and some of that "excess"
could well be dedicated to charity. People have provided bequests to charity for
centuries, since long before there was an estate tax or other death duty. There is
no reason to expect that the tendency to support charity will diminish in the
future.
ll.

Charitable Lead Trusts - The Fundamentals
A.

A Working Definition
1.

Conceptually, a CLT is the reverse of a Charitable Remainder Trust
("CRT"). With a CLT, a fixed or yariable annuity is paid to charity for a
determinable period which may be measured by a term of years or by
reference to the life of one or more individuals; the remainder passes
outright or in trust to one or more noncharitable beneficiaries. The charity
should qualify under the applicable sections of the Code, sections 170,
2055 and 2522, which govern the type of deduction associated with the
creation of the charitable lead trust. The remainder beneficiary can be one
or more individuals, partnerships, corporations, estates or trusts. CLTs
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have been one of the more valuable .planning structures available for
wealthier individuals who wish to give to charity but also want to provide
for the continued affluence of designated family members. Two separate
gifts are made when the CLT is created: a gift of a current interest to one
or more a charitable beneficiaries; and a gift of the remainder interest to
one or more noncharitable beneficiaries. The donor is liable for gift tax on
the present value of the remainder interest.
2.

The principal tax advantage to a CLT lies in the transfer tax deduction for
the present value of the charitable interest. The CLT has been used most
appropriately in situations where the donor and his or her family have no
immediate need for all of the income that they currently enjoy and are
willing to forego some current benefit in exchange for the prospect of
long-term capital appreciation.

3.

The trust property and any appreciation on that property is removed from
the donor's estate, unless the donor retains any powers that could lead to
its inclusion in his or her estate under sections 2036 or 2038 of the Code.

4.

The donor must designate the charitable beneficiary when the trust is
created (or provide a method for designating the charity that is beyond his
or her legal control). Unless great care is taken with the wording and
structure of the charitable benefit, a donor should not designate a private
foundation of which he or she is a trustee as the charitable beneficiary of a
CLT created by that donor.
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5.

The term of the lead interest can be measured: in a variety of ways: (i) in
years; (ii) by the life or lives of individuals living when the CLT is
created; (iii) a measuring life plus a tenn of years; or even (iv) by the
shorter of a term of years or a measuring life plus a term of years. Treas.
Regs. §§ 1. 170A-6(c)(2); 20.2055-2(e)(2); 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2) and Rev.
Rul. 85-49, 1985-1 C.B. 330.

See Ltr. Rul. 1997-21006.

The core

requirement is that the tenn is ascertainable when the CLT is created.
B.

Cautionary Note
There are two basic varieties of qualified CLTs: those created inter vivos or at
death that are treated as separate taxpayers, (often referred to as Qualified NonGrantor CLTs) and those created inter vivos where the grantor is treated as the
owner of the CLT's income for income tax purposes (often referred to as
Qualified Grantor CLTs).

Another variation is a Non-Qualified Non-Grantor

CLT created during life.

These materials first address only Qualified Non-

Grantor CLTs. Qualified Grantor CLTs and Non-Qualified Non-Grantor CLTs
are discussed in Section VI of this outline.
C.

Qualified CLTs
A Qualified CLT is a trust that meets the various statutory definitions that qualify
a donor's transfer to the CLT for one or more tax deductions. I.R.C. §§ 170(t)(2),
2055(e)(2)(B), 2522(c)(2)(B). To be Qualified, the CLT must pay the charitable
lead interest in the form of a fixed annuity or unitrust amount. The CLT need not
specify a particular charitable recipient; this designation can be left to the trustees
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and can be changed by the trustees from year to year. Ltr. Ruls. 2000-43029;
1997-48009; 1993-31015; 1980-51159.
D.

Charitable Lead Annuity Trust
A charitable lead annuity trust is an irrevocable trust under which a sum certain is
to be distributed periodically to one or more charitable beneficiaries not less often
than annually for a term of years or during the life or lives of one or more
individuals who are living when the trust is created. The principal of the trust
must be used to satisfy the annuity if trust income is insufficient. So long as the
annuity payments are determinable when the CLT is created, provision can be
made to vary them. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.70A-6(c)(2)(i); 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vi) and
25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vi).
Unlike the rules governing charitable remainder annuity trusts there is no explicit
prohibition against making additional contributions to a charitable lead annuity
trust. But see Ltr. Rul. 93-04020. However, such contributions do not generate
additional estate or gift tax deductions because the amount of the annual
guaranteed annuity payment must be determinable at the inception of the trust.
Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2)(i)(A), 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vi)(a) and 25.2522(c)3(c)(2)(vi)(a).

Furthermore, it is unclear how the annuity amount would be

adjusted to take such additions into account. Accordingly, most planners have
assumed that such additions must be prohibited and that separate trusts must be
created to hold such assets. See Ltr. Ruls. 1980-34093 and 1980-21095.
E.

Charitable Lead Unitrust
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A charitable lead unitrust is an irrevocable trust under which a fixed percentage of
the net fair market value of its assets (valued annually) is to be distributed not less
often than annually to one or .more charitable beneficiaries for a term of years or
during the life or lives of one or more individuals who are living when the trust is
created.

Corpus must be used to satisfy the unitrust amount if income is

insufficient. Unlike charitable remainder unitrusts, a net income limitation is not
available. Rev. Rul. 77-300, 1977-2 C.B. 352; Ltr. Rul. 1979-18102. Further, the
trust instrument may not provide for the percentage to vary over the term of the
CLT.

Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2)(ii)(A), 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vii)(a) and

25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vii)(a).
In computing fair market value of the trust, all assets and liabilities are taken into
consideration without regard to whether particular items also are taken into
account in determining trust income. The same valuation date and method should
be used each year. If these details are not specified in the trust, the trustee must

select the date and method on the first income tax return that the trust is required
to file. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2)(ii); 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vii) and 25. 2522(c)3(c)(2)(vii).
There is no specific prohibition against additional contributions being
made to charitable lead unitrusts. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
has ruled that a provision that allows additional contributions to be made
would not disqualify the trust: in fact a gift tax deduction may be
allowable for such contributions. See Ltr. Rul. 1980-52068 and 1980-
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43077. However, these are only private letter rulings and should not be
relied upon as precedent.
F.

Additional Considerations
There is no minimum or maximum payout requirement and no limitation
on the number of years that the annuity can be paid to charity. I.R.C. §
170(t)(2)(B); Treas. Regs. § 1.170A-6(c)(2)(i)(A). The trust remainder is
distributed to or held for the benefit of the donor's noncharitable
beneficiaries. A clause that "saves" the trust from violating any applicable
rule against perpetuities will not disqualify the trust, even if the trust's
term is shortened as a result. Ltr. Ruls. 1981-04213 and 1997-21006.
However, a charitable lead interest will not qualify as a guaranteed annuity
interest if the trustee has the discretion to commute and prepay the
charitable interest prior to the expiration of the specified annuity term.
Crown Income Charitable Fund v. Comm'r., 98 T.C. 327 (1992) affd, 8
F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1993) pro; see also Rev. Rul. 88-27, 1988-1 C.B. 331
and Ltr. Rul. 97-34057. In general, no amounts may be paid for private
purposes from the charitable lead annuity trust until the expiration of the
charitable annuity term. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2)(i)(E) and 1.170A-6(c)(2)(ii)(D).

However, in light of the Tax Court's decision in

Boeshore Est. v. Comm'r., 78 T.C. 523 (1982), the IRS issued proposed
regulations that would acknowledge a non-charitable interest in the form
of qualifying annuity or unitrust interest can precede a charitable lead
interest. 67 Fed. Reg. 48070 (7/23/02).
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G.

Refonnation
The transfer of a partial interest to a charity generally will not qualify for a
deduction (unless the trust interest is a qualified annuity or unitrust
interest) even if the non-charitable trust interests are clearly separable.
Rev. Rul. 77-97,1977-1 C.B. 285. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 included
permanent "reformation" rules which permit the amendment of certain
charitable trusts which otherwise would not qualify for a charitable
contribution deduction. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(7), 2055(e)(3) and 2522(c)(4).
To be eligible for this relief the nonqualifying interest must be
"reformable" as defined in the statute. As a matter of practice a provision
often is included in CLTs which authorizes the trustee to amend the trust
to assure it is and remains a qualified CLT.

ID.

Tax Consequences To The Donor
A.

Lifetime Transfers
1.

For income tax purposes, generally no immediate deductions are available
and the CLT is treated as a taxpayer separate and apart from the donor.
I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B); Treas. Regs. § 1. 170A-6(c). A current income tax
deduction is allowable only if the donor is treated as the owner of the
property. If the trust is a Qualified Grantor CLT, all items of income,
deduction and credit of the CLT are attributed to the grantor. I.R.C. §§
671-678.
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2.

For gift tax purposes, a deduction is allowable based on the present value
of the charitable interest. I.R.C. § 2522(c)(2)(B). The remainder interest
does not qualify for a gift tax per donee exclusion. For the gift tax to
apply the gift must be complete. If the donor retains the power, directly or
indirectly, to affect the charitable recipient the gift is incomplete. Treas.
Regs. § 25.2511-2(b)and(c). However, it appears the donor may be an
ofncer or director of a charitable recipient.

Ltr. Rul. 1981-30033.

However, the governing documents of the charity should include
provisions that prevent the donor from having control over the property
received from the CLT he or she created. See Ltr. Ruls. 2001-38018;
2001-08032 and 2000-30014. Payment to a donor advised fund operated
by the charitable recipient may require additional attention. Ltr. Ruls.
2000-10036 and 2000-09048.
B.

Testamentary Transfers
A deduction is allowable for the value of the charitable interest.

I.R.C. §

2055(e)(2)(B). If a grantor retains a reversionary interest in a lifetime CLT and
dies during the term of the trust, a portion of the value of the CLT will be
included in the grantor's estate. I.R.C. § 2036.
C.

Valuing the Charitable Interest
The present value of an annuity is determined by multiplying the amount of the
annuity by factors which are dependent on the applicable rate under section 7520.
See IRS Pub. 1457. The present value of a unitrust interest is determined by
subtracting the present value of the remainder interest from the value of the
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property contributed to the CLT. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(3); 20.2055-2(f)(2)
and 25.2522(c)-3(d)(2).
Under section 7520, the value of an annuity, interest for life or for a term of years,
or remainder or reversionary interest for valuation dates occurring on or after May
1, 1989, is determined under tables that are prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury. Treas. Regs. § 1.7520, § 20.7520 and § 25.7520. See IRS Publication
1457, Actuarial Values, Alpha Volume and IRS Publication 1458, Actuarial
Values, Beta Volume. With respect to the interest rate component, the valuation
tables under this section are based on the interest rate that the IRS announces
monthly in a news release and publishes in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. This
rate is 120 percent of the applicable federal midterm rate compounded annually
(rounded to the nearest two-tenths of one percent) in effect under section
1274(d)(I) for the month in which the valuation date falls. For example, the
applicable federal midterm interest rate for December 2002 (as set forth in Rev.
Rul. 2002-81), is 3.31 percent; 120 percent of this amount is 3.98 percent. The
rate for December under section 7520 was determined by rounding the rate of
3.98 to 4.0 percent.
1.

If an income, an estate, or a gift tax charitable contribution is allowed for
any part of the property transferred, the taxpayer may use the federal
midterm rate for the month of the transfer or for either of the two months
preceding the month in which the valuation date falls. In the case of
transfers of more than one interest in the same property, each interest must
be valued on a basis consistent with the valuation of all other such
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interests. For example, if a taxpayer transfers property to a charitable
remainder trust in December 2002 the taxpayer may use an interest rate
based upon the federal midterm rate for December 2002 (4.0%),
November (3.6%) or October (4.2%) however, the taxpayer must use the
same rate for both the non-charitable lead interest and the charitable
remainder interest.
2.

Regulations provide the 7520 tables apply to "ordinary" beneficial
interests. A "restricted" beneficial interest is an interest that is subject to
done or more additional conditions, powers or restrictions. The governing
instrument may impose these limitations or they may exist based on
surrounding circumstances.

Restricted beneficial interests are valued

based on all relevant facts and circumstances, rather than the standard
actuarial tables, even though the tables may be one useful fact in valuing
such interests.

Treas. Regs. §§ 1.7520-3(b)(1)(ii) and (iii), 20.7520-

3(b)(1)(ii) and (iii), 25.7520-3(b)(1)(ii) and (iii).
3.

The standard tables are not available if the individual who is a measuring
life is terminally ill at the time ·of the transaction. An individual who is
known to have an incurable illness or other deteriorating physical
condition is considered terminally ill if there is at least a 50 percent
probability that the individual will die within one year. An individual who
survives for eighteen months after a transfer is presumed not to have been
terminally ill at the time of the transfer, "unless the contrary is established
by clear and convincing evidence."
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Treas. Regs. §§ 1.7520-3(b)(3),

20.7520-3(b)(3) and 25.7520-3(b)(3).

Nevertheless, the IRS issued

regulations that the measuring lives used for a CLT may only be that of
the donor, the donor's spouse and/or, with respect to all of the remainder
beneficiaries, a lineal ancestor or the spouse of such lineal ancestor. T.D.
8923; Treas. Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2)(i)(A) and (ii)(A), 20.20552(e)(2)(vi)(a) and (vii)(a) and 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(vi)(a) and (vii)(a).
D.

Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
Congress rewrote the GST rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
I.R.C. §§ 2601, et. seq.

See

Subject to a complicated set of exceptions and

exemptions, GSTs are taxed at the top marginal estate tax rate in effect at the time
of the transfer. See I.R.C. §§ 2601, 2602 and 2641.
1.

A GST generally occurs when property is transferred to or for the benefit
of a "skip person" or when an intervening interest in property terminates
in favor of a skip person. A "skip person" is a person who is more than
one generation younger than the transferor of the property (e.g.,
grandchildren or more remote lineal descendants) or a trust for the benefit
of such person(s). I.R.C. §§ 2613(a), 2651. A "non-skip person" is any
person who is not a skip person. I.R.C. § 2613(b).

2.

A CLT and its charitable beneficiaries are non-skip persons. I.R.C. §
2651(0(3). Therefore, neither the creation of a CLT nor distributions to
its charitable beneficiaries will result in any GST tax consequences.
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3.

However, upon tennination of the charitable interests in a CLT, a GST tax
might be imposed if the remainder beneficiaries are "skip persons" in
relation to the donor of the CLT. For example, if the donor of a CLT
creates a remainder interest in favor of his grandchildren, a GST tax might

be imposed upon the tennination of the charitable lead interest. Although
a GST exemption may be available to shield part or all of the remainder
interest from GST tax, every donor must consider the potential impact of
the GST tax (for example, a skip person may succeed to the trust
remainder if a primary non-skip remainderman dies before the charitable
interest expires).
4.

In general, GST tax is paid from the remainder interest.

I.R.C. §

2603(a)(2).
5.

All individuals are granted a GST exemptiot:t, which may be allocated to
lifetime and/or testamentary transfers to shield all or part of such transfers
from GST tax. I.R.C. § 2631. Allocation of the donor's GST exemption
to a charitable lead unitrust that will result in GSTs (where the remainder
passes to grandchildren) is relatively simple: to avoid future GST tax, the
donor may allocate (on a timely filed gift or estate tax return) that portion
of his or her GST exemption which is equal to the value of his or her
taxable transfer(s) to skip persons, using the valuation factors provided by
the IRS in effect as of the date the unitrust is created. I.R.C. § 2642(b).

6.

The effect of allocating a portion of the donor's GST exemption upon
creation of a charitable lead annuity trust cannot be detennined until
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termination of the charitable lead interest using an "adjusted GST
exemption" formula. I.R.C. § 2642(e). The formula "adjusts" the donor's
initially allocated GST exemption to a projected future value as of the date
the charitable lead interest actually expires, using the discount rate applied
under the valuation methods provided by the IRS in effect at the time' the.
trust was created. The amount of GST exemption a donor should allocate
to a charitable lead annuity trust is based upon (i) the term and payout rate
of the charitable lead interest, (ii) the projected rate of return on trust
property (Le., the donor's best estimate of the future value of the trust
when the charitable lead interest expires), and (iii) the discount rate
provided by the IRS in effect when the trust is created.
IV.

Taxation Of Trust And Its Beneficiaries
A.

TheCLT
1.

The trust is taxed as a complex trust. I.R.C. § 661. Any trust income in
excess of the income tax deduction allowable with respect to the charitable
payout is taxed to the trust. The trust receives an unlimited charitable
income tax deduction for items of gross income that, pursuant to the terms
of the governing instrument, are paid during the taxable year to a qualified
charity. I.R.C. § 642(c)(1). The deduction is not limited by percentage
limitations applicable to individuals.

However, the CLT's charitable

deduction is reduced by any unrelated business income realized by the
CLT during the year to the extent the UBI exceeds the percentage
limitations attributable to individuals under section 170(b)(1)(A). I.R.C.
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§§ 681 and 512(b)(11). The deduction is limited to the extent capital gains

or tax-exempt income is deemed distributed. Therefore, the governing
instrument should provide for a hierarchy of sources of payments to
maximize the income tax benefits of the charitable payouts, for example,
by providing for distributions first from ordinary income (including shorttenn capital gains), next from capital gains, then unrelated business
income, then tax-exempt income, with principal last. Rev. Rul. 71-285,
1971-2 C.B. 2487. The IRS has interpreted the controlling regulations to
require pro rata allocations in the absence of economic substance. GeM
39161 and Ltr. Rul. 1999-08002.
2.

The CLT is subject to estimated tax payments. I.R.C. § 6654(1).

3.

In general, the taxable year of a trust is the calendar year. I.R.C. § 644.
There is an exception for wholly charitable trusts exempt from taxation
under section 501(a). I.R.C. § 644(b). However, CLTs are not described
in section 501(a) and thus report on a calendar year basis.

4.

The income of a CLT is reported on Fonns 1041, 1041-A and 5227 and a
Schedule K-l is provided to the charitable beneficiary. The returns are
filed on or before April 15th of the year following the year with respect to
which the returns are filed.

5.

In order to avoid forced sales or adverse tax consequences to the trust,
plans should be made for the trust to realize a sufficient level of cash flow
to satisfy the regular payment of the annuity or unitrust interest. If there is
insufficient cash to satisfy a given annuity or unitrust interest the sale or
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distribution of appreciated property will result in the CLT realizing capital
gain.

Borrowing may be a more favorable short-term alternative.

However, borrowing is not a long-term solution economically and the
trustee must be careful to avoid creating unrelated business income.
Treas. Regs. § 1.514(c)-I(a)(I)(iii).
B.

The Charitable Beneficiary
The tax characterization of what the charitable beneficiary receives can be
determined by the terms of the CLT. In the absence of direction in the governing
instrument, the Code allocates Distributable Net Income ratably. To the extent
possible, a draftsperson will want to allocate items taxed at higher rates to the
charitable beneficiaries.

Similarly, a draftsperson should consider allocating

expenses to income. But see Rev. Rul. 74-19, 1974-1 C.B. 155.
C.

Income Taxation of the Noncharitable Beneficiary
The noncharitable remainder beneficiary generally is not taxed during the ongoing
term of the CLT.

v.

Advanced Considerations - Private Foundation Rules
A.

Application of the Private Foundation Rules
The CLT is considered to be a private foundation for purposes of certain
restrictions placed on such organizations. I.R.C. §§ 508(d)(2) and 4947(a)(2).
Thus, the trust can be subject to the taxes on self-dealings (§4941), excess
business holdings (§ 4943), investments jeopardizing charitable purposes (§
4944), and taxable expenditures (§ 4945). The private foundation limitations may
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apply automatically to the trust under state law but, if not, the limitations must be
spelled out in the governing trust instrument. See Rev. Rul. 75-38, 1975-1 C.B.
161 and Treas. Regs. § 508-3(d).
B.

The Penalty Taxes
An initial tax is imposed at a relatively low level, followed by a more severe
second-level tax which applies if the CLT fails to "correct" the violation which
gives rise to the initial liability. In addition, section 6684 imposes a penalty equal
to the applicable tax if the person liable has previously been liable for a Chapter
42 tax, or if the transgression is both willful and flagrant; the effect is to double
the applicable penalty in such cases.
1.

Tax on acts of self-dealing (dealings between the foundation and its
substantial contributors, foundation

officials

and related persons

"disqualified persons"). I.R.C. § 4941. The prohibition on self-dealing,
often can create unexpected difficulties. The prohibition is absolute and,
presently, the IRS is without equitable authority to excuse harmless
violations. Examples of prohibited transactions are selling or leasing of
property or making of loans between the foundation and a disqualified
person. The IRS has issued several letter rulings denoting relationships
which will not violate this prohibition. See Ltr. Ruls. 94-25004; 94-02026
and 87-43085. The IRS also has noted instances when a relationship will
constitute self-dealing. See Ltr. Rul. 1994-38045.
2.

Tax on excess business holdings.

I.R.C. § 4943. The prohibition on

excess business holdings is designed to restrict involvement in the
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ownership and operation of businesses. While this prohibition may be
simple in concept, section 4943 is an intricate and complex statute.
Generally, holdings are excessive if disqualified persons own 20 percent
(35 percent where a third party has effective control) or more of the voting
stock of incorporated business and the CLT owns more than 2 percent.
The CLT has five years within which to dispose of excess holdings, absent
an extension of up to five additional years which can be granted for good
cause shown. I.R.C. § 4943(c)(7). Nevertheless, caution is advised when
funding a CLT with interests ina closely-held business.
3.

Tax on investments which jeopardize the foundation's exempt purpose.
I.R.C. § 4944. No investment is per se a jeopardy investment; however,
by regulation, several categories of investments are suggested for careful
examination. Treas. Regs. § 53.4944-1(a)(2).

4.

Taxable Expenditures.

I.R.C. § 4945.

The provision prohibits

expenditures for: (i) lobbying and propagandizing; (ii) influencing
elections or conducting voter education; and (iii) making grants to certain
individuals (unless approved by the IRS in advance). This provision also
discourages grants to organizations other than public charities unless the
trustees of the CLT monitor grantees' use of distributions and making
grants for noncharitable purposes.
C.

The 60% Exception
The taxes on excess business holdings and jeopardizing investments do not apply
if at inception the charitable "income interest" is 60% or less of the initial value of
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the trust property.

The regulations define "income interest" to include a

guaranteed annuity or a unitrust amount.
1.

The IRS has ruled that the less than 60% exception of section 4947(b)(3)
from sections 4943 and 4944 is not applicable unless all of the trust's
income, even if it exceeds the annuity or unitrust amount, is made payable
to charity. Ltr. Rul. 1982-41098. This ruling appears incorrect in light of
Treas. Reg. §53.4947-2(b)(2). Nonetheless, the apparent position of the
IRS should be taken into account whenever funding a charitable lead trust
with closely held stock or other assets that cannot or will not be sold.

2.

Moreover, in cases where the present value of all charitable income
interests (without regard to whether any deduction is allowed) exceeds
60% of the aggregate value of the net assets of the annuity lead trust
computed on the date of valuation, the governing instrument of the trust
must prohibit not only the acquisition but also the retention of property the
acquisition of which would give rise to a tax under section 4944. Treas.
Regs. §§ 1.170A-6(c)(2)(i)(D), 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vi)(e) and 25.2522(c)3(c)(2)(vi)(e).

VI.

Advanced Planning Considerations - Variations On The Theme
A.

The Qualified Grantor CLT
If the grantor would benefit from a current income tax charitable contribution
deduction, a CLT can be created that is taxed as owned by the grantor under the
grantor trust rules ("Qualified Grantor CLT").
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1.

An income tax deduction is available for the present value of the qualified
annuity or unitrust interest dedicated to charity. The deduction is equal to
the present value of all distribution payable to charity.

I.R.C. §

170(t)(2)(B).
2.

The gift is considered "for the use of' the charity, so the 30 percent or 20
percent limits apply. I.R.C. § 170(b)(I)(B)(i).

3.

For each year thereafter the grantor will be taxed on all items of income
attributable to the trust.

Accordingly, the key tax consideration is a

comparison of the value of the current deduction versus the deferral of the
tax liability during the term of the trust.
4.

In theory, the trust could be invested in nontaxable assets so that, while the

grantor would be subsequently taxed as the owner of the trust (the income
of which he/she would not receive), there would be no net taxable income.
5.

If the trust ceases to be a grantor trust because of the grantor's death or
otherwise, there is a recapture of the excess deduction taken over the
deduction that would have been allowed had the trust term been clearly
known. The grantor is treated as having received, as of such date, income
equal to the amount of any deduction that was previously allowed less the
discounted value of all amounts that were required to be, and actually
were, paid to charitable beneficiaries. I.R.C. § 170(O(2)(B); Treas. Regs.
§ 1.170A-6(c)(4).
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6.

The income of the CLT is taxed to the grantor.

I.R.C. §§ 671-679.

Although there are several ways to qualify as a grantor trust.
7.

For transfer tax purposes (estate and gift taxes), a charitable deduction is
allowable where a charitable designation is made after the income is
earned.

B.

The Non-Qualified Non-Grantor CLT
Instead of defining the charitable interest as a qualifying annuity or unitrust
interest a CLT can provide that charity will receive "all net income". Since the
charitable interest is not qualified, the grantor is not entitled to an income or gift
tax charitable contribution deduction. However, the trust's income is not taxed to
the grantor and the trust qualifies for an unlimited income tax deduction for the
full amount passing to charity. I.R.C. § 642(c). In essence, the grantor gets the
benefit of an unlimited charitable deduction. In addition, the CLT will not be
subject to the private foundation rules. I.R.C. § 4947(a)(2)(A).

Vil.

Planning Opportunities
A.

Some Preliminary Thoughts after the 2001 Tax Act
1.

Traditional tax motives may change or disappear for some donors between
now and 2009. The testamentary CLT traditionally has been used as a
means of reducing or eliminating estate taxes. To that extent, clients may
want to update their estate plans if the estate tax and the GST tax ceases to
be a factor for the donor. Note that this point will be reached not only

1-22

when (and if) the tax is repealed but also when the scheduled increases in
available exemption amounts exceed a particular donor's taxable estate.
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reductions retroactive to January 1, 2003. Accordingly, the rate arbitrage
is no longer viable for most grantors.
5.

The CLT continues to have a number of useful applications apart from
transfer tax savings:
a.

As a vehicle for charitable contributions by persons who face
disallowance of deductions for personal contributions due to the
percentage limitations;

b.

As a private foundation substitute to fund family charitable giving
for a set period; and

c.

As a means of facilitating family transfers of real estate and
business assets.

B.

General Planning Considerations
1.

The principal tax advantage of a Qualified Non-Grantor CLT is the
possibility to leverage the donor's available gift tax or estate tax
applicable exclusion amounts andlor GST exemption amount. This may
be done with assets which are in a structure that provides favorable
valuations for transfer tax purposes.

2.

In larger estates in which there is large scale estate tax deferral through the
use of the unlimited marital deduction when the first spouse dies, the
creation of a testamentary lead trust at the death of the surviving spouse is
a good way to eliminate taxes upon the second death. This may be done in
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the documents of the first spouse to die by providing a QTIP trust for the
surviving spouse followed by a CLT.
3.

Often planners stagger the dates at which the charitable trusts will
terminate to· provide varying amounts of money to the beneficiaries at
various points in time.

For

a planner might establish three

CLTs, one to end after 5 years, another after 8 years and another after 10
years. The brevity may preclude a 100 percent deductioll but still should
allow a significant reduction in transfer tax.
4.

Generally it is better to use a CLT than a marital trust for deferral if there
is a strong likelihood of substantial appreciation because in the marital
situation the appreciation would be taxed when the surviving spouse dies.
In contrast, in the CLT the appreciation is dropped down a generation
(assuming proper selection of remainder beneficiaries).

C.

Illustrations of Advantageous Use of CLTs
1.

Fonnulas.
While the applicable rate under section 7520 is known when a CLT is
created inter vivos, the same is not true for most testamentary CLTs. If a
particular estate tax outcome is desired, such as a so-called zeroed out
CLT, the duration or the amount of the qualified payment can be described
by a formula. For example, the charitable interest can be described at the
duration and level of payout required to produce a taxable transfer of a

I
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stated amount using the lowest applicable rate under section 7520. This
can be illustrated by a recent private letter ruling. Ltr. Rul. 1999-27031
In this comprehensive and instructive ruling the IRS reviewed a situation
where a donor proposed to create various testamentary charitable lead
annuity trusts and charitable lead unitrusts and fund them at death based
on pecuniary formulas.
Under the donor's proposed Will, the residue of the donor' sestate will
pour-over into a revocable trust. After donor's death, the trustee is to
distribute a set amount, in cash, or property valued as of the distribution
date or dates, to each of several charitable lead annuity trusts. These trusts
were grouped into two categories, those that would terminate in 13 years
and those that would terminate in 19 years. Upon termination, the trusts
were to pass to or for the benefit of various private individuals. The
annuity amounts to be paid from the twelve trusts will be determined
under the following formula:
For the respective charitable terms, the Trustee shall pay such annuity
amount in each taxable year of the trust to [Charity]... from each of the
"A" Trusts, using a term of thirteen (13) years, and from each of the "B"
Trusts, using a term of nineteen (19) years, that will produce a present
value under section 7520 of the [Internal Revenue] Code for the noncharitable remainder interest related to each of the * * * trusts equal to, or
as close as possible as equal to without exceeding, [a set amount];
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The proposed revocable trust further provides that for purposes of this
formula, the trustee is to apply the lowest available interest rate under
section 7520 from among three months, the month of donor's death or the
two months preceding donor's death, and the annuity amount will be fixed
as of the date of the donor's death based upon the applicable interest rate.
The proposed trust further provides that the trustee is to distribute a stated
amount, in cash or in kind, valued as of the distribution date or dates, to
each of various charitable lead unitrusts. These trusts were grouped into
two categories, those that will terminate in 29 years and those that will
t~rminate

in 35 years. Upon termination the trusts were to pass to or for

the benefit of various private individuals. The unitrust amounts for each
trust will be determined under the following formula:
For the respective charitable terms, the Trustee shall pay for each taxable
year of the trust, to [Charity] ... such percent of the net fair market value
of the trust principal valued as of the first day of each taxable year of the
trust, which percent remains unchanged throughout the charitable term and
is a certain determined percent for the "C" Trusts which trusts last twentynine (29) years and a different percent for the "D" Trusts which trusts last
35 years, as will produce a present value under section 7520 for the noncharitable remainder interest related to each of the * * * "C" Trusts and
"D" Trusts that is the greater of: (1) an amount equal to, or as close as
possible as equal to, but not exceeding,·* * * of [Taxpayer's] remaining
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available GST tax exemption (as is required to be allocated among the
Trusts and

"D~'

"c"

Trusts...

The revocable trust further provides that donor intends that all of the
donor's remaining available GST exemption at death be applied equally to
the various charitable lead unitrusts resulting in an inclusion ratio of zero
or as close as possible to zero with respect to each trust. For purposes of
this formula, in determining the amount .of theunitrust payment, the
trustee is to apply the lowest available federal interest rate from among
three months, the month of Taxpayer's death or the two months preceding
Taxpayer's death, and the unitrust amount will be fixed as of· the date of
Taxpayer's death based upon the applicable interest rate.
The- IRS found that with respect to the A Trusts and the B Trusts, the
charitable annuity will be determined pursuant to a specified formula. The
annuity amounts will be ascertainable and determinable as of donor's date
of death, because as of that date, all variables in the formula for
determining

the

charitable

annuity

amounts

will

be fixed

and

determinable. Accordingly, the IRS concluded that the charitable interest
in each charitable lead annuity trust will constitute a qualifying annuity
interest and the estate tax charitable deduction will be allowed for the
present value of each guaranteed annuity interest.
Similarly, the IRS found the amount of the unitrust interest payable with
respect to the C Trusts and the D Trusts. will be determined pursuant to a
specified fonnula.

The unitrust amount will be ascertainable and
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detenninable as of Taxpayer's date of death, because as of that date, all
variables in the formula for detennining the charitable unitrust amounts
will be fixed and detenninable. Accordingly, the IRS concluded that the.
charitable interest in each charitable lead unitrust will constitute a
qualifying unitrust amount and an estate tax charitable deduction will be
allowed for the present value of each unitrust interest.
The ruling touched most of the issues raised in the creation of
testamentary CLTs. For example, the IRS found that the CLTs will be
entitled to charitable income tax deductions for the amounts actually paid
to charity each year. With respect to the generation-skipping transfer tax
rulings requested, the IRS held that (i) the pecuniary bequests to .fund the
CLTs did not constitute direct-skips for generation-skipping transfer tax
purposes because the charitable beneficiaries will be assigned to the same
generation

~s

the taxpayer; (ii) taxable tenninations for generation- .

skipping transfer tax purposes will occur upon the expiration of the
unitrust term of the charitable lead unitrusts because all of the remainder
beneficiaries of those trusts are skip persons; (iii) the taxpayer's
generation-skipping transfer tax exemption may be allocated separately to
each charitable lead unitrust because the pecuniary amounts to be paid to
each CLT will be separate and independent shares for generation-skipping
transfer tax purposes; and (iv) the denominator of the application fraction
for purposes of applying the generation-skipping transfer tax to each
charitable lead unitrust will be equal to the pecuniary amount passing to
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each such trust under the taxpayer's will minus· the amount allowed as a
charitable deduction.

Therefore, if generation-skipping transfer tax

exemption equal to such denominator is allocated to each such trust, the
trust will have generation-skipping transfer tax inclusion ratios of zero.
For a similar favorable ruling see Letter Ruling 1999-47022.
2.

Operating a CLT as the Family's Charitable Pocketbook.
A grantor can authorize the trustee of a CLT to sprinkle the lead interest
among qualifying charitable beneficiaries. However, if the power is held
by the grantor or the grantor's spouse the grantor may be treated as the
owner for income tax purposes. I.R.C. § 674(a). Moreover, if the grantor
retains the power the value of the CLT will be included in the grantor's
estate for estate tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038(a)(1). This
technique is illustrated in a recent private letter ruling. Ltr. Rul. 200240027.
Donors, a husband and wife, created three irrevocable charitable lead
unitrusts ("Trusts"). At the end of the charitable terms, the Trusts are to
continue for the benefit of each of their three children. They appointed
one of their children as the initial trustee of each Trust.
The Trust documents provide:
The trustee shall pay (in cash, in kind, or partly in each) to such
organization or organizations selected by the trustee that is/are described
in each of sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a), and 2522(a), to be used
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in furtherance of each organization's religious and charitable purposes, in
such proportions as are determined by the trustee, in each taxable year
during the trust term, an amount equal to six percent of the net fair market
value of the trust assets (valued as of the first day of each taxable year of
the trust) (the unitrust amount). The unitrust amount shall.be paid on an
annual basis on the ·31st day of December of each year during the trust
term, first from ordinary income (excluding unrelated business income),
then from short-term capital gain, then from long-term capital gain, then
from unrelated business income, then from tax-exempt income, and, to the
extent that the foregoing items for the taxable year are not sufficient, from
principal. Any income of the trust for a taxable year that exceeds the
unitrust amount shall be added to principal. Notwithstanding any existing
or hereafter enacted state law, no amount may be paid during the trust
term to or for the use of any person other than an organization described in
section 170(b)(1)(A), section 170(c), section 2055(a) and section 2522(a).
However, an amount shall not be deemed to be so paid if the amount is
paid for full consideration, such as reasonable trustee fees.

(emphasis

added)
The Trust documents also include prohibitions against the types of
activities and powers that traditionally would cause the Trusts to be treated
as grantor trusts.
The Trust documents provide that should the donors' child ever cease to
serve as trustee the child is authorized to designate successor trustees.
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Should there ever be a vacancy not filled under the child's authority, two
specific individuals were named to serve as successor trustees, one after
the other, with the same power to designate successors. In the event there
still is a vacancy the Trust documents provide: "the successor trustee is to
be such individual or entity designated in writing bya majority of the then
living adult beneficiaries of the trust who are eligible to receive any
current income therefrom and who are not incompetent, so long as such
individual or entity that is to become the successor trustee. is not a related
or subordinate party (as defined in section 672(c)) of either of the Grantors
or any adult beneficiary."
The IRS ruled that on the face of the documents sections 673, 674, 676,
and 677 would not apply. It was noted, however, that whether the donors
would be treated as grantors under section 675 is a question of fact, the
determination of which would be deferred until the income tax returns of
the parties involved had been examined.
Since qualified charitable organizations were given the irrevocable right to
receive annually an amount equal to a stated percent of the net fair market
value of the assets in the Trusts determined annually (the unitrust amount),
the IRS concluded that the unitrust amounts payable under the Trusts are
qualified unitrust .interests. Accordingly, the donors were allowed a gift
tax charitable deduction under section 2522(a) for the present value of the
unitrust amounts in the Trusts.
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The IRS noted: (i) the trusts were irrevocable; (ii) the donors had retained
no interest or reversion in the Trusts; (iii) the donors had no right to alter,
amend, or revoke the Trusts, or to receive an annuity or other payment
from the Trusts during their lives; and (v) the donors held no general
power of appointment over the property in the Trusts.

Accordingly,

assuming there was no understanding, express or implied between the
donors and the trustee regarding the disposition of the amounts -received
by the Trusts, we concluded that no portion of the assets of Trusts will be
included in either Grantor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
There was one negative ruling. Citing regulation section 1.642(c)-3(b)(2)
the IRS noted the ordering provision had no economic effect on the
distributions independent of tax consequences.

Instead, income

distributed to the charitable organizations will consist of the same
proportion of each class of the items of income of the Trusts as the total of
each class bears to the total of all classes.
3.

Funding the Family Foundation with a Charitable Lead Trust.
A family that has sufficient wealth to create a family foundation may well
consider using one or more charitable lead trusts to minimize transfer
taxes on large transfers to younger generations. By directing the ongoing
charitable

distributions

to

a

family

foundation,

the

tax-saving

characteristics of the lead trust are obtained, and the amounts distributed
are paid to the foundation, where family members are able to influence, if
not control, their ultimate application.
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a.

Minimum Distribution Requirement. Treasury regulation section
53.4942(a)-2(c)(2)(iii) takes the position that a private foundation
that is the beneficiary of a charitable lead trust must take into
account as part of the foundation's minimum distribution, the
lesser of (a) the income distributions from the lead trust or (b) five
percent of the trust assets.

However, this regulation was held

invalid in Ann Jackson Family Foundation v. Comm'r., 15 F.3d
917 (9th Cir. 1994), affg 97 T.C. 534 (1991) (reviewed), where a
private foundation disregarded taking into account the assets of the
trust or the annuity distributions received from the trust in
determining its minimum investment return.
b.

Estate Tax Treatment of Foundation in Creator's Estate.
CLTs that make payments to a foundation'in which the creator of
the trust has an influential role can be problematic. In Rev. Rul. 72
552, 1972 2 C.B. 525, the IRS held that the value of property
transferred to a foundation was included in the donor's estate under
section 2036 because the donor/decedent, in his capacity as a
member, director and president of the foundation, had the power to
direct the disposition of its funds for charitable purposes.
Similarly, in Ltr. Rul. 7929002 this same rule was applied to a
decedent who held multiple fiduciary positions in an organization
to which the income from a trust he had created was paid. In
Rifkind v. U.S., 5 CI. Ct. 362 (1984), a foundation was the sole
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beneficiary of a lead trust and its settlor in his role as an officer,
member and director of the foundation, was able to designate (or at
least participate in designating) the recipients of foundation grants.
The court found section 2036(a)(2) applicable, and included the
CLT in his taxable estate.
c.

This techniques is illustrated by a recent private letter ruling. Ltr.
Rul.2oo1-38018.
A donor created a charitable lead annuity trust and funded the trust
with publicly-traded stock. The trust is designed to pay an amount
equal to 8 percent of the fair market value of the initial value of the
trust property to the donor's private foundation each year for ten
years. At the end of the term the balance of the CLT will be paid
to or for the benefit of lineal descendants of the donor. The CLT
provides that neither the donor nor her husband can serve as a
trustee of the CLT. Further, any trustee may appoint an individual,
individuals, or a bank or trust company as co-trustee or successor
trustee. If· ever there is a vacancy and no successor is so appointed
then a majority in interest of the remainder persons (or their
guardians) are to appoint a successor trustee.
The Bylaws of the donor's foundation provide: (i) the number of
directors may not be less than 3 nor more than 15; (ii) the donor
will be a director for life; (iii) every other director will serve for a
term of one year and until his or her successor is duly elected and
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qualifies; (iv) any vacancy in the Board of Directors may be filled
by a majority vote of the remaining directors or by the sole
remaining director, however, the donor may not cast a vote for or
appoint an individual as a director that is either related or
subordinate to her within the meaning of section 672(c); (v) any·
time the foundation is a beneficiary of a charitable lead trust, a
charitable remainder trust or other similar trust, and the charitable
trust was established by a director, officer or substantial
contributor to foundation, the director, officer or substantial
contributor establishing the charitable trust is prohibited from
acting on matters concerning funds coming to foundation from the
charitable trust; (vi) a director, officer, or substantial contributor
who establishes a charitable trust for the benefit of foundation may
not be counted when establishing a quorum to vote on matters
relating to those funds.

The director, officer, or substantial

contributor will be prohibited from voting on any matters relating
to the funds received or anticipated to be received from the
charitable trust, including voting on any disbursements or grants of
such funds; and (vii) any funds received from a charitable trust are
to be segregated into a separate account in the Foundation's books
in such a manner as to allow tracing of the funds into and out of
that account. The separate account will be administered and
distributed by a separate fund committee and donor may not
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possess any power over this account or this separate fund
committee.
The IRS noted the donor had not retained a power over the
property transferred to CLT, and she had not retained an interest,
reversion, or right to alter, amend or revoke CLT.

Moreover,

although she will remain one of the directors of foundation, she is
not permitted to vote on matters relating to disbursements or grants
of funds received from CLT. Since the annuity payable· under the
CLT is a qualifying annuity for purposes of section 2522(c), the
donor's transfer to the CLT is a completed gift for federal gift tax
purposes and is entitled to a gift tax deduction under section 2522,
based on the present value of the guaranteed annuity payable to
charity.
Noting the donor could not serve as a trustee of the CLTor any
successor trust, and could not participate in any vote of the
foundation Board of Directors or officers concerning the annuity
funds received from the CLT, the IRS found the donor had retained
no interest or reversion in trust and no right to alter, amend, or
revoke CLT. Accordingly, no portion of the CLT will be included
in Taxpayer's gross estate.
VID.

Recent Developments And Emerging Opportunities, Issues And Pitfalls
A.

Funding Considerations
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The application of the private foundation rules can be problematic. Three.
recent rulings, summarized below, illustrate creative solutions to otherwise
troublesome situations.
1.

Funding A CLT With A Promissory Note Is Not Self-Dealing.
In Ltr. Rul. 2001-24029 the personal representative of an estate sought
rulings with respect to the eventual funding of a series of charitable lead
annuity trusts ("CLTs"). A significant portion of the decedent's estate was
comprised of interests in real estate and various real estate partnerships
and corporations ("Real Estate"). Under the terms of the decedent's Will
all of his assets passed to a QTIP marital trust with income payable to his
surviving wife. The personal representatives split the marital trust into
three trusts, each with identical terms. Upon the death of the wife, the
marital trusts will be split among trusts for the benefit of the decedent's
descendants and several CLTs. Each CLT will have a 21 year term and is
designed to bear the smallest annuity rate that will result in a full estate tax
charitable contribution deduction. The personal representatives proposed
to sell the Real Estate to a newly formed limited liability company
("LLC") which will be owned, partially or wholly, by or for the benefit of
any or all of the decedent's children and their issue ('Related Family
Members"), in exchange for a secured, interest-bearing promissory note
("Note"). The Note (i) will bear interest at the applicable federal rate in
effect for the month in which the sale occurs; (ii) will have a term of not
greater than thirty years; and (iii) will be secured by the real estate
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interests. The fair market value of the Note will be equal to the fair
market value of the property as established by a qualified appraisal. After
the transaction, the Note will be included among the assets used to fund
the marital trusts for the benefit of decedent's wife. Upon her death, the
Note will be included among the assets used to fund the CLTs. As a result,
the Related Family Members will be indebted to the CLTs under the terms
of the Note. The State Court must approve the proposed transaction and
the Attorney General of State will represent the interests of the charitable
beneficiaries in that proceeding.
The expected effect of the terms and conditions is that the charitable
beneficiaries will be in a position which is at least as favorable as their
current position and is likely to be more favorable. By entering into the
transaction, it was expected the CLTs will be protected from fluctuations
in the real estate market that may occur prior to the death of the decedent's
wife. The Note will serve to fix the value of the CLTs' assets at the
current value of the Real Estate, thus protecting the CLTs from a
downturn in the real estate market, and will fix the return of the CLTs
through a fixed rate of interest, thus protecting the CLTs from fluctuations
in the returns realized by the Real Estate itself. Also, as a result of the
proposed transaction, the cash flow of the CLTs will be improved and
stabilized so that the CLTs will be better able to

sati~fy

their annuity

obligations. Without the sale, the CLTs would receive the Real Estate
interests and would be required to engage in the real estate business. With
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the proposed transaction, the CLTs and thus the charitable beneficiaries
will be less concerned about fluctuations in the real estate market and in
interest rates since the CLTs' income will be fixed in accordance with· the
terms of the Note.
Possibly most important, without the proposed transaction, the CLTs only
would have access to the Real Estate in order to satisfy annuity payments
to the charitable beneficiaries. With the proposed transaction, the CLTs
will have access to (i) the Note, (ii) the real estate interests themselves,
and (iii) the capital of the family LLC.
Based on the information and representations submitted, the IRS ruled:
(1) The sale of the property by the estate to the Related Family Members
is not an act of self-dealing within the meaning of section 4941 of the
Code, and will not give rise to tax under that section to the Estate, to the
marital trusts, to the Related Family Members, or to the CLTs.
(2) The eventual receipt and holding of the Note by the CLTs, and the
subsequent payment of principal and interest on the Notes by disqualified
persons will not constitute acts of self-dealing under section 4941(d) of the
Code, and will not give rise to tax liability under, section 4941 to the
Estate, to the martial trusts, to the Related Family Members, or to the
CLTs.
(3) Notwithstanding that the interests that will be sold to the LLC, a
disqualified person, will be pledged as collateral for the Note to the CLTs,
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the continued operation of the real estate business by the managers of the
LLC or any other Related Family Members, including, but not limited to,
the leveraging and selling of secured assets, and the acquisition of new
assets, will not constitute acts of self-dealing under section 4941(d) of the
Code because the proposed transaction has met the requirements ()f section .
53.4941(d)-1(b)(3) of the regulations, so long as the value of the collateral
remains as required by the terms of the Note, and will not give rise to tax
liability under section 4941 of the Code to the Estate, to the marital trusts,
to the Related Family Members, or to the CLTs.
2.

CLT's Investment In A Limited Partnership Was Not Self-Dealing.
Letter ruling 2000-18062 involved the transfer of real estate and interests
in a limited partnership to a nine year testamentary charitable lead unitrust
("CLT") created upon the death of the grantor's surviving spouse. The
other limited partners of the limited partnership are a number of
individuals and trusts, an estate and another limited partnership. The
individ~als

are all related to the grantor of the CLT by blood or marriage.

All of the trusts are for the benefit of those individuals. The partnership
has a corporate general partner. Real estate transferred to the CLT will be
sold and the proceeds reinvested in additional interests in the partnership.
However, the CLT will always own less than 20 percent of the value of
the total partnership interests. The partnership's other investment assets
provide dividends, interest and realized and unrealized gains from its
investment activities. The partnership charges its limited partners a fee for

1-41

its investment services, including compensation to an unrelated
professional investment manager and reimbursements to the corporate
general partner. Another corporation provides accounting, tax and clerical
services on a cost-sharing basis to members of the family and various
family entities, including the CLT and the partnership. The CLT and the
partnership pay a fee for these services. The service corporation subleases
office space to the partnership. The partnership, both corporations and
many of the limited partners are disqualified persons with respect to the
CLT.
Here, the IRS ruled:
(I) The CLT's retentjonof an interest and investment in the partnership
are not direct or indirect acts of self-dealing, as defined in section
494I(d)(I).
(2)

Payments by the CLT to the service corporation for general

accounting, tax and clerical services and to the partnership (i) for
investment management and advisory services, (ii) for the reimbursement
of the corporate general partner for costs and expenses paid as the general
partner, and (iii) for the payment to the service corporation for general
accounting, tax and clerical services do not constitute direct or indirect
acts of self-dealing by the CLT, as defined in section 4941(d)(I), or
taxable expenditures, as defined in section 4945(d)(5).
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(3)

A sublease of office space by the partnership from the service

corporations does not constitute an indirect act of self-dealing by the CLT,
as defined in section 4941(d)(l).
(4) The CLT's limited partnership interest in the partnership does not
constitute excess business holdings, as defined in section 4943(c).
3.

A Delay In Funding A CLT Caused By Protracted Estate Litigation Is Not
Self-Dealing.
In letter ruling 2002-32033 the IRS was asked to rule on a complicated set
of facts relating to the delayed funding of twochari,table lead unitrusts
("CLTs"). After a set term the CLTs were to tenninate and the remainder
of one CLT was to be divided into trusts for the decedent's children, and
the remainder of the other CLT was to be paid outright to the decedent's
children. Due to protracted litigation, the CLTs had not been funded and
the decedent's estate lacked sufficient liquid assets to do so. Given the
delay in funding, the CLTs owe substantial amounts to the charitable
beneficiary. The estate sought to fund the CLTs with tenancy-in-common
interests in alternate estate property that was income producing.

The

transferred property also would include certain related party promissory
notes that would be transferred to the charity to make up the CLTs'
mearages.

The estate petitioned a local court for approval of the

proposed funding and related transactions.
Based on the information submitted and the representations made the IRS
ruled that all of the following elements of the proposed transaction met the
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estate administration exception described in section 53.4941(d)-1(b)(3) of
the regulations and therefore were not acts of self-dealing:
(1) The distributions of related notes to the charitable beneficiary in
satisfaction of the accrued obligations of the two CLTs;
(2) The transfer of liabilities to the charitable beneficiary together with
assets earmarked to pay such liabilities, via the residue of the decedent's
estate;
(3) The reallocation of assets subsequent to partial funding of the CLTs;
(4)

The assumption of liability by one of the CLTs under an

environmental indemnification;
(5) The receipt by the other CLT of property subject to a lien created
within 10 years prior to the transfer;
(6) The assumption of liability by the charitable beneficiary under a
limited liability company operating agreement;
(7) The assumption of debt and partial surrender by the children of the
decedent of their rights to distributions of assets in exchange for net relief
from liability to the estate; and
(8) The sale of stock by the decedent's estate to the children of the
decedent in exchange for the assumption of debt owed by the estate.
B.

Modification Of A Successful CLT Can Be Permissible
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Two recent situations illustrate where investment performance was so strong the
trustees were permitted to change the tenn of the trust.
1.

Early Termination.
Letter ruling 1999-52093 involved a twenty year inter vivos charitable
lead annuity trust ("CLT").

The sole charitable beneficiary was the

grantor's family private foundation. Originally the CLT was funded with
shares of stock in a closely-held, non-public bank holding company which
was controlled by the grantor's family. The CLT was designed to pay the
private foundation a qualified annuity equal to 5 percent of the fair market
value of the stock contributed to the CLT. At the end of the charitable
term the remainder is to be distributed to the grantor's four children who
also are all of the trustees of theCLT and all of the foundation managers
of private foundation.
The bank holding company merged into a public corporation whose
common stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The CLT
received a number of shares of stock in the new company with a value
substantially in excess of the value of the stock originally contributed to
the CLT. Also, the dividend the CLT will receive from the new company
is well in excess of the amount necessary to pay the annuity to the family
foundation.
Since the CLT now had assets that were readily convertible to cash, the
CLT's charitable interest could be satisfied much earlier than originally
anticipated by the grantor. Accordingly, the grantor, the trustees of the
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CLT, the foundation managers of the family foundation, and the four
remaindermen all wanted to pay the CLT, in one lump sum, the remaining
amount due to the CLT, without discount.
The parties filed a petition in state court seeking authorization to pre-pay
the CLT and then to terminate the trust by distribution of the remainder
interests. Their petition named the state Attorney General as a party to the
sui,t to protect the interests of the charity.
Under these facts the IRS ruled:
(1) The Trustees' prepayment of the entire remaining charitable interest
without discount to the family foundation as the sole charitable beneficiary
of CLT would not constitute the termination of a private foundation under
section 507 of the Code.
(2) The Trustees' prepayment of the entire remaining charitable interest
without discount to the family foundation as the sole charitable beneficiary
of the CLT would not be an act of self-dealing under section 4941 of the
Code since the family foundation was not a disqualified person.
(3) The Trustees' prepayment of th·e entire remaining charitable interest
without discount to the family foundation would not be a taxable
expenditure under section 4945 of the Code but the IRS cautioned that this
is not to say that the income payment to the charitable beneficiary of a
charitable lead trust will never constitute a taxable expenditure. Here,
however, the payment was to be made for the appropriate charitable
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purpose established by the trust document so there would be no taxable
expenditure and it was understood that neither the CLT, the grantor, the
trustees, nor any "disqualified person" within the meaning of section 4946
of the Code would receive any benefit from the prepayment to the family
foundation other than the rights of remaindermen provided in the trust
document.
The Service ruled favorably on similar facts in Letter Ruling 2002-25045.
2.

Term Extension Coupled with Early Distributed to Private Beneficiary.
Letter ruling 2002-26045 involved another story of success. The trustees
of a charitable lead annuity trust proposed to modify the CLT so the trust's
charitable beneficiary, a private foundation, and the remainder beneficiary,
a non-exempt limited partnership, would receive different distributions
than under the original agreement. The CLT had an initial term of 15
years of which 11 years remained. Due to appreciation in the value of the
CLT's assets, the current value of the assets greatly exceed the amount
needed to fund the remaining annuity obligation to the charitable
beneficiary.
The trustees executed an amended and restated agreement which provides
that the CLT was to distribute the CLT's assets in excess of 110 percent of
the remaining undiscounted annuity obligations to the limited partnership.
The remaining undiscounted annuity obligation would be paid in annual
annuity installments over a new fifteen year term, based on the annuity
factor determined in accordance with the applicable regulations and the
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section 7520 rate applicable to the date of the amendment, so the
remainder interest will be as close to zero as possible.
The purpose of the change was to move excess assets from the restrictions
the Code imposes on private foundations so that the assets can achieve
greater economic good by producing a greater return on investment while
at the same time providing more .funds to the charity than originally
provided.
The amendment required the CLT to obtain a ruling from the Internal
Revenue Service that the distribution to the remainderman of trust of the
excess assets would not violate any of the Code's restrictions on private
foundations in sections 1941 through 4945, inclusive. In addition, all
parties planned to petition the state court to approve the amendments to
the CLT and the parties planned to make the state Attorney General a
party to the proceedings to protect the interests of the charity.
Under this set of facts the IRS ruled that the CLT's distribution of excess
assets to the limited partnership and the payment of the remaining
undis~ounted

annuity obligation to the charity at a new annuity amount

based on the current section 7520 rate for a new 15 year period would:
(1) Not constitute a termination of a private foundation under section 507
because section 53.4947-1(e)1 of the regulations specifically provides that
the provisions of section 507(a) do not· apply to a trust described in section
'4947(a)(2) by reason of any payment that is directed by the terms of the
governing instrument of the trust and is not discretionary with the trustee.
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The trust agreement directed the terms of the payments to the charity and
was not discretionary with the trustees.
(2) Not be self-dealing under section 4941 because the CLT, treated as a
private foundation described in section 501(c)(3) of the Code, was not a
disqualified person with respect to, the charity. Thus, the CLT's payment
of the remaining undiscounted annuity obligation to the charity would not
be an act of self- dealing.

There 'would be no sale or exchange of

property, the charity was merely agreeing to receive more money.
(3) Not subject the CLT to tax on the undistributed income of a private
foundation under section 4942 because the CLT already was subject to a
payout requirement.

Although the CLT's payout requirement would

change, the change was required by the amended agreement that was to be
approved by court order and the state Attorney General.
(4) Not subject the CLT to. tax on excess business holdings under section
4943 because the payments to the limited partnership and the charity
would not result in the CLT acquiring interests in business.
(5) Not be an investment which jeopardizes charitable purposes under
section 4944 because the payment of the remaining annuities would be
made to accomplish charitable purposes. Moreover, the transaction would
be based on the amended trust agreement approved by a court order and in
a court action in which the state Attorney General is joined to protect the
interest of the charity. The charity would be protected from decline in the
value of the CLT's assets by the ·fact that the undiscounted amount of the
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remaining annuities to the charity plus 10 percent would remain in the
CLT. There was no investment, the CLT is merely paying its obligations.
(6) Not be a taxable expenditure under section 4945 since the CLT's
expenditure to the charity as required under the CLT's trust instrument was
in furtherance of a section 170(c)(2)(B) purpose in fulfillment of its
charitable lead annuity requirement in its governing instrument.
IX.

Conclusion
The Charitable Lead Trust remains an important and usefully technique to achieve the
dual goals of funding a family's philanthropic activities while passing family capital to
others at reduced transfer tax costs. Knowledgeable and creative planners are finding
new ways to successfully utilize Lead Trusts, even in the most challenging situations.
Further favorable development can be expected.
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SECTION J(a)

Gametes and Zygotes and Frozen Embryos- Oh my, oh my.
I.

Law and the Human Body
A.

Need to classify
1.
Tissue and cells
2.
Gamete - mature sperm or ova (egg)
3.
Zygote - Union of2 Gametes
4.
Pre-embryo - Unorganized Group of up to 8 Cells
5.
Embryo - (Blastocyst) beginning of organized cells

B.

General Rule - Most states hold that in general there is no property interest in
body parts., however, a law appears to be developing towards property rights.
1.
National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
a.
Prohibits buying and selling of organs for valuable consideration.
b.
Definition of organ

C.

D.

E.

2.

Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
a.
Permits anyone over 18 to make or refuse to make an anatomical
gift.
b.
Prohibits purchase or sale of a body part for valuable consideration
... if removal to occur after death

3.

UAGA adopted in some form by all 50 states

Tissue and Cells
1.
Moore v. The Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia
793 P. 2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
a.
Issue - Rights to removed tissue and cells
b.
Once tissue removed from donor there is no property right in donor
Gametes
1.
State Donor Statutes - Focus is on removing all rights and obligations
from donor
2.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41 to 14-1
3.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.30 to .38
4.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996)
Zygotes
Hecht v. Superior Court
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
a.
Leading case on property rights in gamates
b.
Ct held that donor had sufficient property interest in the zygotes to
constitute property.
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F.

G.

Pre-enab~os

1.

York v. Jones
717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.Va 1989)
a.
Donors sued to get possession of pre-enabryo frona Va. Institute
storing the pre-emb~os
b.
Ct. held contract with institute created a bailment implying a
property interest..

2.

Davis v Davis
842 SW 2d 588 (Supr. Ct. 1992)
a.
Upon divorce husband sues for custody of pre-emb~os
b.
Ct. held pre-enabryos neither person nor property but because of
the potential for fonning hmnan life they occupy interim catego~

Enab~o

1.

2.

- Fetus
Roe v Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)
a.
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician
b.
For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in pronaoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life, may, ifit chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation 0 f the life or
health of the mother
without regard to
c.
A state crinainal abortion statute
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests
involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment

Woodward v Connnissioner of Social Services
435 Mass. 536, 760 NE 2d 257
a.
Posthumous children in utero take as though living at the death of
parent
b.
Posthumously conceived child not entitled to inherit under Mass.
law in absence of decedent husband's consent to posthumously
conceive children.
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II.

Property or People
A.

Three views
1.
Pre-embryos at least should be treated as "en ventre sa mere"
2.
Middle position - neither property nor person but respected as a precursor
to human life.
3.
Treat as property

B.

Problems raised
1.
Life in Being
a.
Raises issues re bequests, future interests
(1)
statutes covering posthumously conceived child
(2)
what if deceased husband made his intent for implantation
clear
(3)
tort and criminal law problems
2.

Treat as property
a.
problems enforcing contracts in event of divorce or death
(1)
transfer to the husband or wife for subsequent implant
normally not enforced - right to procreate and right not to
procreate
In event of death the deceased must express intent.
(2)
(3)
As property zygotes, gametes and pre-embryos should be
freely transferred subject to unambiguous contract
language.
(4)
avoids perpetuities problems

3.

Middle Ground
a.
Probably the current state of the law
b.
Courts strive to find incidents of property without clearly labeling
as property
c.
Un~er the proper circumstances allows courts to treat as life in
being."
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State Laws and Legislation:
Use, Storage and Disposal of Frozen Embryos
Healtll Prograll1s

Updated May 2003
Selected Case Law
LegislatioIl

Colorado

co S~:B. 79 (2003) relates to parentage issues. The law clarifies the status of
eggs, spenn, or embryos in case of marriage dissolution. The law also clarifies
legal parentage of a child conceived after the death of a spouse.

Florida

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17 requires written agreement that provides for the
disposition of a couple's eggs, sperm, and pre-embryos in the event of a divorce,
the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.212 (2002) relates to preplanned adoption agreements,
which includes the use of "fertility techniques," which are defined as artificial
embryonation, artificial insemination, whether in vivo or in vitro, egg donation,
or embryo adoption.

Louisiana

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:391.1 declares that any child conceived after the death of
a decedent, who specifically authorized in writing his surviving spouse to use his
gametes,' shall be deemed the legitimate child of such decedent, provided the
child was born to the surviving spouse, using the gametes of the decedent, within
two years of the death of the decedent. Any heir of the decedent whose interest in
the succession of the decedent will be reduced by the birth of a child conceived
shall have one year from the birth of such child within which to bring an action to
disavow paternity.

North
Dakota

N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-03; 14-18-07 clarifies legal parentage of a child
conceived after invalidity or annulment of marriage' or death of spouse.

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 556 (2000) authorizes human embryo donations and
transfers. The law requires certain techniques to be used by physicians. It requires
written consents and confidentiality. (HB 1338)
Tex. Family Code Ann. § 160.001, et seq. creates the Unifonn Parentage Act
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and describes various aspects of determination of maternity and paternity as well
as parentage. The law requires a man and woman to sign consent to assisted
conception. If the father does not sign, however, it does not necessarily mean that
he is not the legal father.

"'-...:.

Virginia

Va. Code § 20-158(3)(B) clarifies legal parentage ofa child conceived after death
of or divorce from a spouse.

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code § 26.26 (2002) creates the Uniform Parentage Act and clarifies
legal interpretation of parentage of a child of assisted reproduction, including in
the event of divorce or death.

Wyoming

Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-401, et seq. (2003) creates the Wyoming Uniform Parentage
Act. The law defines "assisted reproduction" and includes intrauterine
insemination; donation of eggs; donation of embryos; in-vitro fertilization and
transfer of embryos; and intracytoplasmic sperm injection in the definition.
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Massachusetts

Wood\vard v. Conlnlissioner of Social Secllrity (January 2002) asserts that in
certain limited circumstances, a child resulting from posthumous reproduction
may enjoy the inheritance rights of "issue" under the Massachusetts intestacy
statute.

New Jersey

J.B. v. M.B. (June 2000) permitted the destruction of frozen embryos based on
the interests of the former wife, who did not wish to be a parent. The husband
wanted the embryos preserved for religious reasons.

New York

Mallreen K.ass v. Ste'ven Kass (May 1998) upheld the agreement made at the

time that the couple began in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures that the
pre-zygotes would be donated to the NF program for approved research
purposes. At issue was the disposition of five frozen, stored pre-embryos, or
"pre-zygotes," created five years ago, during the parties' marriage, to assist them
in having a child. Now divorced, Maureen Kass wanted the pre- zygotes
implanted, claiming this is her only chance for genetic motherhood; Steven
Kass objected to the burdens of unwanted fatherhood.
Tennessee

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) was the first case on the
disposition of frozen embryos in the United States.

J(a) - 6

California

~

l ".,.~,.w

CA S.B. 771 (2003) requires the Department of Health Services to establish and I
maintain a registry of embryos that would provide researchers with access to ;
embryos for research purposes. The bill specifies requirements for obtaining J
informed consent from an individual considering donating embryos for research. i
The bill also requires certain health care providers to provide a fonn that sets forth I
advance directives regarding the disposition of embryos. [In Committee on I
Appropriations.}
.

~

. " . ,.,.v.•.,..

New

York

N°.Y. A.B. 1908 (2003) relates to advanced written consent and directives for the'

I
,

transfer, use, and disposition of embryos or gametes. The bill also includes I
provisions related to advance directives. [Referred to Judiciary Committee.} i

; New York

N.Y. .l~.B. 4276 (2003) defines medically-assisted reproduction to include·
artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer and gamete transfer. I
The bill provides for the donors to be treated as if they were not the natural fathers ,
or mothers of the child conceived. [Referred to Judiciary Committee.}

i

...

Source: National "Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).
Other Related Web Pages:
NCSL Genetics Project: Genetics La\vs alld Legislative Activity
NCSL Maternal alld Cllild Healtll Project

N"CSL Reproductive Health .Project
This site is made possible by project, MCU 1 H03 Me 00017, from the Maternal and Child Health
Bureau (Title V, Social Security Act), Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services.
For more infonnation, please contact Leah Oliver at leall.o1iver@)ncsl.org or Alissa Johnson at
alissa.jolulson@llcsl.org.

~[@8~

Health Resources and Services Administration

M:Jtemal and Child Health Bureau

•
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:.I.....

National Conference of State Legislatures
INFO@NCSL.ORG (autoresponse directory)

Denver Office:
7700 East First Place
Denver, CO 80230
Tel: 303-364-7700
Fax: 303-364-7800
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Washington Office:
444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 515
Washington, D.C. 20001
Tel: 202-624-5400
Fax: 202-737-1069
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Here is a sample parenting contract which you can use as a model for your
own contract. Please be aware that such a contract has significant legal
implications and that you may want to consult an attorney.
Disclaimer: Gay Family Options provides this sample contract for
informational purposes only--please do not consider it as legal advice of
any kind.

Type of Document

View as Text
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Sample Known Donor Contract
This AGREEMENT is made this
200_
by

day of
and

,
between
DONOR,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, hereafter
and
,
hereafter
RECIPIENT, who may also be referred to herein as the parties.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises of each other,
DONOR and RECIPIENT agree as follows:
1. Each clause of the AGREEMENT is separate and divisible from the
others, and, should a court refuse to enforce one or more clauses of this
AGREEMENT, the others are still valid and in full force.
2. DONOR has agreed to provide his semen to RECIPIENT for the purpose
of artificial insemination.
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3. In exchange, DONOR has received from RECIPIENT

_

4. Each party is a single person who has never married.
5. Each party acknowledges and agrees that, through the procedure of
artificial insemination, the RECIPIENT is attempting to become pregnant. It
is our intent that such inseminations shall continue until conception occurs.
6. Each party acknowledges and agrees that DONOR provided his semen
for the purposes of said artificial insemination, and did so with the clear
understanding that he would not demand, request, or compel any
guardianship, custody or visitation rights with any child born from the
artificial insemination procedure. Further, DONOR acknowledges that he
fully understands that he would have no paternal rights whatsoever with
said child.
7. Each party acknowledges and agrees that RECIPIENT has relinquished
any and
rights that she might otherwise have to hold DONOR legally,
financially, or emotionally responsible for any child that results from the
artificial insemination procedure.

all

8. Each party acknowledges and agrees that the sole authority to name any
child resulting from the artificial insemination procedure shall rest with
RECIPIENT.
9. Each party acknowledges and agrees that there shall be no father
named on the birth certificate of any child born from the artificial
insemination procedure.
10. Each party relinquishes and releases any and all rights he or she may
have to bring a suit to establish paternity.
11. Each party covenants and agrees that, in light of the expectations of
each party, as stated above, RECIPIENT shall have absolute authority and
power to appoint a guardian for her child, and that the mother an.d guardian
may act with sole discretion as to all legal financial, medical and emotional
needs of said child without any involvement with or demands of authority
from DONOR.
12. Each party covenants and agrees that the identity of the DONOR shall
be made known to the child at a time and in a manner to be determined
solely by the RECIPIENT. Each party reserves the right not to disclose his
identity to any others, and RECIPIENT agrees not to disclose DONOR's
identity to ~ny specific persons upon his written request including full
names.
13. Each party acknowledges and agrees that the relinquishment of all
rights, as stated above, is final and irrevocable. DONOR further
understands that his waivers shall prohibit any action on his part for
custody, guardianship, or visitation in any future situations, including the
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event of RECIPIENT's disability or death.
14. Each party acknowledges and understands that any future contact the
DONOR may have with any child(ren) that result(s) from the artificial
insemination procedure in no way alters the effect of this agreement. Any
such contact will be at the discretion of the RECIPIENT and/or appointed
guardian, and will be consistent with the intent of both parties to sever any
and all parental rights and responsibilities of the DONOR.
15. Each party covenants and agrees that any dispute pertaining to this
AGREEMENT which arises between them shall be submitted to binding
arbitration according to the following procedures:
a. The request for arbitration may be made by either party and shall be
in writing and delivered to the other party;
b. Pending the outcome of arbitration, there shall be no change made in
the language of this AGREEMENT;
c. The arbitration panel that will resolve any disputes regarding this
AGREEMENT shall consist of three persons; one person chosen by
DONOR, one person chosen by RECIPIENT; and on person chosen
by the other two panel members;
d. Within fourteen calendar days following the written arbitration request,
the arbitrators shall be chosen;
e. Within fourteen days following the selection of all members of the
arbitration panel, the panel will hear the dispute between parties;
f. Within seven days subsequent to the hearing, the arbitration panel will
make a decision and communicate it in writing to each party.
16. Each party acknowledges and understands· that there are legal
questions raised by the issues involved in this AGREEMENT which have
not been settled by stature or prior court decisions. Notwithstanding the
knowledge that certain of the clauses stated herein may not be enforced in
a court of law, the parties choose to enter into this AGREEMENT and clarify
their intent that existed at the time the artificial insemination procedure was
implemented by them.
17. Each party acknowledges and agrees that she or he signed this
AGREEMENT voluntarily and freely, of his or her own choice, without any
duress of any kind whatsoever. It is further acknowledged that each party
has been advised to secure the advice and consent of an attorney of his or
her own choosing, and that each party understands the meaning and
significance of each provision of this AGREEMENT.
18. Each party acknowledges and agrees that any changes made in the
terms and conditions of the AGREEMENT shall be made in writing and
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signed by both parties.
19. This AGREEMENT contains the entire understanding of the parties.
There are no promises, understandings, agreements or representations
between the parties other than those expressly stated in this AGREEMENT.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto have executed this
AGREEMENT, in the City of
, and the state of
_ _ _ _ _ _ _, on the day and year first above written.

Donor

Print Name

Recipient

Print Name

Notary

Print Name

Back to the top

Sample Known Donor Questionnaire
(Special thanks to Kim and Laine for sending this to Gay Family Options!)

Donor Profile:
Name:
City, State:
Age:
Race:
Maternal Ethnic Ancestry:
Paternal Ethnic Ancestry:
Height:
Weight:
Natural Hair Color:
Hair color as a child:
Natural Hair Texture:
Eye Color:
Physical Build:
Complexion:
Tanning Ability:
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Predominant Hand:
Teeth:
Vision:
Hearing:
Distinguishing Characteristics:
Religion:
Birth Date:
Blood Type:
Sexual Orientation:
Smoker:
Drug Use:
Alcohol Use:
HIV status:
Have you ever been tested positive for an STD?
Additional:

Education I Intelligence
Education:
High School Grade Point Average:
What was your best subject in high school:
College Major:
College Grade Point Average:
Highest Grade In:
SAT Score:
Learning Disabilities:
If yes, please explain:
Have you ever taken an IQ test:
Date of test and score:
Profession:
Additional:

Personal Profile
Have you ever been arrested and/or convicted of a crime/felony?
Have you ever been under the care of a psychiatrist? If yes, please explain.
Have you ever received treatment for drug or alcohol abuse?
Do you drink alcohol? If yes, how often?
Do you take prescription and/or non-prescription drugs? If yes, please
explain.
Have you recently or are you willing to take health related tests? (STD's,
drugs, HIV, etc... )
If yes, can you provide a recent test result?
Please list any significant illnesses you have had:
Have you ever had surgery? If yes, please explain.
Were you adopted?
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Please describe your character (personality):
Please list any clubs, organizations, hobbies, interests, sports teams,
activities, etc. you are or have been involved in:
Please describe any special skills, talents, and abilities you have:
Please describe your future goals (personal and career):
Please explain your reason for wanting to be a sperm donor:
What qualities do you consider to be most important in choosing to work
with prospective parents?
Are you willing to meet any future children from the artificial insemination
procedure once he/she turns 18?
Have you ever been a sperm donor before?
Additional information:

Reproductive Health History
How many times have you produced a pregnancy?
Please list the approximate dates of pregnancies:
Please list the age, sex, and general health condition of each of the
children:
Were all your children born healthy? If no, please explain.
Were any of them born prematurely?
Do you have legal or physical custody of any or all of the above children?
If no, please explain:
Did any of your pregnancies take longer than six months to conceive?
Did you need any medical assistance to conceive your children?

Family History: (age and health status)
Donor:
Mother:
Father:
Siblings:
Maternal Grandmother:
Maternal Grandfather:
Paternal Grandmother:
Paternal Grandfather:

Extended Family Characteristics:
Mother
Year of birth:
Race:
Ethnic ancestry:
Height:
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Weight:
Eye Color:
Natural Hair Color:
Hair type (ex: thin, wavy, straight, thick, etc.):
Vision:
Hearing:
Wear corrective lenses? If so, at what age did she start wearing them?
Complexion:
Tanning Ability:
Freckles:
Physical Build:
Sex and age of children:
Occupation:
Education:
Special skills, talents, abilities, hobbies:
General Health:
Type of personality:

Father
Year of birth:
Race:
Ethnic ancestry:
Height:
Weight:
Eye Color:
Natural Hair Color:
Hair type (ex: thin, wavy, straight, thick, etc.):
Vision:
Hearing:
Wear corrective lenses? If so, at what age did she start wearing them?
Complexion:
Tanning Ability:
Freckles:
Physical Build:
Sex and age of children:
Occupation:
Education:
Special skills, talents, abilities, hobbies:
General Health:
Type of personality:

Sibling
Sex:
Year of birth:
Race:
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Ethnic ancestry:
Height:
Weight:
Eye Color:
Natural Hair Color:
Hair type (ex: thin, wavy, straight, thick, etc.):
Vision:
Hearing:
Wear corrective lenses? If so, at what age did she start wearing them?
Complexion:
Tanning Ability:
Freckles:
Physical Build:
Sex and age of children:
Occupation:
Education:
Special skills, talents, abilities, hobbies:
General Health:
Type of personality:

Sibling

Sex:
Year of birth:
Race:
Ethnic ancestry:
Height:
Weight:
Eye Color:
Natural Hair Color:
Hair type (ex: thin, wavy, straight, thick, etc.):
Vision:
Hearing:
Wear corrective lenses? If so, at what age did she start wearing them?
Complexion:
Tanning Ability:
Freckles:
Physical Build:
Sex and age of children:
Occupation:
Education:
Special skills, talents, abilities, hobbies:
General Health:
Type of personality:

Sibling
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Sex:
Year of birth:
Race:
Ethnic an,cestry:
Height:
Weight:
Eye Color:
Natural Hair Color:
Hair type (ex: thin, wavy, straight, thick, etc.):
Vision:
Hearing:
Wear corrective lenses? If so, at what age did she start wearing them?
Complexion:
Tanning Ability:
Freckles:
Physical Build:
Sex and age of children:
Occupation:
Education:
Special skills, talents, abilities, hobbies:
General Health:
Type of personality:
.6.~.cJs. ..tQ__ . lb.e.._ 1QP_

J(a) - 17

J(a) - 18
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CONTRACT AND CONSENT FORM FOR EMBRYONIC MATERIALS

WHEREAS,
(hereinafter identified as RECIPIENT) desires to conceive a child by
receiving a sperm sample supplied by
(hereinafter identified as DONOR), through this
Agreement, based on the consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, is made in order to fully protect the rights, benefits, duties, promises, and obligations
of both parties. Parties to this contract are DONOR whose consideration furnished is agreed to and defined
as yielding embryonic materials through natural, conventional transfers, involving no physical contact with
RECIPIENT. DONOR agrees to furnish aforesaid consideration in exchange for the following
representations and considerations from RECIPIENT, which is established for DONOR'S and RECIPIENT'S
protection and benefit:
1. WHEREAS, the purpose of this contract is to transfer a sperm sample from the DONOR, to the
RECIPIENT for the fertilization of the egg or eggs with the sperm of DONOR. RECIPIENT shall place the
sperm of DONOR artificially with the hope and desire of the RECIPIENT becoming pregnant. This contract
is agreed to by both parties to fix rights and duties of both parties in conformity with contract law.
(i) That RECIPIENT who covenants for the sperm as genetic material for the potential child may be
considered the "mother," as the parties to this Agreement desire, and the parties here specifically
agree, that the RECIPIENT shall be considered the mother of the potential child for any and all
purposes under the law;
(ii) RECIPIENT agrees that DONOR is held harmless and shall not have to make any payments in
conformity with the obligations of fatherhood. RECIPIENT and child relinquish all claims, present or
future on any property, of any description, of DONOR. In exchange, DONOR relinquishes all rights
and claims of rights of fatherhood in the child whom is constituted of his genetic material, and
submits all decision making rights to mother previously referred to as RECIPIENT. And finally,
DONOR promises that no attempt will be made to communicate with the child.
(iii) DONOR, as provider of the specimen for the potential child, is relieved of ownership or privacy
rights, or expectations whatsoever in his sperm, once discharged from his body and provided to
RECIPIENT. The parties to this agreement specifically agree, that RECIPIENT has bargained for
this consideration, by furnishing the aforesaid relinquishment of claims, and promises to furnish the
following benefits upon the following given conditions:
1.

paid to DONOR upon execution of this agreement.

2.

Reimbursement of all associated expenses incurred by DONOR.

3.

for each additional specimen (Transkits must be sent back within three
days of receiving them).

2. RECIPIENT agrees to undertake the following duties and expenses:
(i)RECIPIENT agrees to bear medical costs of pregnancy and fertilization; whether primary,
secondary or of any stage or complication.
1.

All costs pertaining to Education, Medical, Dental and any other necessities of life, are to
be adequately and fully provided by RECIPIENT, whether expenses are for an "ordinary
child" or handicapped, diseased, or injured child.

(ii)Both parties promise and explicitly represent to one another the following:
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1.

DONOR and RECIPIENT are not infected by sexually transmitted diseases (STD).

2.

Both parties have taken reasonable measures to have diagnosed any such STDs and after
such measures have been completed, both parties promise they are not infected by any
STDs.

3. Purpose of Parties to Contract:
(i) RECIPIENT agrees that the main objective of this contract is to allow RECIPIENT to carry and
deliver a child that she could not otherwise conceive. This allows her the experience of pregnancy,
childbirth, and motherhood through the sperm of DONOR. With no other obligations on the part of
the donor.
(ii) DONOR understands that he waives any right and relinquishes any claim to the donated sperm
and any pregnancy or offspring that might result. DONOR agrees that RECIPIENT may regard the
donated sperm and any offspring resulting there from as her own child(ren). DONOR waives any
rights to decision-making regarding the use of the donated sperm once given to the RECIPIENT,
including the decision-making with respect to pregnancy termination, selective reduction and/or
disposition of any of the donated eggs, fertilized embryos, or potential human children.
4. The cost of all operative procedures and all procedures involved in preoperative ovarian ~stimulation and
monitoring will be covered only by the RECIPIENT.
5. No payment of any expenses, is expected by RECIPIENT to be borne by DONOR.
6. DONOR and RECIPIENT have had the opportunity to have this document reviewed by an attorney of
their own choosing, and if they have opted not to have the agreement reviewed by an independent attorney
prior to their signing it, DONOR and RECIPIENT realize this is a knowing and conscious waiver of any
rights that DONOR and RECIPIENT might have to independent counsel in reviewing this document.
7. The contract is to be witnessed. Said witness(es) represents neither DONOR nor RECIPIENT.
8. The undersigned have read this agreement and understand it fully. DONOR and RECIPIENT understand
that some of the language in this contract and consent form may be technical. They have been given an
opportunity to ask any questions they may have. All questions and inquiries have been answered to their
satisfaction, and both parties represent that they are of the capacity to contract and understand the
respectively binding promises
9. The parties to this agreement acknowledge they are engaging in practices and endeavors which have
not been fully tested, nor explored by either the Legislature. Accordingly, the parties to this agreement
acknowledge that there are risks both as to the procedures and in the determination of the legal rights and
responsibilities of the respective parties to this agreement. The parties to this agreement realize that there
may not have been a legal test of an agreement such as they are now executing, and the parties to this
agreement acknowledge that the Courts have most probably not issued definitive rulings or guidelines
concerning arrangements such as the present one embodied by this agreement. As a result, the parties to
this agreement concur that they are willing to undergo both the medical and legal risks associated with this
procedure, and intend to be bound by their promises.
10. The parties to this agreement concur that all presumptions, obligations, waivers, renunciations,
responsibilities, and actions to be undertaken are in the best interests of the child or children .to be born
pursuant to this agreement. In pursuance to the best interests of the child DONOR agrees to provide any
necessary biological material or information for the health and well being of the child. It is agreed to by both
parties that any such expense for this purpose of furnishing the necessary materials for the health of the
child will be incurred by RECIPIENT.
11.

(i) This shall constitute the sole and entire agreement between the parties, is binding on the parties,
their heirs, administrators, and personal representatives, and no representations or promises not
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contained herein shall be in any way binding. Revisions or amendments to this agreement shall only be
effective if they are in writing, signed by all parties to this agreement.
(ii) In the event that any of the provisions of this agreement are deemed to be invalid or
unenforceable, the same shall be deemed severable from the remainder of this agreement and not
cause the invalidity or unenforceability of the remainder of the agreement. If such provisions are
deemed invalid due to their scope and breadth, the provisions shall be deemed valid to the extent
of the scope or breadth permitted by law.
(iii) This agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be an original, but
all of which shall constitute one and the same agreement.
12. RECIPIENT agrees, during the course of pregnancy contemplated by this Agreement, not to smoke
tobacco products, drink alcoholic beverages, use illegal drugs or, without the prior written consent of the
obstetrician, to use any nonprescription or prescribed medications, other than Tylenol, except in an
emergency. Such promise was asked for by DONOR as a fundamental condition of performance, and
RECIPIENT agrees to such conditions and promises, to follow such conditions or otherwise be in breach of
contract.
, 200_, and the following signatures hereby
This agreement has been executed the _ _ day of
affixed, represent the consent and agreement to the terms of this contract.

1'
domicile
executed upon the __day of

, referred to as RECIPIENT, of the current
have read and agree to the terms of this contract,
, 200_.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
RECIPIENT

I,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, re~rred to as DONOR, of the current domicile
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~havereadandagreetothetermsofthiscont~ct,executed

upon the _ _day of_~_, 200_.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:
DONOR
WITNESS TO SUCH SIGNATURES:
I,
, of the current domicile
as witness of
this agreement agree and acknowledge I have witnessed the freely entered into signing of this contract and
agreement by the RECIPIENT and DONOR on this _ _ day of __' 200_..

Provided by Fertility Portal:
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SPECIMEN STORAGE AGREEMENT

PAGE

I
Account #

THIS SPECIMEN STORAGE AGREEMENT (Agreement) is made and entered into by and between CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK,
(Client).
INC., a California corporation (Cryobank), and
Client either (i) intends to deposit autologous semen specimens or (ii) received a gift of semen specimens for deposit or (iii)
purchased frozen donor specimens from Cryobank for deposit (Specimens). Client desires to deposit the Specimens with
Cryobank for analysis, processing and freezing (Freezing) and/or storage for later implantation into a recipient woman (Recipient)
for the purpose of achieving pregnancy pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth herein.

I. SPECIMEN STORAGE
Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement and thereafter, Client shall deposit the Specimens with Cryobank for Freezing
and/or storage by Cryobanl<. For accounts other than those storing frozen donor semen purchased from Cryobank, California
Health and Safety Code Section 1644.5 requires screening tests of all semen providers for sexually transmitted diseases prior to
use of their semen for assisted reproductive technologies. Cryobank shall not store Specimens from untested semen providers
or semen providers testing reactive as described in Exhibit H - Policy on Infectious Disease Screening Tests, herein. In the event
that Client does not provide current laboratory reports of the infectious disease screening tests, as specified by Cryobank,
Cryobank shall then obtain such screening at Client's sale cost and expense, payable in advance (See Exhibit H). Cryobank
reserves the absolute right to terminate this Agreement upon three (3) days prior wr-itten notice to Client in the event that
Cryobank determines, in its sole and absolute discretion, that the Specimens are inappr-opriate for storage based on the laboratory evaluation, including the risk of transmitting disease. Upon termination of this Agreement pursuant to this Section I,
Cryobank shall refund all storage fees paid by Client (as hereinafter defined) less any laboratory processing and/or testing fees
for services performed by Cryobank or any independent laboratory.
Client understands and agrees that Cryobank cannot assume responsibility for the safety or quality of Specimens that were not
originally processed by Cryobank or have been removed from Cryobank's quality control and later returned to Cryobank. Client
agrees that in said event, the sole responsibility of Cryobank is limited to the storage of the Specimens, upon receipt (including
return receipt), in proper frozen condition.

Client further acknowledges that a list of other semen storage facilities is available upon request of client.
2. TERM
This Agreement shall commence on the date hereof and shall continue for a period of
( ) years (Storage Period),
subject to earlier termination as hereinafter provided. This Agreement may be renewed by Client for successive annual Storage
Periods, from one to five years upon thirty (30) days written notice by Client to Cryobank before expiration of any term stating
Client's intention to renew.

3. SERVICE AND STORAGE FEES
Client shall pay in advance fees for laboratory services as described in section I herein. Client shall also pay in advance the fee
for the storage term chosen in section 2 herein pursuant to the now current fee schedule. See Service and Fee Schedule as of
Agreement Date, for the now current fees.
Client shall pay in advance the storage fees for each renewal period in the amount pursuant to the then current fee schedule.

4.. RELEASE OF SPECIMENS
For accounts storing Specimens purchased from Cryobank, Specimens may be released to Client as provided in Exhibit C - Donor
Screening Notification, and Client shaH pay a retrieval fee in the amount pursuant to the then current fee schedule. See Service
and Fee Schedule as of Agreement Date, for the now current fees.

CCB-3000. 1010 I, revised 7/02
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For accounts other than those storing Specimens purchased from Cryobank, Cryobank shall release the Specimens to Client or
to others upon receipt by Cryobank of an Authorization to Release Specimens (Authorization) in the form attached hereto as
Exhibit A - Authorization to Release Specimens, and Client shall pay a retrieval fee in the amount of the then current fee schedule.
See Service and Fee Schedule as of Agreement Date, for the now current fees.

5. TERMINATION
Notwithstanding any other provisions herein, this Agreement shall terminate upon the happening of anyone of the following
events (Terminating Events):
(a) Expiration of the storage term;
(b) Written instruction of Client to Cryobank directing destruction of all Client Specimens and termination of the
storage agreement;

«) Written instruction of Client to Cryobank to transfer Client Specimens to another storage facility and acceptance of
those Client Specimens by that storage facility;
d) Failure of Client to pay any storage fee within ten (I 0) days after the date of a written delinquency notice from
Cryobank to Client;
(e) Client delivers thirty (30) days prior written notice to Cryobank terminating this Agreement; or

(t) Cryobank delivers thirty (30) days prior written notice to Client terminating this Agreement.
Upon the occurrence of any Terminating Event, all obligations of Cryobank for storage of Client's Specimens shall cease, and Client
shall make arrangements for release, use or other disposition of any remaining stored Specimens within ten (10) days. If Client
fails to make arrangements for, release, use or other disposition of Specimens, Cryobank may, at its sole discretion, destroy all
Client Specimens remaining in storage with Cryobank.
There shall be no refund of storage fees upon termination of this Agreement pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this
Section 5. A pro-rata refund of storage fees shall be paid by Cryobank to Client if this Agreement is terminated pursuant to
paragraph (f) of this Section 5.

6. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
6.1 Acknowledgement of Risks and Release of Liability
Client has been advised and understands that there are inherent risks in the process of Freezing and thawing semen, including but
not limited to damage to the sperm, reduced capacity for fertilization and reduced life span of the sperm after thawing. Client agrees
that Client shall not be entitled to any form of damages, compensation, recovery or reimbursement and releases Cryobank from all
liability in connection with any loss damage or destruction of the Specimen due to the risks described in this paragraph 6.1
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6.2

Liquidated Damages.

The parties acknowledge and agree that in the event of loss, damage or destruction of the Specimens for any
reason whatsoever, except as provided in paragraph 6.1 above and except in cases where Client is storing frozen
donor semen purchased from Cryobank, Client's actual damages as a result thereof would be impracticable or
extremely difficult to determine. Accordingly, the parties hereto agree that in the event Specimens or any part
thereof, are lost, damaged or destroyed for any other reason, including, without limitation, as a result of
Cryobank's negligence, Client shall be entitled to liquidated damages in the amount equal to the storage fee paid
by Client for the Storage Period in which such loss, damage or destruction occurred and, in cases where Client is
storing frozen donor specimens purchased from Cryobank, Client shall also be reimbursed in the amount of fees
paid to Cryobank for such semen purchased.

Cryobank and Client agree to be bound by the terms of this liquidated damages provision by placing their initials below.

(Client InitiaJs)

6.3

(Cryobank)

Waiver of Claim.

Except as expressly provided above with respect to the liquidated damages, Client expressly releases Cryobank, its agents, employees,
officers, directors, shareholders, and affiliates to the fullest extent permitted by law from any claims, loss, damage, expenses,
liabilities, demands. offsets, causes of action and attorneys' fees which Client may have arising out of or in any way relating to this
Agreement, including but not limited to the collection, Freezing, storage, release, loss, damage or. destruction of the Specimens,
and hereby expressly waives and forever gives up provisions of California Civil Code Section 1542 which section provides as
follows:
"A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of
executing the release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor:'

6.4

Indemnification.

Client shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Cryobank, its agents, employees, officers, directors, shareholders and affiliates
from and against any claim, loss, damage, expenses, liabilities, demands, offsets, causes of action and attorneys' fees sustained by
Cryobank as a result of any third party action, proceeding, or dispute of any nature or kind involving the ownership, storage, use
and/or disposition of the Specimens.
Cryobank shall promptly notify Client in writing of any such third party action and Client agrees to immediately assume full
control and responsibility for such matter including the payment of all expenses and liabilities, including attorneys' fees. in
connection therewith. Client shall not settle any such action without the written consent of Cryobank, which consent shall not
be unreasonably withheld.
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7. DEATH OF CLIENT

Clients storing Specimens purchased from Cryobank
In the event of the death of Client, Client instructs Cryobank to dispose of the Specimens by INITIALING ONE
of the following choices:
[

] Release Speci~ens to the ~llowing na~ed beneficiary:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Initials
only

[

] Destroy

Speci~ens.

Initials
only

If Cryobank is unable, after using reasonable efforts, to dispose of the Specimens as provided in this paragraph 7, Cryobank shall
have the absolute right in its sale discretion to destroy the Specimens.

8. GENERAL PROVISIONS

8.1 Entire Aereement: Binding Effect: lurisdiction: Enforceability:Amendment.
This Agreement represents the entire Agreement between the parties concerning the subject matter hereof and there are no
understandings, agree~ents or representations other than as herein set forth. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties
and their respective heirs, spouses, executors, administrators, agents, representatives, successors and assigns, shareholders, directors,
officers and employees. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California. If any
provisions of the Agreement is determined to be unenforceable, the remaining provisions hereof shall nevertheless be fully
enforceable in accordance with their terms. This Agreement may not be amended except by an instrument in writing signed by
all parties hereto.

8.2 Arbitration.
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of this Agreement or the performance, breach or termination thereof shall be
settled by binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The
place of arbitration shall be Los Angeles, California. The arbitration shall be conducted by a neutral arbitrator appointed by the
American Arbitration Association. Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. The
prevailing party shall be entitled to be awarded all costs of arbitration including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees. All information
resulting from or otherwise pertaining to any dispute sha.1I be nonpublic and handled by Cryobank, Client and their respective
agents in such a way as to prevent the public disclosure of such information. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Cryobank and Client
shall have the right to seek and obtain cou,-t ordered specific performance, injunctive and other equitable remedies in connection
with any actual or threatened b,-each of this Agreement by Cryobank or Client.
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8.3 Waiver.
Any waiver by a party of any breach of any provision of this Agreement will not be deemed to be a waiver of any subsequent
breach of that provision, or of any breach of any other provision of this Agreement.

8.4 Notices.
Any notices required or permitted to be provided to a party hereunder shall be in wl'°iting and shall be effective as of the date
personally delivered or sent by electronic facsimile or three (3) days after deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, certified or registered, addressed to the party at the address set forth beneath such party's signature hereto or at such other address
as a party may request in writing be used for that purpose. Client acknowledges that it is Client's obligation to provide a correct
mailing address for Client at all times during the term hereof.

8.5 Exhibits
Each of the completed exhibits are included and made a part of this Agreement.
Client acknowledges that Client has had the opportunity to discuss the provisions of this agreement with Client's attorney,
whether or not Client has done so, prior to the execution of the agreement.
The undersigned have executed this Agreement on

, 20_ _,

*Client

CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK, INC.,
A California Corporation

(Signature)

By:

_
(Signature)

(Print Name)

(Print Name and Title)

(Address)

(Address)
(Telephone Number)

(Social Security Number)
(Telephone Number)

*Proof of identification may be required.
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Client understands that the donor specimens client is purchasing are in compliance with current standards of the American
Association of Tissue Banks' and California Health and Safety Code 1644.5. Client also understands that the accreditation and
regulatory agencies periodically add new requirements to donor screening.
Client understands and agrees that changes in donor screening requirements occurring after specimens are purchased by client
may cause the specimens to be classified as "restricted distribution." Such restriction may require the Client and the Client's
inseminating physician to provide a signed consent form, prior to shipment, acknowledging the specimens no longer comply with
the latest screening requirements. In some cases, it is possible that such restriction may not allow Cryobank to release

the specimens for assisted reproductive technologies.
Client understands and agrees that new medical or genetic information discovered about the donor after the purchase of the
specimens can cause the specimens to be classified as "restricted distribution." Such restriction may also require a signed consent
from the Client and the Client's inseminating physician prior to shipment. In some cases, such restriction may not allow

Cryobanl< to release the specimens for assisted reproductive technologies.
Client understands that the Cryobank attempts to contact donors whenever screening requirements change. Client further
understands that it is not always possible to contact and rescreen donors who are retired from the program.
Client understands and agrees to assume full responsibility for all new specimen screening requirements after Client's purchase
of the donor specimens and to indemnify and hold Cryobank harmless from all liability in connection with the new specimen
screening requirements or restrictions due to new medical or genetic information on the donor. Client understands and agrees
that Cryobank shall not repurchase donor specimens from Client

Client Signature

Date Signed

Print Name
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_

CLIENT ACCOUNT NUMBER:

_

CLIENT NAME:

_

ADDRESS:

APT#

CITY:

STATE:
BUSINESS

H~ME PHON~

_
ZIP CODE:

_
_

PHONE:~_~

BIRTH DATE:

_

MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME:

_

DRIVER'S LICENSE NUMBER:

_

CREDITCARDNUMBER(OPTIONAW:·~_~

~_~

_

~EXP~~

REASON FOR STORAGE (IF STORING):

_

INSEMINATING/REFERRING PHYSICIAN:

_

PHYSICIAN'SADDRESS:

_

CITY:

STATE:

PHONE:

ZIP CODE:

FAX NUMBER:

_

OTHER PHYSICIAN(S)

_

PHONE:
MARITAL STATUS:

_

FAX NUMBER:

o Single

o Married

o Divorced

SPOUSE NAME:

_

o Separated

0 Widowed

PHONE:

_

ADDRESS:
RECIPIENT NAME:

_
~

PHONE:

ADDRESS:

_
_

DONOR NAME:

PHONE:

_

ADDRESS:

_

All payments are due at the time of service. Accepted methods of payment are the following: Cash, Check,Visa, MasterCard,American Express, and Discover.
I, the undersigned, have read the above statement and accept full financial responsibility for all changes incurred by me, or my dependents, for services
rendered by the California Cryobank, Inc. and its affiliates.

CLIENT SIGNATURE:

_

SP~USE/RECIPIENT SIGN~URE:_~_~~_~_ _~~~~~~_~~~~~~~~_~~
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Cryobank offers this program to provide clients the ability to purchase donor specimens and have them stored for use at a future
date" Please allow additional processing time for this service.
The Semen Purchase and Storage Program combines two services:
• The purchase of frozen donor semen
• Storage of the semen for a period of time specified by you.

Requirements for Participation
I) Must have a client account number.
2) Completion of this form and the Specimen Storage Agreement, including all applicable exhibits.
3) Prepayment for the semen specimens you are purchasing plus the storage charge for the period you select.

Your purchase and store account will be opened and your vials will be placed in your storage within one day of
receiving this completed document.
Cryobank is not able to buy back frozen donor semen, whether or not the specimens have left our facili~ Please read Exhibit C - Donor
Screening Notification of Agreement carefully before placing your order:
Please indicate your preferences by completing the following section:
Enter donor choice to the right (Please note: your choice may not be available)
I would like my Specimens stored for
I wish to purchase and store

_

year(s)
Specimens

) Intrauterine Insemination Prepared (lUI)
) Intracervical Insemination Prepared (lei)

Financial
Charge Card #

Exp. Date _ _,_ _

o American

Express

0 Discover 0 MasterCard

0 Visa

Name as it appears on the credit card:.
Signature of cardholder:

_
~--------------------------------

Payment must be made at the time of your order. We will accept cash, and the above charge cards at the time the order is placed or picked up.
Checks must be received at least one week before order is placed. Ifurther understand that credit cards are not transferable according to the rules
of the issuing financial institutions. All payments by credit card must be authorized by the credit card holder at the time of placing an order.

Signature

Date

_

FOR CCB USE ONLY
Date Received
Order Number
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The Cryobank Purchase and Store II Program is available to any Client who is currently pregnant or has given birth in the last 90
days using frozen donor semen specimens purchased from Cryobank. Client shall present the following certification from her
physician confirming pregnancy or recent birth.
Cryobank will waive specimen storage fees for two (2) years for the purpose of ensuring availability of the same donor for
additional children. To take advantage of the Purchase and Store II option, Client must purchase a minimum of six (6) vials at
the time this account is opened.
CERTIFICATION

I am referring
I am

veri~~gthe

to Cryobank's Purchase and Store II Program.
donor used

~rthe

pregnancy was Cryobank donor

number~_~_ _~_~_ _~_~

~

The pregnancy was confirmed on - - - - - , / _ - - - - - - - The child is due on

1

_

OR

The child was born on

Physician's Signature

Date Signed

Physician Information:

Print Name

License Number

Address

Telephone Number
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